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JULY, 1918 ——— OCTOBER, 1918

To be continued Quarterly

Edited by HAROLD COX

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Contents of Vol. 228

No. 465 — JULY, 1918

		PAGE
Germanism, War and Peace	Dr. A. SHADWELL	1
The Navigation Acts	C. ERNEST FAYLE	22
Problems of British Banking	Sir C. S. ADDIS	43
Afghanistan and the German Threat	IKBAL ALI SHAH	59
The Political Situation in Canada	CLAUD A. C. JENNINGS	73
National Expenditure	J. A. R. MARRIOTT, M.P.	92
Books and Travel	W. P. JAMES	107
Irish Realities		125
India in Travail	Sir VALENTINE CHIROL	147
Centralization and Revolution	T. DUNDAS PILLANS	167
The Poetry of Francis Ledwidge	JOHN DRINKWATER	180
The Government of England	EDITOR	190

No. 466 — OCTOBER, 1918

A Programme for Peace—Revised	H. WICKHAM STEED	209
Napoleon I. and Caporetto	HORATIO F. BROWN	230
Spanish Trade with the Indies	DAVID HANNAY	247
The Four Great Wars	G. M. TREVELYAN	265
The Agony of the Victorian Age	EDMUND GOSSE, C.B.	276
The Philosophy of Pessimism	A. WYATT TILBY	296
Religion and Patriotism	Miss M. D. PETRE	313
The Need for Law Reform	Sir ALFRED HOPKINSON, K.C.	331
Wind Power	JAMES CARLILL	343
Caste and Democracy	Dr. T. M. NAIR	355
Labour and a General Election	VICTOR FISHER	371
Commerce and Empire	EDITOR	387

The Edinburgh Review

JULY, 1918 No. 465

GERMANISM, WAR AND PEACE

1. **Marxismus, Krieg und Internationale.** Von KARL RENNER. Stuttgart: J. H. Dietz Nachf. 1917.
2. **Central Europe.** By FRIEDRICH NAUMANN. P. S. King & Son. 1916.
3. **Deductions from the World War.** By LIEUT.-GENERAL VON FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN. Constable. 1917.

DURING the last four years the Germans have revealed to an astonished and incredulous world a national mentality of which few outside Germany suspected the existence and none grasped the full significance. Some do not grasp it yet in spite of all that has come and gone. They still persist in regarding the German nation through the old spectacles as one among others, distinct in certain features but a member of the same family, alike in all essential respects, and one with which the rest can live on terms of equal and cordial friendship in all trust and confidence. At least they affect to regard it in that light, but their sincerity is doubtful. It is difficult to believe that experienced diplomatists can really ignore the systematic abuse of ambassadorial privileges, the calculated breaches of hospitality and good faith, that have been laid bare in one country after another, and can in the future receive a representative of the same State without an involuntary but irresistible impulse to regard him either as a card-sharper himself or as a figure-head put forward to

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cover the operations of card-sharpers. It is equally difficult to believe that Socialists can have the smallest confidence in a Power responsible for the Brest and Ukrainian treaties and their sequel. Neither can they be so impervious to accumulated evidence as they pretend; but by the persistent cultivation of illusions they succeed in resisting a good deal or in evading the logical conclusions. Many others from mental indolence have but a confused idea of the phenomenon of Germanism, and are actuated more by a simple impulse than by reason in opposing it. It is most fully realized by those who have been most deceived about it, as the Americans; by those who have suffered most from it, as the inhabitants of occupied territories, the merchant seamen and prisoners of war; and by those who have most studied it in the self-revelations of German writers.

The three books at the head of this article belong to that category. Two of them are already well known, being translated into English, and they have been the subjects of much discussion. They will be the more briefly dealt with here; but they are bracketed with the first, which is not known and is in many respects the most instructive of the three, because together they cover a very wide field of thought and influence. General von Freytag is a soldier and aristocrat, high in the military councils of Germany; Friedrich Naumann is a Radical politician and 'probably the most widely read 'political writer in Germany,' as Sir W. J. Ashley tells us in his introduction to the English version; Dr. Karl Renner is a Social Democrat and an accomplished writer with an ample equipment of economic, legal and historical knowledge. His book is the most thorough examination of the problems raised by the war from the Socialist point of view that has yet been produced, and its interest is therefore obvious. He is an Austrian and was one of the delegates who went to Stockholm last summer; but the Austrian and German Social Democrats form a homogeneous body, and Dr. Renner identifies himself throughout, not only with his German colleagues, but with German interests in general. His book is indeed more concerned with German than with Austro-Hungarian affairs. In short, he is a mouthpiece of German Socialism. The trio are therefore very widely representative of German thought, and they are all serious writers occupied

with serious and definite questions. They write, moreover, with mature reflection and in a measured strain after prolonged experience of the war, not in the hurry and heat of the early days, like the numerous pamphleteers, whose naïve revelation of the insane self-admiration cultivated in Germany was discussed in this REVIEW three years ago.* The tone is calmer, notably in the work of General von Freytag, who is the most restrained of the three, though he indulges in some boastful reflections on the moral and technical superiority of the Germans. The comparative sobriety of these later and more mature contributions to German war literature enhances the value conferred by their representative character and imparts additional weight to the lessons they teach about the German attitude of mind to war and peace.

Those lessons may be grouped under the following headings: (1) responsibility for war; (2) conduct of war; (3) aims of war; (4) views on peace and the future. It is desirable for us to understand the German mind on these questions; and every source of serious information should be utilized to that end. The writers under discussion have, of course, other ends in view and do not set out their subjects enumerated in that order or in that way; but they furnish enlightenment on all of them in expounding their own special themes. Each of these writers has his own point of view and deals mainly with his own subjects, the nature of which is indicated by the titles of the books. The soldier is concerned with military affairs, the political publicist with politics, and in a lesser degree with economics; the Socialist with economics and juridical questions, on which he contributes a remarkably fresh and interesting discussion. But they all overlap into each other's domains: the soldier lays stress on economic factors, the politician hazards a good deal of speculation about future military conditions, and the Socialist takes both political and military considerations into account. All deal in some measure with the questions enumerated above, and, differently as they approach them, come in the end to conclusions which are practically the same or only divergent in so far as they relate to subsidiary points, or are conditioned by ultimate principles and aims.

* 'German War Literature.' EDINBURGH REVIEW, July, 1915.

With regard to responsibility for the war, by far the most instructive comment is that of Dr. Renner, not only because he is a Socialist and an ardent supporter of the International in its general opposition to war, but also because he enters into long economic and juristic arguments virtually in justification of the Central Empires, and puts forward a formal apologia for the action of the German Social Democrats in supporting war. The two other authorities are content to repeat the stereotyped formula that the Central Powers were forced into a war of self-defence. General von Freytag claims for them that the 'lofty moral strength, arising from the 'sense of righteous self-defence in a war which had been 'thrust upon them, showed its superiority to the zeal which 'a commercial and predatory war could kindle in our enemies.' Dr. Naumann contends that the Central Powers 'had no 'defined military aims because they were only prepared for 'defence. . . . The war began purely as a war of defence'; and elsewhere he speaks of this war, 'which had been thrust 'upon us.' All this, and more to the same effect, is common form too familiar to call for any comment. They say nothing about the 'encircling policy' initiated by King Edward, and carried out by the Machiavellian Sir Edward Grey, which figures so largely in earlier dissertations; it seems to have dropped into the background. But Dr. Naumann attributes to England a secret and sinister purpose based on profound calculations, in which, it appears, we were much better versed than the Germans. After referring to their failure to think out the economic situation that would be created by war, he continues:

'But England had a much more adequate notion of the kind of weapon that lay ready to her hand. She examined our annual imports and secretly rejoiced at the thought of the day when she would force us to our knees by threatening to cut us off from commerce or by actually doing so. It must be acknowledged that our economic dependence was better known in the Foreign Office in London than in the corresponding offices in Berlin and Vienna. Without this knowledge, England would not have used for her own settlement of accounts with Germany the war on two frontiers, which we had to fight out with France and Russia.'

It is an unexpected compliment to be told that we could read German statistics better than the Germans themselves; but the facts contradict Dr. Naumann's argument. If he

were right our Government would have immediately seized the opportunity over which it had secretly rejoiced in advance, to use the carefully calculated weapon that lay ready to its hand. As a matter of historical fact our Government displayed great reluctance to use it, and was only driven to do so after long hesitation and delay by outside pressure and the action of Germany, who first declared a submarine blockade of our coasts and then began sinking unarmed merchantmen without warning. Even then it was not until the second year of war that cotton, though a war material, was declared contraband, and not until six months later that the importance of an effective blockade began to be realized. It has since been carried out only by degrees. The theory of a cunning calculation and of war seized as an opportunity to realize it is incompatible with the facts. That a sober and well-informed writer should adopt and advance it shows the peculiar working of the German mind.

Turning from these banalities to Dr. Renner we find a different line of thought. He says, indeed, that 'England 'seized on the legal charge of the violation of Belgian neutrality 'as an excuse for her imperialistic war,' and it would be interesting to know what he thinks of the Lichnowsky memorandum. But that statement is rather an *obiter dictum*, though a significant one. Otherwise he avoids direct discussion of responsibility except in respect of the German Socialists, whom he exonerates in an elaborate argument which will be explained in its proper place. His whole book, it should be understood, is addressed primarily to Socialists; and his analysis of the problems involved in the war, including its causation and consequences, is based on the Marxian doctrine known as the economic interpretation of history, and on the theory that the evolution of capitalism is the governing influence in the present epoch and the key to all social and national relations. The war, therefore, has arisen out of the modern development of capitalism. There is nothing fresh in that proposition by itself. Many other Socialists have consistently maintained it. Indeed, it follows automatically from their axioms. Capitalism is to them a magic word; it explains everything. All evils are due to it, and since this war is a great evil there is no need to look any further for its cause. But that delightfully simple

explanation explains nothing. It resembles the equally childlike proposition that the war is ' all due to diplomacy.' One might as well say that it is due to the post or the telegraph wires. Diplomacy is the official intercourse between States, and is in the abstract wholly indifferent ; it is merely the use of language. Its effects depend entirely on the character of the language used, which is determined by the mind of the user. It is equally at the service of friendship and of hostility or of neither. If war is all due to diplomacy, then so must peace be. The responsibility for either cannot be laid on the instrument, it rests with the user ; and the question remains which State had a mind to war and directed its diplomacy to that end. Similarly with capitalism. It is an abstraction, signifying a condition common to all Western nations, according to Socialists ; common to both groups of belligerents and to neutrals. A common condition cannot explain different relations—friendship here, hostility there, neutrality in a third quarter ; and since it exists equally in peace and in war it cannot be responsible for either. And since war was much more frequent in pre-capitalistic times and among non-capitalist peoples than it is now, the general proposition that it is due to capitalism is untenable.

Dr. Renner is far too acute and logical a thinker to be satisfied with such a childish formula. As a Marxian he sees in economic conditions the mainspring of action, but finds himself constrained to examine them afresh in the light of the war. He starts with the collapse of the International* and the confusion among Socialists caused by an event which has—temporarily at least—upset all their calculations and reversed their theories by uniting classes within nations, and setting nation against nation. They must study the facts, he says, and not be content to go on repeating old formulas which no longer apply. He leads the way by tracing the modern development of national economy. His main line of argument is that the course of economic evolution with its social consequences laid down by Marx as ' scientific ' and inevitable, was correct only up to a certain point, and that in recent years it has taken quite another turn leading to different

* For an account of this organization, see the EDINBURGH REVIEW, October, 1917.

conditions unforeseen by Marx. He works this out in respect of agriculture, industry, trade, and finance, with a mass of detail which cannot be adequately summarized in a limited space; only the barest outline can be given here. He shows that all these economic activities have changed their relations to each other and to the State, and that class antagonisms have changed with them. The concentration of capital described by Marx has been replaced by the ' centralization ' of capital, chiefly through the banks of all kinds, from Raffeisen and savings banks up to the National Bank. By centralization he means that the banks gather up the drops of surplus value which exude from innumerable sources but are in themselves too small to enlarge the business yielding them or to found new ones. The banks, so supplied, finance all kinds of undertakings, agricultural, commercial, and industrial. The result is that capital, instead of being concentrated in ever fewer hands while the rest become more and more pauperized or propertyless—which was to lead to the collapse of the whole system according to Marx—has been more and more distributed, and instead of ' one capital one ' capitalist ' the order now is ' one capital many capitalists.' The individual capitalist has nothing to do with the undertakings to which his money contributes, he has only a legal title to his share. At the same time other institutions have been growing up affecting all classes; there are industrial Kartells, consumers' co-operative societies, trade unions and other associations, limited liability companies. These represent organization by private enterprise and self-help. They are not under State influence, but grow up within a framework of legislation and administration peculiar to the State. So the State, which has already interfered by various measures intended for the protection of the weak—compulsory insurance, employment offices, factory legislation—plays an increasing part in the development of national economy, which becomes State-permeated (*durchstaatlicht*). The highest phase is in the financial sphere. Private capital, become national capital through the development of the banks, enters into close relation with the State and each makes use of the other. National finance is protected by tariff-walls and the State takes part in developing industrial and commercial enterprises. National economy assumes an imperial character.

What bearing has all this on the question before us? Dr. Renner's analysis may be very interesting to Marxian Socialists, but what has it to do with responsibility for the war? The answer is this. The result of the changes described is the fusion of State power and national economy. The development of the latter takes place within the State area, which is identical with the 'economy area' (*Wirtschaftsgebiet*). It is a closed economic unit shut off from others by a tariff wall and distinguished by its own body of legislation. Within it all parts and classes are bound together into one whole. The legal control of economy by State law effects economic unification within the concrete form of the concrete State. Crossing a frontier we pass into a different economic region; the standards of wages and prices and the modes of conducting business are different. The frontier is the skin; the body (*Wirtschaftskörper*) is the aggregate of economic activities within the skin. The unity is real. The means of transport and communication are disposed round a centre, which is an internal market separated from others. All the elements are bound together by a common law, a common State finance, and also by the national capital which is no longer an amorphous international thing like the atmosphere, but strictly organized within the economy area. Each economy area is different from others in size, population, natural and occupational composition, social structure, and stage of historical development. Protective tariffs make size a most important element; the larger it is the greater the gathering ground for capital, and there is a constant tendency to expansion. But, he asks, why not have free trading activity everywhere? The Germans especially—both capitalists and workmen—have spread themselves everywhere and carried on business in every land. Why not go on enjoying the hospitality of mankind? The object of State boundaries and tariffs is to set up a monopoly and eliminate competition; but external competition becomes the keener the more it is restricted by Kartells at home. 'Spheres of influence' are sought: State agents—diplomats and consuls—are employed to make spheres, lands and people accessible to 'peaceful economic penetration.' But concession hunters of different States compete and the power of the Home State is decisive. So it must become a World State. Power over foreign States is the first political

requirement—power not only at home but outside in all spheres of the world. Otherwise finance capital sees no outlet. And the World-Power must secure these economic spheres by various means—fleet demonstrations, forms of occupation, better still, a protectorate; best of all, complete subjection. Yes, that is the solution. The Home State must be not only a World State but one like the British, that guarantees an economy area extending over the whole earth. This tendency is political Imperialism, and the ultimate cause of the world-war.

Such, in brief, are the main points in Dr. Renner's analysis. From beginning to end it puts the responsibility on Germany as plainly as possible without saying so in so many words. The economic development he describes is pre-eminently that of Germany and in a secondary degree that of Austria. It does not fit any of the *entente* nations and does not apply at all to Great Britain, which is not a closed unit, as he admits, and is already a World-Power. All the phenomena he describes in detail—here omitted—with the dates marking successive stages, are true of Germany and of Germany only. The whole argument might be headed, 'Why Germany went 'to War.' The cause is not capitalism in general but German capitalism in particular, coupled with political imperialism. The Germans wanted to extend their economy area at the expense of their neighbours and could only do it by war. There were, he admits, other causes, weighty and interesting, but secondary, not determining. His exposition corresponds closely with Dr. Naumann's argument for Mittel-Europa, but it is much fuller, more precise, and wider in scope. He writes, however, not as an advocate but as a dispassionate observer seeking to elucidate the facts, and he expresses no moral judgment. The thing is there and he explains it as a scientific Marxian. Writing of the bourgeois idea of Nationalism, a little later on, he says that an empire is only 'autarch' or completely independent when it produces all the raw materials it needs. Hence 'Germany's future is on 'the water.' 'Alongside of and in place of the British Empire 'we boldly set the German. We cannot do otherwise unless 'we would suffocate some day in capital and popular wealth.' That, he adds, is the ruling national idea of our time. It fully explains what the Germans mean when they say that the

war was forced on them. It was forced, not by the enemy countries, but by the discrepancy between their position and their aspirations. There never was a war yet which might not be said to be forced on the people who began it by a similar process of reasoning. But the logic which drives a people to war for extending their sources of wealth in order to avoid suffocation by the wealth they already possess, is not exactly convincing. The motive of pure aggrandizement and dominion corresponding to their wealth fits the case better.

What is Dr. Renner's own attitude to the policy he thus interprets? As a Socialist he cannot expressly approve of the bourgeois national idea, but he certainly does not condemn it. His treatment of the question is of great interest because it throws light on the position of the German Socialists who support the war, and form the great majority of the party; if there were a Stockholm conference they would run it or try to run it, and they count on doing so. One learns from him the line of argument to be expected of them. He steers round awkward points with the dexterity of a practised advocate and smothers plain issues under a cloud of forensic arguments; but it is clear that he has far more sympathy with the 'ruling 'national idea' than with the old Socialist ideals represented by the minority, which he dismisses as Utopian. The German 'proletariate,' he says, has passionately taken up the idea of national unity and independence, and watches with sympathy the struggles of the small awakening nations in the Balkans and further East; but nation and State do not coincide in the Central Empires, where the wars of 1866 and 1870 left the Germans split up and other nations included in the State. This was accepted because it was

'more clearly recognized that States must be before everything united areas with firm military frontiers and organized economic life . . . Small and poor States guarantee neither the required capitalist nor any sort of Socialist development. If the map were arranged by strictly national lines you would have impossible frontiers, but before all you would have many small, poor States incapable of development. With all sympathy for the suffering small peoples one recognized that the principle of small nationalities carried out would be reactionary not revolutionary.'

The true ideal is self-government within a larger unit

without regard to historical or other boundaries—a limited measure of self-determination, but that guaranteed through the higher community—leading up to a league of States. This realizes internationalism, but ' for the present, frankly ' under the deliberate sole rule (*beabsichtighten Alleinherrschaft*) ' of one nation over many dependent peoples.' In other words, the way to the true international, which is at present ' a mere idea,' is to bring all the smaller States of Europe under the sole rule of the Central Powers (otherwise Germany) —a very pretty argument which may be commended to the Independent Labour Party and Sinn Fein. It justifies imperial aggrandizement as a step towards the Socialist ideal.

Dr. Renner's sympathy with the German war policy is further made clear when he comes to deal with the juridical theory of war. He bases his argument on the struggle for existence and the theories of German jurists that Law itself (*Jus, Recht*) is conflict. The struggle for existence pervades modern life, which is all conflict between individuals and classes. Conflict is the special signature and peculiar philosophy of our time. Hence the readiness of the masses for war, each individual feeling himself a fighter and striver in peace. In this sense the war is nothing but the struggle for existence of peoples and States. Other conflicts recede temporarily in the struggle of peoples ; but there is no essential difference in kind. People's war is transformed class-war. But private and class-war take place on the field of a settled legal order which restricts their aims and means. The antagonisms remain, and the conflict continues, but it is civilized by the substitution of legal for personal action. Between States there is also a legal order—that of international law ; but it is of a very precarious nature. The States are sovereign against each other, like individuals without a government ; there is no ordered tribunal between them and no legal decision. There is, therefore, no legal obligation to observe a treaty. He here refers to Spinoza's argument that no sovereign power ought to keep a promise injurious to itself because that would be breaking the promise made to its own people to maintain their interests, which takes precedence of other promises ; and draws the corollary that observance of a treaty, when it was injurious, would be not only no legal duty but a moral crime. So it would be a crime for a State not to make war,

if it were the stronger. He further quotes an argument from Professor Lasson, enunciated at the significant date of 1871:

> 'A State is not there to be the innocent victim of foreign ill-will. One must at least allow it to defend its own skin, get space enough for existence, and secure the atmosphere in which alone it can breathe, though a thousand treaties were against it. The aspiring State which represents the principle of historical progress has the superior historical right; and all treaties must yield to the demand of historical development' ('Prinzip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts.)'

We all know the name of the aspiring State which represents the principle of historical progress, and to which every knee must therefore bow. The same reasoning does not apply to any other, and it means in effect that Germany has a right to do anything she pleases. The citation from Lasson, who is one of the most violent of all the German professors (and they are more extreme than the soldiers), is highly significant in the mouth of a Socialist. Dr. Renner does not applaud Lasson's argument but he does not criticize it, and he incorporates it in his own analysis. He goes on to say that since there is no judge to decide which State represents the principle of historical development nothing is left but the right of the stronger and the survival of the fittest. He calls this a conflict for creating law, which he distinguishes from conflict for enforcing law. As for the latter, war must certainly be held justified, when its object is to enforce standing rights. These may be guaranteed by treaties between particular States or by conventions between several States. Violation of the latter is not breach of a treaty but breach of public order. Such is violation of the neutrality of a State guaranteed by international agreement; it is a revolt against the whole community of States. But by analogy with civil and criminal law there must be civil or criminal execution if treaty or convention rights have a juristic character; and since there is no court and no judicial execution for States they are driven to force. More than all economic influences, he says, the lack of an ordered legal process causes war, for between States force is the only means of pursuing rights. Then the question arises whether arbitrary force (*Eigenmacht*) is not itself unlawful. He answers in the negative with the assistance of German jurists and the German civil and criminal

code. The latter recognizes *Notwehr* or that self-defence which is required to repel a direct unlawful attack on oneself or another. Conduct produced by *Notwehr* is not unlawful, and he admits that Belgium can apply this definition to her own case. A State unlawfully attacked is justified in making war; but, of course, he goes on, we must not forget that it is almost impossible to determine on which side the attack lies. There is no competent and objective judge; so every people is compelled and entitled to judge for itself. But it appears that German law allows a good deal more than simple self-defence. Acts exceeding the necessity are not punishable when committed through bewilderment or terror. And there is also 'justifiable self-help,' which is the right to attack an unattacking person and use violence in various ways when official help cannot be secured in time, and there is a risk that the fulfilment of a claim may be frustrated or substantially hindered. This is war conduct when exhibited by a State. Even if self-help is used in error the law only requires compensation to be given. Further, there are wars which, though not exactly in pursuit of rights, must be recognized from the standpoint of the modern sense of right. Over and above *Notwehr* the civil law recognizes *Notstand*, or a state of need. It allows conduct intended to save life and limb of the person or dependents from immediate danger in a state of need not otherwise to be avoided. According to the German jurist, Ihering, law ceases in *Notstand* both in private and in national life. Anyone in *Notstand* 'acts by blind natural 'force in the a-moral animal sphere of necessity.' *Not kennt kein gebot.* 'Is there such a thing as *Notstand* war? If so 'the question whether it is justified or not has no meaning. 'There is only the question of fact whether real need is 'present. *Real need occurs when the conditions of external 'growth and internal development of the life of a people are per- 'manently prejudiced, when these laws of life press beyond the 'inherited frontiers and constitutional boundaries and burst 'them.'*

Here we have the German claim to override all law without disguise and the dictum *Not kennt kein gebot* adopted by a German Socialist. To leave no doubt on the subject he again refers to Lasson's dictum quoted above, and adds: 'Such real 'need occurs where dependent economy areas in consequence

'of the impossibility of escaping from their economic depen-
'dence can only secure their freedom by political conflict.'
No German writer has advanced a more uncompromising claim. Germany needs raw materials, coaling stations, harbours, markets, and investment areas which she has hitherto enjoyed only by favour of the countries possessing them. This constitutes economic dependence and *Notstand*, and justifies war to obtain them for her own by force. Dr. Renner adds that the *Notstand* of one implies the *Notwehr* of the other. 'It is no longer a question of right but of victory and growth
'or defeat and decay. As certain as that peoples rise and fall
'like classes, families, and persons, is it that there are *Notstand*
'wars.'

The whole thing is now perfectly clear. Germany is in *Notstand*, the enemy countries in *Notwehr*; that is to say, Germany needs things in their possession and is justified in taking them by force, which they are justified in resisting. The war is one of aggression and aggrandizement on her part and of defence on theirs; the issue can be decided only by force. And her action is defended by this German Socialist on the ecomonic and juristic grounds set out above. He has come a long road round but he arrives at precisely the same point as the German military and political imperialists. There can be no illusions about the German Socialists of the majority after this. Dr. Renner drives the lesson home by devoting a section of his book to the justification of the German 'proletariate,' by which he means the Socialists. No other proletariate, he says, has been so deeply convulsed as the German; none has examined the problem of the war so openly and profoundly. It is true that none has devoted so much special pleading to it, but one would have thought that the Belgian and French had been more deeply convulsed, and they have examined the problem too, though their case is a good deal simpler. However, the Germans must be first in everything, and Dr. Renner declares that what causes the German social democracy the greatest distress at present—of which there is no sign—will redound historically to its greatest honour. 'Herein, too, it has been the schoolmistress
'of all other proletariates.' Of course that is the part assigned to Germany in everything by God, history, science, the shade of Marx, or whatever authority you choose to call in. It has

not deserved the attacks and suspicions of brother parties, and they will collapse as soon as the Socialists of other lands learn the events as they really happened. That means, apparently, as soon as they grasp the meaning of *Notstand*. The German Social Democrats, he says, have no reason to shun responsibility, and, he immediately proceeds to disclaim all responsibility on their part. They did not act on psychological grounds, he says; they neither inquired into the guilt for the war nor declared the intention of exonerating a guilty party, for they had neither time nor power to exercise a judicial function; they have neither sanctioned war in general nor this war in particular, nor any war causes whatever. Yet they did exercise a judicial function and placed the guilt first on Russia and then on Great Britain. If they did so without inquiry that does not improve their case. And they did sanction this war and its causes. They did more. They sanctioned the invasion and the treatment of Belgium and laid the responsibility on the Belgians. That is clear from the interview, related by M. Vandervelde, of Noske and Koster with Belgian Socialists, at the Maison du Peuple in Brussels, where they turned up in uniform with true German delicacy at the beginning of the war. Dr. Koster informed the Belgian comrades that it was all their fault; they had only to let the Germans pass and they would have gained numerous advantages. 'Besides, everyone has known for years that 'in case of war with France our troops must pass through 'Belgium.' The Belgians retorted that in that case the Germans had played an odious comedy when they interpellated the Government in the Reichstag about its intentions with regard to Belgium, and when they voted resolutions at the International Congress on the necessity of small States defending their independence and their territorial integrity. The amiable Dr. Koster ridiculed national honour as a bourgeois idea, waived aside international treaties, and argued that since the development of the proletariate was bound up with the economic prosperity of the country they must be on the side of their Government. He finished up by asking the Belgians if they put their neutrality above the lives of one hundred thousand men, which it would have cost the Germans to have attacked by the Vosges.*

*'La Belgique Envahie et le Socialisme Internationale.' Par Emile Vandervelde, 1917.

Dr. Renner argues that the German Social Democrats had only two questions to decide: (1) Was the war there? (2) What was to be done? The first was undeniable, and the answer to the second was that they must support the Fatherland not only negatively but positively. The other proletariates did the same. There was 'all-round *Notstand* ' at the beginning of the war.' This is the usual German and pro-German trick of pretending that all the belligerents are in the same boat. It is totally incompatible with the argument that Germany was attacked and with his own statement that *Notstand* on one side implies *Notwehr* on the other. All-round *Notstand* is nonsense. His answer to the charge that they might have behaved differently and voted against the war credits or abstained from voting, as Bebel and Liebknecht did in 1870, in accordance with the principles of the International, is equally disingenuous. He says they had no guarantee that French and British Socialists would do the same, and at least they sent Müller to Paris on a mission, which was more than anyone else did. And what was that mission? It was an attempt to get the French Socialists to oppose their Government on the strength of an assurance that in no case would the German Socialists vote for the war credits, which Dr. Renner argues they were bound to do, and which they promptly did, with the sole exception of Karl Liebknecht. The French Socialists suspected a trap and were justified by the result. They had reason, for German sincerity had been put to the test a few days before at the Congress of Belgian trade unions, at which Legien, representing the German Social Democratic Unions, and Jouhaux, representing the French Confédération Générale, were both present. Jouhaux asked Legien what the Germans intended to do to prevent war. Were they prepared to take any action? 'We are ready, 'on our side, to march at your call or to march simultaneously.' The answer was silence, which was at least more honest than Müller's attempt to throw dust in their eyes. Dr. Renner ignores this tell-tale episode. The French and Belgians are not inferior in intelligence, have no need to learn 'the events ' as they really happened ' from German comrades; they know only too well.

In sum, Dr. Renner's dissertation puts the responsibility for war in a very clear light. The economic analysis proves

that aggrandizement was necessary for Germany, and the juristic argument proves that she was justified in going to war for that end. No German writer has so thoroughly argued out the case. At the same time he reveals the complete accord of the Social Democrats (exclusive of the small minority who have followed Liebknecht and broken away) with the other parties in regard to the war. To clinch the matter he repeatedly lectures the minority for their foolish and mistaken idealism. Nor does he display a less robust Germanism in regard to the other questions enumerated at the beginning of this article, except that he looks forward to the establishment of a real International in the distant and nebulous future. The questions referred to are more or less bound up with the views and arguments already discussed, and can be dealt with more briefly.

The first is the conduct of the war. It is generally shunned by German writers for obvious reasons; but they seem unconscious of its supreme importance. It is the conduct of the war far more than its inception that has gradually brought the world in arms against them by convincing the other nations one after another that it is impossible to live in friendship with such people. It is this that has hardened as well as multiplied Germany's enemies and fixed their determination to carry on the struggle to the very end, and beyond the end of military operations, if need be, rather than yield to the infamous methods employed. No accommodation with the spirit that dictates them is possible. But for this, peace would have been practicable long ago. If the Germans had fought fair and carried on war in a decent and honourable manner it would have been comparatively easy to come to terms with them. Those who say that 'these things always 'happen in war' are not speaking the truth. Many of them are entirely new, and their deliberate adoption as a calculated policy is unprecedented in warfare, whether civilized or barbarous. It is not a question of 'outrages,' as they are called, committed in the fury and intoxication of war, but the planned, systematic, calculated cruelty and bad faith, not for military but for political ends, the whole principle of *Fürchterlichkeit* or terrorism, and the regular practice of making agreements which are never kept or meant to be kept. General von Freytag himself says that the war on non-combatants

is a new thing. The official German treatment of these questions has always been to accuse the enemy of their own malpractices, except when they are the subject of boasting. So General von Freytag has the hardihood to deplore, more in sorrow than in anger, the maltreatment of prisoners—by the French and British; but he refers with complacency to air raids and submarines. The bombardment of non-military places is 'in itself objectionable,' but 'the 'limits of what is permissible are in this matter in many ways 'elastic.' We know what that means. Conduct which is glorious when practised by Germans becomes an outrage when practised by anyone else. He attributes the Belgian horrors entirely to the 'thoughtless adoption of *franc-tireur* 'methods' by the Belgians, and Dr. Renner endorses this verdict, though his own doctrine of *Notwehr* fully justifies the Belgians. According to this jurist, who bases his justification of the war on civil law, it appears that defence of women and children by any means is not punishable against a civilian outrager, but is punishable when used against a German soldier. But the whole theory of the *Notstand* war, carried on by 'blind natural force in the a-moral animal world of necessity,' obviously justifies any and every means. The Social Democrat is truly a valuable ally of the military.

As for the aims of war, they are implied in its causes already discussed. There is no essential difference between the three authors. All contemplate an enlarged and more powerful Germany. Naturally the soldier is chiefly concerned with military power, and his book is a plea for increased equipment of every kind; but he calls the war an 'economic conflict,' recognizes the economic factors, and insists on the necessity of obtaining sea-power. 'World-power is inconceivable 'without striving for expression of power in the world and 'consequently for sea-power.' He cites Admiral Mahan, and observes that 'in our days of world-policy and world-'economics, the views of the famous naval writer are far more 'in accordance with actuality' (than when applied to the Napoleonic war). Dr. Naumann's 'Mittel-Europa' is, of course, a particular expression of Dr. Renner's enlarged economy area; but it will not suffice in itself. It will need 'an extension of its northern and southern sea-coasts' as well as colonial possessions; the other small States must

come in, either voluntarily or compulsorily; and more military power will be needed. Dr. Naumann says that in future international affairs Mid Europe will ultimately ' be referred ' back to its military strength,' and he points out that in the present war the Central Powers have only just been able to hold their ground; there is no guarantee that in a later stage the same trial could be endured again. He looks forward to a universal system of entrenched frontiers and discusses the military arrangements to be made between the component States of Mittel-Europa. But an essential point is that they shall be Germanized. The Czechs and Magyars, he thinks, will not grudge them *Deutschland über Alles*. ' We need this. ' It is our life's blood.'

German discipline and organization are the watchwords.

' Happen what will the German spirit has received its baptism of fire; the national genius was and is a reality. . . . Now it is our concern to carry through to its goal this essential German character, proved in the most sinister of wars. This will and must be set on foot directly peace is concluded. . . . The ideal is and will be the organism and not free will, reason and not the blind struggle for existence. . . . By its means we shall enjoy our golden age as other conquering nations in other ages and with other abilities and excellences have done before us. Our epoch dawns when English capitalism has reached and overstepped its highest point, and we have been educated for this epoch by Friedrich II., Kant, Scharnhorst, etc. Our dead have fallen on the field for the sake of this, our Fatherland. Germany, foremost in the world!'

Dr. Renner, as already intimated, looks forward ultimately to a new International; but it is a long way off. And, meanwhile, his analysis of the actual conditions tends to the same position as Dr. Naumann's, with which he has much in common. His theory of the economy area and the need of extension leads direct to the conception of Mittel-Europa, which he sets out as against the Russian, American, French, and British imperial areas; and in the world of to-day it must be furnished with adequate power since there is no other guarantee for security. The way of the proletariate is the way of agreement, he says, not of force; and as soon as they are free to decide by their own laws of being they will choose it and no other. But ' the others ' still hold the power and lay their law, the law of force, upon history. ' We do not

, choose it but we must recognize that it is a way of history, 'though sprinkled with blood and tears. And since the pro-'letariate cannot absent themselves from history they must 'travel that way too, though with sorrowful hearts yet with 'watchful mind, so as not to miss the crossing where their own 'road begins.' But Mittel-Europa no more fulfils the requirements of his programme than it satisfies Dr. Naumann ; and obviously war was not necessary to establish Mittel-Europa. He lays particular stress on two things which are needed to remove economic dependence. One is the sure command of raw materials ; and the other free highways by sea and land with sure access to markets and harbours. The latter, he declares, is the one chief ground of the war ; and 'no peace , will be more than a truce, no treaty more than a judgment , of first instance, until the establishment of international , road and market rights is recognized as the chief object , of peace.' He urges internationalization, but it is to be observed that the cases he mentions—the Channel, Straits of Gibraltar, Suez, Panama, the Swiss passes, Antwerp, the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt—are those in which internationalization would benefit Germany at some one else's cost. He says nothing about the opposite cases—Kiel and the Baltic, the Austrian and Hungarian mountain passes. His reference to Antwerp is quite in keeping with Pan-German claims. Antwerp, he admits, belongs by title of right to Belgium, but ' the facts of world-commerce begin to attack 'the title.' The development of the Rhineland has 'gradually 'converted Antwerp into a German harbour in Belgian hands.'

After all this, only a brief reference is necessary to peace and the future. General von Freytag thinks lasting peace neither practicable nor desirable, and the main purpose of his book is to draw lessons from the present war in preparation for the next. Dr. Naumann contemplates a steady preparation for coming wars ; for, ' before the United States of the world ' can come into existence there will probably be a very long ' period during which groups of humanity, reaching beyond ' the dimensions of a nation, will struggle to direct the fates ' of mankind.' Dr. Renner's views are to much the same effect. He discusses the future organization of the world for peace at great length, and this is one of the most interesting sections of his book ; but it belongs properly to another

subject, for it lies far beyond the range of actual affairs in the region of ideas. He is inclined to think it may eventually be realized half by war and half by agreement. The erection of a supreme supernational power is indispensable; and upon this point he makes a noteworthy observation. A supreme Power may be established in two ways—by war and by voluntary agreement. The former must not be excluded. War has been an instrument of historical progress, of union and peace; witness the Roman Imperium. 'Therefore it 'is not excluded that in the future, too, the world may find 'its order in the selection by arms and that the power which 'proves itself the strongest organizer shall also be called by 'history to the greatest work of organization and by right 'become the supreme Power, the judge, administrator, and 'law-giver of the peoples.'

No one will be at a loss to name the Power indicated for this lofty destiny, and though Dr. Renner does not expressly advocate that realization of the International, his acquiescence in it as a possible solution is illuminating. It may be asked how far he represents the views of German Socialists. He belongs to an intellectual school, which is more and more dominating the bulk of Socialists and trade unionists. It supplies those ideologies so dear to the German mind and needed by the Majority Socialists to vindicate their own position. Nor is Dr. Renner by any means the most extreme exponent of the school. His companion-in-arms—very much in arms—Dr. Paul Lensch, is a writer of altogether inferior calibre, but he makes up for that by throwing off all disguise and restraint. His line of argument is essentially the same, but he boldly describes the economic development that has led to the war as exclusively German, glories in it and in the conduct of the war, and throws overboard all the old ideals. With him Socialism becomes identified with Germanism.

A. SHADWELL.

THE NAVIGATION ACTS

The Relation between Commercial Legislation and National Defence Historically Considered: A Rhodes Lecture delivered at University College, London, on February 25th, 1918. By W. S. Holdsworth, D.C.L.

A LITTLE history is a dangerous thing. There is, undoubtedly, grave danger in the modern tendency to ignore the teachings of experience; but there is at least equal danger in the citation of historical precedent when such citation is not accompanied by a comparison of the conditions existing in the past and those under which we have to work to-day. It is not sufficient to show that a particular step taken in the past was followed by certain developments. It is necessary to prove that the relation between that step and those developments was not merely chronological, but was definitely one of cause and effect. And when this relation has been proved, it remains no less necessary to show that the existing situation bears a real analogy to that in which the results in question were produced. Where circumstances remain, broadly speaking, unchanged, the experience of the past may be accepted as a valuable, though not an infallible, guide; but it is of primary importance to remember that a measure which was beneficial at one stage of national development may be ineffective or even injurious at a later stage.

A striking example of the danger involved in a superficial appeal to history is presented by the rather frequent references which have recently been made to the old Navigation Laws as a precedent to be followed in the framing of our *post-bellum* economy. Exactly how far, or in what form, it is proposed to revive these laws is not always made clear, but it is evident that a good many people regard the general policy which they embodied as capable of successful application to-day, and as affording the only hope for the restoration and future progress of the British mercantile marine. Mr. Peto has told us that 'the merchant service is founded upon the Navigation

'Laws passed in the time of the Commonwealth';* their partial revival has been discussed at some length in the columns of 'Fairplay'; and Dr. Holdsworth, in a Rhodes Lecture, delivered at University College, London, has held them up as an illustration of the economic policy to which our future legislation must conform.

It is to be noted, however, that few of the present-day admirers of the Navigation Acts are at much pains to explain their scope, their effects, or the circumstances in which they were passed. Dr. Holdsworth, as befits an historian of English law, cites as precedents for the policy he proposes a score of Acts from the time of Richard II. downwards; but even Dr. Holdsworth is generally content to state the purpose of the Acts and assume their success in effecting that purpose, and neither he nor any one of the other advocates for their revival has taken the trouble to explain the very peculiar conditions under which the Cromwellian and Stuart laws were put into operation and to compare them with those under which British shipping must now be carried on.

The purpose of the seventeenth century Navigation Acts was threefold: to foster the development of English shipping and shipbuilding by reserving the carriage of a large portion of the foreign trade to vessels built, owned, and manned by English subjects; to secure a lucrative monopoly for English merchants; to inflict the greatest possible injury upon the Dutch. The objects proposed to-day are very similar—the encouragement of British trade and shipping and the restriction of German commerce. It therefore becomes of particular interest to inquire what success the legislation of the seventeenth century had in the attainment of its ends, and, if it was successful, under what conditions that success was achieved.

In seeking to promote the prosperity of English shipping the statesmen of the seventeenth century were actuated by considerations of national defence even more than by the hope of commercial prosperity. Armed merchantmen were still taken into the line of battle, privateering played an important part in naval operations, and in the absence of any permanent naval establishment the fighting fleet drew

* 'Hansard,' Vol. XC., No. 9, 21.2.17, col. 1406.

the greater portion of its personnel, as occasion arose, from the seamen who manned the mercantile marine. It could fairly be argued that even if a particular measure had the result of decreasing the total volume of trade, its effects were beneficial if the increased proportion carried under the national flag led to an increase in the aggregate tonnage of English shipping. It was on the ground that 'defence is of much more importance 'than opulence' that Adam Smith held the Act of Navigation to be 'perhaps the wisest of all the commercial regulations 'of England,' although he considered that it was 'not favour-'able to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence 'which can arise from it.'*

This argument was somewhat weakened by the provision of a regular establishment for the Royal Navy, but the circumstances of the present war have led both to a great extension of the auxiliary services, manned chiefly by merchant seamen, and to the necessity of relying for the carriage of our war-time trade on vessels armed for defence. To a greater extent than at any time since the introduction of iron and steam the ships and men of the merchant service have been called upon to play a part in keeping open our maritime communications which could not be played by neutral carriers, however willing, and the development of the mercantile marine as a measure of national defence has again come into prominence. At the same time, it is no longer possible to draw any clear distinction between the requirements of national defence and those of commercial prosperity. The importance of financial stability in the conduct of war is immeasurably greater than at any previous period, and while we shall readily concede to Dr. Holdsworth that national safety must take precedence of national wealth, we must not forget that wealth is itself a vital element of national strength, and that the expansion of shipping must be sought, if possible, by means which are not inimical to trade. With these considerations in mind, let us examine, very briefly, the course of the legislation by which our ancestors sought to promote the expansion of the mercantile marine.

The first attempt to encourage native shipping by confining the carriage of goods to and from English ports to vessels

* 'Wealth of Nations,' Book IV., Chap. 2.

flying the national flag was made so early as the reign of Richard II. In 1381 a law was passed forbidding any subject of the King to ship any merchandise outward or homeward except in ships of the King's liegence.* A single year was sufficient to prove that this Act was unworkable owing to the lack of available tonnage, and in 1382 it was modified by permission to employ foreign vessels in cases where English ships could not be obtained.† Under Richard II. himself, Edward VI., Henry VII., and Henry VIII. similar measures were enacted, confining either the whole import and export trade, or particular branches of it, to native shipping; but the majority of these Acts were either allowed to fall into disuse or mitigated by the granting of licences, and the only case in which any considerable measure of protection was secured to English shipowners for a long period was that of the trade in Gascony wines and Toulouse woad.‡ Even in this case there were not wanting protests as to the costliness and inefficiency of the policy, as may be seen from the preamble to an Act of Edward VI., introducing certain modifications into the system on the ground that the restrictions placed upon the trade caused these articles to be 'sold at such excessive price 'as hath not before been seen within this realm,' and that the navy was 'thereby never the better maintained.'§

Apart from the increase of prices and the difficulty of finding sufficient native tonnage, the great obstacle to effective enforcement of these early Navigation Acts was the fear of retaliation on the part of foreign Powers, and the preamble to an Act passed in the first year of Elizabeth, suspending the whole of the previous legislation on the subject, is well worth pondering to-day, when the revival of a restrictive policy is suggested. In this preamble it is somewhat naïvely stated that:

'Other foreign Princes, finding themselves aggrieved with the said several Acts, as thinking that the same were made to the hurt and prejudice of their country and navy, have made like penal laws against such as should ship out of their countries in any other

* 5 Ric. II., Stat. I., c. 3. † 6 Ric. II., Stat. I., c. 8.

‡ 14 Ric. II., c. 6; 3 Edw. IV., c. 1; 1 Hen. VII., c. 8; 4 Hen. VII., c. 10; 7 Hen. VIII., c. 2; 23 Hen. VIII., c. 7; 32 Hen. VIII., c. 14.

§ 5 & 6 Edw. VI., c. 18.

vessels than of their several cou tries and dominions, by reason whereof there hath not only grown great displeasure between the foreign Princes and the Kings of this realm, but also the merchants have been sore grieved and endamaged.'*

The ineradicable tendency of 'foreign Princes' to make 'like penal laws' to those passed by British parliaments was destined at a later date to play an important part in breaking up a much more elaborate restrictive system.

At a later period of Elizabeth's reign the coasting trade was reserved to English shipping, the restrictions on the Bordeaux trade were revived, and several attempts were made to encourage the building of fishing vessels by the enforcement of fast days and restrictions on the import of foreign cured fish.† So far as concerns the foreign trade, however, the system prevailing under Elizabeth and the early Stuarts was, generally speaking, that of free choice between native and foreign shipping, subject only to the payment of aliens' duty on goods imported in foreign vessels.

The real cause of the expansion in English trade and shipping which marked the Tudor period must be sought in the progress of social and economic developments at home, in the opening up of new markets by exploration and by a wisely conceived series of commercial treaties, and in the creation of a strong, efficient, and permanent Royal Navy. Under the first two Stuart kings the spirit of enterprise decayed, the efficiency of the navy declined, and piracy flourished with unexampled freedom. In such circumstances the competition of the Dutch, then at the height of their political and economic prosperity, was far too strong to be successfully resisted, and the bulk of the world's carrying trade fell into the hands of Dutch shipowners. Meanwhile the progress of colonization had developed new markets and new sources of supply in America and the West Indies, and there was every reason to fear that this trade also would fall into the hands of the Dutch.‡

Under the vigorous government of the Commonwealth

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* 1 Eliz., c. 13.

† See 5 Eliz., c. 5; 23 Eliz., c. 17, etc. The failure of the import restrictions to effect their purpose is acknowledged in the preamble to 39 Eliz., c. 10.

‡ See Child's 'New Discourse of Trade,' 1698, pp. 195, 196.

and Protectorate it was not likely that the nation would tamely acquiesce in this condition of permanent inferiority, and so soon as the naval strength of the country had been reorganized the demand for some effective measure of protection became irresistible. Political animosity accentuated the irritation arising from commercial jealousy, and the Navigation Act of 1651 was inspired equally by the hope of encouraging English trade and shipping and by that of striking a blow at the prosperity of the rival republic. At the conclusion of the war which followed the Dutch found themselves compelled to acquiesce in the restrictions imposed by the Act, and on the restoration of the Stuarts a new Navigation Act was immediately passed, embodying and amplifying the provisions of Cromwell's law, and laying down the general lines followed by English policy with regard to trade and navigation during nearly the next two centuries.*

By the Navigation Act of 1660 it was provided that no goods or commodities of the growth, production, or manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America should be imported into England or Ireland except in ships owned in England or the Plantations, of which the master and three-fourths of the crew were English subjects. As regards the European trade, it was provided that Russian and Turkish products, together with certain specified commodities in the case of other countries, including practically all the principal articles of trade, should only be imported in English ships or in ships belonging to the country of origin, or to that from which they could only be or usually were first shipped for transportation. When brought in such foreign ships they were to pay special duties. Further, with a view to attacking the transit as well as the carrying trade of the Netherlands, it was enacted that no goods or commodities of foreign origin should be imported from any part of the world except from the producing country direct, or from the ports at which such goods could only be, or most usually were, first shipped.

In addition to these restrictions on the foreign trade, the coasting traffic was rigidly reserved to English shipping;

* 12 Car. II., c. 18, confirmed by 13 Car. II., c. 14. For Cromwell's Law see 'Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum' under date October 9, 1651.

but the greatest care and ingenuity of those who drafted the Act were expended on the regulation of the Plantation trade. Not only was it provided that no goods whatsoever should be imported into or exported from any of the English possessions overseas except in English or colonial vessels, but the Plantations were actually prohibited from shipping many of their principal products direct to any part of the world except to England and Ireland or to other colonial ports. Three years later a further Act was passed providing that no European goods should be shipped to the Plantations except from England and Wales and in ships built as well as owned in this country. Still later the permission to ship to Ireland direct was rescinded, and in 1696 the fabric was completed by an enactment that no goods should be imported into or exported from any of the Plantations, or carried from one Plantation to another, except in ships built and owned in England or the Plantations, and that English ships engaging in the Plantation trade should be registered for the purpose.*

The effect of this mixed colonial and commercial system was to make the entire carrying trade of the Plantations an English monopoly, and to constitute England and Wales the sole distributing centre for the greater part of their produce and the entrepôt through which they must draw all supplies of foreign origin. Moreover, it reserved to English shipowners the carriage of practically the entire volume of the English import trade, with the exception of goods of European origin shipped in vessels belonging to the producing country. A more sweeping measure of protection could hardly be devised; that it was not extended to exports from England to the Continent was probably only because most European countries themselves prohibited imports in any but national vessels.

Such were the provisions of the celebrated Navigation Acts which have been described as the foundation of our maritime greatness, and which it is now proposed in some form to revive. The advocates of such revival naturally base their argument upon the undoubted expansion in English shipping which took place during the period of their enforcement; but before considering the effect of the Acts it is necessary to look for a moment at the conditions in which they were to operate.

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* 15 Car. II., c. 7; 22 & 23 Car. II., c. 26; 7 & 8 Guil. III., c. 22.

In the first place, it must be noted that the danger of retaliation was, at the time of their enactment, very small. The trade of the Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonies was already governed by a system as rigidly exclusive as our own. In respect of this trade we had nothing to lose. So far as the direct trade with European countries was concerned, the admission of imports in ships of the producing country was a sufficient security against retaliation. The Dutch shipowners were the common carriers of the world, and few other States were likely to be troubled by the restrictions laid on the general carrying trade, so long as their ships were free to engage in direct traffic with England.

In the second place, it must be remembered that the English mercantile marine was not yet ready to challenge the Dutch supremacy in the general carrying trade. The seafaring instinct, the aptitudes and traditions making for success in seaborne commerce were there; but the progress of English shipping, which had made great strides under the Tudors, had been checked during the Stuart decadence, and the available tonnage was hardly adequate even to the services now reserved to it. The freedom of Dutch institutions, the development of banking and the cheapness of capital, gave to the merchants of the Netherlands an advantage against which it was almost hopeless for Englishmen to compete, and the prospect of immunity from Dutch competition in the reserved trades might well seem to outweigh any disadvantages accepted in respect of other branches of commerce.

These considerations carried the more weight because the principal branch of trade reserved to English shipping was certain to increase and easy to regulate. The Plantation trade was, indeed, the corner-stone of the whole system. The North American and West Indian colonies were then in the first stages of settlement. Their vast, undeveloped, natural wealth enabled severe restrictions to be laid upon their commerce without arresting its inevitable expansion. The prohibition of direct intercourse with the Spanish colonies secured for the characteristic products of the Plantations a practical monopoly of the English market. Their expanding population ensured a demand for English goods. Their importation of slave labour from the Guinea coast was in itself

sufficient to provide employment for a large body of shipping. At the same time, their military and economic dependence upon the mother country was such as to render the regulation of their trade in the interests of English merchants and shipowners feasible and not unreasonable.

Even so, there is some difference of opinion as to the success of the Acts in securing the ends for which they were designed. It used to be confidently asserted that they had been primarily instrumental both in destroying the maritime greatness of Holland and promoting the expansion of English shipping; but the former contention has now been generally abandoned and even the latter is open to question.

The immediate effect of the Acts appears to have been to accentuate Dutch competition in all branches of trade not definitely reserved to English ships. The cost of English shipping and the freights demanded by English shipowners rose considerably, and within twenty or thirty years from the passing of the Acts it had to be admitted that many trades in which we had formerly shared had passed almost entirely into the hands of the Dutch or the Easterlings.* Indeed, it is probable that whatever was lost to the Dutch in the reserved trades was speedily made up by their rapid progress elsewhere, for the Plantation trade itself was not, at first, of sufficient size to be a vital matter to the Dutch shipowners.† Adam Smith himself in the very chapter in which he defends the Navigation Acts (Book IV., c. 2) admits that at the time he wrote, more than a hundred years after the passing of those Acts, the Dutch were still 'the great carriers of Europe,' and that Holland still was 'the great emporium for all European goods.'

It may be said that but for the Acts of Navigation the Dutch shipowners would have monopolized the Plantation trade also, and that they would have profited greatly by its expansion during the eighteenth century; and it is true that when the Acts were passed the Dutch had already obtained such a hold upon the trade that great difficulty was found in enforcing the Acts in the Colonies. It is true also that, when Dutch

* See Roger Coke, 'Discourse of Trade,' 1670; and Child, 'A New Discourse of Trade,' 1695.

† Statistics in Whitworth, 'State of the Trade of Great Britain in its Imports and Exports,' 1776.

commerce showed symptoms of decline in other directions, complaints as to their exclusion from the Plantation trade began to be made in Holland.* It may be doubted, however, whether even the resources of the Dutch shipowners and merchants would have proved equal to carrying on at the same time the trades from which they were excluded and those which they actually monopolized. The actual causes of the decline in the prosperity of the Netherlands which began during the second quarter of the eighteenth century were not connected with the effects of English legislation, but with the exhaustion of the country consequent upon the war of the Spanish Succession and the ruinous losses inflicted on their commerce in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. On the whole we may accept Dr. Holdsworth's verdict that 'there is no evidence 'that the Dutch trade or shipping was seriously damaged 'by the Acts.' It is a little surprising that after pronouncing this verdict he should advocate a new Navigation Act as a means of restricting German sea-power 'to the smallest 'dimensions.'

With regard to English shipping the position is not so clear. There is pretty general agreement even among admirers of the Acts that their ultimate effect was detrimental to the trade of the Colonies. From the first there were bitter complaints on the part of colonial governors and colonial merchants as to the inconveniences arising from the restrictions placed upon their commerce, and from the high freights and shortage of tonnage caused by the exclusion of foreign shipping. So long, however, as they enjoyed a monopoly of the English market, the burden was by no means insupportable and did not, in fact, prevent a rapid and continuous expansion in the volume of trade. This trade, passing as it did through the mother country, was undoubtedly a source of very large profits to English merchants, but the diversion of so much capital and enterprise into a single channel, and the high rate of profit in the monopoly trade, constituted a handicap in all other branches of commerce. Even in the Plantation trade there is room for doubt as to whether the demand for English goods was not unfavourably affected by the restrictions placed on colonial development; as to foreign commerce generally

* Cunningham, 'The Growth of English Industry and Commerce,' Vol. II., 3rd Ed , 1903, pp. 212, 359-60, 675, N. 4.

there were contemporary critics who regarded the operation of the Acts as thoroughly mischievous.*

It was, however, rather by the effect of the Acts upon shipping than by their general influence on the economic development of the country that their promoters would have claimed to be judged, and it cannot be denied that the progress of English shipping during the latter half of the seventeenth century was rapid. Between the Restoration and the Revolution of 1688 the tonnage of the mercantile marine was said to have doubled, and a comparison of the recorded clearances supports this statement.† How much of this increase is to be attributed to the operation of the Navigation Acts, and how much to other causes, such as the development of industry at home and of markets abroad and the progress of banking and finance, it is difficult to say. Sir Josiah Child estimated that the trade of the Plantations employed nearly two-thirds of the total mercantile tonnage,‡ but this is probably something of an exaggeration. It seems reasonable, however, to conclude that a part at least of this expansion must be attributed to the effect of the Acts. During the eighteenth century the growth of the mercantile marine was continuous, and the proportion of the whole tonnage employed in the colonial trade was very large ; but it is open to question whether, with English commerce now firmly established and the rivalry of the Dutch diminished by the exhaustion of the Netherlands, a more liberal policy would not have given still better results.

However this may be, the colonial system was in fact maintained in its full rigour during the greater part of the century. From time to time it became necessary to introduce minor modifications for the purpose of giving relief to the colonists or loosening the shackles upon certain branches of trade—the most important of which were permission to export sugar

* Roger Coke, *op. cit.* Child, a strong supporter of the Acts, admits that there was much criticism of their effects. See also Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-1, and the admission of Adam Smith as to the general effect of the Acts on commerce.

† Child, *op. cit.*, Preface and p. 112 ; D'Avenant, 'Discourses on the Public Revenues and of the Trade of England,' 1698, in 'Political and Commercial Works,' 1771, Vol. I., p. 363 ; Petty, 'Political Arithmetic,' 1699, pp. 258-9 ; Chalmers, 'An Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain,' New Ed., 1803.

‡ Child, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

direct to Europe and the establishment of the Free-port system in the West Indies—but no serious breach was made in the continuity of policy until the revolt of the American colonies.

This revolt shook the whole foundations of the system. When the independence of the United States was recognized, it became absolutely necessary to find some way in which trade with them might still be carried on, not only by Great Britain but by our remaining Colonies, especially the British West Indies, whose dependence upon the North American Continent was in many respects absolute. The process of finding a *modus vivendi* was marked by a long series of regulations and impositions on the part of either side, always countered by retaliatory measures on the other, and it was not until 1830 that something like a definite agreement was reached, by which American ships were enabled to import into British possessions abroad any produce of the United States, and to export goods from those possessions to any foreign country. They were also admitted to participation in the export trade from the United Kingdom to India.

Meanwhile the colonial system of Spain and Portugal had also broken down. The removal of the Court of Portugal to Brazil and the relaxation of the Spanish regulations during the Napoleonic wars were followed by the revolt of the Spanish colonies in South America. It was now possible to trade with South America direct, and it became necessary to admit the produce of Brazil and of the Spanish colonies or republics in their own ships. A further breach was thus made in the restrictions relating to the trade of 'Asia, Africa, and America,' and at the same time this direct intercourse, by enabling South American products to be imported more cheaply and in larger quantities, broke down that monopoly of the home market which alone had rendered the restrictions imposed upon the British colonies supportable.

Nor was it only in respect of the colonial trade that the system of the Navigation Acts was now weakened. During the first quarter of the nineteenth century several European nations imposed, or threatened to impose, measures of retaliation which would have seriously injured British commerce with those countries and the employment of British shipping in their carrying trade. Meanwhile the industrial revolution

had emphasized the importance of free access to markets and sources of supply, and its coincidence with the prolonged conflict of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had enabled British commerce and shipping to make extraordinary strides. While the development of the continent had been retarded by twenty years of devastation and disorganization and the flags of continental States swept from the seas, the British mercantile marine had not only made good its losses but expanded. British shipowners had taken the place of the Dutch as the common carriers of the world, and Great Britain rather than Holland was now the emporium for the world's commerce. The colonial traffic no longer afforded adequate employment to British shipping, which was actively engaged in the carrying trade of every part of the globe. Hence it was now Great Britain rather than her rivals who had most to fear from a competition in restrictive legislation or imposts, and in order to avert such a calamity a series of Reciprocity Treaties were concluded with various Powers, beginning with Prussia and Denmark in 1824. About the same time the complaints of the Colonies were partially met by permission to export to any place in Europe, Africa, or America either in British ships or in ships of the receiving countries and to import goods in ships of the producing country.

Thus, although the Navigation Laws were consolidated in 1845, and there had been no abandonment of the principle which they enshrined, so many modifications had been introduced into the system that it was estimated that over fifty per cent. of the foreign trade was governed by the exceptions rather than by the rules. In these circumstances the protection afforded by the Acts was small, while the inconveniences arising from the remaining restrictions were acutely felt by traders. Moreover, the experience gained under the Reciprocity Treaties suggested doubts as to whether the form of protection provided by the Acts was really necessary or advantageous to British shipping under the conditions of the time. The tonnage on the Register rose from 2,500,000 in 1827 to 4,000,000 in 1848, and the increase in the tonnage of British ships entered and cleared during the same period was actually much greater and proportionately very little less than that of foreign vessels. In these circumstances, an agitation sprang up for bringing the shipping industry into line with the newly

adopted free trade policy of the country, and in 1849 the entire body of the Navigation Laws was repealed with the exception of the clauses relating to the coasting trade. In 1854 the coasting trade itself was thrown open and British shipping was left to compete on its merits in every branch of traffic.

The repeal of the Navigation Laws was bewailed by many of the shipowners as heralding the downfall of British shipping; but their gloomy prognostications were happily contradicted by the course of events. The frank acceptance of foreign competition proved to be a stimulus to greater efficiency on the part of British shipowners and shipbuilders, and a successful effort was made to rival the performances of the American clippers. At the same time the government turned its attention to promoting the welfare of the mercantile marine by legislation aiming at a higher standard of education and capacity among masters and officers, stricter regulations with regard to the safety of ships, and better treatment of the crews. The transition from wood and sails to iron and steam gave an opportunity of which full advantage was taken, and the proportion of British tonnage in the trade of the United Kingdom rose from 65 per cent. in 1850 to over 68 per cent. in 1870, twenty years after the repeal of the Acts.

Since then British shipping has held its own with extraordinary success against the competition, often the heavily subsidized competition, of foreign services. Its positive progress has been almost unbroken, and if its relative position has suffered some diminution, it must be remembered that the overwhelming supremacy of British shipping, as of British commerce, during the earlier part of the nineteenth century, was due to abnormal conditions, and that some part of the leeway made by belated starters in the economic race was bound to be made up. By no conceivable system of commercial policy could nations possessing great natural resources and an industrious population have been prevented from taking part in the trade of the world when once their internal conditions and external relations permitted them to apply themselves to industry and commerce. A comparison of their trade and shipping to-day with those of the period preceding their economic awakening, affords no reliable criterion of their future progress relatively to our own. It must be remembered also that the commerce of the world, with the demand for

carrying space which arises therefrom, is not a fixed stock so that one nation's gain is necessarily another's loss, but that the market for our own goods and our own services depends upon the economic development of our competitors. Despite all the advance made by certain of these competitors, ships under the British flag accounted in 1914 for 45 per cent. of the world's steam tonnage.* British ships carried about 90 per cent. of the total trade between the United Kingdom and the Overseas Dominions, 56 per cent. of the trade between the United Kingdom and foreign countries, and about one-half of the total seaborne commerce of the world.† In the face of these facts the supposition that British shipping will be unable to hold its own in the future without protection seems a little far-fetched. It may be urged, however, that the losses of the mercantile marine during the war have been heavy and that the incidence of war taxation has prevented British shipowners from laying by such large reserves for the replacement of lost tonnage as their foreign rivals. In view of the importance of the question, any proposal for securing our shipping position may at least claim to be considered on its merits.

It is necessary first of all to consider the possibility of reviving the Acts for the more limited purpose upon which Dr. Holdsworth lays special emphasis, namely, the restriction of German trade. Our views with regard to this aspect of the question will necessarily depend very much upon the nature of the peace. If the declared objects of the Allies are attained by the signing of a peace which lays more stable foundations for the fabric of international intercourse, we shall be spared the necessity of transferring the struggle from the military to the economic sphere and there making it perpetual. If, on the other hand, the Allies are forced to acquiesce in a treaty on the old strategical lines, it may be necessary to contemplate the permanent division of the Great Powers into two hostile camps in a state of perpetual economic conflict, breaking out at intervals into open war. It is not an inspiring picture :

* Based on 'Lloyd's Register.' The figures include American tonnage employed on the Great Lakes. If these are excluded the percentage rises to 47.5.

† 'Report of Committee of Chamber of Shipping and Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association,' 1917.

but if it becomes necessary to face it, it will at least be well to cherish no illusions with regard to the prospect. And it would be one of the gravest of illusions to imagine that such a situation would necessarily imply the disappearance of German commerce. We have already seen how small was the effect of the seventeenth century Acts upon the prosperity of Holland, a country occupied almost exclusively with the carrying and entrepôt trade, and there is perhaps even less reason to believe that a similar policy would prove fatal to Germany, a State highly developed industrially, and possessing vast resources of material and labour, intercourse with which must always be a matter of consequence to many foreign countries.

In the last year before the war the entrances and clearances with cargoes of German shipping at German ports amounted to some 36,000,000 tons, and in addition a large amount of German tonnage was employed in trading between foreign ports. The total entrances of German shipping at ports in the United Kingdom, other than those of ships coming from Germany or German possessions, was a little over 2,000,000, and a large proportion of this tonnage represented the calls made by liners in the North American trade, which discharged only a small part of their cargo at British ports. German ships entered at ports in the Overseas Dominions were mostly liners on the direct run from German home ports. It is clear, therefore, that the revival as against Germany of the principle of the Navigation Acts would by no means spell ruin to the German mercantile marine. The chief effect would probably be, as in the case of the Dutch, to intensify German competition on every track other than those leading to British ports.

It may be suggested that we should go farther, that the restrictive measures proposed should be applied simultaneously by all the Allies, and that German shipping should be excluded from any participation in the carriage of goods between ports in the British Empire, France, Italy, Portugal, the United States, and Japan. Even so, there would remain to the German shipowners the direct trade of Germany itself with these countries, and the whole carrying trade of countries at present neutral. Since Allied shipping would be diverted to a great extent from the general carrying trade by the necessity of providing cargo space for goods hitherto carried by German

vessels, it is certain that the German share in the traffic of neutral countries would be greatly increased, nor could German shipping be prevented from profiting by the increased trade of Germany with States whose producing and purchasing power was developed by British or American capital and enterprise. The logic of the situation would seem to lead almost inevitably to the absolute exclusion of German shipping, even when bound from Germany itself, from the ports of the Allies, and this in turn would involve practically the total cessation of commercial intercourse between the Allies and the Central Powers, together with such neutral States as, being economically dependent upon Germany, should attach themselves to the economic system of Middle-Europe rather than to that of the Western Powers.

Is there any assurance that such an exclusive system, involving a vast redistribution of trade on artificial lines having no relation to economic needs, could be permanently maintained? The answer is at least doubtful, the more so because the degree of loss and inconvenience suffered would vary greatly as between the several members of the Allied group. The economic interests of the Allied nations are by no means identical, and they are themselves competitors in many branches of commerce. Impatience of the restrictions imposed would provide the German diplomatists with opportunities for sowing discord of which they would not be slow to take advantage. Moreover, even if the system could be maintained, it is by no means certain that the German economic group would not receive such accessions from States whose commercial prosperity was dependent upon the German markets or supplies, as to afford employment to a body of shipping as large as that required before the war for Germany's share in the world's traffic.

We may turn, therefore, to the larger question of a revival of the policy of the Navigation Acts as a measure of encouragement to British shipping. For this purpose it is obvious that the exclusion of German competition will not suffice. Indeed our chief competitor after the war will be the United States, who have already increased their tonnage to an enormous extent. Japan also, with a greatly increased output, relatively small losses, and extended trade connexions, will be a formidable rival in the traffic of the Pacific and the Far East. Norway, even before the war, played an important

part in the general carrying trade, and though her losses have been heavy, the resources of her shipowners have been swollen by large war profits. If we consider British shipping as unable to maintain itself in the face of open competition, it is obvious that we must discriminate against neutrals, and against our Allies, as well as against our present enemies.

We have still to ask, however, whether a general revival of the policy of the Navigation Acts is likely to have the result of increasing our mercantile tonnage. The considered opinion of our ablest shipowners, as embodied in the joint Report of the Chamber of Shipping and the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association, is that 'any return to the general principles of 'the old Navigation Laws . . . would be against the best 'interests of our foreign commerce and of our mercantile 'marine.' There is something a little Gilbertian about the idea of protecting a particular industry by measures which the leading representatives of that industry regard as injurious; but shipowners, like other men, are not infallible, and in this case they are not unanimous. It is necessary therefore to consider the proposal on its merits.

In the first place, it is to be noted that not one of the special conditions which made for the success of the seventeenth century Acts exists to-day. In the seventeenth century the Colonies were completely subservient, economically and politically, to the mother country; their trade was in its infancy, but was already capable of affording employment to all English shipping likely to be displaced from other routes, and its great expansion in the immediate future was assured. No one would suggest to-day that it would be possible to enforce on the Overseas Dominions a policy which they were unwilling to accept; and it is at least doubtful whether they could be permanently induced to acquiesce in a system involving restrictions upon their right to trade with any States with which profitable commercial relations could be maintained, in such ships as provided the most efficient means of transport. But apart from this initial objection, the benefits to be obtained by the reservation of the Empire trade would be small. British shipowners had already secured before the war the carriage of upwards of 90 per cent. of the trade between the United Kingdom and the Overseas Dominions and Colonies, and at least 75 per cent. of the carrying trade between the British

Overseas Possessions and foreign countries.* So long as the British services maintain their efficiency there is no reason why this proportion should not be maintained, and since no general revival of the Navigation Acts could exclude the shipping of any foreign country from participation in the direct trade between that country and the Empire, the margin of additional employment obtained for British ships would be insignificant compared with the threatened loss of the general carrying trade through retaliatory measures adopted by other nations.†

For here, again, the position existing in the time of Cromwell and Charles II. is exactly reversed. Then our principal competitor was one small country which prospered by carrying on a large entrepôt trade; to-day our competitors—with the exception of Norway—are industrial communities possessed of great natural resources, with whom we have a direct trade of vital importance to ourselves. Then we had little to fear from retaliation; to-day all these countries, and all countries coming under their economic or political influence, would combine to organize a system of retaliation which would be exceedingly effective.

Before the war it was calculated that some 40 to 45 per cent. of British ocean-going shipping was engaged in traffic between foreign ports. To some writers and speakers this has appeared a source of weakness. In reality it was one of the main factors of our strength in peace and in war. We have for long imported goods in excess of the value of those shipped from the United Kingdom, and it was to a considerable extent through the services of our ships as general carriers, and by banking and insurance services closely connected with the carrying trade, that the balance of the exchanges was maintained. Moreover, the services of our ships in carrying, for instance, Brazilian coffee to the United States and Argentine maize to Scandinavia, have done much to develop markets for our own products and fields for the investment of our capital. It must be remembered also that the ability of a tramp steamer to carry, at a reasonable freight, coal from the United Kingdom to South America, or grain from Australia to Great Britain,

* Chamber of Shipping Report.

† Of the foreign tonnage entered and cleared at ports in the United Kingdom before the war one-half was bound from or to the country in which the ships were owned.

depends upon the prospect of securing a remunerative charter for the homeward or outward voyage respectively. And it is only by vessels ready to take their part in the general carrying trade of the world that the assurance of such continuous employment can be attained.

Since it is impossible to exclude foreign shipping generally from the direct trade of the United Kingdom, we are unable, in fact, to reserve to British shipping sufficient employment for such a body of tonnage as we possessed before the war, and must possess if we desire to render ourselves potentially independent of foreign services. The British ships engaged in traffic between foreign ports form a floating reserve of cargo space upon which we can call, through the operation of the freight markets, whenever a sudden expansion of trade or the withdrawal of foreign shipping renders the supply of tonnage inadequate to our needs. In time of war this reserve can be brought, as it has in fact been brought during the past two years, under direct State control, and diverted from its normal employment to the exclusive carriage of such goods as it is most essential for us to procure or to send abroad. Should any disabilities be imposed upon British shipping in open competition for the general carrying trade of the world, this reserve of cargo space would disappear, and we should be deprived of the power to call upon the services of additional tonnage under the British flag when the need for carrying space became acute.

There is, however, one minor application of the principle of the Navigation Laws to which the considerations discussed above do not so obviously apply. The Association of Chambers of Commerce has laid down as an axiom that the reservation of the coasting trade is 'as much an integral national right 'and necessity as the preservation of our frontiers and internal 'communications'; and 'Fairplay' has suggested that the threat of such a measure would form an effective means of securing for British shipping a share of the American coastal trade, as it 'would result in those boats being prevented 'from accepting business elsewhere.' With regard to this point it may be observed that out of 69,000,000 tons arrived and departed with cargoes in the coasting trade, during 1913, foreign tonnage amounted to a bare 600,000, which did not prevent some 44,500,000 tons of foreign shipping entering or

clearing at British ports in the foreign trade. It will surely need some greater and more certain prospect to induce us to embark on the dangerous and doubtful game of retaliation. There appears to be some suggestion that the Imperial coasting trade should be considered as covering all traffic within the Empire, and that participation in this traffic should be denied to ships belonging to nations which close their own coasting trade to British shipping. But, even so, the blow which we have it in our power to strike appears to be disproportionately small as compared with the danger of retaliation. It is not a question of rights but of expediency, and whether from the point of view of commerce or of shipping, the experience of the past suggests that the imposition of restrictions on trade tends, under modern conditions, to damage the country imposing those restrictions even more than the rivals at which they are aimed.

During the period of transition the greatest need of this country will be an adequate supply of tonnage from whatever source it can be obtained. When commercial conditions are re-established, the chief need of manufacturers and consumers will be unrestricted access to markets and producing centres. So far as the mercantile marine is concerned, its restoration and future progress will depend upon the demand for its services and its freedom to accept the cargoes on offer. At such a moment it would be peculiarly unwise to introduce any measure tending to impede the movement of trade or to restrict the activity of the freight markets. Nor is it necessary, in considering the question, to draw any distinction between the requirements of commercial prosperity and of national defence. Ships are not built to look at but to carry goods, and if we desire the tonnage under the British flag to be maintained at its former level, we must leave it free to compete on its merits for the carrying trade of the world. To run the risk of handicapping it in such competition for the sake of reserving a monopoly in any particular trade, or of forcing our way into any small section from which we are excluded, would be to jeopardize the continuance of that great and elastic carrying power which is as essential to our safety in war as to our prosperity in peace.

C. Ernest Fayle.

PROBLEMS OF BRITISH BANKING

Report of the Treasury Committee on Bank Amalgamations (Cd. 9052). 1918.

THE great English banks, or perhaps we ought rather to say the English bankers, are on their trial. In the overhaul of our financial foundations, which is being undertaken as a preliminary to the reconstruction of our economic system after the war, the present-day bankers appear to many of their critics to be old-fashioned, effete, out of date. Mr. Runciman finds them to be lacking in the spirit of adventure. Lord Leverhulme describes them as rabbits *tout court*. The bankers might reply that 'the coneys are but a feeble folk, 'yet make they their houses in the rocks,' and since the banking superstructure has weathered the blasts of war there cannot be much amiss with the financial foundations. Nevertheless, in this period of universal ruin and reconstruction, it is fitting that bankers with the rest be brought up for trial.

One answer they are already making to the critics—the practical answer of amalgamation. Eight of the leading joint stock banks have resolved themselves into four separate banking units. There is, of course, nothing new in amalgamation. The absorption of the smaller country banks by the great central institutions of the metropolis has been a familiar feature of the banking development of the past half century. Even as late as 1896 there were reported to be 196 country banks in England alone, of which only twenty-eight now retain a separate existence. What is novel in the present movement is the absorption of the central institutions by each other.

It is as difficult to analyse the motives as to determine the issues of the recent large bank amalgamations. To say that they are made in the public interest is to beg the question. 'I have never known much good,' says Adam Smith, 'done 'by those who affected to trade for the public good.' The public will probably consider that its interests are more likely to be

served by the banks minding their own business. No doubt the motives for amalgamation, like most human motives, are mixed. The element of fashion may enter into it; the recent marked tendency to trade combination; the propensity to do as others do. Personal vanity may count for something, a kind of megalomania; the desire to possess larger deposits, greater resources, more power than one's competitors. Often the determining motive has been the instinct of self-preservation. The old geographical areas served by the country banks have been obliterated since their absorption, and it is sometimes found that the amalgamated bank has left its flank open to competition, against which it desires to protect itself. The obvious way to do this is by joining forces with a bank strongly established in those districts where the amalgamating bank's connexion may happen to be weak. A quainter reason advanced in justification of their action by one of the chairmen of the amalgamating banks was that 'combination must 'come,' a new variant of the old *petitio principii*, 'it is coming 'because it must come and it must come because it is coming.' The argument that amalgamation is part of the process of evolution and therefore inevitable, like the absorption of the small shopkeeper by the multiple store, is to be viewed with suspicion, like every other analogy drawn from the physical sciences when imported into an economic discussion. Evolution may be a good thing or a bad thing, but there is no reason why we must of necessity submit to it. If it is a good thing we ought to assent to it. If it is a bad thing we ought to oppose it. If it is applicable in the present case it cannot logically be allowed to stop here. The evolutionary process by which eight banks have recently been reduced to four must go on until the four banks are reduced to two. We might then expect the two remaining banks, having been amalgamated into one, to make the monopoly complete by proceeding to absorb the Bank of England. That might be a good thing for the surviving bank. The benefit to the community is not so obvious.

It is true that in the first instance, at any rate, the community is not likely to lose much by the elimination of a certain amount of competition. We are a long way yet from the setting up of a Money Trust, and there will still be enough competition left between the banks that remain to preserve

a free market. But, looking to the future, it is tendencies with which we have to deal, and undoubtedly the tendency of amalgamation will be *pro tanto* to diminish competition. That this is no idle fear may be shown by what has taken place in Scotland, where competition has been practically eliminated by an arrangement between the eight principal banks not to outbid each other in the rates offered for deposits and advances.

It may be admitted that with amalgamation there will be increased mobility of capital. Money may be expected to flow more readily and with less friction where it is wanted in response to the seasonal or industrial demands of different localities within the amalgamated areas. But this will only be true where the areas do not overlap. Where they do overlap there will be no increase in the mobility of capital. There will merely be one channel of credit where formerly there were two.

Individual banks may make small economies by amalgamation, but it does not seem likely to effect any general reduction in working expenses. Staff and premises will probably remain substantially the same. If the amalgamated bank were to close one of two overlapping agencies it is doubtful if there would be any real saving. A new agency would probably be immediately installed by a rival bank, with the result that, so far as the public are concerned, the cost of banking to the community would be the same as before.

It is possible that, with the increased financial power which amalgamation confers, the activities of the amalgamated banks may be extended to the Colonies and the Far East. The experience, however, of the great French banks, the Crédit Lyonnais and the Comptoir d'Escompte, in India, is not encouraging. It takes a long time to train an expert staff, and as the difficulty of providing one proved to the French banks to be insuperable, the Indian branches were speedily closed. Foreign exchange banking is the most difficult banking in the world, and the English banks are not provided among their own staffs with the expert knowledge required to engage in it. They would be forced to recruit their foreign executive from outside by attracting experts from other institutions with the offer of higher salaries. It is doubtful if they would succeed in attracting in this way men of the best class, and

in any event it is obvious that this recruiting ground must soon become exhausted, when the position of the English bank's foreign establishment might become precarious. A more prudent course would be to begin by entering into an alliance with an Indian or Colonial bank, with the intention ultimately, when sufficient hold on the business had been obtained, of absorbing it.

In the long run the wider the field a bank covers the smaller is the danger of any given *percentage* run on it. This seems likely to be so, partly because it has more baskets for its eggs, e.g. a one-reserve system like ours has always worked on a smaller proportionate reserve than the many-reserve American system; and partly because the mere fact of large size, by giving people confidence, makes runs less likely. If this is so, amalgamation should tend in the long run to make a large volume of loans safe on a given basis of reserve. It is the same sort of advantage that a large insurance company has over a small one. This argument might have greater force were it not that banks are already so large that it is doubtful if any further enlargement along these lines will do them much good. Since after amalgamation the aggregate capital and resources of the banks remain the same it cannot be said that the general banking resources of the country are increased by amalgamation. They may even be diminished by it, where the amalgamation is accompanied by a reduction in the liability of shareholders for the uncalled portion of their capital. It cannot be said that amalgamation is likely to have the effect of increasing the general limits of credit. If two individuals have each a credit with the same bank the limit for each individual may remain the same after its amalgamation with another bank; there is no reason why it should be increased. Conversely, if a single individual happens to have credits, say of £100,000 each, with two different banks, he is not likely to get more and may, when amalgamation takes place, get less than his aggregate credit of £200,000.

It is important to emphasize the bearing which this tendency to restrict the limits of personal credit may have upon two of the main foundations of London as the financial centre of the world, the Discount Market and the Stock Exchange. The bill-broker obtains the money to discount his bills by loans from the joint stock banks, against which he pledges the bills as

security. Banks naturally wish to distribute their risks, and therefore assign a limit to the amount they will advance on any one endorsement. The bill-broker has accordingly to borrow from several banks, and if any two or more of them amalgamate he is likely to suffer a reduction of credit. The value the banks attach to his endorsement will not be doubled by the amalgamation of any two of them.

The position with regard to the Stock Exchange is slightly different, but the principle involved is the same. The banks accept certain classes of Stock Exchange securities in pledge as security for loans which they make to the stock-jobber, who is thus enabled to finance his business. He, in turn, makes advances against other Stock Exchange securities which are not accepted by the banks. Here, in the event of amalgamation, the same tendency will come into play with the stock-jobber as with the bill-broker. The borrowing power of the jobber will be reduced, and he, in turn, will have to contract the facilities which he was previously able to give to dealers in those securities against which the banks do not advance. It may be said that the securities in question cannot be considered of national importance since the banks, who must be the best judges, are unwilling to accept them in pledge; that they must be speculative undertakings. The answer is that the banks cannot be expected to keep themselves in touch with the range and mutation of Stock Exchange investments from their inception. Every undertaking, expecially industrial enterprise, has to pass through a preliminary stage before it finds its public, and every obstacle placed in the way of its obtaining a fair trial is a restraint on trade. Everything must have a beginning. The curious investment of to-day may become the gilt-edged security of to-morrow. It is not in itself a sufficient reason for discouraging an enterprise to say that it is speculative. Every new enterprise is in its nature speculative. It may be a sound speculation or an unsound one. Time alone will show. Indeed, a certain amount of speculation is indispensable to any free market in securities, and without a free market in bills and Stock Exchange investments the position of London as the international financial centre might become untenable.

There is yet another danger. The amalgamated banks are associated with the names of individual chiefs who are men up

in years. When they pass it remains to be seen if successors can be found to carry on their work upon the enormously increased scale brought about by amalgamation. It is the same kind of difficulty with which we are confronted in finding men fitted to command the bloated armies of modern times. Why should a big bank be any more immune than a small one from the stiffness and inertia of age, or less liable to become effete and out of date? Indeed, the bigger the bank the greater the danger that with the lapse of time it will become entrenched in a bed of vested interests, inimical to change, discountenancing the introduction of new ideas and discouraging the more efficient methods of young and vigorous competitors. The latent power of the amalgamated banks in sapping competition will be very great. It may even be questioned whether the gigantic size they have already attained does not constitute a menace to the predominant position which the Bank of England has hitherto enjoyed as the bankers' bank. How will the Bank of England be able to maintain its supremacy and control the money market, surrounded by banks individually greater and more powerful than itself, especially when the object in view is by raising the rate of interest to prevent an internal or external drain upon our gold reserve? It is even conceivable that the finance of the State may be threatened, and it is probably for this reason that in Germany the Prussian Minister is said to be considering a State monopoly of banking. Nor can the psychological effect of these great aggrandizements of capital in the hands of a few banks be ignored. They are virtually Government-guaranteed institutions. The insolvency of one of the great banks would involve such widespread disaster that no government could stand aside. They would be compelled to make use of the national resources in order to guarantee the solvency of private banks. From Government guarantee to Government control is but a step, and but one step more to nationalization. We are playing into the hands of Mr. Sidney Webb and the Socialists.

English banking has recently been subjected to much unfavourable criticism based in part upon comparison with Germany. What is desired, and will be desired still more emphatically in the difficult period that will follow the war, is to raise the national productive power to the highest degree

of efficiency, by distributing the banking resources of the country among its various competing industries in such a way as to secure the elimination of the less efficient and the survival of the more efficient industrial units. It is necessary to refuse credit to the one and to grant it freely to the other. That is the essence of banking. It implies an intimate knowledge of industrial conditions which it was comparatively easy for the banker to acquire when every district had its local bank and international competition was in its infancy. The separate and distinct geographical areas, whose financial needs were formerly supplied by local institutions, have now been merged into one by their absorption by the great London banks. The comparative monopoly of foreign trade has been broken into by the competition of other countries whose wealth and power have been increasing at a relatively greater rate than our own. English banking from being local has become national, and, as a result of recent amalgamations, seems not unlikely to become international. In these circumstances it behoves us to take stock of our existing machinery, to consider how far our present methods may be considered adequate and to what extent it may be necessary to adapt them to the changed conditions so as to secure the correspondence and co-operation between industry and finance which is vital to the efficiency of both.

In this respect the banking systems of Germany and England, with a common object to be attained, present a striking contrast in their methods of attaining it. In Germany the interests of industry and finance are merged and correlated in a manner unknown in this country. The great German industries have their representatives on the bank directorates. The banks are directly represented on the boards of the great industrial undertakings in which they are financially interested and have a voice in the management of their affairs. The capital of the German banks bears a proportion to their deposits which enables them to supply industry with the capital required to develop production on a large scale at home and with the long credit required for undertaking engineering and other enterprises abroad. Credit of this kind cannot of course be extended indefinitely, but when the time comes to transfer the burden to the public by the sale of bonds or stock it is the banks which undertake the issue. The interests of the banks

and industries of Germany are thus closely knitted together; and, finally, the Government intervenes to ensure that the balance between the two shall be fairly maintained by withholding its sanction from any foreign financial loan issued by the banks, the agreement for which does not contain a clause stipulating that at least a portion of the proceeds shall be expended in the purchase of German manufactures.

There is no need to labour the points of contrast between this centralization and the familiar decentralized financial methods of our own country. Specialization has taken the place of centralization to a degree and to an extent unknown among any other people. The floating loan market, with an average of about £300,000,000 bills under discount and about £100,000,000 lodged by the bill-brokers with the banks as security against loans; the magnitude of our Stock Exchange operations and the accommodation afforded by the banks in financing them; the variety of colonial and foreign banks, of accepting houses and company promoters, each with its special sphere of influence and finance; the economy and efficiency with which these varying functions are exercised; the untrammelled competition which is the seal of cheapness; the experience and expert knowledge which have accrued through these channels and the freedom with which its portals have been thrown open to all comers have created in London a central market of finance which is the envy of other nations, and in the variety and the extent and the elasticity of its resources is without a parallel in the world.

The many and great excellences of the English system are universally recognized. But nevertheless there are not lacking commentators to point out its defects. Thus there is a growing feeling that in the competition to pay good dividends to their shareholders the English banks have been led to practise an excessive economy in cash and liquid reserves, and that this has reduced the margin of safety to a point which can no longer be considered adequate. Deposits have increased without any corresponding increase in capital or reserves. Banks are relying too much on the resources supplied by their customers for the conduct of their business, and too little upon their own. The three great German banks which correspond most closely with our own—the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, and the Disconto-Gesellschaft—held

at the end of 1913 deposits amounting to £160,620,000, while their aggregate capital and reserves were £42,700,000, a proportion of 26 per cent. At the same date the corresponding figures for the six greatest English banks, now amalgamated into three banks, were, Deposits £369,152,764, Capital and Reserves £33,871,965, a proportion of 9 per cent. The difference, as will be mentioned later, is partly explained by the different character of German banking. The war has introduced disturbing factors which vitiate the figures of later date for purposes of comparison, but it is worth noting that the process of amalgamation during the war has been common to both countries, with the significant difference that in the process of amalgamation the German banks have increased their paid-up capital and reserves while the English banks have not. The more cautious policy favoured by the German banks has its lesson for us.

Scarcely second in importance to the financial strength of a bank is the efficiency of its administration. The German board of direction is composed, to an extent unknown in England, of men possessed of professional and technical knowledge. No one who has been present at a meeting of German bank directors in Berlin, when some foreign enterprise has been under consideration, can have failed to be impressed by the animation with which it was discussed and by the expert and comparative knowledge displayed by individual directors of the enterprise itself and of the conditions prevailing in the foreign country in which it was proposed to undertake it. He may have been led to reflect ruefully upon the different reception his project met with in his own country. He will recall the meeting of the London board; the difficulty of withdrawing its members even temporarily from their country pursuits and their obvious anxiety to lose no time in returning to them; most of them old men, many of them long retired from business; some of them ex-government officials and the like who have never been in business; a few ornamental titled persons; only one or two here and there who have no train to catch and are willing to discuss the matter in hand with attention and, it may be, with understanding.

It would be idle to pretend that a board of this kind constitutes anything like the nexus between industry and finance which obtains in Germany, and which is very much

to be desired in this country. It may be that we do not pay our men enough. A London director has to be content with an honorific position, a fee of a few hundred pounds a year, and, it must be added, a very exiguous degree of responsibility. That is not enough to attract men in the prime of life with expert or technical knowledge of industry and finance, who would have to submit to a reduction in the large incomes they are earning by the exercise of their special abilities if they were to accept a seat on the board of a bank. There are two things which a good man, in the business sense of the term, will not do without—pay and responsibility. Give him sufficient of the former, and you may saddle him with as much of the latter as you like. You may not always get good men by offering them good pay, but you will certainly not get them without doing so. Apparently shareholders are content so long as their profits are not reduced by more than nominal directors' fees. At a recent meeting of a bank with deposits of over £200,000,000 the proposal to increase the directors' fees to £1,000 a year was met by the rejoinder from one of the shareholders present that he did not know what the directors would do with such a sum.

They manage these things differently in Germany. In the three banks to which we have already referred, after payment by the Deutsche Bank of 5 per cent. of the net profits to reserve, and of the ordinary dividend of 6 per cent., and by the Disconto-Gesellschaft and the Dresdner Bank of 4 per cent., the directors receive respectively 7 per cent., 7½ per cent., and 4 per cent. (the Disconto's personally liable partners receive 16 per cent.) out of the remainder. The directors are bound by law to supervise all the details of the bank's business, and to keep themselves well informed as to its general policy and methods of management. They are bound by law to exercise the caution of a careful business man, and are liable to be sued for damages arising out of the crime or negligence of their employees. If cases of this kind are seldom brought to public notice it is not because they do not occur, but because the directors, as a rule, prefer to pay up for the laches of their employees, as they can well afford to do out of their profits, rather than be haled before the court.

But, after all, these things are comparatively details. The fundamental distinction between the banking systems of

Germany and England lies in this, that the separate functions of banking and industry are in the one amalgamated and in the other specialized. This is not all to the advantage of Germany. For a bank, wishing to investigate the merits of any new enterprise, the expert is indispensable, but he can be most usefully employed in assisting the board in an advisory capacity only. To appoint him a director and to give him an equal voice in the finance of the scheme, in which he will probably find himself out of his depth, as well as in the technical part of it, where his authority must be supreme, is to overweight his position on the board. The balance that should be observed between the claims of industry on the one hand and the potentialities of finance on the other is liable to be deflected in favour of the former. And this is especially true in Germany, where the banks are accustomed in the first instance to finance industrial enterprises themselves out of their large capital resources before submitting them to the test of a public issue. There is no doubt that, guided by expert advice, the German banks were led into many enterprises of which the public refused to relieve them, either because the projects were inherently unsound or because their inception was premature. The portfolios of the German banks are said to be loaded with undigested securities of this kind, which are likely to prove an embarrassment after the war, and serious critics in Germany have been led to question the expediency of a policy which tends to imperil the stability of banks by adding to their financial responsibilities industrial functions which, at least in the initiatory stages, can be more efficiently performed by those who have specialized in them.

If finance suffers it is more than doubtful if industry gains by excessive centralization. Undoubtedly it would be to the advantage of both if a better and closer connexion and understanding were established between the banks and manufacturers of this country, but it should be perfectly possible to obtain the desired nexus between industry and finance without sacrificing the independence of either. Our staple industries are all the stronger from having to a large extent financed themselves with the temporary assistance of the banks. It may be said that, although this may be true of the staple and established industries, banks have not been sufficiently adventurous where new industries were concerned,

and that many promising enterprises, which might have been promoted with advantage to the nation, have perished from lack of credit. Bankers, of course, are not omniscient and may sometimes fail to perceive the oak in the acorn, especially in the case of the small businesses. But if a man is refused credit at one bank he goes to another, and in the competition between them it is unlikely that many deserving cases are refused. It is more likely to be the other way. Although the general charge has often been made that industries in this country are being starved for lack of accommodation, it is significant that, so far, no responsible witness has been produced to testify that he has been denied the credit to which he was legitimately entitled.

It is frequently asserted, however, that whatever may be said about the home trade, this limitation of the functions of English banks tends to cramp the growth of our foreign trade, especially as regards the greater enterprises, and that in this respect the banking system of this country compares unfavourably with that of Germany. Financial stability, it is said, may be purchased too dear. Bankers have become over-cautious, too much concerned with their own private interests to the neglect of those of the State. The stimulus of government interference and control is demanded in order to induce them in the national interest to embark on more adventurous banking. Criticism of this kind appears to be based on an inadequate conception of the part the banks already play in the finance of foreign trade.

Apart from government loans, the finance of foreign trade naturally divides itself into two main divisions of short period and long period credits. Short period credits are concerned with the import and export of raw material and manufactured articles to and from this and other countries, transactions which are completed within a few months and are usually financed by means of bills of exchange. The shipping documents are pledged as security to anyone dealing with the bill, which is drawn at so many days after sight, so as to allow time for the acceptor to receive and realize the goods before he is called upon to pay for them. The system, which is capable of infinite variation, has been carried to an extraordinary pitch of organization in this country, and has contributed more perhaps than anything else to make London the world's clearing

house. The goods may not be shipped to or from this country; it may be coffee from Brazil to Holland, or silk from China to America, but the bill will be drawn on London. Bills on London are at a premium because nowhere else can the holder be sure of being able to obtain gold for them readily and freely.

The extent to which the foreign trade of this and other countries is financed in London can only be a matter of conjecture. Even if we knew the mass of acceptances it would not help us much. No money passes when a bill is accepted. It is not acceptance that constitutes finance. It is only when bills are discounted, or borrowed against before they become due, that finance proper begins and a loan is created. At the outbreak of war the Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated that the amount of bills 'carried,' that is, advanced against before maturity, by banks and others was £350,000,000 to £500,000,000, most of which had been discounted. At least £100,000,000 were pledged with the banks as security for loans. At the lowest estimate it is evident that a very large proportion of the available financial resources of the country are employed in the foreign trade, and it is more than doubtful if any government could do more than the competition of banks and accepting houses, native and foreign, is already doing to stretch the credit based on British security to the utmost point compatible with prudence and a due regard for the interests of our domestic industries. It would be no benefit to our foreign trade to close, as has been suggested, the agencies of foreign banks and financial houses established in London, to confine the use of London credit to financing the foreign trade with this country, and to prohibit its being used to finance the foreign trade between two other countries. A large proportion of foreign trade is compounded of three-cornered or more than three-cornered transactions, the silk imported into America from China being paid for by exports of cotton goods from England to China, and indirectly our own trade would suffer if we ceased to finance the trade of other countries. It would suffer also if we suppressed the agencies of foreign banks. A considerable part of their acceptances are employed in financing the export of British manufactures on foreign account, and if there is to be division of labour we should prefer the Englishman to provide the manufactures and to leave the distribution of them to the foreigner.

If the foreign agency accepts bills, its head office has to make provision for their payment at maturity. Accordingly, large foreign balances have to be kept in this country and go to swell the resources of the London money market. When the rate of interest or discounts is high relatively to that of other countries, large sums are remitted here from abroad to be employed in discounting bills. The total varies with the rate of interest, but at times the foreign floating balances available for the use of the London money market are an appreciable factor in the finance of our foreign trade. Any attempt to interfere with what may be called the natural flow of money to this market would undoubtedly tend to restrict our foreign trade by raising the rate of interest, and so increasing the comparative cost of production on which our power to compete in international trade depends. It might also place in jeopardy the financial supremacy of London as the clearing house of the world. A free market means that anyone can send bills here for discount and be sure of getting gold for them when he wants it. Freedom is the breath of life for credit and commerce. To interfere by arbitrary and artificial restriction with their free course and development is to stifle them. The best service government can render the London money market is to leave its management and control to the bankers, whose business it is to understand it.

Bills drawn on or made payable at the London agencies of foreign banks are discounted after acceptance in the ordinary way, and to this extent it may be said that the trade of foreign countries is financed with London money. The assertion must, however, be qualified by the statement that the 'foreign 'agencies' and 'foreign domiciles,' as these bills are called, are discriminated against in the rate, that is to say, they fetch a lower price in the discount market than British bills. When bills are plentiful the discrimination may be considerable; when bills are scarce it may be very slight; but in general there is a marked preference in favour of the British bill. It is therefore only the surplus money of the London market which goes to finance the trade of other countries at the higher rate, after the effective demand of British trade at the lower rate has been satisfied. There is also this to be said, that the London agencies of the foreign banks, during the currency of their acceptances, commonly employ the funds provided to

meet them at maturity in competing for British bills, so that if it is true to say that the trade of foreign countries is financed with British money, it is also true to say that, conversely, British trade is financed with foreign money. It is a fallacy to suppose that if these foreign agencies were suppressed more money would be available for British trade. On the contrary, it is the paradox that is true; British trade would suffer. The absolute amount of the short money in the London market would be reduced by the removal of the foreign balances to Amsterdam or New York; the supremacy of London as a financial centre would be weakened; the interests of British trade would be prejudiced by the reduction in the absolute amount of funds available in the London short money market. There may be sound political reasons for suppression; the economic argument is dead against it.

With long period credits we enter upon a different field of finance. It is no longer a question of providing the means of bridging over the comparatively short period required for obtaining the raw material, working it up into the manufactured article and distributing it to the consumer. We have to provide the means whereby 'the immobile or undeveloped 'assets of a deserving enterprise may be pledged to secure 'the money which should be used to extend still further the 'field of beneficent activity.' For this a bond or stock is the appropriate instrument of credit. The exploitation of the latent resources of other countries, the construction of their railways, the development of their mines, the construction of works of public utility, are essential to the continued expansion of our foreign trade. But all these undertakings take time. A long period must elapse before they become remunerative. To finance them, therefore, does not fall within the ambit of our banking system. They involve a lock up of capital, and the essence of British banking is that its funds should be kept liquid. There is good reason for this. The paid-up capital and reserves of the English joint stock banks in 1917 were £84,475,000, and their *deposits* £1,365,297,000. The banker would thus appear to have enormous *resources* at his command, but it will be observed that his deposits consist to a large extent of credits created by loans, and not of deposited moneys. To that extent they are not available as cash, and in any case are repayable on demand or at short

notice. They are the bankers' short period credits, and no prudent banker would employ them in other than short period loans. His capital and reserves, which form his long period credits, are no doubt available for more permanent investment, but the amount of paid up capital and reserves held in proportion to the deposits is very small, some people would say too small, only 6.2 per cent. It is a canon of sound banking that a banker must not grant credit, different in kind from the credit he receives. He must not part with the money, such as it is, derived from *deposits* unless he can see his way to draw it quickly back again.

It may be admitted that the German banker enjoys an advantage over his English competitors in originating and carrying out foreign enterprises. It is easier for a project to obtain a fair hearing and an intelligent examination of the technical and financial merits claimed for it from a German bank, on the board of which both industry and finance are represented, the leaders of industry acting in co-operation with the leaders of finance, than from an English bank where a sharp line of demarcation is drawn between industry and finance. The German bank is not so dependent as the English on deposits. If the time is not propitious for a public issue, its large capital resources enable it to carry the loan until a favourable opportunity occurs for unloading it on the public. The support of its government will smooth the path of the negotiations with the foreigner, and diminish the risk of default. There will be a clause in the agreement stipulating that a part of the loan shall be taken in German material, so that even if the transaction should not be successful financially, the banker may hope to recoup his financial loss out of the industrial profit. Like the showman at the fair, what he loses on the swings he gains on the roundabouts. It is well that all this should be recognized. But at the same time the pessimist may be reminded of the inception and growth of the gold-mines, the tea, the rubber, and the oil industries in recent years. This is sufficient evidence that the system of finance which prevails in this country presents no material obstacle, so far as the supply of capital is concerned, to the development of new foreign industries.

C. S. Addis.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE GERMAN THREAT

IT has for long been an axiom among those who have taken an intelligent interest in Central Asian politics that ' the Power which holds Herat holds the keys of the 'gates of India.' Those 'keys' are at present grasped by the friendly right hand of Habibullah Khan, Ameer of Afghanistan, and the Government of India has had no cause to harbour misgivings on his account. His Majesty has ever proved himself a strong and enlightened ruler, a lover of peace, and an honourable adherent to treaty obligations. Withal, he has consistently shown that it is his policy to cultivate friendly relations with the Indian Government, and to ensure the future of these friendly relations by developing the natural resources of Afghanistan and by fostering and extending its trade with India. The importance, from the British point of view, of this attitude, is emphasized when it is fully realized that a peaceful and prosperous and powerful Afghanistan is essential to the security of the north-west frontier of India. The maintenance of the integrity of Afghanistan is therefore a prominent feature of Indo-British policy.

The Ameer has already, in connexion with the present World War, clearly demonstrated his ability as a strong ruler and his steadfastness as a sympathetic neutral. Little doubt can remain that he is in favour of peace. He has exercised the great power he possesses to maintain tranquillity all over the rough and difficult area between Orenburg and Peshawar. He has also by his actions given practical proof that he desires no more wars with India. Of great and significant importance is the fact that in 1914 he resisted the attempts which were made to involve him in the present great struggle on the one hand for world supremacy, and on the other for the liberty and integrity of small nations. To the fanatical cries for ' war ' against the Infidels ' he turned a deaf ear, even although the pro-Turkish party had won to their side some of his own near relatives, and the Mullahs had stirred up the prejudices of a

not inconsiderable section of his people. His Majesty the Ameer effectively stamped out this insidious agitation in a typically Eastern and dramatic manner. Eye-witnesses of what was undoubtedly an historic spectacle relate that the Ameer appeared at the bridge of Kabul river in royal state. Holding in his hands a volume of the Koran, he asked those who were known to him to be the principal advocates of a Holy War to show him a chapter in the sacred book in which the faithful were urged to wage war against friends. No reply was forthcoming. No orthodox reply to such a shrewd and disconcerting question was, in fact, possible. Then in few but memorable words the august Ameer made known his policy. '*These Feringhis* (British),' he solemnly declared, '*are our friends.*' He paused and added, '*They are my friends.*' Another pause followed, and in the tingling silence he spoke clearly and firmly, saying, '*I, the "Light of Faith," I, the "Torch of the Nation," have decreed, and now repeat my decree, that no subject of mine shall lift a finger against the Feringhis.*'

The prestige of the Ameer was not only assured but increased by this bold and determined declaration. As if by the wave of a magician's wand the political situation was immediately transformed. His Majesty turned away from the Kabul bridge, leaving a united people who were ready to follow his lead and give loyal adherence to his august decree. This scene, novel as it may appear to the western mind, affords ample evidence of two things—(1) the supreme control exercised by the Ameer over his people, and (2) the friendly attitude he consistently maintains towards the British Government.

The benevolent autocracy of Habibullah Khan has to be exercised with discretion and maintained with tact. In the palace he finds it necessary to act the part of a diplomatist. Like the eastern potentates of old, he must respect the views of influential counsellors and maintain the balance of power between these representatives of conflicting interests and national ideals. It is an open secret in Kabul that the two main palace parties are led by a man and by a woman. The former is the Ameer's younger brother, Sirdar Nasrullah Khan, who has a strong following among the nobles and is commander-in-chief of the Afghan army, and the latter is his

stepmother, Bibi Halima, who is pronouncedly pro-British in sympathies, and has likewise the support of a powerful section. The Ameer's brother's attitude is difficult to define. He is certainly not pro-British; he is perhaps what a Westerner may describe as a 'Nationalist.' He combines with his 'Nationalism' anti-foreign, including anti-British, prejudices. A moderating influence in affairs of state has of necessity to be constantly exercised by the Ameer. Happily, he has a strong personality and is capable, as the Kabul bridge incident shows, of achieving in times of crisis a sheer personal triumph.

The confidence reposed in the Ameer by the masses of the people is undoubtedly a source of strength to him. Like his father, he has ever promoted peaceful and orderly conditions of life. In the old days, lurid memories of which are now recalled with shrugs of horror, tribal warfare was frequent and bloody in Afghanistan. Prince rose against prince in the palace and waded his way through the blood of kinsmen to the throne. A nightmare of persistent intrigue and disastrous feuds enveloped the whole land. In short, in those bad old days no one, as the Eastern proverb puts it, 'trusted even his own shadow.' Generations were born simply to fight; the Afghans fingered keen-edged weapons from their infancy. The administration of the late Ameer, continued by his enlightened successor, Habibullah Khan, has happily transformed Afghanistan and turned the energies of a virile people towards peaceful and elevating pursuits. The Ameer's policy, both in home affairs and in his foreign relations, is fully understood and appreciated by the Indian Government. His friendly attitude is a continuance of his father's policy. The late Ameer cultivated friendly relations with the British Government, which recognized him as an independent ruler, permitted the importation of munitions of war through British India so that the internal government of Afghanistan might be strengthened, and granted him an annual subsidy which now amounts to £120,000. The Ameer adheres strictly to this treaty, and the British Government in turn has dealt honourably with the Ameer.

It seemed even after the outbreak of the present war that nothing could possibly disturb the wonted attitude of the buffer state of Afghanistan, and that the security of the north-west frontier was assured, especially when the holder of 'the keys

'of the gates of India' made his dramatic declaration on the Kabul bridge. But the whole situation has undergone a change in consequence of the Russian revolution. Central Asia has suddenly been drawn into the vortex of international politics. There is now good cause to fear that a stronger hand than the Ameer's may endeavour to snatch from him 'the keys of the gates of India,' by first threatening and then occupying Herat, and even by threatening it alone. And that hand is Germany's—'the mailed fist.'

The first murmur of what may be, or what is really intended to be, a coming storm has already been heard. In its latest 'scrap of paper,' the peace treaty with one of the mushroom Russian republics, the German Government has gone out of its way to give what should be considered a wholly unnecessary guarantee that it will respect the integrity of Persia and Afghanistan. This seems to be a case of 'protesting too much.' It certainly engenders suspicion and, as will be shown, not without sufficient cause.

Taking Germany's promise for what it is worth, one may note two things—(1) that it has been considered necessary to make it so as to justify some move not yet unmasked, and (2) that no mention is made of Russian Turkestan or of the Khanate of Bokhara, which is a protectorate of Russia, and really, in all but name, a Russian province, although governed by a native Khan. The Ameer cannot help feeling that Germany's unsolicited interest in the integrity of his kingdom is far from reassuring. Just as the security of the north-western frontier depends on the continued maintenance of a free, independent, and strong Afghanistan, so does the security of Afghanistan depend on the maintenance of an unviolated Bokhara and a friendly and unaggressive Turkestan.

Russia's political collapse, which has brought about chaotic conditions in the provinces bordering on Persia and Afghanistan, has therefore raised problems which are a source of grave anxiety to the Ameer. He is well aware that the German threat is not only a possibility but is already, to a certain degree, a reality. For several years past German agents, in the guise of commercial travellers, have conducted a close investigation of Bokhara and Turkestan. They have hovered like flies, attracted by tempting food, round the borders of Afghanistan, and their propaganda has been scattered broad-

cast, penetrating even to quarters that the agents themselves have never been able to reach. Berlin has little to learn regarding the sentiments and political aspirations and prejudices of the Khanates and Turkomans and the commercial and industrial potentialities of Bokhara and Russian Turkestan. No doubt, the German Central Asian policy is already well and clearly planned.

Full advantage is certain to be taken by the Germans of the present confused situation. The Russian grip having been relaxed, the first step likely to recommend itself to them is to create a still greater state of chaos in Central Asia which would necessitate or, at least, excuse their active intervention. The diffusion of fresh German propaganda, as was clearly indicated recently by the Viceroy of India in his address to the Council of Princes at Delhi, is known to be already in progress, and the Kaiser's military forces are evidently making frantic efforts to reach the western shores of the Caspian Sea. Russian Turkestan, were that the only ultimate goal of German ambition, would in itself prove to be a rich prize well worth making an effort to secure. Nor would the effort require to be as great as might at first thought appear, to cause this province to drop like ripe fruit into German hands.

Once Turkestan was occupied, Bokhara would prove an easy prey. Indeed, it is probable that the Khan may be drawn into the German net by means of hypocritical promises and professions of friendship so as to co-operate in securing the penetration of Turkestan. An autocrat by temperament, the Khan of Bokhara has long fretted under the overlordship of Russia. His own and his subjects' politics are pronouncedly anti-Russian. But for the fact that the Czar's Government kept strong Cossack and European forces in Turkestan he would have asserted, long ere the Russian revolution broke out, the complete independence of his country, which at present is no doubt a reality. Bokhara, remembering the past and fearing a revival of Russian power, might well be prevailed upon to side with Russia's destroyer.

This spirit of hostility against Russia is shared by the Turkomans of Russian Turkestan. Although the Russians have done so much to develop the commerce and the industrial and agricultural resources of that country, and although they have converted great stretches of erstwhile barren soil into

well-irrigated and cotton-growing land, they have not succeeded in winning the sympathies of the people, who have maintained what is, after all, only an enforced loyalty. Their hostility has not been tempered by prosperity ; rather it has been intensified by it, even among the wandering Turkomans, who never before had the assured incomes they now derive by securing employment in Russian textile industries, but earned instead a precarious livelihood by attacking the Ameer's Kafilas. Russia, in the days of Tsardom, had to lay a firm hand on the province, which, although seething with discontent, was rapidly becoming one of its richest Asian assets. When the revolution broke out, half of Russia's cotton supply was being drawn from Turkestan. For several successive seasons as much as 13,697,000 poods were sent to Orenburg from Tashkend. Prior to the war the bulk of the Russian cotton supply was imported from Germany, but from 1914 until the outbreak of the revolution the Russian Government very wisely bestowed great attention on their Mid-Eastern provinces, and especially upon Turkestan, whose cotton output advanced by leaps and bounds. Germany was thus confronted by the unpleasant prospect that one of the inevitable results of the war would be the ruin of its cotton trade with Russia, owing to the rapid development of Russia's own cotton production. In addition to developing the cotton industries, Russia has also in Turkestan done much for agriculture. Wheat and barley have been grown in rapidly increasing quantities, and the cultivable areas are capable of great extension in the future. Gold and salt are found in the Ural Sea area.

Enough has been said in this connexion to indicate that Russian Turkestan is a rich and tempting enough prize to attract the Germans. Berlin, as has been indicated, is well aware of the sentiments of the Turkomans regarding Russia, and may be expected to take full advantage of this knowledge. The average Turkoman consistently regards the Russians as intruders, and this feeling has hardened into a political principle. He is accustomed, as I can freely assert from personal knowledge, to regard the activities of the Russians as being intended to benefit themselves chiefly. Outsiders may criticize this attitude. It is sufficient for the student of politics to recognize it. There can be no doubt about its reality. One of the causes of this prevailing discontent is the bitterness of

the Turkomans who still remember the gross severities suffered during the early stages of Russian intrusion. Another cause is the attitude of the Khan of Bokhara who has never been able to realize that the management of Turkestan concerns any other than his own infallible self. The Khan is sure to make a bid for full control of the provinces should opportunity offer. He is a powerful potentate, and if backed up by a strong force and liberally supplied with funds, would undoubtedly exercise his influence in assisting to throw off the Russian yoke. He would not find it difficult to fan the embers of discontent in Russian Turkestan. Should it happen that the Khan may prefer not to co-operate in a German penetration of the province, a breath to fan the dormant embers into flame could be blown from Germany.

German influence may penetrate more rapidly than is fully realized in this country. Bribery, at a time like the present, will assuredly accomplish much in Russia and in Central Asia. German gold can buy a not inconsiderable degree of Russian support; it can also purchase the allegiance of influential native agitators in Turkestan. In Bokhara, German gold may similarly ' work magic '; it would undoubtedly accomplish more than German bayonets and with much more dispatch. Indeed, German gold may cause trouble as far south as the Khyber, for it could be freely distributed with effect in stirring up the Uzbek party.

Of one thing there can be no doubt, and that is the gravity of the situation from the Ameer's point of view. Let us therefore survey briefly the outlook as it appears to His Majesty the Ameer and to his people. On the north-east of Afghanistan lies the Khanate of Bokhara; to the north and north-west is Russian Turkestan and westward lies Persia; to the south-west is the province of Seistan. By each of these states or provinces the Ameer's kingdom is more or less threatened; in certain of them there are smouldering antipathies and rivalries resembling those which have created the Balkan problem in Europe.

There is Persia, in the first place. The Persians want Herat; the fertile and beautiful Herat district is the Macedonia or the Dobrudja of Central Asia. The ethnic affinities with Persia of a large proportion of the Heraties constitute a sentimental bond, and the Shia sect of Moslems predominates there as it

does in Persia. The Afghans are mainly adherents of the Moslem sect of Sunnis. Like the Persians, the Heraties are not good fighters. They are descendants of plain-dwellers of sedentary habits, inclined to indolence, and they are lacking in the hardy qualities of the Afghan mountaineers, with their intense love of liberty and inherited valour fostered by immemorial traditions. The Herat area has ever been a hot-bed of intrigue, and would be found particularly susceptible of Germanic influence adroitly engineered. In the past it has been operated upon by Russian propaganda accompanied by systematic bribery. Even the Afghan officials and soldiers were being contaminated in the enervating and poisonous atmosphere of Herat. When, some years ago, the Ameer became aware of this, he issued an order that the Herat garrison should be changed every two months, and he took care that it should consist mainly of Kabul and Ghazni troops, that is, representatives of his most trusted subjects. The Herat question is one which is ever prone to cause friction between Persia and Afghanistan.

Seistan province, to the south-west, also constitutes another problem, and one liable at any moment to become acute. This extensive and low-lying area, sandwiched between Persia and Afghanistan, and divided between these Powers, as is the Basque country between France and Spain, is likewise a political hotbed. The population includes Armenians, Russian Jews, and Persian traders who, in the Afghan section, are far from being faithful adherents to the government of the Ameer. Liberally supplied with Russian funds, a section of the mixed population, and especially the commercial section, has for years pursued consistently and energetically the policy of promoting Russian trade in southern Afghanistan at the expense of Indo-British trade. So well have these Russian agents succeeded in their efforts that in many a town in southern Afghanistan scarcely a British or Indian article is to be seen.

On the north, Russian Turkestan has ever been a source of anxiety. The threat from this quarter is a very real one. Until recently it was the outpost in the mid-east of Russian power. To the Afghan it represented 'the claw of the Russian 'bear,' which seemed ever to be itching to clutch at a vital point in Afghanistan. The 'claw' already holds a district, which was wrested from Afghanistan in 1885, when Russian

encroachments almost brought about war between Russia and Great Britain. The negotiations conducted between the representatives of those great Powers had, however, a peaceful issue, but unfortunately at the expense of Afghanistan, for the determination of the frontier resulted in a decided gain to Russia. The Afghan town of Penjdeh was lost to the Ameer, and its loss is never likely to be forgotten. Wholly Afghan in sympathy as in race, Penjdeh and its area remains anti-Russian to this day. Its position gave to Russia an immense trading advantage. Situated in the extremely fertile Hari Rud valley, it was an excellent prize in itself. It has also a decided strategic importance, being situated on the western edge of the Karabel plateau, the whole of which became Russian, although it is the natural frontier of Afghanistan.

Merv lies to the north and is connected with Penjdeh by railway. It was from the Merv area that the Tekke-Turkomans of old were wont to make their predatory attacks on Persia and Afghanistan; Merv is indeed the strategic key which unlocks 'the gate' to Maruchak and that 'gate' is Penjdeh. The Russians have done their utmost to dominate the commercial life of northern Afghanistan and Persia from the Merv area, and, in accordance with this policy, goods are carried at greatly reduced rates over the Trans-Caspian railway. Thus the great trading centre of Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, is the commercial base for Russian Turkestan, and the starting-point for military expeditions into Central Asia. The Power which dominates the Caspian Sea and holds Merv has, either for military or trading purposes in Central Asia, an immense advantage, the value of which cannot be over-estimated. Should the Germans reach Baku in force, the commercial penetration of Russian Turkestan will at once become an imminent probability and that of Persia and Afghanistan an assured prospect. The same can be said of a military penetration. In this connexion one cannot overlook the great scheme recently referred to in German newspapers, to construct a canal from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and another from the Sea of Azov to the Caspian, by utilizing the river Don and its tributary, the Manitch, which connects a series of long narrow salt lakes. These canals are future possibilities. At present it is important to note that the trade

of the Caspian Sea is believed to be in possession of Germans or German agents, and the transportation of a German force from Baku to Krasnovodsk is less an imaginary contingency than is generally supposed in western Europe.

The next area from which a threat is ever possible, as the Ameer of Afghanistan fully realizes, is Bokhara. I have already indicated how the Germans could turn to account the anti-Russian sentiments of this province by bringing about in Russian Turkestan chaotic conditions which would be favourable to their policy of aggrandizement. As Herat and Maruchdak are threatened from Merv, so is Balkh from Bokhara city, with Kelif on the frontier as a 'spring-board' for starting from. An invading force which had India as its objective would not require in the first place to cross Afghanistan from Bokhara but could work round the eastern border into Chitral, so as to disturb that province with the liberal distribution of gold and munitions of war. By first setting Chitral in flame, the German invasion of India by way of Herat would be greatly facilitated.

The Ameer's anxieties regarding the integrity and defence of his kingdom should be and, as a matter of fact, are shared by all those in the British Empire who realize the importance of maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer state. A strong and friendly Afghanistan is a prime necessity for the future of India. About the reality of its friendship no doubt can now remain. The Ameer has been tested and not found wanting. The fact that his kingdom is likely to be threatened from the north will increase his power and unite his people and, withal, make them realize that their welfare depends on the consolidation of their friendship with British India. It may be remarked, in this connexion, that the Afghan has learned by experience to respect and appreciate British friendship. Great Britain has respected Afghan national ideals, and the friendship has not brought with it any loss of Afghan independence. Afghans know well, on the other hand, that the friendship of autocratic Russia in the past involved in the case of Bokhara the predomination in politics and commerce of a powerful neighbour. It is also fully realized that the independence of Afghanistan depends on the friendly interest of Great Britain. In short, Great Britain, is as much trusted as, in the immediate past, Russia was thoroughly distrusted, and Germany is

known to be a greater potential enemy than Russia ever was or ever was likely to become.

There is a party in Afghanistan which, taking into serious consideration the present grave situation in Russian Turkestan, favours the expansion of their country to the eastern coast of the Caspian. The Turkomans are allied in sympathy to the Afghans by the bonds of race and language. As in Afghanistan, too, the Moslem sect of Sunnis predominates. This expansion would create a prosperous and progressive greater Afghanistan and remove for ever the German threat in Central Asia. I refer to it merely as one of the suggested solutions of the Russian Turkestan problem which is already becoming acute. Another suggested solution is the creation of an independent Turkestan, which would effectively form a buffer state to prevent aggression on the part of Germany against Afghanistan and Persia and indirectly, therefore, against India.

The general opinion in England seems to be that Afghanistan of itself is sufficiently strong to prevent military penetration by even so strong a Power as Germany. This is a mistaken idea. The Afghan is, undoubtedly, an excellent fighting man, but it has to be recognized that he is neither trained nor equipped for modern warfare. Against any army supported by heavy artillery he could not set up a prolonged or effective resistance. Afghanistan, therefore, is only a ' paper buffer ' state,' and, as we have had to realize, treaties are not necessarily sure guarantees of the future stability of any kingdom, so long as Germany remains unbeaten.

It is my desire to impress upon the friendly British people that the immediate interests of my native country of Afghanistan are threefold—first, military ; second, commercial ; and third, industrial. To promote these interests the existing bond of friendship between British India and Afghanistan must be greatly strengthened and firmly consolidated.

The first interest is the military. Essentially a military folk, as is well known, the Afghan people are susceptible to the formation of a strong military kinship. They admire and esteem the British soldier and British military methods. Germany has attempted to woo them in this connexion by sending Krupp guns into the country, and although it has never been able to send German instructors, it may not have been unconcerned with the arrangement, which prevailed for a

time, of having a German-trained Turkish officer at Kabul. This Turkish officer was appointed a Colonel of Afghan Lancers. He trained the force efficiently, but his presence was resented by the nobles, who disliked the idea of having a foreigner in command of Afghan cavalry and especially of such a crack force as he had under him. The Turkish colonel had consequently to return to his own land. French guns have also been imported into Afghanistan, but the chief source for the supply of arms is through British India. That the Ameer has made good use of his armed forces is clearly shown by the fact that India has had no cause to distrust the friendly attitude of the Ameer, and that Afghanistan has been happily brought into a state of law and order which favours the promotion of trade and the extension of industrial activities. British example and influence has been fruitful of much good in Afghanistan.

The army of the Ameer, however, is in need of efficient officers, and these officers must be natives. My view, which is shared by other patriotic and progressive Afghans, is that facilities should be afforded the Ameer to have his officers trained at the British Military College at Quetta. If this policy were adopted the bond of sympathy which has happily been formed, and is growing daily stronger, between Afghanistan and British India would be secured for all time. The British-trained Afghan officer would become the missionary of British friendship in high and influential circles. If, on the other hand, British officers were sent to Kabul, such an arrangement would be productive of anti-British intrigue engineered from outside as well as within, for the Afghan is easily stirred up to resent foreign influence from whatever quarter it may come. Natural susceptibilities are extremely sensitive, and from the British point of view this is a good thing, because it is the very essence of Afghan patriotism—the patriotism which holds together the buffer state. Whether or not my proposal is the best one in the circumstances, the fact remains that Afghanistan must in some way be strengthened so that her resistance against aggression from any quarter may be assured in the future. It can be assured in no better way than by having a strong and efficient modern Afghan army.

The second Afghan interest is the commercial. Here one

can say at the outset that Great Britain has lagged behind, and missed great opportunities of achieving progress, while Russia has done her utmost to 'corner' everything. Afghanistan exports large and increasing quantities of dried fruit, raw hides, wool, silk, fur, etc. In return she requires sugar, green tea, machinery of all descriptions, cotton prints, household utensils, ghee, lace, and so on. Trade between India and Afghanistan should be nursed and systematically cultivated. At a time like the present, when Russia is disorganized and German commercial activities have to be directed into new channels, it will be nothing short of disastrous if no efforts are made to increase the commercial connexion between India and Afghanistan. The question is no mere domestic one. It has an international importance not to be underestimated. On the future development of Indo-Afghan trade much depends. The very security of India is involved while its commercial prosperity is also affected.

The third Afghan interest is the industrial development of the country. Of late years great progress has been achieved in this connexion under the enlightened direction of the Ameer. He has fully realized that peaceful conditions within his borders depend greatly on securing steady and remunerative employment for the masses of the people. He has employed British engineers at Kabul and introduced electric plant, while British guidance and assistance have been enlisted in the establishment and development of factories. Afghanistan has immense natural resources which, if they are fully taken advantage of, will make it a rich and prosperous country whose chief and vital interest will be the continued maintenance of peaceful conditions of life. There are extensive forests, untapped mineral veins, areas which can be utilized for cotton growing and areas which can be cultivated for cereals with profit. Withal, the country is in great need of roads and bridges, of the improvement of housing conditions and the introduction of modern sanitary appliances and principles.

It is of the utmost importance that the British public should know more about modern Afghanistan, which lingers chiefly in their imaginations as the scene of 'old, unhappy, far-off 'things, and battles long ago.' It is important also that extended knowledge should be accompanied by very real interest in the welfare of the Ameer's kingdom. A prosperous

and progressive Afghanistan, attached by strong commercial and sentimental bonds to British India, will do much to secure permanent peaceful conditions in Central Asia. If what I have written—writing as I do as a native of Afghanistan—will help to make my readers realize that Afghanistan is already awake and bestirring itself, and that its interests are closely bound up with British interests, I shall feel that I have accomplished some little good by taking up my pen and giving expression in the English language to views which are representative of those entertained by a not inconsiderable section of my countrymen.

Ikbal Ali Shah.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CANADA

THE recent general election in Canada constituted the first authoritative intervention of the Canadian people in the issues raised by the war. Though the life of the late House had been extended a twelvemonth, there was no popular demand for an election. The people of English-speaking Canada trusted the Government, and were prepared to go on trusting it, and it was generally hoped that the Twelfth Parliament would be prolonged by special legislation till the end of the war. The burdens, the sacrifices, the bereavements of the war had been borne without complaint, and with no other effect upon the great mass of the people than to stiffen their will against the enemy. The Canadian people are to-day supporting an armed force of their own raising and of their own sparing of nearly 450,000 men. More than 35,000 of these men have fallen in battle. War loans to the amount of nearly $800,000,000 have been raised by the Canadian Government. The country's expenditure on war account has risen to a million dollars a day. These figures may not be impressive when compared with the corresponding totals of the United Kingdom, but they seem mountainous to a country of less then 8,000,000 inhabitants, for years absorbed in its own material development, borrowing for that purpose between $200,000,000 and $300,000,000 annually, and for the same purpose bringing in immigrants of average quality faster than it has since been sending out the flower of its young manhood to fight for the Empire. Even when Sir Robert Borden declared himself for compulsory military service, no opposition came from English-speaking Canada. There was, however, opposition from other quarters, and Sir Robert Borden saw that by keeping to the rut of party government he might fail in his object of reinforcing the overseas army, even if he succeeded in the party fight. To put a compulsory service law on the statute book by force of a party majority in parliament is one thing; to give effect

to such a law under a government representing but one of the political parties is another. Inevitably there would be accusations of unfairness ; the party in office would be charged with discriminating against the party out of office ; men eligible for military service would resent, and possibly resist, their compulsory drafting by officials whom they regarded as of the camp of their political adversaries. Therefore, both for the purpose of keeping the war-time election as free as possible from discord, and for the purpose of obtaining through that election the largest unanimity in support of the Military Service Act, Sir Robert almost from the day of his return from the Imperial War Conference last summer laboured to form a Union Government.

Parliament had come to be too generally looked upon as a party arena where gladiators of two opposing camps contended. Extremes of partyism that would have been ruled out a generation previously had come to be recognized as legitimate in parliamentary warfare. Measures designed for the public good and for identifying the country with the Empire were treated by the Opposition, whatever its party complexion, as mere manœuvres to catch votes, and Opposition strategy was too often directed to frustrating those measures, even when their merits were recognized. In a country of intelligent and loyal people this state of affairs was bound to come to an end no matter how artfully party strife might be egged on. In the general election of 1911, the issue being the reciprocity pact with the United States, many Ontario Liberals left their party and voted against reciprocity, less on economic grounds than because they regarded the agreement as too strongly committing Canada's tariff fortunes to those of the United States, thereby thwarting the Imperial preference policy then occupying the thoughts of many of the Canadian people. On the other hand, the economic argument in favour of the pact had great weight with the people of the Western Provinces. In Saskatchewan and Alberta the vote was strongly in favour of the pact, though in Manitoba and British Columbia it was overwhelmingly against the pact. Economic considerations count for more with the West to-day even than they did then, but observers of that part of the country would grievously wrong it if they mistook its leaning towards reciprocity with the United States to mean alienation

from the Empire. Together the provinces of the West have sent more men to the front per thousand of population than any other province of Canada has sent. So far from being wedded to any particular party, notwithstanding the seeming bondage of Saskatchewan and Alberta to Liberalism, the serious business of Western politics is the building up of the West. What with the revolt against the excesses of partyism in Ontario, the racialism of Quebec, and the economic preoccupation of Western Canada, the time was at hand when the destinies of the Dominion could not be determined simply by a contest between Grits and Tories, made the most of by players of the lone hand in Quebec. The war and Canada's keen participation in it, Sir Robert Borden fortunately being Prime Minister, hurried to completion the leavening process of union that for some time before had been silently working among the parties and sections in Canada, and inaugurated, every loyal British Canadian hopes, a new and more splendid era in the history of the country.

The greatest difficulty confronting Sir Robert's compulsory service policy, and his efforts to unite both political parties in support of it, came from Quebec. Almost from the first that province had been worse than listless towards Canada's part in the war. According to an official report the number of French-Canadians who had enlisted in Quebec by the end of last winter did not exceed ten thousand, whereas some five thousand French-Canadians in other parts of the country had offered themselves and been accepted. From the first the efforts to obtain volunteers in Quebec were discouraged. Recruiting meetings were attended by disturbers, speakers were howled down, and young French-Canadians who showed any disposition to enlist were made to feel that if they donned the uniform they would get the cold shoulder from their friends. A few of the newspapers and some of the men of influence in the province reprobated this conduct; but for the most part the press excused it, and other men, prominent in the public life of the province, used ingenious if not ingenuous arguments to prove that the blame for the disturbances really rested on the government. Men who were looked up to by the younger generation publicly urged that the European war was no concern of Canada's, and that Canada ought to keep out of it until she found herself in danger of invasion.

The man who made himself most conspicuous in this way was Mr. Henri Bourassa, editor of *Le Devoir*, a French evening paper published in Montreal. Mr. Bourassa was not a member of the last parliament, nor has he been elected to the new parliament, but he is the recognized leader of the Nationalists, a political group which had its rebirth in a former controversy in the Quebec Liberal party over Canada's part in the Empire's defence. Mr. Bourassa was a member of the House that was elected in 1896, when Sir Wilfrid Laurier took office. Sir Wilfrid had no more admiring disciple than this somewhat restless and brilliant man. But the South African war came between them. In October, 1899, Mr. Bourassa resigned his seat in order to go back to his electors and submit his anti-Imperialist views to them. He was returned by acclamation. From that time until he left the Dominion Parliament in 1907 he was not a thoroughgoing supporter of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's. He was against Canadians participating in the South African war, he was against the measure for establishing a Canadian navy in 1910, and he is against Canada's taking part in the present war. In his newspaper he opposed the volunteering stage of recruiting and more strenuously opposed the drafting stage.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, as the leader of an all-Canada party, felt that he must play his cards skilfully to make that party a winning one at the polls. The strength of some successful party leaders lies, not in their parliamentary management, their adroitness, or their personal magnetism, but in the compelling soundness of their public policy. Other successful party leaders owe little of their mastery to their statesmanship and much to their skill in handling men and groups. Sir Wilfrid Laurier belongs to the latter group. It is not to be said that he takes no account of public policy, but in his philosophy party generalship comes first.

In the case of the South African war Sir Wilfrid could say to his English-speaking followers that the men who desired to volunteer to serve the Empire had been permitted to do so; to his French-speaking followers he said that he had not sent any troops to fight Great Britain's battles; that he had simply allowed those who wanted to form a contingent to do so, and that he had left Great Britain to bear the cost. It was only under strong pressure from English-

speaking Canada that Sir Wilfrid had gone even that distance.

In his Naval Service Bill, which he introduced into the House early in 1910, and which became law in that session, Sir Wilfrid went farther, but his caution increased as he proceeded. In introducing the measure he said: 'When Britain is at war 'Canada is at war.' When he moved the second reading of the Bill early in the following February he qualified that statement by saying: 'If England is at war we are at war 'and liable to attack. I do not say that we shall always be 'attacked, neither do I say that we would take part in all 'the wars of England. That is a matter that must be guided 'by circumstances, upon which the Canadian Parliament 'will have to pronounce, and will have to decide in its own 'best judgment.' He saw no cause for war arising between the United Kingdom and Germany. In the course of the ensuing debates on the Bill he said in answer to a question: 'Undoubtedly, when England is at war Canada is at war, 'but it does not follow that Canada is bound to take part in 'all the wars in which England is engaged. These wars may 'be very far from Canada. These wars may be of such a 'character that Canada might have no interest in them. 'They might be of serious moment or they might be insig-'nificant.'

About the time that the Laurier Naval Service Bill was introduced into the House (January, 1910), Mr. Bourassa's paper *Le Devoir* came into existence. It was out-and-out against the new measure, against Canada's taking part in the Empire's naval defence or in Great Britain's wars. So far from repenting of the separatist ideas he had expressed more than eight years before as a member of parliament opposed to the sending of Canadian volunteers to aid the British forces in South Africa, Mr. Bourassa had evidently become more confirmed therein. In his editorials and speeches he did much to stir up Quebec feeling against the Laurier Naval Service Act. His activity put reviving breath into the Nationalist Party. When the seat for the French-Canadian constituency of Drummond and Athabasca became vacant a Nationalist candidate was returned in the by-election of November, 1910. That was disconcerting to Sir Wilfrid, for the constituency had a long Liberal record. It opened

his eyes to the seriousness of the reaction of his Naval Service Bill upon French-Canadian opinion. The negotiations which were entered upon at that time by the Canadian and American Governments on the subject of reciprocity set a new series of events moving which swept him ten months later to defeat at the polls. Had he foreseen that a general election would so soon be forced upon him he would probably have brought in a Naval Service Bill of a different character. As it was, though tenders for the construction of the warships were called for and received before Sir Wilfrid found himself nearing the rapids of a general election, his government did not give out the contracts. Consequently, in the election campaign of 1911 his Quebec supporters were able to tell the voters that the new navy was still a thing on paper and that they were not to be drawn into Great Britain's wars. But the Laurier Government's inaction in regard to its naval programme did not save the situation, and in the general election of September 21, 1911, Sir Wilfrid was beaten.

His defeat did not weaken his faith in his system of party campaigning. On the contrary, it confirmed him therein. In his Naval Service Bill, careful though he had been not to tip the scales to the British side, he had not weighted the other side enough to suit a large volume of French-Canadian opinion, worked upon as it had been by Mr. Bourassa, Mr. Monk, and others. After the 1911 election, in order to live down his Naval Service Bill, Sir Wilfrid showed himself colder than ever towards proposals to commit Canada to measures of Imperial defence. In the session of 1913 he opposed Sir Robert Borden's Naval Aid Bill to enable the Canadian Government to strengthen the Royal Navy by a gift of three battleships. The Bill passed the House only after a long and extremely bitter party fight; it was defeated in the Senate by Sir Wilfrid's majority there. This time Sir Wilfrid Laurier did not let himself be outdone by Mr. Bourassa as an assertor of Canada's 'autonomy,' and his opposition to the Borden Naval Aid Bill undoubtedly went far to rehabilitate him in the eyes of the Quebec voters who had forsaken him in 1911. It is probable, however, that any gain he had made in French-speaking Canada was more than offset by loss in English-speaking Canada.

In other controversies dealt with by the last parliament,

in which Quebec took a keen interest, Sir Wilfrid sided with that province, notably in the debates over the Bill for extending the boundaries of Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec, a controversy which involved the question of the school rights of minorities. In all the provinces between the Ottawa River and the Rocky Mountains the school question has been a bone of contention between English and French. It was the controversy over the educational rights of the Roman Catholic minority in Manitoba which opened the door of office to Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1896. He then got the support of a large proportion of English-speaking Canadians because he agreed to terms of settlement that were acceptable to the Manitoba government of the day, a government in the hands of his own party friends. At the same time, French-speaking Canada strongly supported him upon the understanding that he would be at least as favourable to the separate schools in Manitoba as the Conservative government had been. But the Manitoba school question did not disappear. From time to time it has since vexed the relations between Protestants and Roman Catholics, but especially between English-speaking and French-speaking sections of Manitoba, and when the bounds of Manitoba were extended to Hudson Bay a strong stand was made by Quebec members for the granting of special school rights to the minority throughout the annexed territory. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, as leader of the Opposition, gave his countenance to these demands.

Years before the Manitoba school controversy sprang up the question of language rights in the north-west territories had been fiercely debated in parliament, the French-Canadian members taking strong ground in favour of their mother tongue as an official language in that part of Canada, a great part of which has since been organized into the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. When those two provinces were set up in 1905, Sir Wilfrid Laurier then being in power, he inserted in their constitutions (which are Acts of the Dominion parliament) a provision which had the effect of tying the hands of the legislatures of the two new provinces, and securing the continuance of language rights to such separate schools as existed in the north-west territories under the Ordinances passed in 1901. This was very agreeable to Quebec, and was made acceptable to the two new provinces

by the handsome subsidies provided in their Autonomy Acts. By thus perpetuating in Saskatchewan and Alberta the separate school rights established in these territories before they became provinces Sir Wilfrid Laurier made himself answerable for a bad state of educational affairs over which public opinion is strongly agitated to-day in Saskatchewan.

In the ten years preceding the war immigrants were swarming into the Canadian west, especially into Saskatchewan. The immigrants coming from the various countries of continental Europe in most cases settled in colonies of their respective nationalities. Thus they sought to preserve the language and customs of the land of their birth. The newcomers were soon made to perceive that the government held their fortunes in the hollow of its hand. If they failed to carry out the conditions of their land grants, the lands could be taken away from them. It was the duty of party workers to see that the settlers from foreign countries were duly impressed with the difference between basking in the sunshine of the provincial government's favour and incurring its displeasure. These aliens were generally induced to make haste to become naturalized, three years being the term of probation. The German, Austrian, Bulgarian, and other groups of ex-aliens became a tower of strength to the provincial government, the more so because of the study of that government to attach their support. Its school regulations were well designed to that end. These provided that the school board of any district might employ teachers to give instruction in any language other than the English language to all pupils whose parents or guardians desired such instruction for them. It has therefore come about that many languages are being taught in the public schools of Saskatchewan, and that in many districts the children of English-speaking parents are unable to receive a proper schooling in their mother tongue.

The fruit of this educational policy has been ripening since the war began. Truckling to voters born in enemy countries has tended to keep alive their pride of original nationality and to pass it on in full strength to their Canadian-born children. Many of the naturalized Germans and Austrians of Saskatchewan and Alberta did not, at least early in the war, dissemble the coldness of their British allegiance. Sir Robert Borden's War-time Elections Act suspended during

the period of the war the suffrage in the case of all persons born in enemy countries who had been naturalized after March 31, 1902. But for this legislation the showing of the three Prairie Provinces in the recent election would have been far less favourable to union government and to compulsory service than it was. The English-speaking people of Saskatchewan are now coming to the rescue of their language. Towards the end of February, 1918, a great meeting of the school trustees from all districts of the province was held in the town of Saskatoon, and resolutions were passed calling upon the provincial government to take steps to ensure that every child in the province receive adequate instruction in the English language; that no language but English be used as the language of instruction in any school in the province; and that no language except English be taught during the school hours in any school which comes under the provisions of the School Act. These resolutions are, of course, no more to the liking of French-speaking Canada than of the alien races in Saskatchewan.

About the time the war broke out the quarrel between Quebec and Ontario over the use of the French language in the schools of the latter province was at its height, and the Quebec feeling generated in that quarrel was skilfully used by unscrupulous men to turn the French-Canadian people against recruiting. For many years there has been a drifting of population from the north side of the Ottawa river to the south side, from the French-speaking province of Quebec to the English-speaking province of Ontario. As the trek continued, the border counties of Ontario acquired more and more the character of an extension of Quebec. The French settlers established themselves in knots and the areas they gained were gradually consolidated. Even if the new-comers had shown a disposition to maintain cordial social and commercial intercourse with the English-speaking people, among whom they had thrust themselves, their strict adherence to the French language would have kept a gulf between the two races in the one neighbourhood. The control of public schools is a matter largely of district government. It gradually came about that there were few English-speaking pupils to attend the schools in the French block. Courses that were acceptable to the religious authorities were taken up, and the French language was

practically the only language taught and the only language used for purposes of instruction. From time to time protests were made in the legislature against this state of affairs, and regulations were issued to correct it—regulations, however, which were indulgent in so far as the use of French as the language of instruction was concerned.

At last the Ontario government under Sir James Whitney was constrained to take a stand in support of English as the one language of instruction in the public schools of Ontario. What is known as Regulation 17 provided that in all schools, the so-called 'bilingual' schools included, the one language of instruction should be the English language, save in the case of very young pupils whose mother tongue is not English. An English-speaking inspector was appointed to see that teachers competent to use the English language as a medium of instruction were placed in the 'bilingual' schools and performed their duties in accordance with the law. Training courses were provided in which French teachers could qualify themselves for the work. There was provision too for school instruction in the use of the French language. A storm of protest followed, not so much from the French-speaking sections of Eastern, South-western, and Northern Ontario, as from Quebec. Regulation 17 was denounced as a measure of intolerance and persecution, and as a violation of the constitution. Particularly inflammatory was the campaign carried on by *Le Devoir* and other Quebec newspapers. They denounced the Regulation as an outburst of hatred directed against the French language and the Roman Catholic religion. These statements are quite unjustifiable. French is more largely taught in the secondary schools of Ontario than any other language except English; no element in the Province of Ontario was more strongly opposed to the use of French as a language of instruction and as a second official language than was the body of English-speaking Roman Catholics.

While Sir Wilfrid conspicuously associated himself with the Quebec side in this question, he was careful never to accept avowedly the racial, religious, sectional, or anti-British basis of the Quebec movement. He pleaded that Regulation 17 should be modified in the interest of French-Canadians, but he put his plea on the large ground of Canadian unity and harmony. He did not defend Quebec's stand against either

voluntary or compulsory service in the overseas forces, but he said much about personal liberty and the right of the people to decide. ' Canadian unity ' and ' the liberty of the subject ' are phrases that sound well to English-speaking Liberals, and Sir Wilfrid evidently convinced himself that he could win in the last general election by taking the French side in Quebec and using catchwords of Liberalism in English-speaking Canada.

Even if political incendiaries in Quebec had been less busy for the last twenty years, French-Canadian war feeling might still not have risen by this time to the same pitch as English-Canadian war feeling. More than any other body of people in the Dominion, the *habitants* order their lives in accordance with the counsels of their spiritual guides, who make a point of concerning themselves with the personal, family, and social affairs of their flocks. This is conducive to the happiness of the simple life and to the maintenance of law and order ; but it keeps French-Canadians aloof from the general movements of opinion and disqualifies them from sharing with the same zest as English-speaking Canadians in the study of matters pertaining to the larger citizenship of the Dominion. From the best of motives it has been the policy of the Church to keep Quebec a pent-up Utica, and by using its influence to retain the young people at home, to get them married and attached to domestic duties early in life the Church has promoted the growth of the French-Canadian population, which is the most prolific in Canada. It is only by immigration that English-speaking Canada has been able to gain ground in the national legislature in the race with Quebec fecundity. Ontario and the maritime provinces are portions of English-speaking Canada in which ground has been lost, their representation in the new House being lower than it was in the old. As the west is likely to keep on growing by immigration from the United States, the balance of political power in the Dominion parliament tends to settle to that side of the country. Of the 235 members who constitute the new House of Commons fifty-seven come from Western Canada, including Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and the Yukon. That is to say, Western Canada has a representation in the new House that comes short of Quebec's representation by only eight members.

It is not necessary to believe that the French-Canadian clergy were latterly or at any time parties to any *Quebec Ueber Alles* policy. They were attending to their duties as pastors of their people. In the hard times of the late 'eighties and the early 'nineties they had an experience which taught them that the youth of Quebec would soon depart from the submissive way of life in which they had been brought up, if they were allowed to wander from their social and religious institutions. In those days thousands of young men and women from the province, finding it difficult to make a living at home, went to the Eastern States of the neighbouring republic, and there obtained employment in the cotton mills and paper mills and other industries. Many of these made their homes there, and no people in the United States have been readier to accept conscription and enrol in the army that country is raising for overseas service against Germany than the sons of these Canadian exiles. This war difference between French-Canadians in the Eastern States and the French-Canadians in Quebec must be set down to difference in social surroundings. The exodus from Quebec to the United States in the lean years mentioned produced effects that came more immediately under the notice of *curés*. When these young people came home to spend the Christmas holidays or to begin life anew there, it was observed that they had forgotten some of their manners. Instead of showing the old-time deference to the parish priest they behaved with curtness. More than that, they remarked upon the oddness, the 'backwoodness' of their parents in rendering humble duty to the local clergyman. That experience had the effect of starting a strong movement under Church auspices to open up colonies and build railways thereto within the province itself, so that homes could be found and industries established to provide for the overflow from the congested districts. And when French-Canadian settlers went into other parts of Canada, notably into Ontario, it was usually in settlements of many families, and under the wing of the Church.

This clerical solicitude for the French-Canadian people has undoubtedly, in a sense, hindered the 'Dominionizing' of Quebec; but to say that the political ideas that have sprung up on French-Canadian soil are the fruit of clerical planting would not be just. These for the most part are the work of

other sowers, of politicians who are shrewd enough to keep dutiful to the Church, but who have their own axes to grind and who have few scruples about misrepresenting English-speaking Canadians and discrediting the British connexion. With the clergy it is *pro ecclesia* rather than *contra imperium*. Some of the warmest expressions of loyalty to Great Britain and the Empire that have been heard in this war-time have come from the higher clergy of French-speaking Canada. How any thinking French-Canadian could entertain the idea of having his province under any other flag than the Union Jack it is not easy to conceive. Sir Etienne Tache's declaration that the last gun fired in support of British supremacy in British North America would be fired by the hand of a French-Canadian was no mere rhetorical flourish, but a reasoned statement.

Quebec has the advantage of having at the head of its Provincial Government a man of sanity and tact, Sir Lomer Gouin. At the beginning of the session of the legislature in January, one of the members of the Assembly, Mr. Francœur of Lotbinière, introduced a resolution to the effect that if other provinces desired Quebec to withdraw from confederation, Quebec would be prepared to consider the matter. Ominous as it seemed, this resolution ended well, as was no doubt intended at the outset. Looked at as a thing of the past, it has the appearance of a parliamentary manœuvre to set Quebec right in the eyes of the world. The debate on the resolution was conducted on a high plane, the speeches being such as well became the members of a legislature of a self-governing province under the British Crown. Especially admirable was Sir Lomer Gouin's speech, in which he gave eloquent expression to his feelings of loyalty to confederation and to British connexion. His administration of his native province has been along progressive lines. The production of wealth has greatly increased and the public credit was never higher. On its eastern frontier Quebec touches the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, as well as the province of New Brunswick. The St. Lawrence river, the great artery of Canada's commerce with transatlantic countries, passes through the province of Quebec. Thus environed, it is impossible that the rural people of French-speaking Canada should remain in their present state of

simplicity and let their opinions continue to be made for them by unworldly men of religion on the one hand and designing demagogues on the other.

For Canada 'coalition' is a word of happy association and of good augury. It was a Coalition Government that brought the old Province of Canada—composed of Ontario and Quebec—into the great project of confederation, and it was by ministers of that coalition, conferring with representatives of other British North American provinces, that these were brought into confederation at the same time. Fifty years after the meeting of the first parliament of the Dominion of Canada, the thirteenth parliament was elected to support a Coalition Government. It would have been well for the Dominion had the same concord held between the two political parties throughout its history as at the time of its birth. Some things that were in the prospectus of the first Dominion Government remain to be finished or to be taken out of misdirected courses. Some good the Dominion may have got out of party politics, but more harm. Canadian partyism has been the bulwark of Quebec nationalism.

It has been Canada's experience that where the Party System rankly flourishes, the Spoils System is seldom in a languishing state. Personally, ministers may wash their hands in innocency, but, when the machine rules, the party campaign fund must be kept filled, contributions to it must be repaid by the tariff favours, the fat contracts, railway concessions, senatorships, etc., of which future delivery was implied or expressly stipulated in return for the cash turned over to the party war chest. The zeal of party workers must be rewarded and places of trust and emolument are given to them, however unfitted for such offices they may be. The public estate is made poorer by the transfer of agricultural areas, coal lands, timber berths, power sites, railway grants, etc. Wasteful expenditure is made upon undertakings, not because the country needs them but because the exploiters need the money and because votes can thereby be bought in round lots. The public service, carried on at an excessive cost, is kept at a low state of efficiency. With extravagance, patronage, graft, all of them the offspring of party government, Canada had her own troubles in that piping time of peace and hey-day of her material development,

the first decade of this century. Of the wild oats sowed in that seed-time some of the crop is shooting up in the midst of the yield of a later and better husbandry.

A big railway problem that cannot be waved aside now thrusts itself upon the attention of the government, when its own powers and the country's financial resources are kept under the heaviest strain by the business of the war. The Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, the National Transcontinental Railway (a government-built road which the Grand Trunk Pacific was to operate), and the Canadian Northern Railway came to a pass at which choice had to be made by the government between allowing their usefulness to be greatly impaired or taking the responsibility of providing for their finances. Never was it so important to the country that the efficiency of the railway should be at the maximum as it is now, when the winning of the war may depend on the production and transportation of supplies, especially of Canadian foodstuffs. To follow up the old government policy of loaning money to the railroads or buttressing their credit would be to get deeper into a quagmire into which many scores of millions of public money have already disappeared. The Canadian Northern Railway and its tributary lines have been taken over by the government, and the question of what sum must be paid to the company to complete the government ownership is now a matter of arbitration. After being constructed at an enormous cost to the public, the National Transcontinental Railway, which was to have been operated by the Grand Trunk Pacific, proved, as every reasonable critic predicted, a misplaced enterprise. If there had been less of 'politics' and more of sound business policy in the railway construction of the first decade of the century, the railway situation in Canada would not have been in its present welter. According to the reports of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the affairs of the National Transcontinental Railway, upwards of $40,000,000 of the public money was unnecessarily spent upon it. The situation in Canada's railway affairs has brought forth a clamour for government ownership. If the Laurier government had not meddled with the Grand Trunk Railway Company's project to extend its system into the west, the present government might not have been embarrassed with the brood of troubles that have come home

to roost. The demand for public ownership is in some quarters sweeping enough to include the Canadian Pacific Railway, a system that is nearer business perfection than any service or undertaking carried on under public ownership in Canada. Its forwarding of the crop from Western Canada this autumn was truly wonderful. The C.P.R. has shown itself to be one of the great war service organizations of the Empire.

While it may be true that in all democratic countries the material interests of the nation are to some extent made the sport and spoil of party politics, it is less commonly true that the nation is thereby pulled out of the course charted for it by its founders. Partyism was deflecting the needle of the Canadian compass. The party system was taken advantage of by racial leaders who had little use for either Toryism or Gritism.

Suspicion and dislike of English-speaking Canada and of everything British were systematically inculcated by some leaders now revered by the French-Canadian people. And there have been not merely local but national leaders in Canada, some of them English-speaking, who did not disdain to truckle to the ill-feeling thus generated in Ontario against things British. This had the mischievous effect of putting sometimes one, sometimes the other, of the English-speaking parties in a false light as towards British connexion.

It looks as if Sir Robert Borden had wrought a moral revolution in Canadian politics that will put an end to all serious divisions in the Dominion and bring about that more perfect union looked forward to by the greatest of the Fathers of Confederation. The difficulties were tremendous, but by infinite patience he carried one position after another. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's refusal to join in a 'fifty-fifty' coalition to put through parliament Sir Robert's announced plan for reinforcing the army by selective draft did not discourage the Premier. He persevered in his efforts to form a Union Government. He had the hearty co-operation of his own colleagues in the Cabinet and but little countenance from the leading Liberal politicians. Sir Robert's Conservative fellow-ministers had placed their resignations at his disposal. If he could find enough responsible Liberals to fill half the places under him in the Cabinet, he would have no difficulty in getting those places vacated by Conservatives then occupying them.

He made approaches to several of Sir Wilfrid's principal followers in the House. He opened communications with leading Liberals in provincial politics. To the onlooking public his task seemed hopeless. He has prevailed by sheer force of patriotism. More than any other Canadian statesman Sir Robert Borden stands out as the National Moderator.

In the Western provinces, especially in Saskatchewan and Alberta, there are many people of enemy country birth. Being widely distributed in the constituencies, the power of these numerous ex-aliens at the polls would be great, and would certainly not be exerted in favour of reinforcing the Canadian troops. No part of the country has a more creditable showing at the front than the Canadian west. The four provinces west of the Great Lakes have a record for volunteering that, relatively to population, is not excelled in any other part of Canada. That being so, the home voting would be in a very large degree in the hands of persons of enemy country birth or descent. Sir Robert Borden took the perfectly reasonable view that naturalized citizens of enemy country birth ought neither to be permitted to vote in the war-time election nor required to serve against their fatherland. Accordingly he introduced his War-time Elections Bill, which, like his Military Service Bill, was put through parliament against the strong opposition of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his remaining adherents. After that measure became law there was little chance of the west, whose representation in the new parliament was increased by twenty-two members, returning a majority in favour of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. The War-time Elections Act also established a Dominion franchise independent of the provincial franchise laws, and conferred the vote on all the women of Canada who are mothers, wives, sisters, or daughters of men serving overseas. This added hundreds of thousands to the voters' list. In some cases there would be as many as half a dozen women relatives of a man entitled to vote because he was in the army. By previous legislation the soldiers themselves were all enabled to vote in this election. It was the delay in counting their votes that kept the election returns so long incomplete.

For many weeks before the election it was manifest that English-speaking Canada, irrespective of party, was rallying to Sir Robert Borden. That this was a consequence of

increasing war sentiment is not the inference to be drawn, for the balance of opinion throughout English-speaking Canada was unmistakably heavy in favour of further war efforts before the question of compulsory service was taken up by the government. The point is, that the mass of the people were getting out of the party grooves and showing themselves to be of one mind against the enemy. They were throwing off the metaphysics of partyism. The delusion that there was a Liberal way of supporting the war different from the Conservative way could no longer be kept up by party sophists. The crushing force of the war facts was too much for the stewards of partyism. Former strong supporters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier in Ontario and the western provinces called forth outbursts of applause by their declarations from public platforms that this British Dominion must not come under the control of a political leader elected to office by the grace of Quebec and its political masters and religious pastors.

It will not be the Premier's fault if the union he has established does not last. Having vanquished self-seeking partyism, he now proposes to famish it, for the effect of his abolition of patronage and his project of civil service reform can be no less than the starving out of the plunder-bund of party politics. The Union Government is receiving very loyal and very general support from the press, which assuredly is not concerning itself much about the fate of party systems, now that the best principles of both parties are held to by the government of the day. The support of the great body of Canada's English newspapers is no slight testimonial to the character of the government. Of the polemics of Canadian politics comparatively little is now to be found in the country's English press. That is a condition very favourable to the cementing of the bonds between the two elements of the Union Government. Much of the stereotype of politics has been made obsolete by the war and must go to the melting-pot. Take the tariff question, for example. It cannot be exactly what it was before the war. The Imperial sentiment of Canada, as expressed by more than four hundred thousand of its sons who volunteered to fight the battles of the Empire, and as expressed at the polls by the great majority of English-speaking Canadians, must have its part in shaping the tariff. The need for larger revenue to carry out the programmes of

reconstruction will also have its weight in determining tariff policy. So will the goodwill of Canada towards its neighbour and ally, the United States. The claims of the west, too, supported as they now will be by a greatly increased representation in parliament, and favoured, as they will be, by the national gratitude for the west's magnificent part in the war, cannot be disregarded. It is worth while to add that the two parties in the Ontario Legislative Assembly have agreed to avoid a war-time election and maintain a truce until the war is over. Very possibly other provincial legislatures in the Dominion will come to similar agreements. The effect of this suspension of party strife in provincial politics must be to give the new union at Ottawa a chance to become firmly knit. If the Conservatives and Liberals in the Union Government live up to the covenant to which they have severally put their hands, they need have no fear of any 'cave' of grafters, hard-shell partisans, racialists, and disloyalists that may gather themselves unto any political captain whatever, for the great mass of the English-speaking people are as solid for clean government as they are for British-Canadianism.

CLAUD A. C. JENNINGS.

NATIONAL EXPENDITURE

1. Reports from the Select Committee on National Expenditure, 151, 167, 188 (1917); 23, 30, and 59 (1918).
2. Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Official Report Vols. 102–105.

INTER arma silent leges. Literally interpreted the ancient aphorism has lost none of its point; but it is not less applicable if for judicial laws we substitute those 'observed uniformities' which economists are wont to describe as 'laws.' So far as they are laws, and not mere maxims of the schools, their silence is not likely to be permanent. The vindication of economic laws may be more tardy than that which attends upon the transgression of the laws enacted by senates, but it is at least as sure.

Such reflections, though trite, are inevitably suggested by a perusal of the reports presented to the House of Commons during the last few months by the Select Committee on National Expenditure. The Committee was appointed on July 27, 1917, and its terms of reference were as follows:

'To examine the current expenditure defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament and to report what, if any, economies consistent with the execution of the policy decided by the Government may be effected therein. To make recommendations in regard to the form of public accounts, the system of control within the departments and by the Treasury, and the procedure of this House in relation to Supply and Appropriation, so as to secure more effective control by Parliament over public expenditure; and to have power to appoint from outside its own body such additional persons as it may think fit to serve on any Sub-Committee which it may appoint with the view to the preparation of such recommendations.'

The Committee got to work without delay; it distributed its duties among six sub-committees, dealing with (1) The War Office; (2) The Admiralty and the Ministry of Shipping; (3) The Ministry of Munitions and the Air Board; (4) The

Treasury; (5) The Office of Works, the National Service Department, the Ministry of Labour, and the Post Office; and (6) The Ministry of Food, the Wheat and Sugar Commissions, the Board of Agriculture, the Ministry of Blockade, and the Board of Trade and the multitude of new departments which the Board of Trade has thrown off during the war. Two further sub-committees were also appointed of a somewhat different character. One was charged with the duty of considering the form of public accounts and of reporting what changes, if any, are desirable; the other was ordered to report on 'the present procedure of the House of Commons in relation 'to Supply and Appropriation, and on proposals for its amend-'ment with a view to securing more effective control by 'Parliament over public expenditure.'

It was obvious that if any effective purpose was to be served as regards current expenditure, investigations would have to be carried through with expedition, and the results of them would have to be embodied in a series of interim reports. No fewer than six such reports have already been presented to the House of Commons. From a perusal of these, together with a consideration of the detailed information given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the action already taken by the Government on the several recommendations of the Committee, the public is in a position to estimate the value of the work accomplished by the Committee. But the reports, though widely noticed in the daily and weekly press, are at once voluminous and somewhat technical, and Mr. Bonar Law's communications to the House of Commons are buried in the pages of 'Hansard.' It may not therefore be amiss in the following pages to indicate briefly some of the topics with which the Committee has dealt and to consider the action taken by the Government in reference to them.

The first report, presented at the end of October, 1917, began, very properly, with an attempt to estimate the gross cost of the war. But that estimate is already out of date. During the last eighteen months the rate of expenditure has increased by no less than 50 per cent., with the result that, according to the estimates recently submitted to Parliament, the expenditure for the year 1918-19 will reach the appalling total of £2,972,000,000. It might have been expected that the defection of our most expensive ally and the generous assistance

rendered to the other members of the Grand Alliance by the United States would have sensibly diminished the financial burden imposed upon ourselves. That expectation has not, however, been realized. On the contrary, the burden has increased, is increasing, and is not likely to be diminished.

The problem of national expenditure, at all times of first-rate importance, has never, therefore, been so important and so insistent as it is to-day. As regards public control, the solution of the problem depends upon the proper adjustment of the relations between the House of Commons, the Cabinet, the Treasury, and the spending departments. In normal circumstances those relations are, briefly, as follows: the spending departments formulate their demands to the Treasury; the Treasury having sanctioned, modified, or rejected them is responsible for the aggregate expenditure to the Cabinet; the Cabinet is responsible to the House of Commons, and the House is responsible to the country. The first weakening in one of the links of this chain of responsibility occurred before the war, when the Treasury, hitherto the jealous custodian of the country's purse, itself became a great spending department. That the Treasury should be divested of functions which it never ought to have assumed is a primary condition of any solution of the problem under review.

These new functions of the Treasury were, however, assumed with the acquiescence of the House of Commons. Can anything be done by a reform in procedure to tighten the hold of the House of Commons upon the purse-strings; and, assuming such reform, would the House be likely to make effective use of the new machinery? On both these points there is much diversity of opinion. Since the outbreak of war, the House has admittedly lost whatever control over expenditure it formerly possessed. Estimates are presented in 'token' form, and expenditure is authorized, without any control over details, by a succession of votes of credit. Is it possible, under war conditions to look for any improvement in this respect?

Though in view of the uncertainties of war it is impossible, and were it possible would clearly be inadvisable, to furnish detailed estimates of expenditure upon the army, navy, and air service, yet there seems to be no sufficient reason why, in the case of many departments, precise estimates should not be presented to Parliament. Many of the innumerable

sub-departments which in the last three years have grown out of the Board of Trade afford illustrations in point. The Committee elicited from the accounting officers of these departments an almost unanimous opinion that no real difficulty would be found in the preparation and presentation of such estimates, and that being so, it is impossible to resist the conclusion they express:

'Where secrecy is not necessary in the national interest, we consider that estimates in such cases should be presented to Parliament. The preparation of estimates, the effort to keep within them, and the prospect of their public discussion, have an influence in the administration of the departments themselves that tends to economy. The publication of the figures is useful as a guide both to Parliament and in the formation of opinion. Expenditure by Government, without effective limitation of amount or control of direction, is unsound in principle; war conditions make it inevitable in many cases; but it should not be carried beyond the point where it is really inevitable.'

There is, however, a further and more far-reaching question: Is the House of Commons anxious or even competent to enforce public economy? It is obvious that, under existing methods of procedure, it lacks the power; does it also lack the will? To this question Mr. Austen Chamberlain, who knows both the House and the Treasury exceptionally well, gave, in debate, an unequivocal reply:

'There is no more wasteful body than the House of Commons, and there is no Minister or ex-Minister who will not confirm what I say, that for one economy, good, bad or indifferent, which this House have helped to make, they have forced upon him or tried to force upon him a hundred unnecessary extravagances. It is quite idle for us to pretend that the House of Commons favours economy. We do not. We hate imposing taxes, but we love spending money.'

If no help is to be got from a reform of parliamentary procedure, whither must we turn for the exercise of the control so palpably lacking and yet so urgently required? The Treasury is the centre and core of the whole financial system: it alone possesses the technical knowledge of the whole administrative machine; it is the depositary of the tradition of economy, and it is served by an exceptionally able permanent staff. May we not therefore reasonably look to the Treasury for the control of public expenditure?

To this question the Select Committee addressed itself from the outset of its investigations. It appointed, as we have seen, a special sub-committee to deal with this section of its work; but apart from that the question of Treasury supervision necessarily occupied much of the time and attention of the other sub-committees appointed to investigate the internal working of the administrative departments, and references to the matter recur in most of the six reports already presented to Parliament. What is the general impression to be derived therefrom? It is that from the moment of the outbreak of war the Treasury, inured to a system well adapted to peace conditions, found itself hopelessly overweighted, seriously undermanned, and quite unequal to the task of exercising any adequate control over old departments suddenly expanded out of all recognition, or over new departments called into being to meet new needs but devoid of 'administrative traditions or experience, not 'limited in their expenditure by the restrictions of parlia-'mentary estimates, without the safeguard for the most part 'of competitive tendering, working under conditions of great 'stress.'

The Committee add:

'There was need of an active financial supervision, watching the methods adopted, detecting mistakes, suggesting improvements, preventing competition between departments in purchasing supplies and in obtaining labour, restricting rates of profit, enquiring into the numbers and organization of the vast new staffs employed.'

Has the need been met? The conclusion of the Committee, reached after prolonged, patient, and detailed investigation into the working of the departments, and after taking evidence from the representatives of the Treasury, is as unequivocal in substance as it is obviously restrained in tone. It is: 'that the degree of control that is now being exercised falls 'far short of the needs of the case.'

Here, as elsewhere, however, the Committee was not content with negative criticism. It has admittedly aimed at being helpful and constructive. It accordingly recommended:

'1. That the staff of the Treasury should be strengthened by the addition of men of ability and administrative experience from outside.

'2. That a more active financial supervision should be exercised by the Treasury over the departments. This supervision should aim at ensuring the adoption of sound financial methods in every province of administration, at preventing undue profits being made by contractors, at preventing competition between departments in purchasing supplies and in obtaining labour.

'3. That the Treasury should hold a series of enquiries into the numbers and organization of the large clerical staffs recruited by the various departments during the war.

'4. Above all, that in the exercise of a proper financial control the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be enabled to feel that he has the support of the Cabinet, with whom the ultimate decisions rest.'

In regard to the Ministry of Munitions the Committee made further detailed recommendations:

'1. That the Treasury should give such directions with regard to capital expenditure, and grants or guarantees of allowance from excess profits in respect of capital expenditure, as would establish a definite limit for the financial branches of the Ministry, while leaving them free to conduct and settle negotiations without reference to the Treasury in each case.

'2. That the Treasury, without attempting a detailed control over the terms of individual contracts, should determine from time to time the rates of profits and should satisfy themselves that the principles adopted in settling the conditions of contracts were sound.

'3. That the Treasury should lend greater support to the financial branches generally in their efforts to promote economy.

'4. That the Treasury should insist upon a more complete co-ordination between government departments in the purchase of munitions of war and the materials required for their manufacture.'

Following upon these recommendations, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in January that in addition to obtaining further assistance for the Treasury, generally from men with outside business experience, he had appointed two special committees to advise the Treasury on contract arrangements and to inquire into the temporary staffs of departments respectively. The former Committee, charged with the special duty of investigating the general question of expenditure, the methods adopted in the department, the contracts, and everything connected with purchases, consists of Lord Inchcape, Lord Colwyn, and Sir Peter McLelland. The latter, appointed to inquire into the staffing of departments, consists

of Sir John Bradbury of the Treasury; Mr. Warren Fisher of Somerset House; Mr. J. Rostern, Goods Manager of the Great Central Railway; and Mr. C. H. Wood. In regard to the Ministry of Munitions the Chancellor of the Exchequer has arranged that the Ministry shall

'submit for Treasury authority all proposals for capital expenditure exceeding £50,000 on a new factory or an extension of a factory, and that all concessions to firms in respect of capital expenditure shall take the form of cash grants, to be subject to Treasury approval when in excess of £10,000 or £50,000, according to circumstances.'

Mr. Bonar Law at the same time announced that steps were being taken for securing as far as possible the co-ordination of departments in making purchases and obtaining labour, and he insisted that the Treasury had always given, and would continue to give, their full support to the finance branches of departments generally. He has, however, made no secret of his own conviction that it is not to Treasury supervision or control that we can look for the effective correction of public extravagance in time of war. No external control can, in his judgment, be effectual; we must look, on the contrary, to control from within, the control, as Mr. Asquith put it, of 'a domestic tribunal in the department itself.' As Mr. Bonar Law said in the course of the debate initiated by Mr. Herbert Samuel:

'It is quite impossible with any expansion of the Treasury staff that they could effectively control the way in which that business (e.g. the work of the Munitions Ministry) is done. I am sure of that. The most we can hope to do . . . is to try to get a good system of expenditure in those departments and, if possible, to get good men at the head to carry out those systems.'

The significance of these words, in view of the position of the speaker, himself the official custodian of the nation's purse, can scarcely be exaggerated. Mr. Chamberlain, speaking as an ex-Financial Secretary, as an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, scouted the notion that the House of Commons would or could restrain extravagance. 'I am convinced,' he said, 'that it is upon the departments in the first instance, 'and upon the Treasury in the second instance, that we must 'rely to prevent waste and to secure economy.' If, however,

the verdict of Mr. Bonar Law be sound, we can no longer rely upon the second of these safeguards. The present head of the Treasury declares that the Treasury is almost powerless in the matter. There remains therefore only the departments: upon the efficiency of their internal organization everything must, according to Mr. Bonar Law, depend.

This opinion, frequently reiterated, gives additional importance to the investigations carried on by the Committee in the great spending departments. The number of those departments has multiplied with bewildering rapidity during the last four years. But, as spenders, two stand out pre-eminent. Of recent expenditure out of the vote of credit about 72 per cent. —excluding advances to the Allies and the Dominions—has been spent by the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions. The Admiralty is also, of course, a large though not an extravagant spender, and many of the new departments have already displayed considerable aptitude in acquiring habits of prodigality. In regard to the latter the Treasury cannot airily divest itself of responsibility. Hastily set up to meet emergencies, staffed largely by men and women inexperienced in public administration, compelled to improvise machinery, possessing no traditions—to whom should they look for guidance and control if not to the Treasury? Has the Treasury afforded it to the utmost of its power? It is difficult after a perusal of these reports to answer that question with a confident affirmative. Take an elementary point—the preparation and presentation of estimates. It is conceded that the fighting departments cannot, in war time, disclose estimates. The new administrative departments could hardly, perhaps, be expected to prepare estimates in the first year or two of their existence. Is there any valid reason why they should not prepare them now? Have they been encouraged by the Treasury to do so? The Committee suggests that they have not. 'We have reason to complain,' said the Chairman of one of the sub-committees, 'that the Treasury have not 'made this demand for estimates from these departments.' One result of this neglect is an overlapping and reduplication of functions; a second is a marked variation in rates of wages; a third is the lack of co-ordination between department and department in regard to the purchase of materials; and there are others.

It is, however, upon the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions that the fierce light of investigation is most persistently turned in these reports. On the whole the War Office emerges creditably from the ordeal. That in the early stages of the war there was an enormous amount of waste and extravagance is true; but the vast scale of improvisation probably rendered it inevitable; and it is clear that there has been steady and substantial improvement as the months and years have gone by. There is, as the Committee have shown in detail, room for more; but there is reason to believe that the very able administrators now responsible, within the War Office, for finance, purchases, and contracts are fully alive to the defects of the original system, and are amending them as rapidly as circumstances permit.

Nor has there been any disposition either to resent or neglect the large number of detailed recommendations made by the Committee. In illustration, it may be mentioned that strict orders have now been issued as to the conservation of arms, ammunition, and equipment; that between January 1st and October 31st, 1917, no less than 285,000 tons of salvage were shipped from France to England, and that from waste fats collected from army camps alone there have been produced:

(1) Sufficient tallow to provide soap for the entire needs of the army, navy, and other government departments with a surplus for public use producing an actual revenue of about £960,000 per annum, and

(2) 1,800 tons of glycerine, sufficient to provide, at one-fifth of the ordinary cost, propellant for 18 million 18 pr. shells.

Results hardly less striking have been obtained by the collection of woollen rags, cuttings from cotton textiles, and condemned boots. These things may seem to savour of those 'candle-ends and cheese-parings' which Mr. Gladstone (addressing be it noted a Scottish audience) once declared it to be the primary duty of a Chancellor of the Exchequer to save; but the results obtained have not only more than justified the care expended, but have helped to point a homely though timely moral. It is this: that if you look after the pennies the pounds will look after themselves; that, as Mr. Gladstone and the mid-Victorians understood, it is only by meticulous scrutiny into the details of expenditure that large

public economies will be effected. Shall we ever, after the present orgy of extravagance, recover the Victorian spirit of economy? The answer must in any case be doubtful: but what is not doubtful is that it will never be recovered until the responsibility for policy is once more in the hands of those who feel the pressure of direct taxation, or conversely, till the payment of direct taxes is co-extensive with the electorate.

The Admiralty, apart from the relatively modest scale of its expenditure, calls for even less comment than the War Office. But the picture presented in these reports of the Ministry of Munitions is painted in very different colours. That Ministry is to-day probably the largest spending department in the world. Nowhere, therefore, ought the financial arrangements be more scientific. Nowhere, as a fact, would they seem to have been more haphazard. Be it admitted that much is to be forgiven to a new department, hastily called into being to meet a grave national emergency; be it admitted that the first duty of the department was to obtain delivery of the goods, regardless of cost, and that in the fulfilment of that duty a remarkable measure of success has been attained; but, making every acknowledgment and every allowance, the indictment preferred by the Committee against the methods of the Ministry is unspeakably grave. Nor has the Munitions Ministry displayed the same amenability to honest criticism as other less seriously impugned departments. Too often do we find in its official replies under the head of 'action taken' the stereotyped phrase: No fresh instructions 'appear to be required.' That is not the opinion of the Committee, nor will it, we suspect, be the verdict of the taxpayers. There is not, for example, a business man in the country who has not felt the repercussion of the suicidal concession of the 12½ per cent. bonus on wages.

This point, at least, has not escaped attention. In their second report (par. 16), the Committee draw attention to the appalling fact that an all-round increase of 10 per cent. in wages and in the cost of commodities purchased at home now involves an increase of about £130,000,000 a year in national expenditure. What degree of ultimate responsibility attaches to the expansion of credits, to the undue reliance upon loans, to the too tardy imposition of increased taxation—these are questions of the utmost nicety and withal very

highly controversial. It is, however, not open to doubt that we have become involved in a vicious circle. Higher wages mean higher prices; a rise in prices appears on the one hand to justify demands for an increase in wages and on the other certainly involves a larger demand for 'currency'; larger supplies of currency, unless accompanied by a proportionate increase in the supply of commodities, unquestionably tend to a further inflation of prices; and so on *da capo*. The Committee decline the attempt to determine the order of importance of these various factors; and wisely. Each factor in the progression is in part cause and in part effect. But whatever the order and whatever the relative importance, the results to the national exchequer and to the taxpayer who fills it are disastrous.

The sixth report, which was presented to Parliament so lately as May 15th, is certainly not inferior in interest to its predecessors, a fact which suggests that there are probably vast regions of governmental extravagance and ineptitude still unexplored. This report focuses the attention of Parliament and the public upon two striking illustrations of wasteful—and in one case of pernicious—expenditure. The one refers to the decision to establish a school of aerial gunnery at Loch Doon in Ayrshire; the other and worse case is the subsidy to the bakers. For the selection of Loch Doon as a site for a school of aerial gunnery there was, and perhaps is, something to be said. Admittedly the school was badly wanted, and it was not easy to find a suitable site. After an expenditure of at least £500,000 and of an immense amount of skilled labour, the project had to be abandoned. If, as seems probable, the site proved to be an impossible one, the Air Board is to be congratulated upon having had the courage to acknowledge a mistake and cut a loss. But no one will hesitate to endorse the comment of the Committee that Loch Doon will be remembered 'as the scene of one of the most 'striking instances of wasted expenditure that our records 'can show.'

The waste thus reprobated pales, however, into insignificance as compared with that involved in the subsidizing of the loaf. A more conspicuous instance of pernicious panic legislation, or rather administration, even this war has not, thus far, afforded. It is worth while, therefore, to recall the circumstances. In

the summer of 1917 the Government were somewhat seriously alarmed by the multiplying symptoms of industrial unrest. The spectre of the Russian revolution had not yet been laid at Brest-Litovsk, and the English Bolshevists were still talking loud. Accordingly a number of commissions were hastily appointed to investigate the causes of unrest and were bidden, in equally hot haste, to report. They did so, and most, if not all, the reports concurred in the conclusion that one of the most serious causes of unrest was to be found in the upward trend of the prices of the necessaries of life. As the unrest was mainly discovered among the best paid classes of labour, while the hardships referred to affected mainly the worst paid labourers, the accuracy of the conclusion is open to question. But the Government decided, again in hot haste, that whatever the cost to the Exchequer the price of the loaf must not exceed 9*d*. The 'orthodox' economists made their protest against this fatuous decision, only to be brushed aside by the 'practical' politicians and derided by the demagogues. But the report of the Committee proves conclusively that the 'doctrinaires' were right and the 'practical' men were wrong.

What has happened? Precisely that which a moment's reflection and a cursory investigation would have warned the Government to anticipate. In the price of bread, as of other commodities, there always has been and is a considerable amount of local variation. Imperfect means of communication; lack of facilities for distribution; varying degrees of efficiency among bakers; the provision or lack of up-to-date machinery: all these and other elements enter into the price of the loaf when sold to the consumer. Not even a Government subsidy—calculated at a flat rate for the whole country—can eliminate all such variations; and a rate calculated to give a reasonable profit to the less efficient has represented an enormous and unjustifiable bonus to the more efficient.

The facts, as elicited and set forth by the Select Committee, deserve close scrutiny, and will repay the attention of every taxpayer in Great Britain. Acting on the instructions of the Government the millers have, for the last nine months, been compelled to supply the bakers with flour at 43*s*. 9*d*. per sack. This sum was fixed on the assumptions that the cost of baking (allowing for reasonable profits to the baker) is 23*s*. per sack, and that the 4-lb. loaf is sold to the consumer at 9*d*. The

millers are, of course, recouped for their loss out of the State subsidy, which is now estimated to amount to an aggregate of £40,000,000 a year. But the costs of baking, instead of being, according to the official assumption, 23*s.* per sack, vary, in fact, from 10*s.* to 25*s.* Four-fifths of the bread consumed in this country is manufactured by one-tenth of the bakers. For these efficient and well equipped bakers the assumed cost of baking is ridiculously high, and in many cases excessive profits are being made at the expense of the taxpayer. For the inefficient bakers the subsidized flour is too dear, and they are clamouring for permission to sell bread at a price above 9*d.*; and, as a fact, in some cases more than 9*d.* is being charged and paid.

The problem is not an easy one, but a suggestion put forward by the Select Committee is well worth consideration:

'If trade fluctuation in the price of bread were permissible, the price of flour to the baker might be raised by several shillings a sack, without raising the price of bread in the vast majority of cases above 9*d.* It is estimated that 1*s.* more in the price of flour represents a saving of £2,000,000 of the State subsidy, so that if the price of flour could be raised by 5*s.*, which in our opinion is quite practicable without generally increasing the cost of the loaf to the consumer, the subsidy would be reduced by £10,000,000.

'It is true that in certain of the smaller and more remote centres of population the price of bread might have to be raised ½*d.*, 1*d.*, or even 1½*d.* above the standard, but this local variation would not be greater than in normal times, and might to some extent be neutralized by a system of carriage-paid delivery of flour or by some other means.'

A more drastic solution would be to withdraw the subsidy altogether and allow bread to be sold at its economic price. In the vast majority of cases that price ought not to exceed 9*d.* per 4-lb. loaf. As things now are about 20 per cent. of the aggregate amount of bread could not be sold at 9*d.* If the less efficient bakeries could, without a diminution of the total supply, be eliminated, or brought up to the standard of the more efficient, the problem would be automatically solved. And it is on those lines that the true solution should ultimately be found. But it will take time. Until the change can be effected either a small minority of people must pay more than 9*d.* for the loaf, or the Treasury must subsidize the inefficient bakers. It is, however, nothing short of a public scandal that,

without any benefit whatsoever to the vast majority of consumers, the whole body of taxpayers should be compelled to put enormous sums into the pockets of a particular trade.

It remains to attempt in a few sentences a summary of the advantages, in some cases direct, in others incidental, which have already accrued from the appointment of the Committee.

The heads of the great administrative departments—or most of them—would be the first to admit that they owe to the Committee many valuable suggestions for the improvement of their business methods, particularly in finance, and that there has already resulted an appreciable saving in public expenditure. Quite apart, however, from specific and quotable instances of economies effected, there can be no question that the mere existence of such a Committee, composed for the most part of keen and experienced business men, and charged by the House of Commons with the specific duty of watching the expenditure of public money, is calculated to infuse into the departments a spirit of economy. Officials cannot but be conscious, in some cases painfully conscious, that they will be required, as no mere audit can compel them, to account for the money they spend. For this Committee is not an Audit Committee; nor is it an Estimates Committee. Its functions are midway between a post-mortem examination of past and a prospective approval of future expenditure. The former function is already fulfilled, and admirably though necessarily somewhat tardily fulfilled, by the Public Accounts Committee, assisted by the Controller and Auditor General. The latter function ought to be performed by the Treasury. The Select Committee is charged with an investigation of *current* expenditure. It is easy to understand that the function is, in relation to established departments and to experienced permanent officials, a delicate one. A prying or over-critical temper might well arouse just resentment and make things worse rather than better in the departments. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer has himself borne testimony to the spirit of constructive helpfulness which has from the first inspired the activities of the Committee, and to the great service they have rendered ' not only to the country but to the Govern- ' ment by the recommendations which they have made.'

Probably a greater service has been rendered to the cause of economy by the mere fact of publicity. The half-dozen

reports already published unquestionably contain information which if widely disseminated and properly digested may prove of incalculable advantage to the taxpayers of this country. The reports are based upon an immense mass of evidence, much of it supremely interesting, but the evidence has not yet been and probably never will be published. Could it be, it would be at least as informative as the reports themselves. This publicity has produced a most important reflex action upon the House of Commons. If we may believe Mr. Austen Chamberlain, nothing will ever avail to infuse that assembly with a genuine spirit of economy. But the popular indignation which has been expressed as a result of the publication of the reports of the Committee has compelled the House to think more seriously of public expenditure than it is constitutionally inclined to do. That alone is a result sufficient to justify the appointment of this Committee and its protracted patient and detailed investigations.

J. A. R. Marriott.

BOOKS AND TRAVEL

1. **Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée.** By VICTOR BÉRARD. Paris: Armand Colin. 1902–3.
2. **The Early Historians of Norway.** By PROFESSOR W. P. KER, LL.D. Reprinted from the Saga Book of the Viking Club. 1910.
3. **The Dawn of Modern Geography.** By C. RAYMOND BEAZLEY, M.A., F.R.G.S. Vols. I. and II. Murray. 1897–1901. Vol. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1906.
4. **The Heimskringla; or, The Sea Kings of Norway.** Translated from the Icelandic of Snorro Sturleson by SAMUEL LAING. Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans. 1844.
5. **The Book of Ser Marco Polo.** Translated and edited by COLONEL SIR HENRY YULE. Third Edition, edited by HENRI CORDIER. Murray. 1903.
6. **The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation.** By RICHARD HAKLUYT. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. 1903.

FROM Lord Morley's recent 'Recollections' it is pleasant to find that even at the height of the Land League troubles in Ireland the anxious politicians at Dublin Castle found time to unbend over literature. 'On the old question what 'author one would take to a desert island,' writes Lord Morley, 'Asquith was for Balzac; of course, Shakespeare and the 'Bible are given in, though perhaps not most read.' If this old question ever became a practical one for myself, I should be inclined to choose an atlas. It is wonderful what entertainment is to be got out of an atlas with some experience of travel and a little imagination. You can plan tours, which in fancy are sometimes as vivid and often more entirely satisfactory than the real thing. With a large scale map and a smattering of geology you may actually picture the scenery. In that fine war-book, 'Marching on Tanga,' Captain Brett Young writes:

'All through the Pangani trek I carried in my haversack one book a thin paper copy of the Oxford Book of Verse, but what I

read more often was a small scale Bartholomew map of England finely coloured with mountains, meadow lands, and seas, and there I would travel magical roads, crossing the Pennines, or lazing through the blossomy Vale of Evesham, or facing the salt breeze on the flat top of Mendip, at will. In these rapt moments the whole campaign would seem to me nothing but a sort of penance by means of which I might attain to those blue remembered hills.'

If you are lucky enough to have a mind stored with literature and history, each page of your atlas would bring with it a wealth of imaginative recreation to cheat time on your desert island. You might open your atlas and dream you were delivered and sailing home

> 'Sweeping by shores where the names
> are the names of the victories of England.'

Or say you opened at the map of the Ægean—what a crowd of memories from the Trojan War to the heroisms and disappointments of Gallipoli. To look at Troy and Argos on the map is to dream again all the drama of Hector and Achilles, to conjure up the form of Helen, and see

> 'the face that launched a thousand ships
> Against the topless towers of Ilium.'

In your mind's eye you catch again the flash of the beacon fires from island to island that heralded the return of Agamemnon, with the crime of Clytemnestra and all the trilogy of woes to follow. Or, perhaps, the first thought would be of the great struggle between Greece and Persia. Marathon, Thermopylæ, Salamis—the names on the map are trumpet calls; and the story is as epical in Herodotus as the Trojan War in Homer.

To the poet, John Keats, born in a London livery stable, the discovery of Homer was the discovery of a new world. His sensations, as he described them in the sonnet that every one ought to know by heart, were the sensations of the traveller and explorer. He felt, he said, 'like stout Cortez when, 'with eagle eyes, He star'd at the Pacific.' When Keats wrote Cortez, he meant Balboa. It was Balboa who first sighted the Pacific from the peak in Darien. But this slip cannot ruin the poetry. For the comparison is just the right

one to express the modern poet's thrill on discovering Homer. Every traveller knows the thrill of coming suddenly, on a mountain top, to an unexpected view of the sea. There are few more thrilling moments in history than the famous incident in Xenophon's Anabasis, when the ten thousand Greeks, lost and surrounded in a hostile country, struggling blindly on, harassed by attacks day after day, suddenly from a mountain top in Armenia caught the glitter of the waters of the Euxine; it meant safety and home: and from the labouring throats, caught up from rank to rank, rang out the ecstatic shout, 'Thalatta, Thalatta'—the Sea, the Sea. How could one look in the map at the mountains of Armenia and not be stirred by the memory of that moment and the thrill of that cry?

So much for the magic of a page of the atlas. But happily we are not dependent on one book. The whole literature of travel is at our command. With these books at hand we can at will recapture the thrill of primitive mystery and the excitement and exhilaration of discovery. Or we may wander at will among the beauties of nature or art. Tennyson's little poem to his friend, Edward Lear, may be remembered. Lear is better known to most of us by his 'Book of Nonsense' than by his books of travel. But it was for his book of travels in Greece that Tennyson was so grateful:—'I read and felt that I was there.'

> 'And, trust me while I turn'd the page,
> And track'd you still on classic ground,
> I grew in gladness till I found
> My spirits in the golden age.'

Or Louis Stevenson's poem of thanks from his sick chamber to his friend Horatio Brown, for his 'Life on the Lagoons,' may be recalled:

> 'despite my frowning fate
> It did my soul so recreate
> That all my fancies fled away
> On a Venetian holiday.'

Tennyson put his own impressions of travel into poetry. It is almost as good as revisiting Milan to read the well-known lines. First in the cathedral:

'the chanting quires,
The giant windows' blazon'd fires,
The height, the space, the gloom, the glory!'

Then the view from the roof:

'How faintly flush'd, how phantom-fair
Was Monte Rosa, hanging there
A thousand shadowy-pencill'd valleys,
And snowy dells in a golden air.'

It was the vision of the Alps that awakened the true genius of Shelley; their spirit passed straight into his poetry. It was with the pilgrimage of Childe Harold on a lower level that Byron became a poet. Coleridge, like Byron and Shelley, wrote poetry about Mont Blanc; and it was on a walking tour, and because Wordsworth had been reading Shelvocke's Voyages, that the idea of 'The Ancient Mariner' was suggested to him—a poem which perhaps owes some of its details to Coleridge's reading in the old Bristol library of Captain Thomas James's 'Strange and Dangerous Voyage.'

Keats, till he was taken to Italy to die, had with his narrow means and precarious health but scanty chance to travel; but he had the heart of the traveller. 'I have many reasons,' he wrote to Reynolds, 'for going wonderways, to make my 'winter chair free from spleen, to enlarge my vision. I'll 'have leather buttons and belt and over the hills we'll go. 'If my books will help me to it, then will I take all Europe 'in turn and see the kingdoms of the earth, and the glory 'of them.' From his walking tour in Scotland, the one chance he got and made so much of, he wrote, 'You would lift your 'eyes from Homer only to see close before you the real isle 'of Tenedos.' One of the passages that Keats and Cowden Clarke first read together in Chapman's translation of Homer was the shipwreck of Ulysses in the Odyssey, and Cowden Clarke records how much moved Keats was by the phrase, 'The sea had soaked his heart through.'

The Odyssey is the prelude to all this literature of travel. There rests on the poem the eternal light and freshness of the dawn.

'So gladly from the songs of modern speech
Men turn . . . . . .
To . . . . . hear like Ocean on a
western beach,
The surge and thunder of the Odyssey.'

Borrowing from the Odyssey, Tennyson takes Ulysses for the very type of the passion of travel:

> 'I cannot rest from travel . . . . . .
> For always roaming with a hungry heart
> Much have I seen and known; . . . .
> . . . . . My purpose holds
> To sail beyond the sunset and the baths
> Of all the western stars until I die.
> It may be that the gulfs will wash us down:
> It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles.'

Homer and Herodotus are full of travellers' tales. For this ancient world almost all real travel was travel into the unknown. Primitive geography was an oasis in a wilderness of mystery. Look at a map of Homeric geography. In the middle, in the light, is the Eastern Mediterranean, and all around it twilight regions of barbarians and monsters, then the encircling ocean, and, beyond, Cimmerian darkness. Until the discoveries of Columbus and Magellan all the old maps represented the world as circular, oval, oblong, or square, with the Mediterranean in the middle and the ocean all round. The well-known map in Hereford Cathedral puts plumb in the centre the sacred City of Jerusalem. In this map you will see to the right of Jerusalem the granary of Joseph occupying a considerable share of the earth's surface. We know from the records of pilgrims that the Pyramids of Egypt were regarded as the barns in which Joseph stored his grain against the seven lean years. Remoter peoples are indicated by such inscriptions as 'Here dwell very evil men.' The whole is decorated with strange medieval flora and fauna gathered from the old bestiaries and herbals—mandragora, salamanders, hippogriffs; and round the margin are set men with horns and men with tails, men with four eyes and men with eyes below their shoulders. It is not easy to realize that our ancestors who went on the Crusades had this notion of the world's surface. As a matter of fact these monkish maps, founded not on observation, but on medieval legend, a misreading of the Bible and the reports of pilgrims more credulous than credible, do not represent the best knowledge of the time. The sailing charts in use about the same time for the guidance of sailors were a different matter altogether,

and give a wonderfully accurate delineation of the Mediterranean coast. Those charts, however, were no more familiar to the average man then than Admiralty charts are to the average man now; and for the ordinary pilgrim or crusader the world was just such a place of grotesque distortions and embellishments as is represented by the Hereford map.

Mystery is the mother of romance, and in the early world mystery began very near home. There was room within the narrow limits of an inland sea for Siren and Cyclops and the other bewitching marvels that Ulysses encountered. But by degrees trade, colonization, and empire penetrated the shadows and banished mystery beyond the Pillars of Hercules and the bounds to the north of barbarian resistance. Tacitus's 'Germania' was an essay in political romance. When in turn the barbarians invaded the empire, the twilight descended again, and mystery was reintroduced into the Mediterranean. For the barbarians romance lay in the splendour of Constantinople and the immemorial majesty of Rome. We catch the reflection in the vision of Valhalla.

It is impossible for us civilized moderns to form any real notion of the effect on the barbarians of the first sight of such a city as Constantinople adorned by Constantine with all the wealth and art of Greece and Rome. Charles Kingsley had a try in his ballad founded on the saying of Athanaric to Theodosius. When the 'Kaiser' of Micklegard displayed the marvels of Byzantine civilization, the old Goth, like the Queen of Sheba, with no spirit left in him, could only murmur

> 'Woden in Valhalla,
> But thou on earth art God.'

We have, by the way, a vivid account by a contemporary eye-witness, the chronicler Villehardouin, of the impression made by Constantinople on the Crusaders as late as the thirteenth century:

'You may understand how they stared at Constantinople, those who had never seen it, for they could not have imagined that there could be in the whole world a city so rich, when they saw those lofty walls and rich towers wherewith it was enclosed right round, and those gorgeous palaces and towering churches so many in number that nobody could believe it who did not see

it with his own eyes: and the length and breadth of the City, which was sovereign among all the cities of the world. You may well believe that the sight made the flesh of the boldest creep, and that was no wonder, for the enterprise was the greatest undertaken by any race of men since the world was created.'

If such was the impression made on knights and squires who had known something of Norman castle and cathedral, we may imagine the feelings of the barbarians fresh from their palisaded camps and wattled homes.

Most of us think of the Crusades as wars of religion. As wars of religion they were a failure. The splendid dream of Hildebrand, Urban, and Innocent could not be realized, and the tide of Moslem conquest was not stayed. As was finely said by a great philosopher: 'A second time the 'disciples sought their Lord at the Sepulchre and a second 'time the answer was, "He is not here. He is risen."' But the Crusades were a great deal more than wars of religion. They were among other things a rare opportunity of travel in the Middle Ages. The Crusades for the time absorbed and superseded the pilgrimages to Rome. 'The immense processions of pilgrims to Rome,' says the historian of Rome in the Middle Ages, 'ceased during the Crusades. The Crusades ended, the old longing reawoke among the peoples and drew them again to the graves of the apostles.' In 1300 Pope Boniface VIII. promulgated his Bull of Jubilee, which promised remission of sins to all who should visit the basilicas of St. Peter and St. Paul during the year. 'The pressure towards Rome was unexampled. A spectator standing on one of the heights of the city might have seen swarms like wandering tribes approach along the ancient Roman roads from north, south, east, and west. Italians, Provençals, Frenchmen, Hungarians, Slavs, Germans, Spaniards, even Englishmen. They spoke in many dialects, but they all sang in the same language the litanies of the Church, and their longing dreams had but one and the same object. On beholding in the sunny distance the dark forest of towers of the Holy City, they raised the exultant shout, "Rome, Rome," like sailors, who after a tedious voyage catch a first glimpse of land. During an entire year Rome swarmed with pilgrims, and was filled with a perfect babel of tongues.' The trade in relics and images was so gigantic that the hostile Ghibellines,

and after them the sceptical Gibbon, hinted that the Jubilee was just a commercial speculation. The great dream of a United States of Christendom under the spiritual sway of Christ's Vicar at Rome faded, but the fruits of the Crusades were none the less real; and they were the fruits of travel and human intercourse. Urban and Peter the Hermit sowed; but it was science and discovery, the scholastic philosophers and the men of the Renaissance, Marco Polo, Vasco di Gama, Columbus, who gathered the harvest.

In the dark ages between Constantine and the Crusades the pilgrims were the chief travellers. Greek literature begins with an Odyssey, English literature with a pilgrimage to Canterbury. It has been said that the Crusades were the Pilgrims' Progress developed into the Holy War. Pilgrimages in fact provided the outlet for an ineradicable instinct, the passion for roaming:

> 'We are the Pilgrims, master; we shall go
> Always a little further: it may be
> Beyond that last blue mountain barred with snow,
> Across that angry or that glimmering sea,
>
> 'White on a throne or guarded in a cave
> There lives a prophet who can understand
> Why men were born: but surely we are brave
> Who make the Golden Journey to Samarkand.'

This instinct for roaming reinforced by religion filled Europe and the East with pilgrims. It was the Moslem interference with the Christian pilgrims that was the ostensible cause of the Crusades. When Jerusalem was inaccessible the pilgrims thronged, as we have seen, to Rome. The pilgrims, as travellers, had their limitations. Like Cook's tourists they travelled by customary stages along customary routes. They carved their names—for example, on the relics at Cana of Galilee. Like the Hereford map they got their world out of focus by putting Jerusalem too much in the centre, and also by their taste for marvels. Bishop Arculf, in the year 680, saw a column at Jerusalem which cast no shadow at noon in the summer solstice, and that proved it was at the centre of the earth. The pilgrims saw only what they went to see, and the things they went to see were the sites of miracles and the relics of

the saints. In Egypt they had eyes only for Joseph's barns and were agog to go in search of Pharaoh's chariot wheels. The pillar of salt, which was once Lot's wife, was a continual attraction. Though the more cultivated, or less credulous, Roman lady pilgrim, Silvia of Aquitaine, in the fourth century reported that it had already disappeared and was supposed to be in the Dead Sea, yet Antoninus of Placentia, in the sixth century, says he saw it, and, moreover, denies the rumour that it was being licked away; and Theodosius says it waxed and waned with the phases of the moon. Antoninus also saw on Mount Sion the stone which the builder rejected because, as he surprisingly adds, 'it was so ugly.' Yet, though they tell us so much that we cannot believe, and leave out so much that we should be glad to hear, the pilgrims kept alive the tradition of travel. They widened contracted horizons. Moreover, we get here and there a hint or glimpse of the life of the time: of the crowded shipping in the Red Sea ports laden with Indian spices; of the great Pharos at Alexandria ablaze all night with torches amid the world's traffic. Alexandria, we are told, was equally hospitable to pilgrims and heresies and so crowded with merchants from every nation under heaven that it took a whole day to get from one end of the town to the other. So are we reminded that we must not forget the traders among the early travellers. Marco Polo revealed to medieval Europe the wonders of Cathay, but before Marco Polo were the immemorial caravan routes to the East. The lust of trade and the lust of travel found in each other a mutual spur.

> 'Away, for we are ready to a man!
> Our camels sniff the evening and are glad;
> Lead on, O Master of the Caravan:
> Lead on the Merchant-Princes of Bagdad.
>
> 'We travel not for trafficking alone:
> By hotter winds our fiery hearts are fanned:
> For lust of knowing what should not be known
> We make the Golden Journey to Samarkand.'

Just as behind the Arabian tales of Sindbad the Sailor lie the real Chinese voyages of Soleyman the Merchant and other Moslem traders of the ninth century, so the Odyssey itself is full of details that doubtless came from the bold early

mariners of the Mediterranean. This theme is fully treated in Victor Bérard's famous book on the Phœnicians and the Odyssey. These ancient mariners penetrated to Northern Europe without chart or compass. The land of the Læstrygonians, which Bérard puts in Sardinia, can only be Norway—the land where a sleepless man might earn a double wage, so near were the paths of day and night; the land where the harbour of the Homeric description was manifestly a Norwegian fiord.

There was the trade in amber with the Baltic and the trade in ivory with Africa. Something was known of the Guinea coast from the traders by the old Sahara caravan route long before Prince Henry the navigator set about his great enterprise of circumnavigating Africa. His sailors were full of superstitious terrors. They had heard the seas to the south were boiling hot and the air there thick with demons. But the Turk had blocked the land route and the trade of the Indies was at stake. Prince Henry persevered, and incidentally founded a Portuguese Empire and modern ocean travel. As Mr. Kipling remembered, Hakluyt called his great work 'Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries.' Trade is not all prose. There is poetry in freights and cargoes. As Masefield writes:

'Quinqueremes of Nineveh from distant Ophir,
Rowing home to haven in sunny Palestine
With a cargo of ivory
And apes and peacocks.
Sandalwood, cedarwood, and sweet white wine.

'Stately Spanish galleon coming from the Isthmus
Dipping through the Tropics by the palm green shores
With a cargo of diamonds,
Emeralds, amethysts,
Topazes, cinnamon, and gold moidores.

'Dirty British Coaster with a salt-caked smoke stack,
Butting through the channel in the mad March days,
With a cargo of Tyne coal,
Road rails, piglead,
Firewood, ironware and cheap tin-trays.'

In the dark ages besides the traders and the pilgrims, the other great travellers were the pirates. Within the pale the wandering penitent; without the pale the marauding

Pagan. We all know from our early history books the horrors of the Viking raids. But that account of the matter comes from the chronicles of the raided monasteries. It is a very different picture painted from the other side. It was a jolly roving life of adventure and discovery, of prowess and plunder. You can read all about it and realize the zest of it in the Sagas. The Northmen were a nation of Francis Drakes. No other nation has such a delightful history book as the 'Heimskringla.' The Northmen's world was at first as restricted as Homer's, only viewed from the opposite end. You may read the extent of it in the very first paragraph of the Heimskringla. Until the time of our King Alfred they had not got, even to the north, to within six days' sail of the North Cape. It was Othere the Northman, who took service with Alfred, who first explored that coast, passed the North Cape and reached Archangel. Like the Homeric world, too, the Northmen's world was full of myths and monsters. Odin came to them out of some eastern land of giants and dwarfs and dragons. Into this dim world the Northmen went forth in their long ships into all seas, to explore and to ravage and plunder. Harold Haarfagr gave his son Eric, when he was twelve years old, five long ships in which to go a-raiding. He spent eight years exploring and plundering, first in Denmark, Friesland, and Saxonland, then in Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and France. After that he sailed north to Lapland and all the way to Archangel. On the way home his men picked up a girl wife for him whose equal for beauty they had never seen. That is what the Vikings travelled for, not for the remission of sins.

The Northmen greatly widened the bounds of the known world. They colonized the Hebrides, the Orkneys, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland. They discovered Greenland. They actually discovered America four centuries before Columbus. It is now agreed that the Vinland of the Sagas was the coast of North America. Columbus himself went to Iceland to pick up the lore of the sailors, and very likely heard the tradition. The Vikings came, saw, and conquered Vinland; but the way was long, the booty small, the struggle hardly worth while. They left it and perhaps forgot it. These are only visionary memories caught up with old-world myths in such monkish romances as the Voyage of St. Brandan, just

as recollections of pilgrimages and crusades live in the romances of the Grail.

The Vikings went north and east as well as west and south. Othere got to Archangel. Hakluyt couples him with Chancellor as discoverer of Muscovy, but between the Norse discoverer and the English there had rolled some seven centuries. The first Russian kingdom of Novgorod was founded by the Northmen. It was to Novgorod that the little Olaf Trygvesson was spirited away to save his life from the dangers that overhung his cradle in Norway; and the splendid Saga of Harold Hardrada is there to remind us how the Northmen made Novgorod a link between north, east, and south.

These Northmen won Normandy under Rollo. They governed England under Canute. They conquered England under William. They conquered Sicily under Roger. By this time they had been converted to Christianity. Their conversion under Olaf, called the Saint, was managed with harryings and burnings after the Viking fashion. But, converted, they brought in time their new piety and all their old roving and fighting spirit to the service of the Crusades. The first Crusade was preached by a French Pope on French soil and was mainly a Norman French enterprise. The mightiest Crusaders came from Norman France and Norman England. The Crusades were the culmination of the Viking raids as much as of the Christian pilgrimages.

When the Crusades failed, and the Turk was astride the road to the East and in possession both of Jerusalem and Constantinople, the forces that inspired the Crusades—the religious impulse, the passion for wandering, the love of change, the love of freedom, the love of money, the yearning for the unknown—all found their vent in a new epoch of discovery. Marco Polo had dazzled Europe with his revelations of the splendours of Kubla Khan. The sound of a cry from the fabled Prester John had stirred all Christendom. Now Venice, Genoa, Portugal, Spain, England, Flanders were all forced to seek new routes for their trade. Prince Henry tackled the problem of the circumnavigation of Africa, and Vasco di Gama reached India round the Cape. Columbus sought it across the Atlantic and discovered America. Magellan found his way to India through the straits named after him and proved the world was round. English seamen

tried for a north-west or north-east passage, and though they did not find it, their voyages had great results. And after the English went the Dutch. Hakluyt found it in his heart to commend the Dutch adventurers, but, said he, our English nation led the dance, broke the ice before them, and gave them good leave to light their candle at our torch.

From the time of the Odyssey the untravelled world had been shrinking. But until the Crusades it shrank very slowly. Homer's world after all was not so much smaller than Chaucer's. The Homeric map is in extent much the same as the Hereford map. But after Columbus all the doors were opened, and Europe surveyed mankind from China to Peru. Who can forget the superb cry of exultation with which Hakluyt introduces his great work? 'Which of the Kings of this land before 'Her Majesty had their banners ever seen in the Caspian 'Sea? Which of them hath ever dealt with the Emperor 'of Persia as Her Majesty hath done, and attained for her 'merchants large and loving privileges? Who ever saw 'before this regiment an English Ligier in the stately porch 'of the Grand Signior at Constantinople?' And so on through the commercial and diplomatic triumphs of the Virgin Queen—in Tripoli and Aleppo, at Babylon, Balsara and Goa, on 'the 'mighty river of Plate,' and the coasts of Chili and Peru, and beyond new Spain and across 'the mighty breadth of 'the South Seas' to the once fabulous Cathay.

New horizons were opened, new oceans crossed, new continents revealed, ancient civilizations unburied. We speak lightly now of the discovery of the New World. The New World has become a conventional phrase. Just pause to think of the thrill of it when the New World was in fact as in a phrase a *new world*. Try to realize what a revelation it meant, what a revolution in the old world's whole mental conception of the scheme of things. The living writer who bears the splendid name of Sir Walter Raleigh says of it:

'All preconceived notions and beliefs concerning cosmography, history, politics, and society were made ridiculous by the new discoveries. The world had been opened up by the fanatical self-confidence of visionaries, and had proved to be wilder than their wildest dreams. New kingdoms were to be had for the taking. All things became possible. Credulity was wiser than experience; and the wonders reported were reckoned merely the first-fruits of greater things to come.'

It was as if an aeroplane blundered into Mars and came back to tell the tale. The inspiration of unlimited horizons is felt in all the literature of that age. The discovery of the New World meant Utopias in the sphere of thought as much as El Dorados in the sphere of trade, adventure, and empire. It inspired Spenser, Marlowe, and Shakespeare, as well as Frobisher and Drake. It gave England its great Elizabethan Age. Hakluyt's Voyages are the English Odyssey. Anthony Froude reproved and helped to remove our neglect of these Homeric heroes of ours. That neglect is past. We can buy Hakluyt now in shilling volumes; and to-day there is no English soul so dead as to be deaf to Drake's drum. We say now as Elizabeth's Lord High Admiral said then: 'God 'send us to see such a Company together again, when need is.'

It was a map that first set Hakluyt's imagination afire. When he was a schoolboy at Westminster he happened, as he afterwards told Sir Francis Walsingham, to visit his cousin and found lying open on his board certain books of cosmography with a Universal Map.

'He seeing me somewhat curious in the view thereof began to instruct my ignorance: he pointed with his wand to all the known seas, gulfs, bays, straits, capes, rivers, empires, kingdoms, dukedoms, and territories. From the map he brought me to the Bible, and turning to the 107th psalm, directed me to the 23rd and 24th verses, where I read that they that go down to the sea in ships, and do business in great waters, these see the works of the Lord and his wonders in the deep. Which words of the prophet together with my cousin's discourse (things of high and rare delight to my young nature), took in me so deep an impression that I constantly resolved I would by God's assistance prosecute that knowledge and kind of literature, the doors whereof were so happily opened before me.'

From Columbus' day to our own the untravelled world has been shrinking like Balzac's 'Peau de Chagrin' from the lust of exploration. Happily, even for us on whom the ends of the world are come, the thrill and exhilaration still live in the books. But, unless in the air, there remain no new worlds to conquer. Not even the Poles preserve their mystery. If Tennyson's Ulysses were alive to-day, the disillusion of his old age would have lacked its final consolation. Happily, however, the end of exploration is not the end of travel. After all its constellations of islands had been marked on the

map of the Pacific, there was still much for the Earl and the Doctor to learn, for Herman Melville, for Robert Louis Stevenson, to learn and to tell us. And it is consoling to reflect how near to their own boundaries the nations have found a playground for their fancy. Only a hundred years ago Scotland was for England the land of romance. For our great grandparents there was the excitement of revelation as well as the charm of fiction in the Waverley Novels. In the days of Rob Roy, Aberfoyle was for the average Englishman as remote as Abyssinia.

So for the French romantics less than a century ago, Spain was the land of romance. The ideal castle that the Englishman builds in the air the Frenchman finds in Spain. Over the Pyrenees the Frenchman thought himself in fairyland: and, indeed, the Pyrenees make a very fitting frontier for fairyland. So for the great medieval Kaisers, there was a fatal glamour in sunny Italy beyond the Alps. In classical times Thessaly was the land of witchcraft and *diablerie.* Nobody will forget this who has ever read the 'Golden Ass,' either in the difficult Latin of Apuleius or the pleasant Tudor English of Adlington. The moment you are over the Thessalian border you are head over ears among phantasms and illusions. Lucius the hero, a visitor from neighbouring Attica, even before he was transformed into the Ass, could not help seeing in every bird and beast, nay, in every stock and stone, a human being metamorphosed by magic art and malice. Even to-day there are, as Mr. Kipling says, dark places of the earth, full of unimaginable cruelty, touching the railway and the telegraph on the one side and on the other the days of Harun-al-Raschid.

The beauty of travel is that every true traveller is a pioneer. One may go pioneering in familiar scenes and find primitive conditions in the twentieth century. One has only to travel with Mr. Stephen Graham's Russian pilgrims to realize how little pilgrimages are a thing of the past, how much their spirit remains the same. To read Mr. Doughty's great book of 'Travels in Arabia Deserta' is to go a-pioneering in primitive pastoral conditions and to rediscover the life and atmosphere of the Book of Genesis. From familiarity with the old nomad life the author seems to have caught the very accent of the Pentateuch.

Discoveries are of many kinds. Did not Messrs. Spencer and Gillen only the other day discover the Stone Age still surviving in Central Australia? Have we not seen lately the resurrection of pre-Homeric Crete? Did not Layard rediscover Nineveh, and Schliemann Troy? How many of us dreamed of an ancient civilization in Mashonaland before Theodore Bent wrote his book about its 'Buried Cities'? What did Englishmen know of the monasteries of the Levant until Robert Curzon made them the theme of his entrancing narrative? Or what adventure was more adventurous than Vambéry's to Bokhara, or Burton's to Mecca, disguised as dervish and pilgrim; or what primitive mystery more mysterious than those they risked their lives to unveil?

Man, says Horace, does not change his spirit by changing his sky. True: but his spirit may win in travel refreshment and fresh inspiration. Moreover, genius adds a transfiguring light to skies familiar and unfamiliar. Laurence Sterne travelled to see if they really ordered things better in France; and he took on his travels the genius of the essayist. His 'Sentimental Journey,' itself immortal, became the parent of an immortal progeny. Heine wrote his 'Sentimental Journeys,' and the 'Reisebilder' are the most magical things of their kind. Not among his 'pictures of travel,' but in a book of literary criticism, Heine asks suddenly:

'Do you know China, the land of winged dragons and porcelain tea-chests? The whole country is a cabinet of curiosities, surrounded by an interminable wall guarded by ten thousand Tartar sentinels. It is a country in which nature and mankind cannot look at each other without laughing, but they are too highly civilized and too polite to laugh out loud; and to contain themselves they make the oddest grimaces. It is a country without shadows and without perspective, and the brightly coloured houses have for roofs tiers upon tiers of umbrellas with tinkling bells which turn into a joke the very wind as it blows over them.'

I confess that as a reader I enjoy travel more with Heine even than with Humboldt; more with Stevenson and his donkey in the Cevennes even than across the great Gobi Desert with Sven Hedin. For in this kind the delight of travel is intensified by the vision of the poet and the humanity of the essayist. And you get the intimacy of the essayist without the egotism, and little romances, like the novelist's,

without the novelist's heavy-handedness. It is this spirit in travel which makes 'Eothen' the perennial joy it is. It was in this wise that Théophile Gautier painted Spanish life 'across the mountains,' or Eugène Fromentin a Sahara as yet unhackneyed by the circulating libraries. You would expect the French to excel in this kind as they do to-day with Loti and Maurice Barrès. It was this spirit that refreshed us when we escaped with Gissing from Grub Street to renew our humanity by the Ionian Sea. It is this spirit which makes Mr. E. V. Lucas so companionable a traveller. It was in this spirit that Mr. Belloc took on him his pilgrim vows. He vowed to go to Rome on pilgrimage and see all Europe which the Christian faith had saved; and he said: 'I will start from the place where I served in arms for my 'sins: I will walk all the way and take advantage of no wheeled 'thing; I will sleep rough and cover thirty miles a day; and 'I will hear mass every morning; and I will be present at High 'Mass in St. Peter's on the Feast of St. Peter and St. Paul.' Mr. Belloc did in fact enter Rome on foot, and was present at High Mass in St. Peter's on the appointed feast day; but all the other conditions had been broken in one part or another. To this rash vow of Mr. Belloc we owe a book for all its flings and poses as fresh as it is fascinating. Most entertaining of all, perhaps, was the spirit in which George Borrow wandered about Catholic Spain distributing his Protestant bibles. It is no wonder that the blameless meetings of the Bible Society were unusually well attended when a report was expected from its amazing missionary. Mr. Augustine Birrell has told us how the sombre Sunday reading of his Nonconformist childhood was lightened by the dear, deluding title of 'The Bible in Spain.' Borrow found in Spain a store of peculiar characters and picturesque scenes; but, to do his genius justice, it needed no such exotic aids. Mumpers Dell with a gipsy girl and a travelling tinker were good enough for him, or a horse-coper in his own county, or a Methodist in the mountains of Wild Wales. Borrow was born brother of the gipsy. The wind on the nearest heath was for him emancipation, inspiration, revelation. The road to fairyland ran from his front door. Happy are they of this brotherhood. Thoreau, said Bret Harte, found the freedom of the wilderness within earshot of Emerson's dinner-bell.

Nature is not less inspiring to Mr. W. H. Hudson in his Sussex downland than in the Green Mansions of his tropical forests. The late Samuel Butler, when he wrote his 'Alps and Sanctuaries,' about Northern Italy, thought it well to explain that he did not write about Italy because he loved England less. He found, he said, a charm in the villages of Kent, Surrey, and Sussex, which in its way he knew not where to rival. He had seen many foreign cities, but knew none in his opinion so beautiful as London.

If the spirit of the prophet had been in Naaman the Syrian, he would have found the healing streams of his native Abana and Pharpar as sovereign as all the waters of Israel; and we may all experience to the full in our own beautiful country the saving virtues of travel. There is a story of a staunch Scotsman, who was taken to behold the world-famous view of the Himalayas from Darjeeling. He gazed long in silence, then turned and said: 'Man, they mind me of the lowlands 'of Scotland.' To the true traveller every open path is a path to paradise, and the nearest hill but a spur of the Delectable Mountains. Where there is piety, there are always places for pilgrimage, and wonderways to travel wherever there is the will to explore.

'What shall we tell you? Tales, marvellous tales
Of ships and stars and isles, where good men rest,
Where nevermore the rose of sunset pales,
And winds and shadows fall toward the West:

. . . . . .

'And how beguile you? Death has no repose
Warmer and deeper than that Orient sand
Which hides the beauty and bright faith of those
Who made the Golden Journey to Samarkand.'

W. P. James.

IRISH REALITIES

THE 'knowledge, falsely so called,' of the gnostics consisted in the possession of certain mystic words and formulæ by virtue of which the soul was supposed to be able to overcome the resistance of gods and devils, and so to win its way upward through the heavens. Just so English Home Rulers have sought salvation in the Irish Question by repeating with conviction certain formulæ, and they have been pained and puzzled when the Irish gods have failed to be appeased and the Irish devils have continued to roar.

Lord Morley, for instance, an agnostic in religion but a gnostic in politics, makes it clear in his 'Recollections' that he went to Ireland as Chief Secretary in the spirit of doctrinaire orthodoxy; his associates were mainly of the household of the faith; and though he 'listened with the patience required 'by good manners' to those who tried to shake his imported convictions, they remained unshaken. Even Dilke, most laborious of politicians, whose knowledge of France was profound because he spent much of his life there, who made long journeys in the East in order to master the intricacies of the Eastern Question, who spent months in studying on the spot the problems of the Dominions and of the United States, even he never thought it worth while to cross St. George's Channel before committing himself on the Irish Question, and when in 1885 he paid a flying visit to Dublin he came, not as a learner, but as one already conscious of possessing the saving formula.

The reason for this fatal neglect of democratic politicians to study conditions in Ireland itself has lain, partly, in their over-confidence in the efficacy of the representative system. It has been assumed at Westminster that the voice of the Nationalist Party is the voice of Ireland, and that any compact made with this party would be a settlement with the Irish people. A little enquiry would have shown that an essential feature of the tactics of this party has been to economize

truth, and by an apparent accommodation with the principles dominant in the party at Westminster which chances to need their alliance to carry forward their policy by the only practicable method, that is, by disguising its ultimate object. It would be unfair to blame the Nationalists for pursuing this path. If English Home Rulers talked of 'devolution,' of 'local self-government' and the rest, as certain to secure a settlement of the Irish Question, it was not for the Nationalists to undeceive them; the very name of the party should have been argument enough for this purpose. If they used one language in the House of Commons, another in Ireland, and yet another in America, it was open to English politicians to compare the variants and to draw their own conclusions. Doubtless they did so; but since it was certainly a question of a 'political lie' somewhere, every one found the truth in the variant which chanced to suit his own party programme. And so the Parliamentary travail which ended in the birth of that unhappy abortion, the Government of Ireland Act of 1914, was wasted and worse than wasted. For ten years the Liberals in office had chanted their favourite formulæ for exorcizing the demons of Irish disaffection, and with what result? In the summer of 1916 the present writer was told the result, by an old Irishman who remembered the rebellion of '48. 'I have never known,' he said, 'the hatred of England 'so widespread and so deep in Ireland as it is now, and it 'has all grown up since 1906.' It has spread wider and sunk deeper since.

Such an outcome of years of effort at conciliation, of the most friendly and flattering advances, and of a solicitude for the interests of the Irish people which may be characterized as that of a doting grandmother, must needs come as a surprise to a people like the English, who are conscious—perhaps a little too conscious—of their generous intentions. It has not been a surprise to those who know Ireland and the general character of its people.

The ultimate trouble is not indeed due to the causes that Irishmen allege. The charges brought against England by the extreme Nationalists are, for the most part, absurd. It is wholly untrue to say that Ireland since the Union has, in comparison with Great Britain, been overtaxed; that as a consequence of the Union the population of Ireland has been

diminished by one-half; that England has used her preponderance in the Imperial Parliament to exploit Ireland and to depress such of her industries as competed with her own.* As for the charges grosser than these, they are merely characteristic examples of Irish oratorical hyperbole. When young Ireland talks of 'bloody British tyranny,' of the 'brutal police,' and so on, this merely means that young Ireland has no experience of what tyranny is, or of what a brutal police is capable. Having no experience it has to draw on its rich imagination and its inexhaustible vocabulary of superlatives. When the Sinn Fein leader P. H. Pearse told a New York audience that 'the unquenchable national spirit of Ireland gives courage' to young girls to bare their backs to the lashes of a soldiery,' † he was probably unconscious that he was a liar; he felt himself merely to be a patriot and a poet, and free to use for patriotic purposes a poet's licence. For these things have not happened in Ireland within the memory of living men. The badness of the government of Ireland in recent years has not been due to its having been tyrannical; it would, indeed, have been a better government if it had been more tyrannical. The trouble is due to the fact that, largely owing to the shifting phases of opinion at Westminster, the government of Ireland has never been consistent, the normal state being a liberty too often allowed to degenerate into licence, with interludes of a discipline which has never been effective because it was known that it would not be sustained.

It will be urged that, if this be so, the task of governing the Irish should be taken away from those who have failed to understand them, and assigned to those who do, namely, to 'themselves alone.' But is it so certain that they understand themselves? Mr. George Russell ('Æ.'), who is widely

* See 'Undertaxed Ireland,' in 'The Nineteenth Century' for last June. For statistics of the great growth of Irish wealth during the first forty years of the Union, see R. M. Martin, 'Ireland Before and After the Union with Great Britain,' 1848. In 1800 the population of Ireland was 4,000,000, the amount of taxation £4,387,096. In 1840 the population was 8,000,000 and the amount of taxation £4,102,385. The disaster of the famine was due to economic and other causes with which the Union had nothing to do.

† Speech at the Emmet Celebration in the Æolian Hall, New York, March 9, 1914.

regarded as perhaps the most representative of living Irishmen, writes as follows of his countrymen: *

'For all our passionate discussions over self-government, we have had little speculation over our character or the nature of the civilization we wished to create for ourselves. Nations rarely, if ever, start with a complete ideal. Certainly we have no national ideals, no principles of progress peculiar to ourselves in Ireland, which are a common possession of our people.'

Even the Irish Convention, representative as it was, did not represent the whole of Irish opinion, for the momentarily dominant Sinn Fein element ostentatiously ignored it. Even thus restricted, informed though its debates were by a mutual good-will unique in Irish history, it quite failed to reach even approximate agreement on any important principle, not to mention the particular applications of such a principle. It was, indeed, precisely in this disagreement that it most accurately reflected the mind of Ireland. 'The State,' says Mr. Russell, 'is a physical body prepared for the incarnation 'of the soul of a race.' But the population of Ireland is made up of a medley of races, and in this medley one race alone has so clearly defined a soul that it can be said to understand itself. The soul of the Ulster Scot may not be such as to appeal to the poetic imagination; but it is at least a strong soul, intensely self-conscious, and provided already with a physical body with which it is reasonably content. The soul of the mass of the Irish race, Gaelic by courtesy, is as vague and fluctuating as the mists on its mountains; it cries aloud for reincarnation, and its ululations echo through all the world; but it too has a body, and its failure to understand itself is shown by the fact that it does not realize that if it is dissatisfied with its present incarnation, this is due mainly to its own fault.

'We may say with certainty (says Mr. George Russell) that the external circumstances of people are a measure of their inner life. Our mean and disordered little country towns in Ireland, with their drink-shops, their disregard of cleanliness and beauty, accord with the character of the civilians who inhabit them. Whenever we develop an intellectual life these things will be altered, but not in priority to the spiritual mood. . . . That building up of the

* 'The National Being,' p. 3.

inner world we have neglected. Our excited political controversies, our playing at militarism, have tended to bring men's minds from central depths to surfaces.'*

In other words, Irish Nationalists have been obsessed by the idea that with the resurrection of Ireland as a nation everything will be altered in the twinkling of an eye, not realizing that the processes of Providence are not cataclysmic, and that those who are to be rulers over many things must first have shown themselves faithful over few things. For years past the Irish people have possessed all the extensive powers of local self-government enjoyed by the other nationalities of the United Kingdom. How have they used these liberties? Their gross abuse of their powers of local self-government has been denounced even by Sinn Fein, which is wrong, not in its insistence on the need for regeneration, but in its representation of the obstacles in the path of such regeneration. The least of these is the existing system of government. The true obstacles are in the character and habit of mind of the people themselves, which are the outcome of conditions which no Government can alter.

The failure of the Irish to understand themselves is due very largely to the fact that they have no standard of comparison by which to judge themselves. Ireland, isolated on the very outskirts of Europe by a double barrier of sea, is of all islands the most insular. The world is amazed at the attitude of the bulk of the Irish towards the great war; it would be still more amazed could it realize the point of view which determines this attitude. It is defined in the name of the now dominant party—Sinn Fein, i.e. 'we ourselves.' This is more than a formula for the principle of 'self-deter-'mination'; it is a confession of faith in the essential superiority of everything Irish, and the proclamation of a boycott against all influences by which the pure springs of native inspiration might possibly be contaminated. Every other civilization in the world has grown up as the result of a multitude of influences flowing from every quarter; Ireland alone, it seems, would have been capable of developing an ideal culture in isolation, and has only been prevented from doing so by the brutal intrusion of an alien and inferior race.

* *Op cit.* p. 5

Nay, in spite of this intrusion, her glory remains unique. 'Ireland,' said Mr. Devlin, addressing his constituents in Belfast against conscription, 'is a nation greater than England, 'greater in its civilization, nobler in its ideals, more imposing 'in its spirituality, more ancient and more impressive than 'any civilization in Europe.'

The pitiful thing is that this nonsense is believed by the Irish people. It is believed, not only because it flatters the vanity which is one of the most salient of Celtic characteristics, but because the people have no knowledge which would enable them to gauge the measure of its truth. All the education they receive is in the forcing-houses of religious and political sectarianism; after leaving school the vast majority of them never touch a book; and such judgment as they have of the affairs of Ireland and of the world is based on the instructions of their priests, the declamations of political agitators, and an occasional reading of local newspapers more concerned with parochial faction than with world-politics.

It is also, doubtless, to this intellectual and spiritual isolation of the country that is due the survival, as active forces, of ancient traditions, of primitive beliefs and superstitions, of savage instincts, and generally of a point of view which is that of a society in a very early stage of development. Catholic Ireland at the present day is almost as prolific of miracles as the Gaul of Gregory of Tours. The people, carefully preserved by their Church from the slightest contamination of 'Liberalism,' live in an atmosphere of the supernatural, and, like the grown-up children they are, use their naturally quick intelligence to people the waste spaces of their world with a host of creatures of the imagination.* Like children, too, they do not distinguish between this world of fancies and the world of fact. For the average Irishman evidence has no meaning, as the records of trials by jury in this country show; he believes what he wants to believe, and in doing so is quite unconscious of any moral lapse. His native vanity, moreover,

* The spring of this year was rich in portents. In Connaught a new-born baby prophesied woes to Ireland, and died within an hour (compare Gregory of Tours, *Historia Francorum*, lib. ii. cap. 1). At Kiltrustan in Roscommon, a phantom black pig appeared, with a ghostly litter of bonhams, visible only to children; and in an orchard near Aughrim there was a vision of the Blessed Virgin.

makes him desire to produce on all occasions a favourable impression; so he is apt almost unconsciously to tune his opinions and their expression to suit his audience, not only in private but in public—a fact which explains the astounding contradictions which puzzle and confuse the matter-of-fact world outside. If this world were to say in its haste 'All 'Irishmen are liars,' it would be wrong; for a lie is a conscious and deliberate perversion of the truth. In Ireland the truth, as the word is generally understood, simply does not exist.

Unless this characteristic be understood, it is impossible to realize the immense part played in Irish politics by what may be called the historical imagination. Even the scientific study of Irish history provides, unfortunately, material enough for understanding the origin of the deep-seated hatred of the native Irish for the English, though it also shows that the fault has lain not all on one side. But the scientific study of history has not been encouraged in Ireland, with the result that even Irishmen who should know better believe in the myth of a golden age of Irish civilization which the English destroyed, knowing nothing of the true conditions before the Normans came, when 'released from all control these half-'dozen kings fiercely battled like bulls for the mastery of 'the land,' and there were 'for the recalcitrant always ready 'battle-axes and trained troops of swift raiders and 'plunderers.' *

Yet more remarkable is the complete lack of any sense of historical perspective, so that remote happenings have a present-day significance which would be impossible in a less primitive community. No one can understand the Irish Question who does not realize that in large districts of Ireland things that happened hundreds of years ago are still living issues, that the passage of time has not obscured them. One instance out of many must suffice. Three hundred years ago a certain district in Tyrone was 'planted' by King James I. with Protestant settlers, the Irish Catholics retiring to the hills. When the present writer was there in the summer of last year the valley was full of rumours that the 'mountainy men' were about to descend into the valley, massacre the

* See Standish O'Grady, 'The Last Kings of Ireland.' 'English Historical Review,' Vol. iv.

Protestants, and reoccupy the land. The rumour was no less significant because it was baseless. Nor was it so wholly ridiculous as some may suppose. Such things had happened, miserable to relate, often enough before in Ireland, and the memory of them lives almost undimmed; and it has also to be remembered that so lately as the year before, in Easter week 1916, Irishmen had begun the rising in Dublin by shooting down in cold blood many of their unarmed and defenceless fellow-countrymen. As a Derry man said to the present writer, 'They would think no more of killing you than 'of cracking an egg.' Such being the temper of the people and such the power of its mutual antipathies, no illusion could be greater than to suppose that self-government would bring peace to Ireland. Self-government, to be successful, implies an instinct of self-discipline, some sense of realities, some readiness to compromise, and in this land of bitter feuds, of untutored imagination, and of long memories, these conditions are rarely to be found.

The fundamental assumption underlying the whole Nationalist claim is that Ireland, being one island, is also one nation. Ireland, it is asserted, is 'the clearest geographical, 'historical and political entity in Europe'; which is only superficially true of its geography, and of its politics and history the very reverse of the truth. As recent events should have conclusively proved, there are in Ireland not one nation, but two, the dividing line between them being marked, partly by difference of race, but far more by difference of religion. This is extremely hard for people in more advanced countries, and particularly in England, to realize; it can be realized only by bearing in mind what has been said about the isolation of Ireland, which has left it all but untouched by the influences which, elsewhere, have tended to subordinate the narrow interests of creed. Catholicism in Ireland is a living reality, informed with all the childlike spirit of the ages of faith; Protestantism in Ireland is the Bible religion of the Reformers, *protestant* still, not the colourless amalgam of humanitarian sentiment and watered-down theology which inspires the non-conformist conscience in England. In Ireland, Protestants and Catholics stand face to face as they have stood since the sixteenth century, marking and emphasizing 'the contrast 'not only of two creeds, but of two breeds, of two ways of

' thinking, of two ways of looking at all the most vital interests ' of men.' In Ireland, in short, the question of creed remains dominant, and, with rare exceptions, it is creed that marks the line of cleavage in all that makes for national sentiment.

If this truth needed further illustration it was supplied when the Government proposed to extend the National Service Act to Ireland. The Protestant archbishops called on the members of their Church to render willing obedience ; the General Synod of the Presbyterian Church did the same, in even stronger terms ; the Roman Catholic hierarchy, on the other hand, denounced the proposal to apply ' conscription ' to Ireland as an unparalleled outrage and threw the whole immense weight of the authority of their Church into the conspiracy to defeat the Act. In the light of these facts the English people may perhaps grasp the full significance of the proposals made in the Convention for safeguarding in the Irish Parliament the rights of the Unionist minority. It is a minor matter that the safeguards proposed were as invidious as useless. The significant question is—What is meant by ' Unionists ' ? As a political term ' Unionist ' will be meaningless when Home Rule is an accomplished fact, unless—as seems probable—it comes to apply to those who cling to what remains of the ties with Great Britain and the Empire. But Unionist in Ireland is practically, though not quite, synonymous with Protestant ; in the Convention report it was used as a euphemism to disguise an unpleasant truth.

It is worth while to enquire further into this antithesis which lies at the very root of the Irish question. It is not the fault of the Roman Church if British Protestants fail to understand all that is implied in her claim to be the supreme arbiter in all questions of ' faith and morals,' for the pronouncements of the Popes during the last hundred years have re-abated not a jot of the claims of their greater medieval predecessors.* In most countries, even in most Catholic countries, these pronouncements have proved but stage thunder—the ' godless ' forces of Liberalism have seen to that. But not so in Ireland, where of all native forces the Church is far the

* E.g. in 1911 the decree *Quantavis diligentia* reasserted the ancient *privilegium fori* forbidding under penalty of excommunication the summoning without authority of any ecclesiastical person before a lay tribunal.

strongest. Of its strength a hundred examples might be given, but none more conclusive than the recent action of the Church in the matter of 'conscription,' which involves the whole principle at issue, not only between Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, but between Liberalism and Catholicism everywhere. The Catholic position was clearly stated by Father Peter Finlay, S.J., Professor of Theology in the National University, in letters to the *Irish Times* of the 14th and 18th of last May.* He writes:

'No doubt political consequences of the first magnitude have followed on the action of the bishops; but the issue laid before them was religious and moral, not political, and they were entitled, in duty bound, to decide it. Laws of Parliament may be just or unjust, binding or not binding upon conscience; and when we Catholics doubt their justice and binding force, we appeal, not to politicians or to civil courts for guidance, but to the Catholic bishops. In this sense we set our bishops above Parliament, as every true Christian sets his individual conscience.'

The bishops are not, indeed, Father Finlay says, infallible. Bishops are entitled to decide what issues are moral and what political—this is the doctrine held by all educated Catholics—but their decision must not be arbitrary; they must be guided, in deciding, by the law which they administer (i.e. the law of the Church), and 'an appeal may always be made against 'their decision to the supreme teaching authority in Rome.'

In view of the fact that, at one time or another, the Church has claimed jurisdiction over nearly every field of activity of the modern State, as falling within the sphere of faith and morals, and that none of these claims have ever been abandoned, Father Finlay's contention means in effect that whatever constitutional system may be set up in a truly Catholic country, all the acts of the legislature must run the gauntlet of a House of Lords Spiritual and, in case of dispute, be referred to the supreme authority in Rome. In this case, what is the value of the 'guarantees' given to the Protestant minority in Ireland? If Father Finlay be right, no guarantees of freedom of opinion in Ireland will, under a permanent Catholic majority,

* He has since developed the theme in an article on 'The Doctrinal Authority of Bishops,' in 'Studies,' Vol. vii., No. 26, June, 1918.

be worth the paper on which they are written. There would, of course, be no 'persecution'; there would be no blazing Acts of Faith in College Green; but there would be an indefinite accentuation of the persistent pressure with which Irish Protestants are already familiar, a constant tendency of the legislature, and more especially of the administration, to put non-Catholics at a disadvantage in every walk of life.*

Religion, then, marks a fundamental line of cleavage between different sections of the Irish people. But it is not the only one. There are other dividing forces which owe their origin partly to the racial and political struggles of the past, partly to the economic conditions of the present. 'If we are to unite 'Ireland,' wrote Mr. George Russell in his 'Thoughts for 'the Convention,' 'we can only do so by recognizing what truly 'are the principles each party stands for, and will not forsake, 'and for which if necessary they will risk life.' To recognize these principles, even as Mr. Russell expounds them, is to recognize the impossibility of uniting Ireland—as Mr. Russell himself confessed when he left the Convention in a huff. But most certainly, unless they be recognized, it is impossible to understand the Irish question; and it is therefore proposed to indicate as briefly as possible the principles of the three great groups of Irish opinion, and the causes which have led during the last two years to the shifting of the balance between them. These three groups are the Unionists, Nationalists, and Sinn Feiners.

Mr. Russell, in the pamphlet above quoted, makes a sincere effort to state the position of the Unionists impartially, though his own bias is throughout obvious. He writes:

'The Unionists are, many of them, descendants of settlers who, by their entrance into Ireland, broke up the Gaelic uniformity and introduced the speech, the thoughts, characteristic of another race.'

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* As an instance may be cited the Scheme for University Scholarships and Bursaries under the Irish Universities Act, 1918, issued by the Dublin Corporation. The scheme lays down that 'Holders of the City Scholarships awarded in the year 1918 must be matriculated students of the National University,' the whole *raison d'être* of which is its 'Catholic atmosphere.' Trinity College, though it has many Catholic students, and though for the year 1917-1918 it contributed £1,916 2*s.* 8*d.* to the City rates, is excluded.

He is right when he says that these settlers have grown to love their country of adoption as much as any inhabitants of Gaelic origin; but when he adds that, owing to centuries of life in Ireland and by intermarriage, they are now much more akin to their fellow-countrymen in mind and manner than they are to any other people, he is certainly not right as regards the Protestants of the north, who are and feel themselves to be far more akin to the Scots than to the southern Irish. After paying a generous tribute to the sterling qualities which have made the industries of Ulster famous, he sums up quite accurately the objections of Ulster business men to the creation of an Irish national State:

'They believe that an Irish legislature would be controlled by a majority of small farmers, men who have no knowledge of affairs, or of the peculiar needs of Ulster industry, or the intricacy of the problem involved in carrying on an international trade.'

Ulstermen point out that the principle of 'Ireland a nation' involves the complete right of self-taxation, and that the Nationalists and more particularly the Sinn Feiners proclaim their intention of protecting Irish industries. This would involve a tariff war with Great Britain fatal to Ulster industries, which are dependent upon the maintenance of the closest relations with Great Britain and complete association with her world-wide prestige in the benefits of which they participate. Ulstermen, moreover, fear that the expense of the social and economic experiments in which the Irish would indulge would not be shared by the farmers, who are not accustomed to direct taxation, and that they would use their majority to shift the burden on to the industrial north, which would be crushed under the weight of the excess profits and income taxes. In short, to the religious antagonism, and to the race antagonism which difference of creed has accentuated, is added a conflict of economic interests between the industrial north and the agricultural south.

The second political group consists of the Sinn Fein party. 'These,' says Mr. Russell, 'may be described as the spiritual 'inheritors of the more ancient race in Ireland,' and their general standpoint cannot be more authoritatively described than in his own words:

'They regard the preservation of their nationality as a sacred

charge, themselves as a conquered people owing no allegiance to the dominant race. . . . They are inspired by an ancient history, a literature stretching beyond the Christian era, a national culture and distinct national ideals, which they desire to manifest in a civilization which shall not be an echo or an imitation of any other. . . . They assert that the Union kills the soul of the people,' etc. etc.

The third group—that of the Nationalists—occupies a middle position between those who desire the perfecting of the Union and those who aim at complete independence, their policy being to maintain the connection with the Empire, and at the same time to acquire an Irish control over administration and legislation in Ireland.

They are a practical party taking what they can get, and because they could show ostensible results they have had a greater following in Ireland than any other party. This is natural because the average man in every country is a realist. But this reliance on material results to secure support meant that they must always show results, or the minds of their countrymen veered to those ultimates and fundamentals which await settlement here as they do in all civilizations.

'The intellect of Ireland,' says Mr. Russell, 'is fixed on 'fundamentals.' He makes it clear—and it is far clearer to-day than it was a year ago—that the Home Rule Act, if put into operation at once, and even if Ulster were cajoled or forced into accepting it, would not be regarded as a final settlement by Irish Nationalists, that it had nowhere in Ireland been accepted as final, and that unless it were altered so as to give Ireland unfettered control over taxation, customs, excise, and trade policy, the Irish people, instead of trying to make the best of it, would begin at once to use whatever powers they possessed under it as a lever to gain the desired control. 'The practically 'unanimous claim of the Nationalists,' he says, 'is for the 'status and economic control possessed by the self-governing 'dominions,' and he adds that by this alone will the causes of friction between the two nations (i.e. Great Britain and Ireland) be removed. Causes of friction are to be removed, by the erection of tariff barriers and preparation for a tariff war! They are to be removed by subjecting the large Protestant minority of English and Scottish descent to the domination of a purely Irish majority, fervently Catholic,

and led by fanatics eagerly intent on eliminating everything English or Scottish from the life of Ireland!

Thus we are brought down to the fundamentals of Irish Nationalism. As recent events have shown, the distinction between the Nationalist and Sinn Fein parties is not one of principle: it is only a difference of opinion as to the application of a principle on which both are agreed—the principle that Ireland is a separate nation.

English politicians, by their habitual loose use of language, have played into the hands of the separatists. By asserting that Great Britain is championing 'the rights of small 'nationalities,' without defining what they mean by nationalities, or what rights they have in mind, these phrase-makers have laid themselves open to a charge of hypocrisy; for the superficial resemblances between the Irish and other national movements are conspicuous. In a pamphlet, 'The 'Resurrection of Hungary,' published in 1904, and said to have been inspired by Kuno Meyer, Mr. Arthur Griffith, the Sinn Fein leader, drew a parallel between Ireland and Hungary. The pamphlet has had an immense circulation, and his analysis of the methods by which the Magyars obtained from Austria the virtual independence of their national State has been the foundation of Sinn Fein policy since.* It may be concisely stated that the Irish claim to a separate national polity has, indeed, no such historical and juridical foundation as underlies the claims of the Poles or the Czechs, or such as underlay that of the Magyars; nor is there, as in the case of the Yugo-Slavs, the grievance of men of the same race and sympathies being artificially divided under separate allegiances and compelled on occasion to fight each other. But language and methods are the same. The Irish movement began, as similar national movements had begun elsewhere, by the attempt on the part of a small group of enthusiasts to revive an all but extinct literary tradition and to recreate a language which survived only in local dialects mutually more or less unintelligible. The Gaelic League, founded in 1893, for more than two decades made little headway; up to the time of the rebellion it had not assumed a definitely extremist complexion; and the Sinn Fein group had no considerable following in the country.

* See the remarkable article, 'Sinn Fein and Germany,' by 'Vigilant,' in the 'Quarterly Review' for January last.

To-day the League, purged of its moderate elements, is definitively a Sinn Fein organization ; hundreds of new centres have been established for the propagation of the Gaelic language ; and the Sinn Fein chiefs, at the very moment when their treasonable commerce with the enemy is once more evident, are advertised by the Nationalist leaders as their 'colleagues.' * In the autumn of 1914 it was possible for Sir Edward Grey to speak of Ireland as 'the one bright spot,' so ready had been the response, not only of the Irish leaders, but of the Irish people, to the call to arms, so complete for the moment the reconciliation of north and south in opposition to the common enemy. The Irish Question seemed on the point of being solved for ever by the removal of the mutual fears and suspicions which had divided the Irish from the British and the Irish among themselves. How is it that this fair hope has been so utterly belied ?

The hope was doubtless in the first instance based on an illusion—the illusion that the placing of the Home Rule Bill on the Statute Book had awakened in Ireland a new spirit of loyalty to Great Britain and to the Empire. It cannot be too strongly stated that to expect any such sentiment from the mass of the Catholic Irish is utterly idle, for the historical and other reasons already mentioned. The Nationalist Irishmen who flocked to the colours were partly those of the old fighting stocks who love war for its own sake and for what it brings, partly those who saw, rightly, that it was to the interest of Ireland to conciliate the English people, by a crowning proof that England had no reason to fear or distrust a nationalized Ireland, and who recognized, also rightly, that the interests of Ireland are bound up with those of the Empire. But the interests of Ireland were always the first consideration, and recruiting languished just in proportion as the authorities, in their ignorance of Irish conditions, neglected or flouted Irish nationalist sentiment and put in the forefront of their appeal the common flag of the Empire.

The irreconcilable Sinn Fein minority took advantage of every mistake made by the Government or the War Office to recruit their ranks ; they were plentifully supplied with money from obvious sources ; the successful arming of Ulster in

* Manifesto of the Mansion House Anti-Conscription Conference, June 6, 1918.

resistance to the Home Rule Act gave them a model which they were not slow to imitate ; and the criminal weakness of Mr. Birrell's regime allowed them to prepare openly for rebellion, not—as in the case of Ulster—against a particular form of government within the Empire, but against the Empire itself. No one can accuse them of underhand treachery ; they proclaimed their objects ; they paraded fully armed, executed elaborate manœuvres, and actually held in Dublin a full-dress rehearsal of an attack on the Castle—while the bloodthirsty police looked on.

Then, suddenly, came the rebellion of Easter week, 1916. English Ministers have gone out of their way to extol the virtues of the rebels as ' clean fighters ' and to praise them for their courage. Some doubtless fought cleanly, and some were brave. But, none the less, the rising would never have taken place had not the Government, trusting to the pledge given by the elected representatives of the Irish nation, stripped the country of troops. The rising began with a series of brutal murders of unarmed soldiers, police, and civilians ; and numbers of the rebels, as soon as the troops began to arrive, slunk off home and buried their rifles. By the people of Dublin the troops were welcomed as deliverers ; the insensate rebellion was all but universally condemned ; the voices of extremists quavered into silence, and all over the country public bodies, of every complexion of politics, hastened to pass resolutions dissociating themselves from all sympathy with an enterprise so mad and so wicked. All Ireland lay as wax for a statesman, had any statesman existed, to mould into whatever shape he pleased. Everyone is agreed that if at that moment the Government had extended the Military Service Act to Ireland Irishmen would have come in like lambs and fought like lions—if only to wipe off their shame—finding in the comradeship in arms with the British people, whom they have never known or understood, a new sentiment and a wider loyalty.

Two years have passed since then, and the attitude of the Irish people has completely changed. The Sinn Feiners, who have never disguised their anxiety for the success of the German arms, are recognized as the most powerful popular force in the country ; * the Church has proclaimed its

* It does not follow that popular sentiment is in favour of Germany. In Ireland nothing follows.

sympathy with them; and the Nationalists have only succeeded in preserving a precarious hold in some parts of the country by imitating the violence of their language and adopting all the essential parts of their programme. To what is the change due—a change amazing even in this land of unreason and untutored passions?

It has been due partly to the almost incredible folly of the Government, partly to the cleverness with which the Sinn Fein leaders took advantage of this folly. On the morning of May 12, 1916, Mr. Asquith arrived in Dublin on a mission of 'conciliation.' The executions of the rebels, many of whom had been condemned for foul murders, were stopped; the Prime Minister made the round of the prisons and did everything but shake hands with the rebels interned there; he paid no tribute of appreciation to the soldiers or the police. A fortnight later he completed the effect of these activities by proclaiming in the House of Commons 'the break-down of 'the existing machinery of government in Ireland,' whereas it was only those responsible for the working of the machinery who had disgracefully failed. The effect of all this on the quick-witted Irish was immediate. The prisoners, who before Mr. Asquith's visit had been depressed and cowed, and were in many cases tearfully protesting their penitence, entirely changed their tone, becoming truculent, defiant, and unruly. They now believed, and the rest of Ireland soon believed too, that the rebellion, so far from being a disastrous fiasco, had been a triumphant success; that what all the constitutional methods of the Nationalists had failed to secure in years of Parliamentary effort had been won by a week's effort in arms.

It is unnecessary to pursue the negotiations that followed, which culminated in the assembly of the Irish Convention on July 25, 1917. Among the mass of the Irish people the Convention excited little interest. The Sinn Feiners, who by this time had secured an immense following in the country, ostentatiously refused to take part in it. The Nationalists, on the other hand, were largely discredited by their short-lived agreement with the Ulstermen for the 'partition' of Ireland. So that not only was the Convention not fully representative, but it met in an atmosphere of suspicion, being widely regarded as an insidious device of the British Government to divide Ireland against itself (as though it

were not already divided !), and to prove to all the world, by advertising the disagreements of Irishmen, their unfitness for self-government. Englishmen may acquit Ministers of any such Machiavellian subtlety—and indeed the whole policy of British Cabinets towards Ireland has been innocent of any suspicion of statecraft—but the Irish, who have been described as ' a nation of cattle-dealers,' are not apt to recognize generous motives in the other parties to a bargain, even when such are present, and in the case of British party politicians they have had good cause to suspect their absence. And so it is not surprising that every proposal put forward by the British Government for an accommodation has been suspected of being a trap or, in the circumstances of the present time, as being inspired by fear. But, as Lord Burleigh said to Queen Elizabeth, ' It is the poison of all government when the subject ' thinks the prince doth anything more out of fear than favour.'

In this connection a word must be said about the execution of the leaders of the Easter week rebellion. The Irish, like their kinsmen the Portuguese,* have no sentimental objection to bloodshed as such, so long as it takes the form of assassination or is in ' hot blood '—there is no memory of the unfortunate people killed by the rebels during that bloody Easter holiday, nor even of the insurgents who were caught red-handed and summarily shot ; but, like the Portuguese, they have a horror of capital punishment, and, above all, of the long-drawn-out process of trial which the English idea of justice thinks essential even in cases of obvious guilt.† What the result of Sir John Maxwell's discipline might have been had it not been interfered with it is impossible to say. It was interfered with. Sir John Maxwell was removed in response to popular clamour ; prisoners equally guilty with those executed were amnestied, with the natural result that people believed that an excessive severity had been exercised in the case of the others. The book-shops of Dublin were filled with the works of the ' murdered ' poets, and among the impressionable young people of both sexes the Sinn Fein creed, watered by the blood of the ' martyrs,' spread with amazing rapidity. It was impossible to convince even those who had been previously

* See G. Young, ' Portugal, Old and Young,' pp. 12, 13

† Cf. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 34 : ' The cold-blooded killing of a criminal by society is revolting to him.'

loyal in their attitude towards the war that, in taking up arms against the Government at such a time, the Sinn Feiners had done anything worthy of death.

Sinn Fein sentiment spread far and wide during the year following the rebellion, but the Sinn Fein organization did not keep pace with it for lack of leaders. Count Plunkett was a poor substitute for such eloquent firebrands as Pearse or de Valera, while Mr. Griffith and Mr. Eoin MacNeill, though both men of ability, were handicapped by the fact that they had been careful not to share the perils of the rebellion. This defect the Government remedied by the unconditional release of all the imprisoned rebels—including those guilty of deliberate and cold-blooded murders—on the eve of the opening of the Convention. All loyal Ireland was thunderstruck by so fatuous a proceeding, which could be explained only by the bringing to bear on the Government of some pressure from outside difficult to resist. It was explained on the ground of the desire to 'create an atmosphere' for the Convention. It did so, but hardly in the way that was expected or desired. Lawlessness in all the country had already increased under the rule of Mr. Duke, whose strictly legal training fitted him ill to deal with disorder in a country where to wait for 'legal evidence' is to wait in vain, and who revived the *laissez aller* policy of Mr. Birrell, with less cynicism, but similar results. In the new 'atmosphere' it flourished amazingly.

Now the Irish people, for all their lawlessness, are easily led and easily governed by those who will take the trouble to lead or to govern them. The Sinn Feiners took the trouble, and they met with remarkable success. It is not for a moment to be supposed that this success was due solely, or even mainly, to the appeal made by their ideals to the Irish people. After all, as Mr. George Russell truly says, 'the average man in all 'countries is a realist,' and this is most true of the shrewd Irish peasant. The scatter-brained youths of the towns might be caught by the sounding inanities of Sinn Fein oratory; it flattered their vanity to be told that they belonged to the most ancient, the noblest, the most highly civilized race on earth; it soothed their consciences to believe that, though more courageous than any other human beings, it would be a crime against their country to fight the formidable German. But

the men of the countryside needed more solid bait, which was presently provided. Mr. Arthur Griffith's paper 'Nationality' for June 9, 1917, contained this significant piece of news:

> The Club lately formed at Castlemahon, Newcastlewest, is urging the local farmers to consider the present taxation, and the trend of future taxation. Other districts, please copy this headline.

The other districts did copy it, and soon the most popular item in the otherwise meagre Sinn Fein programme was that which promised that Ireland, her independence secured by international action at the Peace Conference, would not only escape all taxation necessitated by the war, but would unload all her other obligations on to Great Britain and become at a stroke 'the only nation in Europe free of a national debt.'* It is easy to understand the force of this appeal to the pockets of people too ignorant to understand the silliness of the assumption that underlies it. But this was not all. The insatiable land-hunger of the peasants was to be satisfied, and as an earnest of the intentions of the triumphant Republic the local Sinn Fein organizations entered forcibly on the lands of 'ranchers,' 'drove' the offending cattle, and ploughed up grass-lands, in defiance of the law and regardless of the economy of the farms thus outraged.

But men, and especially perhaps Irishmen, are governed by fear even more than by desire; and the Sinn Feiners have not shrunk from applying the element of fear. In Ireland 'coercion' by the legal Government has always been one thing, coercion by organized terrorist groups quite another; and has not Irish civilization enriched the political armoury of the world with a new weapon and the vocabularies of all nations with a new word—the boycott? The Sinn Feiners have faithfully reproduced this, and all other methods of intimidation employed in earlier agitations, their object being—as Judge Wakely pointed out at the Roscommon Quarter Sessions in May—to terrorize people into thinking that they are the rulers of Ireland and that the Government Departments are of no consequence.

This was precisely the result aimed at by the policy advocated

* Mr. Darrell Figgis at Ennis, July 4, 1917.

by Mr. Arthur Griffith in his 'Resurrection of Hungary,' published in 1904; and the infinite tolerance of the Government during the session of the Convention enabled it to achieve a large measure of success. That success acted rapidly on the trend of opinion in the Convention itself. Successive Sinn Fein victories at the polls forced the Nationalists to show their hand more completely in demanding at least 'dominion 'self-government.' The southern Unionists, resentful of their desertion by the Ulster Protestants under the 'partition' scheme, despairing of any adequate protection for their lives and property by the Imperial Government, believed that their only chance of safety lay in coming to terms with the Nationalists. But this ill-assorted and short-lived alliance was far from being a victory for the British policy of conciliation. It was the outcome, so far as the Unionists were concerned, partly of the instinct of self-preservation, partly of bitter resentment at the constant betrayal by the Government at Westminster of the interests of those Irishmen who have been consistently loyal to the British connection: a resentment which has done much towards uniting the Irish people on the only principle which could unite them—common hatred of the British Government. Let there be no mistake about this. The resistance of the Protestant democracy of Ulster to Home Rule is not dependent upon affection for Great Britain; it is due to a fundamental instinct of self-preservation, to the determination of a highly efficient community not to be placed at the mercy of a majority less efficient—and wholly alien. Ulster sentiment towards Great Britain, based partly on community of race, but far more on community of interests, might easily be turned into hate, as it has been before. 'In 'Ireland it does not pay to be loyal' is a refrain which has been heard too often of late. Before the change of system introduced with the viceroyalty of Field-Marshal Lord French there was a rapidly growing tendency among the Southern Unionists to use language not differing greatly from that of the more moderate Sinn Feiners. The present writer has talked with Tory country gentlemen, lifelong Unionists, who maintained that if the Union was to be dissolved, the more complete the dissolution the better, as they had lost all faith in the power or will of the Government to protect their friends, and any perpetuation even of a shadow of authority over Ireland

at Westminster would merely serve as an excuse for the misrule of the Irish Parliament and expose them, in their isolation, to attack as an alien garrison.

Recent events have, indeed, changed this temper. The anti-conscription campaign, by its revelation of the spirit in which the Roman Church is prepared to use its inordinate political power, and of the unwillingness or powerlessness of the Nationalists to pursue a moderate policy, has killed any disposition of the Southern Unionists to compromise with their principles. The process has been helped by recent object-lessons in the probable fate of unpopular minorities under a nationalist regime. The boycotting of the six Protestant members of the Wicklow Urban Council who had the temerity to vote against an anti-conscription motion attracted special attention because the victims were comparatively conspicuous. But it was only a sample of the system everywhere applied; for everywhere men who refused to sign the pledge or to contribute to the anti-conscription fund have been made outcasts among their neighbours and have lost their means of livelihood. What hope will there be for the Protestant minority in the south of Ireland if subjected to a majority which knows only two principles of government—ecclesiastical authority and organized terrorism? Their hope at present lies in the maintenance of the Union. But if they are abandoned by the British people, and possibly also cut off from their co-religionists of the north, their only chance of survival will be to accommodate themselves to the prevailing sentiment, which will certainly not be love of England or enthusiastic loyalty to the Empire.

In short, Home Rule, whether under a federal scheme or any other, will not conciliate the disloyal elements in Ireland; it will merely tend to alienate the loyal. Sir Edward Carson said in the House of Commons on the 25th of last month, 'There is no use in having the whole of Ireland against you.' The remark was greeted with laughter and cheers, which seemed to indicate a dawning appreciation of realities in the House. But the reiteration by the Chief Secretary of his Home Rule faith proved that the principles of political gnosticism still rule in high places, and that the efficacy of formulæ has ever now not been wholly discredited.

INDIA IN TRAVAIL

1. **India in Transition.** By H. H. The Aga Khan. The Medici Society. 1918.
2. **Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government.** By Lionel Curtis. Macmillan. 1918.

FOR the first time since the old East India Company disappeared and the government of India was transferred to the Crown, the purpose of British policy in India was clearly defined last year in the Pronouncement made on August 20th in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu. It was, he stated, 'the gradual 'development of self-governing institutions with a view to 'the progressive realization of responsible government in 'India, as an integral part of the British Empire.'

There can be no mistake as to the constitutional significance of that Pronouncement. For sixty years since the Mutiny, British policy in India has been framed in the spirit of Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858. Whilst it promised complete religious toleration and the admission, 'as far as may be,' of Indians of whatsoever race or creed 'freely and impartially' to the Indian public services, it contemplated India merely as a great trust to be administered at the direction of the British trustees in the interests of those committed to their charge.

It is to that interpretation of our duties towards India that we have hitherto held fast. We have abstained even more rigidly than in the days of the East India Company from any interference with Indian religious, social or domestic institutions, however repugnant to our own ideals. We have concentrated our energies on promoting mainly the material welfare of the people, and the intellectual side of education, rather than its moral side, lest on the latter we should be suspected of trenching on the domain of religion. The number of Indians admitted to the higher ranks of the public services has been steadily, if slowly, increased. The creation of urban municipalities and rural boards has offered Indians an opportunity, of which they have been slow to avail themselves

effectively, of taking part in local government, and in 1892 they were given substantial representation in the Legislative Councils of the Viceroy and of the Provincial Governments. A slightly new note was, it is true, sounded in the Proclamation issued by King Edward VII. on November 2, 1908, the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's Proclamation. Stress was laid on 'British guidance and control'; but it announced that the time had come 'prudently to extend the principle 'of representative institutions' and to give 'politic satis-'faction' to the aspirations of important classes 'representing 'ideas that have been fostered and encouraged by British 'rule.' The reforms thus foreshadowed took effect in the Councils Act of 1909, with which the names of Lord Morley, who was then Secretary of State, and of Lord Minto, who was then Viceroy, will always remain closely associated. It considerably increased Indian representation, basing it largely on election, and conferred on Indian members substantial powers to criticize the action of the executive, to elicit information by means of questions, and to make their views known by way of resolutions. Indians were also for the first time introduced into the Executive Councils of the Viceroy and of Provincial Governors-in-Council, i.e. into the very mainsprings of government, as well as into the Secretary of State's Council at Whitehall. But the object of all these measures, however liberal and far-reaching, was avowedly only to give the Indians a larger consultative voice in Indian affairs, and to bring Government into more direct and regular contact with Indian public opinion as voiced by representative Indians. It was never intended to give Indians any real control over the Executive through the legislative councils, or even to prepare the way for any such transfer of powers to them. The principal author of the Act of 1909, Lord Morley, to whom none can impute reactionary or even conservative tendencies, used the very plainest language in Parliament:

'If I were attempting to set up a parliamentary system in India, or if it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India, I for one would have nothing at all to do with it. . . If my existence, either officially or corporeally, were to be prolonged twenty times longer than either is likely to be, a parliamentary system in India is not at all the goal to which I would for a moment aspire.'

Yet within less than ten years from that emphatic declaration, the goal which Lord Morley formally repudiated has been formally adopted by his successor. What is the reason for this change? Partly, no doubt, it is a consequence of the failure of Lord Morley to foresee that, whatever his own intentions, the reforms which he initiated were destined to lead us into a blind alley, if they were not to lead to definitely representative institutions. Enthusiastically as they were welcomed at first by the Western-educated classes in India, to whose political influence they were in themselves a direct and open concession, they failed to satisfy their aspirations as soon as it was shown in practice that increased opportunities of consultation involved no effective increase of power in the conduct of public affairs. Indirectly the Indian members have unquestionably been able, during the last ten years, to make their influence substantially felt in the Indian Legislatures, but more often in private and confidential conferences between their leaders and the official representatives of government than in public debates, of which alone the Indian public is cognizant. One of the most unhappy provisions of the Morley-Minto reforms was the resort to a mechanical majority to uphold the final discussions of the Executive in legislatures which were only designed to be consultative. It served merely to foster the illusion that they had something of the character of parliamentary assemblies in which the Executive must rely for its maintenance in office upon a voting majority.

In the Viceroy's Legislative Council the official majority was permanently secured. In the Provincial Councils, in which government depends for its majority on some non-official votes in addition to the safe official votes, it has already in some instances been compelled to abandon even legislation which it considered almost essential less it should lose face by being placed in a minority. As Mr. Lionel Curtis remarks in his 'Letters to the People of India,' to which further reference will be made:

'Is it humanly possible, if this system be long continued, that the Executive will resist the temptation to influence non-official members by means other than pure argument in open debate? Wherever this system has been long continued, government by "influence" has set in, degenerating into government by intrigue, and ending in government by corruption.'

Already, though with no shadow of foundation, Indian elected members have not hesitated to suggest the intrusion of such evils by ignoring and pouring contempt upon their fellow-countrymen who owe their seats not to election but to nomination by government. On the other hand, criticism of government unrestrained by any growing sense of responsibility has increased in bitterness with the larger opportunities it enjoys of making itself heard. The Morley-Minto reforms have thus promoted discord instead of harmony between the two races by the creation of assemblies which are neither in reality merely deliberative, since the Indian members do actually wield sufficient power in them to hamper and obstruct, though not to control, the Executive; nor parliamentary, since the power wielded by the Indian members remains entirely divorced from the real responsibility that can only act as an effective restraint when an opposition has to face the possibility of being called upon to change places with the government and translate its own theories into practice.

But great as was even before the war the disillusionment of Indian politicians, and even of many thoughtful Europeans, over the results of the Morley-Minto reforms, and widespread as was already the agitation for another 'forward step' in the very direction which Lord Morley had excluded from all his calculations, such a complete change of front in British policy as the Pronouncement of August 20th implies would not, it may confidently be asserted, have taken place without the great revolution produced by the war in the whole outlook both of the British and of the Indian peoples. The genuine outburst of enthusiasm with which India responded to the call of the Empire at the beginning of the war came almost as a revelation to the British public generally, who know little about India, and the impression deepened when during the critical winter of 1914-15 Indian troops stood shoulder to shoulder with British troops in the trenches to fill the gap which could not then have been filled from any other quarter. The loyalty displayed by the Indian princes and the great land-owning gentry and the old fighting races who had stood by the British for many generations, was no surprise to those Englishmen who did know India; but less expected was the rally to the British cause of even that section of the new Western-educated classes in India which, until then,

had taught hatred and contempt of the British rulers of India with a violence which implied—even when it was not definitely expressed—a fierce desire to throw off British rule itself. In some cases the homage paid to the righteousness of the British cause may not have been altogether genuine, but with the great majority it sprang from the one thought, as expressed by Sir Satyendra Sinha, one of the most gifted and patriotic of India's sons, in his presidential address to the Indian National Congress in 1915, that, at that critical hour in the world's history, it was for India 'to prove to the 'great British nation her gratitude for peace and the blessings 'of civilization secured to her under its ægis for the last 'hundred and fifty years and more.' The tale of German frightfulness and the guns of the *Emden*, which were an ominous reminder that a far worse fate than British rule might conceivably overtake India, helped to confirm Indians in the conviction that the British Empire and India's connection with it were well worth fighting for. Great Britain and the whole British Empire marked their sense of the new imperial spirit of which India had shown herself capable by admitting representatives of India* into the innermost counsels of the Imperial War Conference which assembled last year in London. India's representation at the imperial conferences inevitably brought to the forefront a question which had hitherto preoccupied only those who had given time and thought to one of the great problems of the British Commonwealth of Nations—namely, the position of India within an Empire made up of self-governing nations. Could it possibly continue in such company to be a mere dependency, however important, without any definite voice in the control of its own affairs? Could it under such conditions be regarded as an equal partner with nations each of which had full control of its own affairs? Simultaneously, our own war aims came to be more clearly defined, and, with the Russian revolution and the accession of the United States, the world-war shaped itself more and more to the one paramount issue: Freedom *versus* Slavery; Democracy *versus* Military Despotism. So the conception of India's ultimate position as another great self-governing nation within the British Empire grew into an

* Maharajah of Bikanir and Sir Satyendra Sinha.

inevitable corollary not only of her own claim to full partnership in the Empire she was fighting for, but of the principles for which the British Empire and its allies had committed themselves to a life-and-death struggle.

This is, as I read it, the logical genesis of the Pronouncement of August 20th. Seldom in our history has so far-reaching a decision been based so largely on abstract principles of right rather than on the considerations of practical expediency which usually inform our policy. Let us not, therefore, be surprised or discouraged if the difficulties it involves are great, but let us recognize how great they are, and then face them. They are far greater than any we have yet encountered and surmounted during our three centuries connection with India.

We have undertaken to introduce democratic institutions, which in our own country have been the slow product of our national evolution and of our western civilization, into a country with an ancient civilization entirely different from our own, and only recently and still very superficially influenced by ours, a country which in the course of its long history has never known democracy, except in the microscopic shape of the Indian village *Panchayat* or Council of Five Elders, whose horizon has never extended beyond the village. The system of autocratic government under which we have hitherto ruled India has been none of our own making. We took it over from our predecessors, the Mogul Emperors, alien conquerors like ourselves, merely making it more paternal and efficient than ever it was in their days. It is the fashion with Hindus to praise the Emperor Akbar for having, although a Mohammedan, ruled India largely through the agency of Hindus. But the Hindus he employed merely enforced his rules of government, which, if for his time and creed singularly tolerant and enlightened, were nevertheless despotic; they were what to-day would be called 'bureaucrats,' though of the best type. Under the indigenous Hindu rulers, before India was overwhelmed by successive waves of Mohammedan conquest, despotic forms of government equally prevailed, though the power behind the throne was frequently that of the Brahman oligarchy, sometimes good and sometimes bad, but never in any sense tending towards democracy. The Buddhist Emperor Asoka, whose edicts engraved on stone pillars remain to this

day the most splendid monuments of apostolic kingship, was an absolute autocrat, though a saintly autocrat. The ancient social structure of India is the reverse of democratic. There is nothing in the tenets of Islam fundamentally incompatible with democracy, but even the Mohammedans of India are still largely tinged with Hindu conceptions, and Hinduism is a social even more than a religious system, based upon the iron law of caste. A law which assigns men from their birth to separate pens from which until death they can never emerge is fundamentally incompatible with democracy, and at the present day there are scores of millions of low caste or no caste Hindus whom their fellow-men of the higher castes regard and treat as 'untouchable,' especially in Southern India, where Brahmanical ascendancy has been much less severely shaken than in the north by the impact of Islam. Even in its higher aspects, Hindu philosophy does not tend to develop the sense of social duty of which democracy should be the political expression, for it teaches the individual to seek not the relief of human suffering around him, but his own escape from an endless cycle of suffering existence, which is all *mayà* or illusion, by complete withdrawal from human intercourse and concentration of all his faculties on the salvation—i.e. the annihilation—of self. There is not even a belief in the efficacy of prayers for others to relieve Indian asceticism from the reproach of spiritual selfishness to which the more recluse forms of Christian monasticism are open.

Historical and geographical causes have produced another obstacle to democratic progress in the profoundly unequal level of civilization to which the different parts of India have attained. As Lord Morley said: 'We have now, as it were, 'before us in that vast congeries of peoples we call India a 'long, slow march in uneven stages through all the centuries 'from the fifth to the twentieth.' Millions of hill and jungle folk are barely removed from primitive savagery. The relations between the great landlords and the peasantry of large parts of India still retain much of their old feudal character. Between the masses of the two greatest communities, Hindus and Mohammedans, the fanatical spirit of our own religious wars still smoulders, and, in spite of the watchfulness of a strong government, leaps up suddenly from time to time into flames. Only last autumn, at the very time

when the political leaders who claim to voice their sentiments were striving to sink all differences in order to create an impression of real national unity, the old feuds broke out with fierce intensity in the province of Behar over the usual killing by Mohammedans for sacrificial purposes of cows which the Hindus worship as the most sacred of all animals. Throughout several large districts the Hindus, taking the Mohammedans as well as the authorities completely by surprise, slew, burnt, looted, destroyed mosques, and outraged Mohammedan women until British troops came in to restore order, and the subsequent trial of the ringleaders showed even educated Hindus to have had a hand in that reign of terror.

Account must also be taken of another but very different line of division which happily implies no kind of antagonism. The greater part of India is under direct British administration, but a large portion, covering a third of its area and including more than a fifth of its population, is not. The Native States —which might well be given the style and title of 'Indian 'Principalities,' for some of them, like Hyderabad, Kashmir, Mysore, and the chief Rajput, Sikh, and Mahratta States, are as large or as populous or as wealthy as the lesser European States—enjoy under treaty a varying measure of internal autonomy under their own hereditary rulers. The loyalty of the princes and ruling chiefs of India to the Crown has never been so strikingly demonstrated as during the war. Many of them are enlightened and progressive. We cannot legislate for them, but we shall have to consult them as constitutional changes in British India must react directly upon their interests and those of their peoples across boundaries that are generally quite artificial. The Conference of Princes which assembled this winter again at Delhi is an indication that they intend to make their voices heard far more distinctly in the future—voices that must carry weight in respect both of India's constitutional position in the Empire and of the constitutional relations between the Indian Government and the peoples of India. They have learnt a great deal from us, and we can learn not a little from them—especially from those who are already trying to reconcile the principle of authority with representative institutions.

If there are so many deep-rooted traditions, opposed to

the growth of a true democratic spirit in India, where are the forces that can foster it? They are scarcely to be found anywhere outside the small class of Western-educated Indians who have caught it from their British teachers—administrators as well as schoolmasters—often quite unconscious of the seed they were sowing in their pupils' minds but none the less effective. For the new spirit that is growing up in India, tender growth though it still be, has been sown not only in the schools and universities that have familiarized the Indian student with our literature and our science, with our history and our institutions and our political ideals, but in every sphere of human activity in which the educated Indian has seen the Englishman at work, hard perhaps and unbending, and even sometimes impatient and over-bearing, but almost invariably true to the standards of justice and integrity, and to the strong sense of public duty he brings with him from his western home. Western-educated Indians are still, it is true, only an infinitesimal portion of the population of India, but their influence cannot nowadays be measured by counting heads. They have almost a monopoly of all the liberal professions; they control the Indian press and Indian public life; they sit on the Bench and in the Legislative Councils; they are even represented in the Executive Councils of Government, as well as in all the higher 'Imperial' public services, whilst the subordinate services, commonly called 'Provincial,' are almost wholly recruited from their ranks. At first mainly confined to the Hindus, and especially to the high-caste Hindus, who had for centuries monopolized the higher indigenous learning, and to the small Parsee community of Persian origin in the Bombay Presidency, the new learning has spread and is spreading more and more to the Mohammedans and the Sikhs as well as to non-Brahman Hindu castes. Its first-fruits were a movement for the emancipation of Indian society from the trammels of religious and social customs and beliefs which were deemed fatal to all substantial progress on the path of Western civilization, and then a still more powerful movement, which largely overshadowed the social reform movement, for the emancipation of India from the state of tutelage implied in a system of government, originally welcomed as paternal and gradually resented as despotic. The knowledge of English gave the

Western-educated classes a common language for the first time in Indian history, and a medium in which to express their community of thought, and with it a new conception of Indian nationhood and of Indian national unity. At first Indians were chiefly attracted by the literary side of western education, not only because it appealed more powerfully to their imagination, but because it afforded the only avenue to government employment, with all the prestige that has ever attached to it in India, even in the humblest capacity. But the demand for scientific education, long neglected, has at last begun to grow, and to grow rapidly, with the steady expansion of Indian commerce and Indian industry. The best Indian Nationalists realize that the development of India's material resources and the practical application of scientific teaching to the material conditions of Indian life must form part of India's national equipment. Though many forces still combine to hamper the ever unpopular cause of social and religious reform, it is amongst the best Indian Nationalists that, under the influence of Western education, the duty of service and the sense of a common citizenship transcending the narrow limitations of caste and creed, have been most effectively preached and practised. Western education has produced many of the finest intellects and some of the finest characters in modern India. But in modern India, as elsewhere, *corruptio optimi pessima*, and Western education has also produced many dangerous visionaries and some criminal fanatics.

The history of the Indian National Congress shows how the tares have grown up with the wheat. Founded in 1885 to give collective expression to the views of the Western-educated classes, it soon became the focus of all their political activities, and claimed to be regarded as the unofficial 'Parliament of the Indian people.' It has had many able speakers and many distinguished and well-intentioned leaders. Its shortcomings have been largely due to the artificial conditions under which it has grown up. It has brought forward from year to year an increasingly long list of Indian grievances and Indian demands, some of them reasonable, some quite impracticable or premature, and, as was perhaps to be expected in an inexperienced and irresponsible assembly, it was seldom the voice of reason that prevailed. Gradually, however, during the worst period of unrest in the first decade of this

century there arose a definite line of cleavage between the Moderates and the Extremists, and in 1907 Mr. Gokhale and Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, both unfortunately now dead, defeated the more violent factions at the famous session at Surat, which broke up in wild confusion. The enlarged legislative councils set up under the Morley-Minto scheme of reforms, which gave more legitimate opportunities of expression to Indian public opinion, helped together with the Surat scandal to throw the Congress for a time into the background. But the satisfaction produced by those reforms was short-lived. The Congress again came to the front, and of late years the All-India Moslem League, founded twelve years ago in opposition to it, has entered into a working partnership with it under the lead of a new school of 'Young' Mohammedans, some of them closely in touch before the war with the 'Young' Turks of Constantinople. During the first two years of the war the Congress hearkened to the patriotic counsels of patience and moderation impressed upon it by both Mr. Bhupendranath Basu, now a member of the India Council in London, and Sir Satyendra Sinha, who in turn presided over the sessions of 1914 and 1915. But since then circumstances have again played into the hands of the Extremists, who represent forces which it is folly to underrate. They are in their essence reactionary, though they affect a Western disguise, and are ready to borrow their weapons from the most disreputable arsenals of the West, and even draw their inspiration from a perverted Western type. Profoundly hostile to everything for which our Western civilization stands, they conjure up wonderful visions of a wholly mythical era of freedom and wealth and learning in India, ruthlessly destroyed by British conquest. Denouncing British rule as intolerable servitude and its representatives as cruel slave-drivers, they deliberately seek to inflame racial hatred, and amongst the fruits of their teachings is anarchism. As Mr. Gokhale once warned the Bombay Students' Brotherhood: 'When one talks to young 'men of independence in a country like India, only two ideas 'are likely to present themselves clearly to their minds. One 'is how to get rid of the foreigner, and the other is how soon 'to get rid of him.'

Anarchism had subsided before the war, and the voice of extremism was hushed by the first great wave of war

enthusiasm. But it was not permanently silenced. Only its tactics were modified. The Extremists themselves claimed partnership in India's loyalty and clamoured for its immediate reward. As time passed without the visible fulfilment of Mr. Asquith's promise of 'a new angle of vision,' they turned that period of uncertainty to account in order to revive Indian suspicion and distrust, and started a fresh campaign of invective against the 'bureaucracy' that was obstructing in its own selfish interests the just redress, long overdue, of India's wrongs. The 'bureaucrats' cannot defend themselves, and the Government of India have never deemed it to be their duty to inform or to guide public opinion. Unofficial Europeans, aroused from their usual aloofness, showed more zeal than discretion. Always opposed to political changes which disturb business and may affect their own position, they denied through their customary organs all necessity for reform in heated terms, which were in turn interpreted as evidence that 'the 'new angle of vision' would prove to be, like the Morley-Minto reforms, 'mere moonshine.' Racial hatred revived, and to ensure its vitality the Extremists had recourse to one of their favourite devices. Knowing perfectly well that the British Government meant to meet the reasonable aspirations of India, they set to work to raise Indian demands and Indian expectations to a level of unreason which, as they shrewdly calculated, was bound to engender fresh disappointment and bitterness whenever the time came for a final definition, however liberal, of British policy. The steadying influence and unique prestige of Mr. Gokhale, who died in 1915 gallantly fighting against the recrudescence of Extremism, were sorely missed at this juncture. Moral courage is still rare amongst Indian politicians, who are more often guided by their emotions than by their judgment. Many of them seem to think that their influence can only be maintained by shouting with the loudest, or they are prompted by Oriental notions of effective bargaining, i.e. asking much whilst expecting to get and ready to accept far less. The whole development of the violent Home Rule campaign in India affords a striking illustration of the process by which men of relatively moderate views and good intentions get swept off their feet. When it became known soon after Lord Chelmsford's arrival at Simla that he and his government were engaged in preparing

a scheme of reforms to be laid before the British Government, the Indian elected members of his Legislative Council, to the number of nineteen, agreed, at the instigation of the more advanced spirits amongst them, to draw up their own recommendations and to submit them to the Viceroy. So far they were altogether within their rights, but they forthwith proceeded to publish their recommendations—some of them perfectly sound, others very crude, some quite impracticable. As soon as they were published other still more fiery spirits caugh hold of them and were determined to go one better. So the Congress, in which the Extremists had regained the control they had lost in 1907, passed a series of drastic resolutions at the Lucknow session at the end of 1916, for which the recommendations of the nineteen served as the jumping-off ground. Mrs. Besant, who had long helped to swell the ranks of the Extremists by her extravagant glorification of Hinduism, though she had formerly professed to have nothing to do with politics, had now assumed their leadership, and started her Home Rule League. She promptly seized upon these resolutions, asserted them to be the very minimum that would satisfy the demands of India, and at the next Congress session at Calcutta over which she presided at the end of last year gave them, with a final twist, the shape of an ultimatum to which her own eloquence lent an almost minatory note. Thus many members of the Congress who would have been quite content to await patiently the results of the Pronouncement were rushed into committing themselves to a policy which deliberately ignored and was intended to frustrate the careful limitations of the Pronouncement.

By these resolutions the Congress traversed the right which the British Government have specifically reserved to themselves, as 'responsible for the welfare and advancement of 'the Indian peoples, to be judges of the time and measure of 'each advance,' and to be 'guided by the co-operation received 'from those upon whom new opportunities of service will 'be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that 'confidence can be reposed on their sense of responsibility.' For the Congress lays down in great detail the nature of the constitutional reforms by which alone, in its view, the demands of the people of India can be satisfied and must be satisfied without delay, and though it does not purport to formulate a

scheme for immediate Home Rule on the lines of Dominion self-government, it recommends a series of measures calculated to produce such a paralysis of government that the only remedy would very soon be either to restore its autocratic character, which would then mean a counter-revolution, or else to make a headlong plunge into Home Rule, which in the circumstances would have all the revolutionary characteristics of an enforced surrender. The crucial proposals which alone deserve attention would vest all legislative power, including the power of the purse, in large popular assemblies with an overwhelming elective majority. The executive power on the other hand would be vested in a Governor and Council, half of which would be British and consist of men appointed from England with no Indian experience, and the other half would be Indian and elected by the popular assemblies. Yet an Executive composed of men thus deriving their authority from two different sources, and bearing in its composition all the seeds of potential conflict, is neither to be armed with any power over the assembly but that of a delaying veto, nor compelled to hand over the reins of government to an opposition all-powerful to signify its will but powerless to impose it. The most striking instance that occurs to one's mind of the deadlock which such conditions are bound to produce is the 'Period of Conflict' between the Prussian Government and the Prussian Legislature between 1862 and 1866, which Indians themselves would least of all consider a happy omen. To put it mildly, the Congress scheme aggravates every defect which experience has shown to be inherent to the Morley-Minto reforms and converts all their weak points into real danger points. It might pave the way to Bolshevism, but never to peaceful democratic evolution.

If we were driven to believe that a policy making straight for conflict were the only one that would satisfy Indian educated opinion, and that the raging and tearing campaign for Home Rule, hot and strong, with open threats of passive resistance if denied, meant more than a nefarious but sterile attempt on the part of the Extremists to wreck the Pronouncement before it bears fruit, we might well despair of the future of India on any lines of peaceful democratic evolution. But there are some indications to show that we need not be driven to such tragic conclusions. The Congress itself wisely decided,

though by a very narrow majority, not to follow up its resolutions with the immediate despatch of deputations to England for purposes of aggressive propaganda in this country, and when the Home Rule League declined to consider itself bound by that decision and sought to steal a march upon the advocates of greater patience and prudence by proposing to despatch its own deputations, disapproval was widely expressed, and in no uncertain terms, before the British Government took the strong step of cancelling the passports already issued to them by the Government of India. Not a few prominent politicians are stated to have actually withdrawn from the league, and Mrs. Besant's influence, though not her violence, appears to be waning. The ignominious collapse of Russia has had a sobering effect, for the revolution had been greeted in India with rapturous enthusiasm as the death-knell of the Anglo-Indian as well as of the Russian 'bureaucracy.' The more thoughtful Indians now see how powerless even the Russian *intelligentsia*, relatively far more numerous and matured than the Indian *intelligentsia*, has proved to control the great ignorant masses as soon as the whole fabric of government—even one so honeycombed with corruption and treachery as that of Russia—has been hastily shattered. The critical stage upon which the war has once more entered is in itself bound to revive the warm community of feeling and of effort with the rest of the Empire which marked the first impact of German aggression, for the great issues for which Indians realized that the war was being fought are still trembling in the balance.

How difficulties melt away when Indians and Englishmen can be brought together to discuss even burning political questions in a calm and dispassionate spirit is not the least valuable contribution to a study of the present situation in India which Mr. Lionel Curtis has made in publishing in this country, with a special preface for British readers, his 'Letters 'to the People of India on Responsible Government,' which originally appeared in India. Just as in South Africa he had helped to steer the Act of Union into port, Mr. Curtis succeeded in India in lifting the discussion of the Pronouncement of August 20th out of the quicksands of racial controversy by inducing a representative group of Britons and Indians in Calcutta to agree on the principle, and even on the general outline, of a scheme for carrying it into effect, and to embody

the results of their conferences in a joint address submitted by the signatories to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. The principle is that of specific devolution. As Mr. Curtis himself remarks :

> 'A dozen draftsmen working on that principle might produce as many different plans for giving effect to it. These particular proposals are not submitted as offering the one key to the problem, but only because a principle of government cannot be properly explained nor thoroughly tested by discussion until it is expressed in some scheme and developed in considerable detail.'

The salient feature of this scheme is that, whilst maintaining throughout the various stages to be travelled before the ultimate goal of the Pronouncement can be reached the general structure and the paramount authority of the existing provincial and central governments responsible to the British Government and the British Parliament, it contemplates the immediate creation within smaller areas of new Indian executive organs, invested with such powers as can safely be devolved upon them and responsible to an Indian assembly and an Indian electorate. If it is essential to make those powers and responsibilities real and palpable within the agreed limits of devolution, those limits must be clearly defined so as to avoid the danger of friction, inevitably greater where racial differences come into play. They can be, and should be, capable of expansion at stated intervals, if the event justifies the transfer of power and responsibility to Indian shoulders, just as, if the event should fail to justify them, they should be suspended or even withdrawn altogether. The risk of failure if they are drawn too wide at first, and the opportunities for incessant agitation if they are constantly open to modification, must be as far as possible excluded. Whilst self-governing institutions must be based on the broadest possible representation, the lines of cleavage in India are so many and so deep that important minorities and special interests can scarcely be safeguarded otherwise than by some form of separate representation until the sense of national unity predominates. The educative value of representative institutions lies in bringing home to the widest electorates in any way qualified for the franchise the nature of the power conferred by the vote, and in India, where political

education has scarcely yet made a beginning, the surest and quickest way to bring it home to the elector is through his pocket. India is so largely rural, and Indian taxation falls so largely on the land, that even an illiterate electorate, so long as it has some stake in the land, will probably learn sooner than many people expect to hold its representative responsible for the effects of legislation and administration in those simple spheres of government activity which can be most readily made over to Indian control without endangering the more complicated or vital parts of the State fabric. That we must be prepared for some loss of efficiency during this period of elementary political training Mr. Curtis is too honest not to admit. We may even have—temporarily, at any rate—to stand by and witness cases of hardship and injustice to inarticulate and helpless classes we have hitherto made it our business to protect, until they shall have learnt to protect themselves. This is, indeed, the gravest objection to which any transfer of the powers and responsibilities we have hitherto assumed as trustees for the people of India must always be open, and it underlies the reluctance of many British administrators to recognize the necessity for any such transfer. Mr. Curtis, however, and the Indians with whom he has been co-operating, have wisely tried to meet this objection by insisting that 'the government of India must 'have the right to recall powers which have been abused or 'neglected.' Subject to this safeguard we are, they hold, justified in beginning to take steps for the gradual determination of a self-imposed trusteeship which has ceased to command universal assent. For though there are few educated Indians, unless blinded by racial passion, who believe that India is ripe, or can for some time yet be ripe, for the same measure of self-government that the Dominions enjoy, the great majority believe that she is ripe for a first instalment and entitled to demand it.

Even so conservative an Indian as the Aga Khan, strikes no uncertain note on this point. His position is as remarkable as his personality. His Highness is the spiritual head of an important Mohammedan community, and ten years ago he was the political leader of the Indian Mohammedans in opposition to the Congress movement. He is not a ruling chief, but he enjoys one of their most cherished privileges, namely, the

right to a salute of guns. He has seen many men and many cities, and he is as much at home in Europe as in India. He has no patience with Indian Extremists, who are constantly harping on India's servitude and inveighing against her alien oppressors. He is quite satisfied that the average Indian who has so long seen the work of administration carried on by British heads and Indian hands, just as the work of conquest was often carried on with Indian help, 'does not 'look upon himself as belonging to a conquered people, or 'on his country as dominated by foreigners.' He warns us, however, that 'this altogether healthy Indian sentiment' cannot last unless we reckon with the 'many forces, internal 'and external, that are working to awaken Indians in general, 'and the urban population in particular, to the reasonableness 'of their claim to a share in their own government.' He favours a measure of almost complete provincial autonomy, with elected provincial assemblies, in which every community should have its own representation, whilst the powers of the government of India should ultimately be confined to a few purely all-Indian functions, and that the Native States as well as the autonomous provinces should send their representatives to an Indian senate. This Federal India under a Royal Viceroy is itself to be merely the pivot and centre of a greater South Asiatic Federation, towards which Arabia and Southern Persia, Afghanistan and Bokhara, parts of Tibet as well as the Malayan States, will naturally gravitate. But being what our French neighbours call *un démocrate autoritaire*, His Highness will not hear of responsible government, and prefers a system modelled both in its federal and parliamentary aspects, as he admits, upon the constitution of the German Empire. Few Englishmen, and, in spite of similar tendencies beneath the surface of the Congress resolutions, perhaps not many Indians, will be inclined to follow him in that direction, and, interesting as his speculations are, the Aga Khan perhaps hardly himself realizes how far they carry him in an opposite direction to that of the Pronouncement of August 20th, which now governs the whole Indian situation.

For Mr. Montagu has completed his mission of inquiry and consultation on the spot, and he has brought back to England a report signed by the Viceroy and himself, which is believed to contain definite recommendations for giving full effect

to the Pronouncement. It may be published at any moment, but Government are pledged to allow ample time for its discussion, and the form as well as the substance of the legislation dealing with important constitutional changes requires time and care. But it is of the utmost importance that there should be no unnecessary delay. We have had object-lessons enough as to the danger of procrastination, and in India as elsewhere time is on the side of those whose purpose is not to pull down but to build up a wall of racial antagonism. One cannot ignore the language used by the Extremist leaders, which becomes more and more menacing in proportion as they realize that the bold and generous policy towards India foreshadowed in the Pronouncement will completely cut the ground away under their feet as soon as it has been definitely invested by the British Government and the British Parliament with finality in the shape of legislation. They are therefore shouting louder than ever: 'The Congress scheme, the whole Congress 'scheme, and nothing but the Congress scheme,' and openly threatening passive resistance if that scheme is rejected. They know that scheme to be incompatible with the terms and the spirit of the Pronouncement. They know, therefore, that it must and will be rejected, and they are bent on organizing in the meantime forces of resistance which shall make its rejection lead as surely to strife and conflict as its adoption would. We cannot hope to reconcile Indian Extremism. What we can hope to do is to free from its insidious influence all that is best in Indian public life by opening up a larger field of useful activity than Mr. Gokhale himself looked for in one of his most thoughtful speeches, as true and as weighty to-day as when he delivered it nearly ten years ago:

'Our rulers (he said) stand pledged to extend to us equality of treatment with themselves. This equality is to be sought in two fields: equality for individual Indians with individual Englishmen, and equality in regard to the form of government which Englishmen enjoy in other parts of the Empire. The attainment of full equality with Englishmen, if ever it is accomplished, is bound to be a slow and weary affair. But one thing is clear: it is both our right and our duty to press along this road and further good faith requires that we should not think of taking any other. Of the twofold equality we have to seek with Englishmen, the first, though difficult of attainment, is not so difficult as the second. For it is possible to find in this country a fair number of Indians

who in capacity and character could hold their own against individual Englishmen. But the attainment of a democratic form of self-government such as obtains in other parts of the Empire must depend upon the average strength and capacity of our people taken as a whole, for it is on our average strength that the weight of the edifice of self-government will have to rest. And here it must be regretfully admitted that our average strength to-day is far below the British average. The most important work before us, therefore, is to endeavour to raise this average. There is work enough for the most enthusiastic lover of his country. In fact, on every side, whichever way we turn, only one sight meets the eye : that of work to be done, and only one cry is to be heard—that there are but few faithful workers. The elevation of the depressed classes, who have to be brought up to the level of the rest of our people, universal elementary education, co-operation, improvement of the economic condition of the peasantry, higher education of women, spread of industrial and technical education, and building up of the industrial strength of the country, promotion of closer relations between the different communities. These are some of the tasks which lie in front of us, and each needs a whole army of devoted missionaries.'

To these tasks we now propose to add that of training the people of India to self-government. We have the right to expect the hearty co-operation of all Indians who are still ready to hearken to the words of their dead leader. But they also will have the right to expect from us support and protection against the desperate attempts which will certainly be made to wreck the great experiment by his old foes, who are already organizing to resist its acceptance in India. Indian Extremism is a rank nettle which may have to be grasped with a very firm hand. If we are to educate India successfully to political liberty we may have to apply one of the great lessons which the war is burning into the conscience of the British people with all their innate love of freedom—that the worst enemy of liberty is licence.

VALENTINE CHIROL.

CENTRALIZATION AND REVOLUTION

1. **Les origines de la France Contemporaine.** By H. A. TAINE. 1875.
2. **L'ancien régime et la Révolution.** By A. DE TOCQUEVILLE. 1856.
3. **Reflections on the Revolution in France.** By EDMUND BURKE.

THE history of the old French monarchy is the record of a gradual consolidation under one sceptre of a number of practically independent fiefs. After the final expulsion of the English invader in the middle of the fifteenth century, the Kings of France had time to turn their attention to the curbing of their almost equally troublesome feudatories. Louis XI., one of the craftiest, most unscrupulous and most astute of monarchs, led the way in this work. The process was continued by Louis XII. (1498), and the absolute monarchy of France may be said to have been finally established under Louis XIII. (1610), through the instrumentality of his famous ministers, Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, so that at last Louis XIV. could with truth exclaim, 'L'état 'c'est moi.'

Richelieu's statecraft was founded on three main lines of policy: (1) to destroy the political power of the nobility, and to reduce them to the position of court lackeys; (2) to keep the various classes of Frenchmen estranged from each other; (3) to keep the agricultural population in poverty. In his 'Testament Politique' he wrote: 'If the people are 'prosperous they will with difficulty be kept in bondage.' It was his theory that the acquisition of property by the peasantry would lead to their abandoning work. He held that misery was the only guarantee against idleness.

The King was the sole and unchallenged master of France. He levied taxes by royal decree, and could dispose of the revenue as he pleased; he was absolute controller of the life and fortune of every Frenchman; he could, by a stroke of the pen, imprison their persons and confiscate their property.

He could appoint whomsoever he pleased to any office whatever; he could lavish favours and pensions on his favourites, and crush and ruin any man or woman whom he disliked. He could squander the substance of France on court extravagance or foreign wars.

It is obvious that such a system could only be carried out by appropriate instruments. The country was governed in effect by a bureaucracy. At the head of the Government was the Conseil du Roi, a body composed of officials, whose very names were hardly known. They held office at the will of the King; and were entirely without social influence. Acting under the Conseil du Roi was an official called the 'Controleur Général.' In his hands was gathered the whole network of administration throughout the country. He submitted his reports to the Council for approval, but in practice he centralized in his person the government of the kingdom. Under him each province was administered by an 'Intendant' or Steward, who was as supreme in his district as was the Controller General over the whole of France. In each province there was still a nominal Governor in the person of a great territorial noble, but he had become a mere ornamental figure-head, and beyond an occasional appearance at some social function, took no part whatever in the management of provincial affairs. In fact, he would have considered it derogatory to his dignity to do so. Under the Intendants, a Sub-delegate was appointed for each canton, who had to control his district, and report to his superior. Both Intendants and Sub-delegates held office at the pleasure of the Conseil du Roi, and were, in fact, appointed from the personnel of that body, so that the bureaucracy of Paris was reproduced in every corner of France.

The powers of this bureaucracy were all-embracing. There was no phase of the national or individual existence which it did not control. Under its baleful influence all local institutions withered and died. The Conseil du Roi had first of all the fixing and management of the taxes. Part of the French taxes were 'farmed' to financial companies, the most vicious system of taxation in the world. The Conseil du Roi dealt with these companies, fixed the contracts and regulated the mode of collection. The most hated and onerous of the numerous imposts under which the peasantry groaned

was the 'taille,' a tax upon the estimated property of individuals. In secret session the Council fixed its amount each year, together with its apportionment among the several provinces upon the recommendation of the Intendants and their Sub-delegates. The mode of collection was atrocious. In each parish one of the inhabitants was selected by the Sub-delegate not only to collect the tax but to assess it upon his neighbours according to his opinion of their means. The duty was compulsory, and failure to collect the amount contributable by the parish was punished with the galleys. The wretched collector had often to be protected by a strong body of police from being torn to pieces, and was generally ruined; and he revenged himself by ruining in turn, by excessive exactions, those against whom he had a grudge, and exempting his own relatives or those who might be useful to him on the expiry of his odious task.

The Council had also the control of all public works and all the great highways. The Intendant directed the work of the engineers; the Sub-delegate provided the *corvée* or forced labour which executed it. The *corvée* also included the transportation of troops from one part of the country to another, for which the peasant was forced not only to supply his labour but furnish his horses and carts.

The Council also interfered in the course of justice. In all cases where individuals brought actions against the authorities, it either ordered the Courts to dismiss them or reversed the decisions if against the State. De Tocqueville says: 'There was hardly any part of social economy or 'political organization which was not remodelled by decrees 'of the Council during the forty years which preceded the 'Revolution.' Even the relief of the poor in the most remote corners of France was entirely regulated by the central body in Paris, which annually assigned to each province, out of the general taxes, certain funds which the Intendant distributed in relief among the various parishes. The Council issued annual decrees for the establishment of workshops for the indigent in places which it selected. It also undertook to teach the peasantry how to cultivate the land, and in case of need compelled them to adopt its advice. It distributed, through the Intendants and Sub-delegates, pamphlets upon the art of agriculture, though hardly any of the peasantry

could read or write. As De Tocqueville remarks: 'It would 'have been more effectual to have diminished the burdens and 'inequalities which oppressed agriculture, but that does not 'seem to have entered into their heads.'

Under this system the free self-governing townships of the Middle Ages gradually lost their independence, and were placed under the rule of officials sent down from Paris. In this connexion one of the worst abuses of the old regime falls to be mentioned. In order to replenish the royal exchequer it was the practice to allow townships which had had their rights of self-government abolished to repurchase those rights from the central authority at a very heavy price. When the central cash-box was again empty, the privileges of self-government were again abolished, to be resold later on. De Tocqueville says that 'in the course of eighty years 'the right to elect their magistrates was sold as much as 'seven times over to the towns.' The reason for this shameful plunder was openly avowed. 'The necessities of our 'finances,' runs an edict of 1722, 'oblige us to seek the means 'of replenishing them,' and De Tocqueville adds: 'I know 'of nothing more disgraceful in the character of the old regime.'

No hamlet, however insignificant, was allowed to expend without permission any sum, however small, on local requirements. Before a town could spend its own money it had to petition the Sub-delegate, who reported to the Intendant, who referred the request to the Controller General, who laid it before the Council—a sort of House-that-Jack-built procedure, which involved a minimum delay of a year, often extended to three years, before an answer was returned. This was inevitable, seeing that such petitions were continually pouring in by the thousand from all parts of France. An idea of the subordination to which the localities were reduced by the bureaucracy may be obtained from the style adopted in addressing officials. 'We beg of you most humbly, 'Monseigneur,' write some of them to the Intendant, 'to 'accord us your goodwill and protection. We will endeavour 'to render ourselves not unworthy by our submission to all 'the commands of your Grandeur. We have never opposed 'your wishes, Monseigneur.' 'It was thus,' adds De Tocqueville, 'that the bourgeoisie were prepared for Government, 'and the people for Liberty!'

There was, in fact, no affair of business in which the State did not interfere. Even the agricultural population, which is as a rule so hostile to advice, were brought to believe, under this demoralizing system, that if their calling was not in a satisfactory condition, the fault lay with the Government. One of them writes to an Intendant: 'Why does not the 'Government appoint Inspectors who would go once a year 'through the provinces to ascertain the state of cultivation, 'and teach the cultivators to change it for the better; telling 'them how to rear their cattle and fatten them; how to sell 'them and where they should take them to market? The 'Inspectors should be well paid and the cultivators giving 'best proof of their success should receive marks of honour.' 'Inspectors and crosses!' is the bitter comment of De Tocqueville, 'this is an expedient which would never have 'occurred to a Suffolk farmer.'

The Government having thus usurped the place of Providence, it was natural that each individual should invoke it in his own necessities. Peasants demanded compensation for the loss of their beasts; landowners in good circumstances implored assistance to increase the value of their land; manufacturers solicited the Intendant to grant them privileges which would guarantee them against inconvenient competition; or, having fallen into difficulties, asked him to procure for them a loan from the Controller General. In times of dearth, so frequent in the eighteenth century, all hopes were centred in the Intendant, and it was from him alone that nutrition seemed to be expected. Every misfortune was attributed to the Government; it was even held responsible for the inclemency of the seasons. It is not to be wondered at that when Arthur Young was travelling through France, the greatest marvel in the eyes of his French friends was the fact that he, a private country gentleman, should have undertaken his tour of inquiry entirely at his own expense, and without any mission from the British Government.

Reference was made above to the policy of Richelieu in respect of the destruction of the political power of the nobility. Deprived of all share in the local life of the country, as well as all participation in national affairs, they ceased to live on their estates, except those who were too poor and insignificant to attend the Court. The great proprietors became place

and pension hunters about the person of the King, and the penalty they most dreaded was to be exiled to their country palaces. Their tenants seldom knew them by sight, but continually felt their presence by the seignorial dues exacted. In the Middle Ages the great nobles maintained order, dispensed justice, relieved distress, and in many directions exercised useful functions. Under Louis XIV. and his successors they were supplanted by the bureaucracy, and all that the peasantry knew about them was that the cultivator of the soil had to grind his wheat at the seignorial mill, sell it at the seignorial market, press his grapes in the seignorial wine-press, bake his bread in the seignorial oven, paying a heavy fee on each occasion. Moreover, he often had to see his crops devoured by the seignorial game, one of the bitterest grievances of all. Besides the 'capitaineries,' or royal hunting demesnes, which were of enormous extent, the great nobles kept out of cultivation vast tracts for game preserves, thus not only restricting the cultivable area of the country, but diminishing the food supply by the devastations of the deer and birds. Arthur Young, who was a well-to-do Suffolk squire, and therefore the last person in the world to be imbued with revolutionary opinions, records his feelings when he rode through thirty-seven miles of country in one of the best parts of France for markets, and found the quantity of waste lands surprising; it was the predominant feature the whole way. 'Thus it 'is,' he says, 'wherever you stumble on a Grand Seigneur you 'are sure to find his property desert. Go to their residences, 'wherever they may be, and you would probably find them 'in the midst of a forest, very well peopled with deer, wild 'boars, and wolves. Oh! if I was the legislator of France 'for a day I would make such great lords skip again.' Game preserving involved a further wrong to the farmers, for they were not permitted to weed and clear and sow their land until far too late in the year lest the young birds should be disturbed, the consequence being that the crops were so scanty as to strike with horror the practised eye of Arthur Young, accustomed as he was to the luxuriance of Suffolk farms.

In spite of their immunity from taxation the French *noblesse* became impoverished generation by generation, for they wasted the rents and dues wrung from their estates in gambling and debauchery in Paris. Bit by bit parts of

their properties were sold to the thrifty and penurious peasantry, so that at the time of the Revolution a good deal of the land was cultivated by small holders. Curiously enough this very fact contributed to increase the hatred felt towards the *noblesse* and precipitated the Revolution, for the exactions which had been borne with patience while there was no hope of emancipation from slavery, became absolutely intolerable after the sweets of proprietorship had been tasted. As Richelieu had foreseen, they became discontented with their position, and began to inquire why they alone should pay taxes to the State, while greater proprietors not only paid none but wrung enormous tribute from little ones.

In addition, the nobility themselves contributed to their own downfall by the adoption of the new philosophy of the Encyclopædists. Revolutionary ideas became fashionable in Paris, which had become to all intents and purposes France, owing to the extreme centralization above described. The language of Voltaire, Diderot, d'Holbach, and d'Alembert spread through the whole country. It was not necessary for the illiterate masses to have read a single line of those authors; their ideas passed from mouth to mouth, and were, so to speak, in the very air. Then appeared Rousseau's 'Contrat 'Social,' a work which had the most extraordinary effect upon the thought of the period; greater perhaps than that produced by any other book ever published. In it was enunciated the supremacy of the State in its most extreme form. The sovereignty of the people was proclaimed as the only title of authority, the word 'people' signifying the proletariat, to the exclusion of all the wealth and intellect of a nation; thus substituting for the despotism of a single tyrant the far worse despotism of the ignorant, envious mob, a prototype of present-day Bolshevism.

The frightful state of the French finances which was one of the contributory causes of the Revolution, was largely due to the incredible prodigality of the Court, of which the following examples, culled from Taine's 'Origines de la France 'Contemporaine,' will give some idea.

The King's own establishment, as it existed in the reign of Louis XVI., consisted of a body-guard, infantry, cavalry, and *corps d'élite*, numbering in all 9,000 men, costing annually 7,681,000 *livres*, and the whole decked out in gorgeous and

costly uniforms. The royal stables contained 1,857 horses and 217 carriages attended to by 1,458 men, whose livery cost 540,000 *livres* per annum. In addition to this little army there were twenty governors, besides sub-governors, chaplains, professors, cooks, and valets, to look after, train, and serve the pages; also thirty physicians, besides apothecaries, nurses, stewards, and treasurers; in all more than 1,500 men. The amount annually expended on the purchase of horses was 250,000 *livres*, while 287 horses were exercised daily in the two stables. The total cost of this service in the year 1787 was 6,200,000 *livres*. The royal kitchen was on the same scale, employing 486 people and costing annually 2,177,771 *livres*. Besides this, the kitchens of Madame Elizabeth and the other princesses cost 3,660,491 *livres* per annum. The wine merchant's bill came to 300,000 *livres* per annum, and the butcher's and other purveyors to a million. The household of the Duc d'Orléans consisted of 274 members; that of the princesses of 278; the Comtesse d'Artois employed 239; the Comtesse de Provence 256; and the Queen 496. When it was a question of forming a 'household' for Madame Royale, aged one month, it took eighty people to look after the young lady. The civil establishment of 'Monsieur' comprised 420—and his military 179 persons. The civil household of the Comte d'Artois numbered 456 and his military 237 persons. These are only a fraction of the total personnel at Versailles alone; time and space forbid a more extended numeration. And besides this head centre of rampant extravagance, there were the country seats of Marly, la Muette, Meudon, Choisy, Saint Hubert, Saint Germain, Fontainebleau, Compiègne, Saint Cloud, Rambouillet, without reckoning the Louvre, the Tuileries, and Chambord, each and all of which were conducted on the same scale of appalling extravagance.

While all this profusion reigned in the Court, a system of the most ridiculous and childish etiquette prevailed, which must have made the life of the monarch a burden to him, and degraded his satellites below the dignity of humanity. Two examples of this, translated from Taine, must suffice:

'In the morning the first valet de chambre awoke his Majesty; five series of persons then entered the room, in rotation, and although the ante-chambers were vast, there were days when they

could hardly contain the crowd of courtiers that thronged them. First took place the "family entry," consisting of the princes and princesses of the blood, together with the first physician and surgeon and other useful people. Then came the "grand entry," which comprised the high officers of state, some of the most favoured nobility, and the Queen's and princesses' ladies of honour, without reckoning the barbers, tailors, and valets of various kinds. Meanwhile, upon the King's ands was poured spirit of wine out of a silver-gilt dish, and he was then presented with the holy water vessel, upon which he said a prayer and crossed himself. Then, before the whole assembly he got out of bed, and put on his slippers. The Grand Chamberlain and the first lord presented him with his dressing-gown; he donned it, and took his seat on the arm-chair where he was to be dressed. At this moment the door reopens and a third wave rolls in—it is the "entry of the warrant officials," seigneurs who have the much-prized privilege of assisting at the "petit coucher," and with them arrives a cohort of servants—ordinary doctors and surgeons, readers, and others. At the moment when the officers of the wardrobe approach the King to dress him, the first lord, informed by an usher, repeats to him the names of the great people who await at the door; this is the "fourth entry," called that of the bed-chamber, and it is more numerous than the others, consisting of a crowd of functionaries, of all descriptions, far too numerous to specify. Ushers marshal the throng and enjoin silence. Meanwhile, the King washes his hands and begins to undress himself. Two pages remove his slippers; the grand master of the wardrobe takes off his night-shirt by the right arm, while a valet brings the shirt in a covering of white silk. This is a solemn moment, the culminating point of the ceremony; the "fifth entry" has begun, and in a few minutes, when the King has taken the shirt, all the remaining mob of notables and household officers who wait in the gallery will furnish this last wave. There is a rigid rubric for this shirt. The honour of presenting it is reserved to the son and grandson of France; failing them to the princes of the blood, "if legitimate"; failing them to the Grand Chamberlain or the first lord. Observe, that this last alternative rarely occurs, the princes being compelled to attend the rising of the King, as the princesses are obliged to attend that of the Queen. At last the shirt is presented; a valet of the wardrobe takes away the old one; the first valet of the wardrobe and the first valet de chambre hold the new one, one by the left arm, the other by the right, and during the operation two other valets de chambre hold before him his unfolded dressing-gown in fashion of a screen. The shirt is put on, and the toilet begins. A valet de chambre holds a looking-glass before the King, and two others, one on each side, light him if necessary with flambeaux. Valets of the wardrobe bring the rest of the clothes; the Grand Master of the Wardrobe passes to the King his vest and coat, to which he attaches the blue ribbon of St. Louis, and girds on his sword. Then the valet in charge of the handkerchiefs brings three in a saucer, and the

Grand Master of the Wardrobe offers the saucer to the King, who selects one of the handkerchiefs. Finally, the Master of the Wardrobe presents to the King his hat, his gloves, and his walking stick. His Majesty then goes to his bedside, kneels upon a prie-dieu, and says his prayers, while a chaplain pronounces in an undertone the prayer *quæsumus deus omnipotens*. That done, the King prescribes the order of the day, and passes with the leaders of his Court into his Cabinet, or sometimes grants audiences. Meanwhile all the rest wait in the gallery so as to accompany him to mass when he comes out. Such is his uprising—a play in five acts. Without question nothing could be better devised for occupying an aristocracy in emptiness. A hundred or so of great nobles have employed two hours in coming, in waiting, in entering, in defiling, in marshalling themselves, in remaining on their feet, in maintaining on their faces an easy and respectful air which befits actors on a great stage, and immediately afterwards the highest of them will go through the same mummery in the Queen's apartments.'

As to the last-named unfortunate lady, she had to submit to the same absurd rigmarole with regard to her chemise, and her lady-in-waiting. Madame Campan, describes in her memoirs how one day in the depth of winter she presented the garment to Her Majesty who had just got out of bed and stood shivering, half-naked, on the floor. The lady of honour enters, removes her gloves and takes up the chemise. A knock is heard at the door; it is the Duchess of Orleans, who removes her gloves and takes up the chemise. Another knock, and in comes the Comtesse d'Artois, who is privileged to take the chemise. Meanwhile the wretched Queen is waiting with chattering teeth, her arms crossed on her breast, and cannot refrain from murmuring: 'This is 'odious, what importunity!'

It will be seen from the foregoing that the seed of the French Revolution was sown some four centuries before the actual outbreak. It began to show above the ground when Richelieu completed the autocratic structure whose foundations had been laid by Louis XI.; it became a sturdy plant when Louis XIV. was able to make the arrogant boast, 'L'état c'est moi.' From that date there remained in France no other source of government than the royal will exercised through an all-pervading bureaucracy. In a monarchical State, in which representative institutions are either non-existent or elementary and feeble, there is nothing so effectual

in restraining a despotic king as a powerful and high-spirited nobility. But the French nobles were reduced to the position of the King's spaniels, and had become so debauched and invertebrate that when the Revolution arrived they were unable to lift a hand to save their master. De Tocqueville points out that the only part of France which rose in arms for the monarchy was La Vendée, and that was the one province in which the nobility had continued to reside on their estates, and refused to join the courtiers at Versailles. For this they were impeached as disloyal by the Intendant of the Province, but they died sword in hand for their ungrateful sovereign at the head of their devoted and heroic tenantry.

Had the history of France taken the same course as that of England; had the Kings of France developed rational liberty instead of suppressing all liberty; had they fostered local life by maintaining municipal institutions instead of destroying them; had they encouraged the great nobles to reside on their estates and act as the leaders of provincial society; and had they recognized the truth that a contented and prosperous peasantry is the surest guarantee for the stability of a State, the French Revolution would never have occurred. The entire absence of all experience in the responsibilities of power for a period of a century and three-quarters made the French people receptive of every wild scheme propounded by visionary theorists, and ready to believe that fantastic paper constitutions could inaugurate a Golden Age. Their only experience of government had imbued them with hatred of the past, and from the past they had a wild and frantic desire to cut themselves entirely adrift. Because the old regime had reeked with abuses, they were convinced that its reformation was impossible, and that an entirely new political structure must be erected on its ruins. The control of the country fell into the hands of those who had the full courage of their opinions, and were prepared to go to all extremes in carrying their theories into effect. The great body of the French nation had been deliberately rendered incapable of organizing its own self-government; and the extraordinary spectacle was presented to the world of a population of twenty-six million people, subjected to the bloody tyranny of a ferocious, determined, and well-organized minority of less than half a million. Taine estimates the number of Jacobins

in France as a whole at from three to four hundred thousand, of whom some six thousand were in the capital.

Burke, in his 'Reflections on the Revolution in France,' tells us that 'we do not draw the moral lessons we might 'from history,' which he describes as 'a great volume 'unrolled for our instruction, drawing the materials of future 'wisdom from the past errors and infirmities of mankind.' Of this great volume the part which deals with the French Revolution abounds with lessons for future ages. We see in it, for instance, the fatal consequences to a nation of the entire suppression of free institutions for nearly two centuries. A people, on the other hand, which keeps in close touch with the realities and responsibilities of government, will acquire a dignity, a sobriety, and a caution which will secure it from the pursuit of plausible chimeras and restrain it from 'the 'falsehood of extremes.' It will act upon the principle laid down by Burke as that which has distinguished our own country, and so largely contributed to the stability of its institutions; 'In what we improve we are never wholly 'new, and in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete.'

The French Revolution specially warns us of the danger of excessive centralization and bureaucracy. No doubt nations may fall into the opposite extreme, as in the case of the United States of America, where the doctrine of local sovereignty, or 'States Rights' pushed to its limit, precipitated the War of Secession. In England the present danger lies in the opposite direction. It is true that the great cities and towns of England and her sister kingdoms are, in many respects, object-lessons in the art of local government. The counties, too, in the main, exhibit the same success in their organization. But there is a constant tendency on the part of Parliament and the central bureaucracy to interfere with the independence of the local authorities. During the war this tendency had been enormously intensified. A gigantic new bureaucracy has been called into existence, and one of the most urgent of post-war problems will be the difficulty of disbanding this great army of male and female officials.

The worst fault a government can commit is that of governing too much. The utmost that a statesman can hope successfully to accomplish is by wise laws to ensure equal

justice for all citizens, and by equitable taxation and economical administration to permit and encourage the diffusion of prosperity and comfort among all classes of society. The rest must be left to the people themselves, for it is only thus that a self-reliant and liberty-loving nation can be built up. These are the principles which have made our country great in the past and which alone can perpetuate its greatness; for civic virtues are not to be expected from a nation of State-driven slaves. Such a nation may, indeed, for a time present all the outward appearances of wealth and splendour, but it will contain within itself the germs of dissolution, and will share the fate of the great empires of the past, whose mouldering ruins furnish the antiquary with material for speculation, and the moralist with reflections on the vanity of human affairs.

T. Dundas Pillans.

THE POETRY OF FRANCIS LEDWIDGE

Songs of the Fields (1916); Songs of Peace (1917); Last Songs (1918). Three vols., with Introductions by LORD DUNSANY. Herbert Jenkins.

FRANCIS LEDWIDGE, coming from Irish peasant stock, for some time living so that his publisher could advertise him as 'The Scavenger Poet,' joined the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in 1914, and was killed in Flanders in 1917, at the age of twenty-five, leaving two books of poems and the material for a third, which has since been published.

To these volumes Lord Dunsany has contributed intimate little prefatory notes, full of generous delight in a new poet's work. His preference for individual poems is a matter over which we may differ pleasantly enough; it is no small distinction for any man to have known the shy footfall of genius when it came, and Lord Dunsany has proved his critical sense in the best of all ways. It is with nothing but respect and gratitude for his charming and courageous god-parentage that we question his opinion at a crucial point in his very brief analysis of Ledwidge's poetic quality. He says, in introducing the poet's first book:

> 'I have looked for a poet amongst the Irish peasants because it seemed to me that almost only among them was in daily use a diction worthy of poetry, as well as an imagination capable of dealing with the great and simple things that are a poet's wares. Their thoughts are in the spring-time, and all their metaphors fresh. . . .'

Ledwidge, he concludes, is the poet for whom he has been looking. We believe that underlying this passage is a misconception in general æsthetics, and that the definition arising from it demonstrably fails to fit the particular case of Ledwidge. In its profounder issues poetry depends little enough on the artificial—but not therefore negligible or worthless—culture that a man absorbs from the prosperous

condition of his descent and his own early advantages of society and education. In the process, however, by which a poet comes to the final realization of his faculty such things are of considerable moment, and the nature of their influence is not such as is commonly supposed. Every poet, if he is to do work of any consequence at all, has to find himself through tradition; that is an unescapable condition of his function. Native wood-notes wild are no more of the most natural lyrist's untutored sounding than is the bird's ecstasy unaware of the generations, and almost invariably the personal ease of the young poet's song depends upon the degree of intimacy with the poetic resources of his tongue that he has acquired unconsciously by natural inheritance and early association. The most mannered early verse, after the merely imitative period, is nearly always the work of poets with no assimilated knowledge of literature in their blood who have suddenly become conscious of examples that others have never lacked. One cannot help contrasting with Ledwidge the case of poets such as Mr. Robert Graves and Mr. Siegfried Sassoon, who set out upon their poetic careers at twenty, having already made in the progress of boyhood the sound adjustment to tradition, the necessity of which some of us had to waste several precious years of early manhood in laboriously perceiving and meeting. It is they, and not Ledwidge, who fetch their first proper tunes to their own easy impulses, assured of a technical behaviour that they need not strain at. There are, no doubt, earlier poems by Ledwidge than any that Lord Dunsany has published, but we may take it that in 'Songs of the Fields' we have the first work of any personal character. And from this through the three volumes nothing is more notable in the poet's external habit than his certain progress from a manner heavy with self-conscious discovery of English poetry, through which his genius struggles often but brokenly to its own gesture, to clear deliverance from this tardy constraint, when he writes of his own simple and lovely world with no touch of untutored circumstance, but in the sweetest and most delicate tradition of English song.

Whether these poems are printed in chronological order we are not told, though the dates given in the last volume suggest that they are, and they are certainly so arranged as to show direct continuity of development. From the beginning

there are signs of imaginative waywardness and of the suddenness of inspired thought that are unmistakable in their meaning. On the first page we find, 'And the sweet blackbird in the 'rainbow sings'; and the presence of poetry is clear. But for long the smallest flight is marred by the mannered or insincere turn. The wind 'like a swan dies singing,' the dusk is velvet, the moon is a pilgrim, the harebells ring. Not yet, either, can he use such a word as 'sublime' in 'Ah! then the 'poet's dreams are most sublime,' with any of the sureness that belongs to mastery. In his anxiety to do well by the demands of poetry for significant figures, moreover, he falls at first often into triviality and sometimes into real gaucherie. The 'woodbine *lassoing* the thorn' is as unimpressive as the crane watching the troutlets' circles grow 'as a smoker does 'his rings,' and there is the same kind of poverty in 'Autumn's 'crayon.' Worse than these, as indicating some deeper defect of judgment, from which, however, he wholly recovered, are such phrases as 'fog of blossom,' and 'facefuls of your 'smiles.' Another uncertainty in his earliest work comes from the occasional confusion—by no means unknown in poets of far greater experience and power—of scientific knowledge with vision. It would be interesting to know something of Ledwidge's adventures in learning; one imagines that his eager mind, something after boyhood, went through a phase of delight in mere contact with formal instruction, and that for a little while to know a fact was as exciting as to realize a thing. Out of such a mood surely comes the little town's '*octagon* spire toned smoothly down,' which is strangely what poetry is not; and yet he could turn his learning sometimes in his verse to right account, as in, 'When will was all 'the Delphi I would heed.'

These are indications in particular of the general directions in which the first book is weak. Against them, even among the poems that fail in any complete effect, are to be set many tender and exact felicities, such as:

> 'And like an apron full of jewels
> The dewy cobweb swings . . .'

Or again:

> 'And in dark furrows of the night there tills
> A jewelled plough . . .'

Or, speaking of a poet,

> ' And round his verse the hungry lapwing grieves.'

Professor de Selincourt recently reminded us of the wonder of two simple words in Milton's

> ' Which cost Ceres *all that* pain . . .'

There is a kindred beauty in this young Irishman's

> ' Then when the summer evenings fall serene,
> Unto the country dance his songs repair,
> And you may meet *some* maids with angel mien,
> Bright eyes and twilight hair.'

To these may be added

> ' And when the sunny rain drips from the edge
> Of midday wind, *and meadows lean one way* . . .'

and the thought of April who

> ' Will have a cuckoo on her either shoulder . . .'

and the slight, surprising, mastery of

> ' I watch an apple-spray
> Beckon across a wall as if it knew
> I wait the calling of the orchard maid.'

It is interesting to note that of the half-dozen or so poems in ' Songs of the Fields ' that have a legendary or historical source, all but one have little to distinguish them from the exercises of a true poet, while that one is, unexpectedly, the most completely successful poem in the volume. The explanation is, probably, that the set subject-matter at once subdued the natural play of his genius, and, by keeping him intent on an external responsibility, held him from the excesses to which he was yet liable in his freer meditation. And so, when with such a theme his faculty did for once break through restraint and soar above the occasion, as it did in ' The Wife ' of Llew,' he wrote what seems to me, if the arrangement of the book is significant, to be his first delicate masterpiece :

'They took the violet and the meadow-sweet
To form her pretty face, and for her feet
They built a mound of daisies on a wing,
And for her voice they made a linnet sing
In the wide poppy blowing for her mouth.
And over all they chanted twenty hours.
And Llew came singing from the azure south
And bore away his wife of birds and flowers.'

It is fragile, a thing partly of the fancy; it has not the vivid and intimate contact with reality that was to make some of the later songs of such fine bearing in their little compass, but it is a lovely device, surely made. There are three other poems in this first volume that may be chosen for their rounded achievement as distinct from occasional excellence: 'The Coming Poet' (though the first stanza is hardly good enough for the second), 'Evening in February,' and 'Growing Old,' with its perfect conclusion:

'Across a bed of bells the river flows,
And roses dawn, but not for us; we want
The new thing ever as the old thing grows
Spectral and weary on the hills we haunt.
And that is why we feast, and that is why
We're growing odd and old, my heart and I.'

'Songs of the Fields' is a book full of expectancy. The reader leaves it in the assurance of an impulse that will overcome all its difficulties, and break presently from hesitant and alloyed grace into sure and bright authority. The development came, beautifully, and, in a few happy moments of complete liberation, to the height of promise, but it was won with tragic difficulty in the preoccupation into which the poet was called, and in which he was finally to perish. 'Songs of Peace,' issued after an interval of a year, and presumably containing work most of which was written in that time, opens with Ledwidge's longest poem, 'A Dream of Artemis.' Here and there are slack lines, as, 'Such music fills me with a joy half pain,' and the poem generally, although it has dignity, and although its 'Hymn to Zeus,' has lovely touches in it, is unimportant in the body of the poet's work. From a word in Lord Dunsany's preface, however, we gather it to be of earlier composition than the rest of the book. The

short lyric, 'A Little Boy in the Morning,' has a first verse of lucky gaiety that is hardly maintained in the second. Then follows a series of poems under divisional headings, 'In 'Barracks,' 'In Camp,' 'At Sea,' 'In Serbia,' and so on, in which for many pages disappointment seems to be the destined end of our hopes. Still we have the frequent witness that here is a poet of the true endowment :

'The skylark in the rosebush of the dawn,'

a beautiful image that he uses twice, by the way—or the right sort of particularity in :

'Dew water on the grass,
A fox upon the stile . . .'

but still the full and easy realization of the manifest gift is deferred. The earlier blemishes are seldom present—it is but once and again we come across words of such relaxed imagination as 'filigree,' and yet the positive advance in creation waits. Then, towards the end of the book, we come to a poem headed, 'Thomas McDonagh,' of which Lord Dunsany says, 'Rather than attribute curious sympathies 'to this brave young Irish soldier, I would ask his readers 'to consider the irresistible attraction that a lost cause has 'for almost any Irishman.' The political equation in the matter does not concern us here, nor does it concern anybody in the presence of what happens to be Ledwidge's first encompassing of profound lyric mastery. Its occasion was, certainly enough, an accident ; we know that these enfranchisements of the spirit are dependent upon no outward circumstance. Here is the poem :

'He shall not hear the bittern cry
In the wild sky, where he is lain,
Nor voices of the sweeter birds
Above the wailing of the rain.

'Nor shall he know when loud March blows
Thro' slanting snows her fanfare shrill,
Blowing to flame the golden cup
Of many an upset daffodil.

> ' But when the Dark Cow leaves the moor,
> And pastures poor with greedy weeds,
> Perhaps he'll hear her low at morn
> Lifting her horn in pleasant meads.'

The first stanza seems to me to be flawless, the second to have one slightly insensitive phrase—fanfare shrill—and an epithet in the last line that, while it is exactly appropriate, is somehow not perfectly used, while in the last stanza the precisely significant ' greedy weeds ' falls doubtfully on the ear. For the rest, it is a poem of that limpid austerity that comes only from minds slowly but irresistibly disciplined to truth. Its inspiration is a quality that, while it is immeasurably precious to those who can perceive it, escapes the sense of many altogether. It has mystery, but it is the mystery of clear modulation and simple confidence, not that other mystery of half-whispered reticence and the veiled image ; it is at once lucid and subtle, and it has the repose of vision, not of fortunate dream ; it is of the noon, not of the dusk. Preferences in these matters are temperamental ; there will always be many more to divine the spirit of wonder in the depths and distances of a Corot than in the flat perspicuousness of a Cotman, but for some the very ecstasy of revelation is touched by the Norwich drawing-master. So it is with poetry ; the shy song, the shadow-haunted, with its ghostly quavers and little reluctances, makes its own gentle and enchanted appeal, but for some of us it often leaves half-created what in intention was but to be half-said. For us, the power of presenting, in hard and definite outline, experience perfectly adjusted by the imagination to figures of reality, with imagery that never denies its relation to some intellectual concept and design by claiming sufficiency for itself, is the most hardly won and richest gift of poetry. It was to this power that Ledwidge's development moved, in the poem just quoted, where he comes first to its unquestionable exercise. Like all fine verse, it needs to be read not in silence only, but also aloud.

From this point in ' Songs of the Fields ' we have two other poems, ' The Wedding Morning ' and ' September,' of, perhaps, as rare a quality, and two others, ' Thro' Bogac Ban ' and ' The Blackbirds,' of almost equal attainment, and in ' Last Songs ' at least half the poems are written with assured

lyric maturity and lightness. 'Autumn,' 'Pan,' 'To One 'Who Comes Now and Then,' and 'Had I a Golden Pound,' are, it may be, the most striking of them. This is the last-named:

'Had I a golden pound to spend,
My love should mend and sew no more.
And I would buy her a little quern
Easy to turn on the kitchen floor.

'And for her windows curtains white,
With birds in flight and flowers in bloom,
To face with pride the road to town,
And mellow down her sunlit room.

'And with the silver change we'd prove
The truth of Love to life's own end,
With hearts the years could but embolden,
Had I a golden pound to spend.'

The book, which, as a whole, is decidedly the poet's best, has little of the war in it, and only once, in the charming 'Soliloquy,' is there a martial note, and there it is sounded in a slightly conventional contrast with a gayer mood. His songs, here as in the beginning, are almost always of the quiet fields of Ireland or the quiet fields of the mind, and his tenderness for this tranquil and fertile world was not, as it has so often and less significantly been, the fruit of reaction against the squalor and confusion of war. He went to France bearing it in his heart, and there it prospered, in witness of his natural vocation, until he was killed.

Such a gift as that of a few lovely lyrics was at no time greatly esteemed by the world, and in these days, although love of beauty is by no means rare, indifference often smoulders into open hostility. And yet the world's esteem is so little a thing, and beauty so durable, asking but a little companionship. Ledwidge's poems gain nothing from that other gift that he so devotedly gave, that we so forlornly receive. That the world should spend a poet so may be the tragic necessity of the time's folly, and the poet himself least of all would make dispute about it. But nothing justifies the world's pitiable pretence that in making the supreme sacrifice the poet exalts and sanctifies his art; nothing is meaner

than the appropriation to our own hearts of the glory of the soldier's death—a glory which is his alone. It is ours to keep him in remembrance, to realize, it may be, the courage that was his; but the continual insistence not that his devotion is splendid, but that it is upon us that his devotion may splendidly bestow itself, is contemptible. Ledwidge died heroically: that I can reflect with deep reverence; that he died for me I can remember only in forlorn desolation and silence. But his poetry exults me, while not so his death. And it is well for us to keep our minds fixed on this plain fact, that when he died a poet was not transfigured, but killed, and his poetry not magnified, but blasted in its first flowering. People, says Lord Dunsany in a letter, 'seemed to think that one poet 'dead more or less didn't much matter.' So many people, indeed, find in a poet's untimely death an emotional excitement, which if they were honest with themselves they would have to confess was far from being wholly unhappy, that is more vivid than anything else that they ever get from poetry at all, and if the untimely death is also a noble one, yet more punctual is this facile compassion for the arts. But to those who know what poetry is, the untimely death of a man like Ledwidge is nothing but calamity. There are indeed poets who, dying young with what seems measureless promise unrealized, we may yet feel to have so far outrun the processes of nature in early achievement that the vital spirit could no longer support the strain. Keats was such a one; the constructional perfection of the odes alone bears witness to an intellectual disciplining of genius so far beyond the normal reach of what was but boyhood, that nature had to sink exhausted under the pressure, and there was, perhaps, little of unhappy accident in the stroke that was but an inevitable squaring of the account. In other words, I cannot but think, however profitless such surmise may be, that if Keats had lived to mature manhood, the poetry of his first youth would have been of far less grandeur than it is. But nothing of this can be said of Ledwidge. His development was slow, and, while it was certain enough, it moved with no remarkable concentration nor to fierce purposes. He was cultivating his glowing lyrical gift with tranquil deliberation to exquisite ends, and nothing is clearer than that

when he died he had but begun to do his work. His future was plainly marked. Already he had come through the distractions of imitation to a style at once delightedly personal and in the deepest and richest traditions of English lyric poetry. It is, perhaps, strange that his Irish nature should have sung its homeland in a manner that is, it seems to me, not Irish at all, but so it is. He was coming, in a few songs had come, to mastery in the succession of Wyatt and Herrick and Marvell and the lyrical Wordsworth and Matthew Arnold, and such later poets as Mr. Davies and Mr. Hodgson. And across his gentle maturing, with no providence of beauty won beyond the common achievement of poets thus young, death came violently, with no healing, against nature. His own September of the year came in his life before spring had well gone:

'Still are the meadowlands, and still
Ripens the upland corn,
And over the brown gradual hill
The moon has dipped a horn.

'The voices of the dear unknown,
With silent hearts now call,
My rose of youth is overblown
And trembles to the fall.

'My song forsakes me like the birds
That leave the rain and grey,
I hear the music of the words
My lute can never say.'

JOHN DRINKWATER.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND

1. **The Government of England.** By DAVID DUNCAN WALLACE. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1917.
2. **Report of the War Cabinet for the Year 1917.** Cd. 9005. 1918.
3. **How to Settle the Irish Question.** By G. BERNARD SHAW. Constable. 1917.

IN a recent pamphlet Mr. George Bernard Shaw suggests that the way to settle the Irish Question is to give Home Rule to England. Whether that suggestion completely meets the situation is a matter on which both Irish Nationalists and Ulster Loyalists would have a good deal to say. But, at any rate, Mr. Shaw's proposition contains this amount of truth, that the question of the government of Ireland also involves the question of the government of England. Vaguely this is realized by most of the English, Scottish, and Welsh advocates of Home Rule for Ireland, who intermittently proclaim their enthusiasm for some federal constitution for the United Kingdom. It is noticeable, however, that most of these British politicians demand federalism primarily because they think it would settle the Irish problem, not because they have seriously considered the merits of federalism from the point of view of England, or even of Scotland or Wales. In their mouths federalism is little more than a phrase employed for the purpose of avoiding the hard facts of the real Irish problem. From this point of view it is waste of time to deal at length with federalism. The Irish problem is essentially a question of nationality. It arises from a fundamental antipathy between those inhabitants of Ireland who wish to build up an independent Irish nation, and other inhabitants of Ireland whose nation is the United Kingdom. No form of federalism can reconcile these opposing views. To offer Ireland the position of an American State in a federal constitution for the United Kingdom is to mock at Irish Nationalists. They demand that Ireland shall be a nation, and Massachusetts is not a nation, nor even Colorado. The

only nation for the whole American people—except the hyphenated—is the United States. Equally hopeless is a federal scheme based on what is called Dominion status. The more moderate—or the less frank—of the Irish Nationalists have put forward this demand with the idea of conciliating British Imperialists, while at the same time securing the essential object at which all Irish Nationalists aim—Ireland a Nation. The Dominion of Canada looks upon herself as a nation; so does Australia, and so in course of time perhaps will South Africa. But to concede this position to the whole of Ireland would be to trample under foot the national sentiment of north-east Ulster. The Protestants of Ulster, though they have been settled for three hundred years or more in Ireland, have never forgotten their English and Scottish descent. Their hearts are with Great Britain, and their pro-British national feeling is at least as much entitled to respect as the anti-British national feeling of the southern Irish. Ulster refuses to be annexed to an Irish nation, whether it calls itself a Dominion or an Independent Republic.

Therefore, in considering the question of federalism it is best to begin by dismissing altogether from our minds the Irish problem, for the two questions have nothing whatever to do with one another except for purposes of political camouflage. Nor, with all respect to Scotland and Wales, does their attitude towards federalism, whatever that attitude may really be, constitute a finally determining factor. The population of Scotland at the last census was 4,761,000, of Ireland, 4,390,000, and of Wales, 2,032,000; the population of England was 34,038,000. The disproportion of relative wealth and of relative commercial and industrial activity is at least as great, perhaps even greater. For the organization and control of great world enterprises are centralized in England to a far greater extent than in any other portion of the kingdom. These enterprises are not due to Englishmen alone. Many of the most successful enterprises launched from England owe their inception, their upbuilding, and their continued success to Scotsmen, who have come south for their own and for England's gain. Quite an appreciable fraction of the whole population of England is Scottish in origin, and to that fraction England owes a debt which is not measured by numbers only.

The contribution of Wales to the population of England is also considerable, and though Welshmen do not stand out so pre-eminently as Scotsmen in the world of commerce, Wales has at any rate supplied England with one Prime Minister.

Ireland, too, has helped to feed—in a double sense—the population of England, and has given us many men who have made their homes here and have helped to make the name of England famous throughout the world.

This composite character of the population of England emphasizes the importance of the inference that numbers alone suggest; for Scotsmen and Welshmen and Irishmen are personally concerned in the government of England to a far greater extent than Englishmen in the government of Scotland or Wales or Ireland. It is seldom that Englishmen permanently migrate to other portions of the kingdom; the reverse movement is immense and persistent.

These considerations suffice to justify the proposition that if we are to frame a new constitution for the United Kingdom it is with the government of England that we have to begin.

Hitherto, English people have on the whole been contented with their government. It has been evolved with a good deal of friction and some fighting, but it has been evolved by themselves, and its various theoretical defects have been obviated by the spirit of compromise, which is one of the most valuable characteristics of the English people. As regards the general merits of the English constitution it is worth while to quote the opinion of a recent American writer, Professor Duncan Wallace, who has summarized both with insight and with balance the main features of our system of government:

'Perhaps the most valuable of the distinctly English contributions to modern civilization is popular constitutional free government. Even nations antagonistic to the English in other respects have copied their free institutions and practical political principles to such an extent that we may say that the larger the degree of freedom which a nation enjoys, the more closely will we find that its government has been modelled after that of England.'*

That may be accepted as a just tribute to the merits of our

* 'Government of England,' p. 3.

constitution for the purposes which it was intended to serve. Whether the same constitution will suffice for the duties now being thrust upon the State is altogether another question.

The machinery of our constitution is still based on Victorian designs; it is being called upon to perform functions which no Victorian statesman ever contemplated. It will be sufficient here to quote the words of a man who for a long period was one of the most prominent members of the Liberal party. Speaking at Oxford in 1873, Sir William Harcourt said:

> 'Liberty does not consist in making others do what you think right. The difference between a free Government and a Government which is not free is principally this—that a Government which is not free interferes with everything it can, and a free Government interferes with nothing except what it must. A despotic Government tries to make everybody do what it wishes, a Liberal Government tries, so far as the safety of society will permit, to allow everybody to do what he wishes. It has been the function of the Liberal Party consistently to maintain the doctrine of individual liberty. It is because they have done so that England is the country where people can do more what they please than in any country in the world.'

Since Sir William Harcourt laid down these propositions a large part of the country, and especially that section which still calls itself the Liberal Party, has travelled so far that the word liberty has almost come to mean exactly what he said it did not mean. People talk to-day, apparently without any sense of incongruity, as if liberty from the constitutional point of view meant the multiplication of electors and of elections. Perfect constitutional liberty will be attained—so at least these modern Liberals imply—when every person, male or female, is entitled to vote for one or more parliaments and a plethora of local administrative bodies. It is further assumed, or more often expressly stated, that these parliaments and local bodies are all to be busy doing things, and as the action of every governing body is in one form or another coercive action, it follows that what is now called constitutional liberty really means an elaborate organization for giving everybody an equal opportunity of sharing in the frequent coercion of everybody else.

This habitual inversion of the meaning of the word liberty

is so complete that it would be an excess of politeness to describe it as being due to loose thinking. It is due to loose speaking and no thinking at all. By American presidents as well as by Hyde Park tub-thumpers democracy and liberty are mentioned in one breath as if they represented the same ideal. They may both be ideals, but they are not the same.

They are both ideals. The world has outgrown the conception of the paternal monarch ruling by divine right; it has equally outgrown the conception of the privileged classes ruling by right of wealth and education; the only possible conception for the government of the present and the future is a system in which all citizens shall have a right to share on terms as nearly equal as possible in constituting the government to which they have to submit. That is democracy. It is both an ideal and a necessity.

Liberty is quite another matter. It also is an ideal, and a much older one than democracy. It needs no definition. We all understand what we mean by liberty the moment we are threatened with the loss of it. Liberty may to a large extent co-exist with monarchy or with aristocracy. Under the autocratic rule of the Roman Emperors a large part of the world enjoyed probably at least as much liberty as the citizens of the republic of the United States to-day. A still better, because more recent, example of the combination of liberty with autocracy is presented by India. The government of British India is essentially autocratic, but probably in no part of the world, not even in England, is the private citizen so perfectly free to follow his own fancies without any interference on the part of the government. No such striking example can be furnished of the combination of liberty with aristocracy; but during the greater part of the Victorian era, when England was governed by a quasi-aristocracy, composed of the well-to-do classes, the maintenance of liberty was definitely recognized as a fundamental principle of government.

We have now left that period behind. The very improvements secured during the Victorian era have stimulated the desire for still greater progress. It is the man who is already on the up-grade who is ambitious to move higher, not the man who has long been stationary. Just as the Reform Bill of 1832 was forced upon the landed aristocracy by the increasing

wealth of the middle classes, so the constitutional changes which are now taking place are the result of the increased prosperity of the working classes. They demand power for themselves, partly because growing strength generally brings with it a desire for power for its own sake, and partly because they believe that they can use political power to improve their own material position relatively to that of other classes.

This hope springs from past experience. In the past each class as it has climbed into power has tended to use its control of the machinery of government for its own benefit. The working class proposes to do likewise, and it is this implicit programme which helps to explain the verbal confusion between democracy and liberty. One of the things which the working man most wants is liberty. Few well-to-do people can fully realize how comparatively narrow are the limits within which a weekly wage-earner is a free man. He has to be at his work in the factory or the shipyard on the stroke of the bell or the hoot of the siren. His movements are directed by a foreman, whose methods of command probably do not err on the side of excessive courtesy; he has little choice of residence except between one dull street and another; his holidays are extremely brief and his range of possible travel limited accordingly. With more money in his pocket and with more book knowledge in his brain he demands a larger and a freer life; he thinks he can get it through parliamentary action, and that is why he confuses the two distinct ideals of democracy and liberty.

The practical question to be considered is whether it is possible so to reform the government of England as to secure both of these distinct but not necessarily conflicting ideals. That on present political lines we shall not secure them both is certain. Democracy in fact is at present moving rapidly in the direction of tyranny, and the proposals so far made for reforming our constitution are not likely to mitigate that tyranny.

The momentarily fashionable scheme of constitutional reform, namely, the proposal for the establishment of some system of federal government for the United Kingdom, seems to have been first put forward by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain as far back as 1885 for the purpose of parrying

the Irish demand for Home Rule. It has been raked up for the same purpose by Mr. F. S. Oliver, who has written at length upon it recently in *The Times*. Apart from this Irish aspect of the question, which has been dealt with above, the only argument ever urged in favour of federalism is the contention that it would relieve the pressure of work upon our present single parliament. No evidence is adduced to show that this would be the case. If we may judge from what Professor Wallace writes, American experience points in the contrary direction. He says:

> ' " The mother of parliaments " has some peculiar and interesting ways all her own. But before taking up these let us emphasize the fact that the House of Commons and the House of Lords are true deliberative assemblies. There is a strong tendency for a large body to become a mere machine for registering the decrees of a ring of leaders or a set of committees. That such has not been the fate of Parliament is largely due to the fact that it is not overwhelmed with the thousands of bills which crush the freedom of debate out of some legislatures ' (page 72.)

He goes on to state that the number of bills brought into the House of Representatives at Washington is enormously in excess of the number introduced into the House of Commons at Westminster. Yet, in addition to Congress, the United States possesses some forty legislatures, each enjoying very wide powers under the guarantee of a written constitution.

Apparently the advocates of federalism for the United Kingdom do not propose to have a written constitution with its necessary concomitant of a Supreme Court endowed with the power to annul any act of any legislature which conflicts with the Court's interpretation of the constitution. On the contrary, the imperial parliament is to maintain a real sovereignty throughout the United Kingdom for the express purpose, among other objects, of safeguarding the interests of Ulster. Consequently, the House of Commons would have power to interfere with all the proceedings of the subordinate legislatures. That it would do so we may infer from what happens daily in connexion with local governing bodies. Popularly elected county councils have been in existence now for a considerable period of years. In theory their existence ought to have relieved parliament of a good deal of work. In practice the congestion is as great, if not greater, than before,

the reason being that the imperial parliament continues to interfere with the work which it has deliberately entrusted to other elected bodies.

This statement applies not merely to remote counties; it applies also to the capital of the Empire. The London County Council is a popularly elected body, representing a population greater than that of either Scotland or Ireland, and more than double that of Wales. It is treated by the House of Commons and by the bureaucrats of Whitehall as if it were a child in leading strings. If the federalists wish to induce belief in their bona fides let them begin by demanding the liberation of the great borough councils and county councils of the kingdom from the irritating, time-wasting, and money-wasting interference of the House of Commons and its attendant tribe of ministers and officials.

When we proceed to ask what the new 'national' but subordinate parliaments are to do no answer is forthcoming. We are told with much emphasis what they are not to do. They are not to interfere with the crown, or with the army or navy, or with the national debt, or with customs, or with excise. These restrictions cover a fairly considerable area of activities. Other restrictions remain. Take for example a question that has already arisen in Germany—the question of the control of direct taxation. At present in Germany the right of imposing direct taxation rests with the separate States; the imperial government in view of the cost of the war wants to share in that right; the States object; and the controversy is not yet settled. In the United Kingdom the income tax is the main staple of the public revenue, and its importance for meeting the interest on the national debt and other post-war expenditure for which the whole kingdom will be liable is fairly obvious. It is extremely improbable that any Chancellor of the Exchequer would consent to part with control of this tax. But if the subordinate parliaments are not to be allowed to levy customs duties or excise duties or income tax where are they to get their revenue?

Take again the question of factory legislation. Is it proposed that there shall be one factory law for Birmingham, another for Glasgow, a third for Belfast? A kindred question has already arisen in connexion with the scheme of national insurance. Apparently for the sole purpose of conciliating

what the Germans call 'particularist' sentiment, Mr. Lloyd George, in his national insurance scheme, provided separate bodies of insurance commissioners for England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. Not only do these separate bodies cost a great deal of money for salaries, but they involve an immense amount of clerical labour and expense in accounting for insured persons who transfer themselves, say, from Bristol to Cardiff or vice versa—a change that a man may make two or three times both ways in the course of a year.

Finally it may be asked, What are to be the working relations between the parliament of England and the parliament of the United Kingdom? If a federal system is to be set up England will speedily acquire a separate feeling of nationality akin to that already existing in a deliberately hostile form in Ireland, and in a form of friendly jealousy in Scotland and Wales. Suppose some question arises between the sovereign parliament of the United Kingdom and the nominally subordinate parliament of England. In the parliament of the United Kingdom the English representatives will outnumber by three to one the combined representatives of the other nationalities, and they will in the case of such a conflict almost invariably vote in support of the view expressed by the parliament of their 'nation.' The consequence will be that England —instead of sharing power as she now does on absolutely equal terms with Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, and frequently permitting a government to be imposed upon her against the wishes of the majority of her representatives—will use her superior voting power to impose her will upon the whole kingdom. Thus federalism, though it might mean a gain of constitutional liberty for England, treated as a single national unit, would imply a corresponding, and in substance a much more serious, loss to Scotland and Wales and Ireland.

As regards individual liberty—the liberty that most matters to human beings—there is no reason to believe that any gain would result from federalism to any section of the community. Federalism only means the multiplication of parliaments, and in a democratic country, parliaments, as the experience of the United States has shown, are to a large extent instruments of tyranny. The most notable of modern political movements in the United States is the revolt against parliamentary government. Americans have found by

experience that their numerous legislatures are mainly engaged in passing laws for the private benefit of the members of those legislatures and of their personal or political friends. In order to cure this rampant evil many States have established the Referendum, which gives citizens of the State the power of negativing by a direct vote the measures which have been passed by the elected legislature. Other devices for escaping from the tyranny exercised by elected persons are the Initiative, which enables the electors themselves to pass laws over the head of the legislature, and the Recall, which provides that a certain proportion of the electors in a constituency may by a direct vote demand the resignation of their representative in the legislature. In Switzerland, which has longer experience of democratic government than any other country in the world, the Referendum is in constant use as a check upon the elected legislatures. The Referendum also forms part of the constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, and its employment becomes increasingly common.

We need not, however, look abroad for evidence of the way in which uncontrolled parliamentary government leads to tyranny. The parliamentary system cannot be worked except with the assistance of organized parties. There may be many parties, as in France, ever ready to form fresh combinations with one another to meet the emergency of the moment, or there may be only two, as used to be the case in England, and possibly will be so again. But without party machinery of some kind no average candidate has any chance of election, because the average elector will not trouble to vote for a personality who at best is a mere name to him. Even the name of the candidate may be unknown to a majority of the electors in the constituency he is wooing, though it may be a household word throughout the kingdom on the lips of the small minority of people who take a watchful interest in the political life of their country. The expansion of the electorate will make such a possibility even more common, and will render the parliamentary candidate even more dependent than he is at present on some form of party machinery. There is little liberty of action for members of parliament now; there will be less in the future. For the caucus which puts men into parliament logically claims the right to control their votes. And the more necessary

the aid of the caucus becomes to the candidates, the more irresistible will be its control over their conduct.

The first business of the caucus is to look to its own corporate interests. It has above all things to see that those who support it receive an adequate reward. That was, of course, the meaning of the attempt made by the present chief Liberal Whip to organize a pensions office within the Liberal Party. He wanted to be able to tell hesitating electors throughout the kingdom that if they voted for the Liberal Party they could be sure of liberal pensions. In America this particular device for corrupting the electorate and degrading the legislature has been in operation for over fifty years. Not merely is political influence used to secure favourable administrative consideration for persons who can trump up some kind of claim for services alleged to have been rendered in the American Civil War, but in addition the United States Congress does not scruple to grant pensions to politically favoured individuals by means of private bill legislation. Professor Wallace states that in the two years 1905 and 1906 Congress passed 6,940 private bills, 'principally private 'pension bills to place names upon the rolls which could not 'meet the requirements of the pension law.'*

Nor is it only by means of pensions or promises of pensions that candidates for parliament can corruptly win votes and compel the State to pay for the corruption of its own government. The immense extension of the functions of the State in recent years has created a vast army of officials, most of whom, both male and female, will soon be voters. Their interest in obtaining increased salaries for themselves and increased chances of promotion is far more direct than any interest that some of them may feel in the general problems of national government. If they vote at all they will vote for the candidate who promises most to them in their character as employees of the State. This consideration goes a long way towards explaining the complete failure of the House of Commons to deal with the scandals revealed by the successive reports of the Committee on National Expenditure. Apart from cases of sheer carelessness due either to the incompetence of the junior bureaucracy, or to their indifference to the waste of other people's money, these scandals

* 'Government of England,' p. 73.

resolve themselves into the unjustifiable expenditure of public money for the benefit of private persons. These private persons are voters, and the instinct of self-preservation will make them actively resent in future elections any present attempt to cut down the advantages they are obtaining at the expense of the taxpayer.

Nor can the taxpayer effectively defend himself. In the Victorian age politicians used to regard it as part of their business to study the interests of the direct taxpayer because his vote was then an important factor. As late as 1874 Mr. Gladstone thought it worth while to try to restore the drooping fortunes of his party by offering on the eve of a general election to abolish the income tax by means of economy in expenditure. To-day the payers of income tax constitute so small a minority of the electorate that no politician troubles to appeal for their support. Indeed, it is possible that more votes are to be won by deliberately attacking rather than by attempting to spare the income tax payer. In the eyes of the Socialist party an income tax, confined to the middle and upper classes, and rising to twenty shillings in the £, is an ideal in itself quite apart from the use to which the money may be put. The Socialists and those who follow their lead welcome rather then resent wasteful expenditure; it brings their ideal of confiscation nearer. Meanwhile, should any popular complaint arise against any particular tax, for example the extension of the income tax to weekly wage-earners, or the tax on amusements, the difficulty is met not by economy in expenditure but by increasing the relative burden on the rich.

In substance and in fact the expenditure of the State is determined not by the people who provide the money but by the people on whom it is spent. The immediate result is a wicked waste of human effort. Thousands of persons, male and female, who ought to be doing useful work are engaged in making a pretence of work for one another's benefit in government offices. Meanwhile they are destroying the liberties as well as diminishing the wealth of the nation. For they cannot maintain their pretence of work except by interfering with the real work that is going on outside. Hence arises the incessant and wanton interference with private business. This interference not only wastes the time of busy men by requiring them to reply to countless futile questions,

but it also constantly holds up and often entirely stops useful enterprises.

These are the immediate effects of parliamentary government with a democratic electorate. Whither do they lead?

So long as a sufficient number of private industries remain in existence to provide the revenues required by parliament for the corruption of the electorate, as well as for the necessities of the State, the scheme will work. But the inevitable tendency both of high taxation and of bureaucratic interference is to restrict private enterprise, and these forces operate with ever-increasing effect. As the taxable area grows less, so must the scale of taxation grow higher, for there will be fewer people to pay taxes and more people to demand government jobs.

That the State enterprises themselves can be made to yield a revenue to the State is one of the fundamental delusions of the Socialist party. The only State enterprise which yields a net revenue in this country in normal times is the carrying of letters. That is an extremely simple service involving no complicated business calculations or skilled labour. It is, moreover, a monopoly. On the other hand, the parcel post service, which is subject to the competition of the railway companies and of other private agencies, involves a heavy annual loss. The telegraphs, which were a profitable concern when in the hands of private companies, have failed to pay their way under State management. The loss has in some years exceeded a million pounds, which has had to be made good out of taxes levied upon private businesses. Incidentally the acquisition of the telegraphs by the State led to the blocking of the development of the telephones for many years, lest they should interfere with the State telegraph monopoly. Less than ten years ago the State took over the telephones also. They were then yielding a handsome profit to their promoters; it is doubtful whether the revenue now covers the cost of working and maintenance. These illustrations are typical. Everywhere the State works more expensively than private firms, and the more complicated the business the less competent is the State to undertake it. But when the State has converted all profit-making private enterprises into money-losing State enterprises, it will be faced with the hard fact of having no revenue with which to meet the cost

of necessary public work, such as the maintenance of an army and navy, the upkeep of streets and roads and harbours.

Then the full tyranny of Socialism will begin. When it has completely destroyed the pecuniary motive for enterprise and industry the State will be compelled to have recourse to coercion to get the necessary work done. The citizen of the future slave State, instead of escaping the tyranny of the factory bell, will find himself subject to a still more tyrannical master. He will be forced to do whatever work the State imposes upon him in return for a uniform standard of maintenance in the shape of standard food, standard clothing, and standard house-room. He will be permitted neither choice of residence for himself nor choice of school for his children, for private whims in such matters as these would hopelessly upset the smooth working of the all-controlling bureaucracy.

Needless to say, long before this point was reached human nature would revolt. But what many people fail to see is that this is the goal towards which at the moment democracy is moving. Take as a typical example the Education Bill now before the House of Commons. This Bill does many good things. In particular, it abolishes half-time work for young children, and so frees the child from the compulsion of giving up its early years to earning money for its parents. The Bill also proposes to increase the opportunities for later education. That is all to the good. But in addition the Bill distinctly aims at reducing all education to one uniform standard. All schools, including the great public schools, which are one of the most characteristic features of English life, are to be brought under the final control of the Board of Education, and though temporarily that control may be lightly exercised, gradually the bureaucracy will increase its deadening grip. The same bureaucratic control will next be extended to the universities. We are, indeed, already moving in that direction. The ideal which our professed reformers contemplate is a complete system of State education from the crèche to the university.

Yet, surely education of all matters is one where State control should be kept down to the minimum, so that the human mind may develop, untrammelled by official codes. There are, undoubtedly, cases where intelligent interference

from above—though not necessarily from a government department—is the only way of securing a standard of efficiency, which many parents are too ignorant or too indifferent to call for. But the present Education Bill aims not only at raising the standard of educational efficiency, but also at lowering it in order to secure equality at the expense of liberty. One clause of the Bill compels local education authorities to abolish the few fee-paying elementary schools which are still maintained to meet the wishes of parents who are afraid that their children may pick up unpleasant habits, or still more unpleasant insects, in the rougher type of free school. This is surely a very laudable parental precaution for which the parent is fully prepared and even anxious to pay. But a large number of English Socialists are endowed with a mentality similar to that of the Russian Bolsheviks. They demand absolute equality of condition for everybody, and the cultivated Oxford don, who is now Minister of Education, finds himself compelled to bow to their demand. We could not have a better illustration of the present drift of democracy in the direction of tyranny.

That drift is ultimately due to false economic teaching based upon social envy. Large numbers of voters have been taught that the only way to lift the poor is to pull down the rich; that the way to increase wages is to destroy capital. They are able to give immediate political effect to this false economic teaching because of the peculiar faults of our machinery of government.

That machinery had its origin more than six centuries ago. The House of Commons was called into being for a very specific purpose, and its constitution was designed for that purpose. The counties and boroughs of the kingdom were required to send representatives to the King's Court to settle with his ministers what contributions these communities should make towards the cost of carrying on the King's government. These communities, the freeholders of the county and the burgesses of the town, had definite local interests of their own, and it was the business of their representatives to defend those interests. Quite properly, the representatives were paid by the constituencies whose interests they defended. In a very short time these delegates to the King's Court established the principle that the King must

listen to their tale of grievances before they would vote his supplies.

That is the beginning of parliamentary government in England. It meant the establishment of a body, more or less popular in character, with power to influence the executive government. The system worked on the whole well for many centuries, though in the later period its success was, perhaps, rather due to the innate love of liberty and to the genius for compromise which the English people possess than to the primary merits of the constitution itself. That primary merit, the direct connexion between the interest of the constituency and the duties of the representative, disappeared with the defeat of the Stuarts by the House of Commons. As soon as parliament had established its own supremacy, a seat in the House of Commons became valuable for the advantages which the occupant could obtain for himself. The constituencies then ceased to pay their representatives; instead the candidates paid the voters. There was thus a complete inversion of the original conception of the English parliament.

Nevertheless, England, in fact, enjoyed throughout the eighteenth and the earlier half of the nineteenth centuries a government so far superior to that of most other countries that her constitution then served as a model for the whole world. By the latter half of the nineteenth century nearly every autonomous country had adopted the English parliamentary system. The results have often been—as in the South American Republics—ludicrously unsatisfactory. Nor need we be surprised. For long before these foreign countries began to copy our system, a wide breach had been made between its theoretical basis and its practical working. Our imitators copied the theoretical basis, not realizing that this basis had its birth under conditions which had long ceased to operate. We made the system work largely because, to quote the flattering words of Professor Wallace, we had been able to prove 'that the popular will among a highly civilized 'people, notably gifted in public self-control and following 'the leadership of a patriotic governing class, is itself a suffi-'cient safeguard to individual and national liberty.'

But can we permanently rely upon this very vague safeguard? The danger ahead arises not from the mere extension

of the suffrage to as many millions of electors as there were hundreds of thousands in the mid-Victorian period, when the House of Commons reached perhaps the zenith of its reputation; for there is no reason to believe that the new electors differ fundamentally in character from their predecessors, and the machinery required for counting a thousand votes is much the same as that necessary for counting a hundred. The really important difference is the enlargement of the functions of government, which has resulted in the multiplication of government employees, who are all voters, and in the complication of issues to be submitted to the electorate. The territorial basis for the election of the House of Commons, which was absolutely logical in the days of Simon de Montfort, has no relevance whatever to existing conditions. It would be hard to discover a single constituency which, in its corporate capacity, has any common interest to defend at Westminster, except, indeed, in the case of constituencies wishing to receive a bribe from the central government in the shape of some local undertaking to be subsidized at national expense. A typical illustration of this factor occurred a few years ago in a northern constituency, where each of the rival candidates promised to bring pressure to bear upon the government of the United Kingdom to spend more money upon a local harbour. That clearly is not a form of political motive which it is desirable to encourage.

Apart from such obviously undesirable examples as this our present territorial constituencies have no communal interest of their own in the vast number of problems now coming before parliament. Nor have the electors as a body any special knowledge or any means of acquiring knowledge of the complicated issues submitted to them. In such conditions it is altogether unreasonable even to hope for a sound judgment. What England now has to do is to follow the spirit instead of the letter of Simon de Montfort's great achievement. We have to evolve new forms of government to deal with new problems. If our plans are to be successful they must be based, as was Simon de Montfort's, upon the principle of a direct and logical connexion between the purpose aimed at and the character of the agency framed for achieving that purpose. The most urgent of modern day problems are industrial or commercial; therefore the basis of the agency or agencies

for dealing with them must be industrial or commercial, and not territorial.

Happily, the genius of our people is already moving in this direction. The trade unions have already ceased to be local. They have organized themselves into great national bodies and have also created what amounts to their own diplomatic service for communicating with analogous bodies abroad on matters of common interest. In addition, great progress has been made of recent years in the constitution of Works Committees, which give a direct voice to the employees in determining the conditions of employment in the workshop itself. The relationship of Works Committees to trade unions is at present undetermined, and probably both forms of organization will do better work by existing side by side than by attempting to absorb one another. Together they should be able to form effective constituencies for the election of representatives of wage-earners on national councils of industry. Much progress has also been made in recent years among employers in the direction of combining together for common ends.

These combinations on both sides have certainly tended to improve relationships between employers and employed by creating that feeling of mutual respect which usually emerges when each side is forced to recognize the power of its opponent. The general result is that employers and employed are more inclined to co-operate on friendly terms than at any period since the growth of big industries destroyed the individual tie between master and hired man working side by side in the same shop. It must be added that the inclination of employers and employed to a friendly alliance has been immensely strengthened in the last year or two by their common impatience with the irritating interference of government departments. At the same time the new combinations of employers are quite rightly concerning themselves with the commercial interests of the industries they control. Instead of relying upon the Foreign Office or upon the Board of Trade, or upon any new government department that may be brought into being by restless politicians, they are making arrangements, at their own expense, for the collection of commercial information abroad of the precise character required.

In these encouraging developments of our industrial life we can see the germs of a true parliament of industry and commerce. Such a parliament would be composed of men necessarily cognizant of the problems with which they are required to deal and pecuniarily interested in their satisfactory settlement. The members of the existing type of parliament are not necessarily cognizant of anything except the art of winning votes from indifferent electors; in their capacity as members of parliament they have no pecuniary interest in anything except their own self-voted salaries and their chances of obtaining office. Taken in the mass, members of parliament elected for territorial constituencies are incapable of bringing to bear on commercial and industrial problems any technical knowledge, and their decisions instead of being guided by the commercial motives which lead to commercial success, are constantly subject to irrelevant and even corrupt influences. If the House of Commons retains its present constitution it should confine itself to functions which affect the nation as a whole in its corporate capacity, and should leave to bodies constituted on a commercial and industrial basis the settlement of commercial and industrial problems. If England can evolve such a constitution as this, she may yet teach the world how to combine democracy with liberty.

EDITOR.

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A PROGRAMME FOR PEACE—REVISED

WINTER will certainly bring us further offers of peace from the enemy. Not all of them will be insincere. Some may seem tempting. They will be accompanied by subtly-disguised campaigns of propaganda, of which the real object will be to sow dissension between us and our Allies, and especially between our Continental Allies and 'Anglo-Saxonism.' We cannot be sure that the source of these enemy offensives will always be detected in time or exposed with convincing completeness. It behoves us, therefore, not only to organize our defences against them, but to prepare betimes our own 'peace offensive.'

In preparing and conducting it we need to be honest with ourselves and honest with the enemy. Propaganda not based on policy, and policy not in harmony with facts, are alike worthless. But in order to be honest with ourselves we must know clearly what it is that we are resolved to secure in the way of a peace settlement. We must define and proclaim our programme for peace while we are still at war, lest peace, coming as a thief in the night, take us unawares and find us unready.

In the EDINBURGH REVIEW for April, 1916, was published a tentative definition of Allied war aims. The article, entitled 'A Programme for Peace,' was written under the influence of a visit to the battle-field of Verdun early in March. Its avowed purpose was to stimulate 'a discussion that may 'help to clear up obscure points and to further the acceptance

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' of a general (peace) programme.' For purposes of comparison and reference it is here reproduced, although some of its postulates have since been fulfilled and others rendered obsolete by the course of the war. It ran :

' (1) That the Allies win the war so thoroughly as to be able to dictate their terms. An inconclusive peace, following upon even a victorious war, would be but a prelude to a fresh period of armaments and of preparation for a struggle still more cruel.

' (2) That, as a preliminary step to the winning of the war, the British people entrust its management to a few men filled with the war spirit and determined to conquer literally *at all costs*.

' (3) That the co-ordination of Allied effort, and particularly of Franco-British effort, be carried much farther than it has hitherto been. To this end the British forces in France should be regarded as an integral part of the French Army, and should receive orders, not merely suggestions or advice, from the French Commander-in-Chief and his Chief of Staff. Just as the French Navy is, in practice, subordinate to the British Navy, so the British Army, with its reserves and resources, should be effectively subordinate to the French Army, which, in the conduct of a Continental war, is at least as superior to our Army as the British Navy is superior to the French Navy.

' (4) That as soon as a Government for War shall have been formed in Great Britain, a policy of economic alliance between the various parts of the Empire, with the help of statesmen from the Overseas Dominions, shall be drafted on broad lines.

' (5) That this policy having been formulated and adopted in principle, the British Empire, as a whole, shall concert with its Allies a scheme for economic defence against Germany and her allies both during and after the war. The objects of this scheme would be : (*a*) To tighten the ' blockade ' of Germany ; (*b*) to convince Germany and her allies that the longer they continue the struggle the more complete will be their economic ruin, and the more protracted the period of economic servitude through which they must pass until they have fully indemnified those of the Allies who have most suffered from Germany's action ; (*c*) to establish, as a settled principle of Allied policy, that, until these indemnities have been fully paid, the British and Allied Navies will not recognize the German or any enemy flag upon the high seas ; and that the Allies will exact such additional guarantees of the payment of these indemnities by occupation of territory or otherwise as may be deemed essential.

' (6) That, simultaneously with the formation of an Allied economic policy, there shall be taken in hand the establishment of a definite scheme of European reconstruction, territorial and political, such a scheme to include :

(*a*) The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France ;

(*b*) The adjustment of Belgian territory in accordance with Belgian requirements;

(*c*) The constitution of an ethnically-complete Serbia in the form of a United States of Yugoslavia;

(*d*) The constitution of a unified self-governing Poland under the Russian sceptre;

(*e*) The constitution of an independent, or at least autonomous, Bohemia, including Moravia and the Slovak country of north-western Hungary;

(*f*) The allotment to Rumania of the Rumane regions of Hungary and the Bukovina, provided that Rumania shall have helped effectively to liberate those regions from Austro-Hungarian rule;

(*g*) The establishment of the freedom of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles to shipping, after Russia has secured, or has been given, possession of Constantinople;

(*h*) The completion of Italian unity by the inclusion within the frontiers of the kingdom of Italy of all Italian districts in the Trentino and the Carnic Alps, on the Triestine littoral and the Istrian coast; the establishment of Italian naval control in the Adriatic by the possession of Pola, Lissa and Valona.'

This 'programme' evidently needs revision in the light of the last two and a half years of war. During that period we have seen the intervention and the overthrow of Rumania; the Russian revolution and the collapse of the Russian army under German and Bolshevist influence; the declaration of war by the United States and its effects in Central and South America; the defeat and recovery of Italy; the overthrow of defeatist tendencies in France; the bringing of the American hosts to Europe and the establishment of a unified military command; the repulse of the German offensive and the Allied victories in France, Palestine and the Balkans; the recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks and the prospective recognition of the Yugoslavs as Allied and belligerent peoples. These and other events have so quickened the flight of Victory that the beat of her wings is already in our ears and her form and features are coming into sight. It seems therefore desirable to bring up to date the 'programme' of 1916, and to examine those of its postulates which still await realization.

Late in 1916 the formation of the British War Cabinet went some way towards fulfilling the suggestion that, as far as Great Britain was concerned, the management of the war should be entrusted to 'a few men filled with the war spirit.'

The successes of Mr. Lloyd George's administration have been due to its war spirit, just as its failures may be traced to some flagging of that spirit on his part and on the part of his colleagues and advisers. He and his colleagues have faltered far too often, and, on some occasions, have run after false gods or sought broad and easy paths to an inglorious peace. But much may be pardoned him and them for their steadfastness in securing the unification of the supreme Allied military command. Their task in this respect was hard—harder than the public ever suspected. Prejudice, intrigue, and even defeatism masquerading as super-patriotism, had to be overcome before Marshal Foch could be placed in the position which has enabled him to lead the Allied armies to triumph. It now remains to unify the economic and the political command of the Allied cause. The economic command is, indeed, in process of unification, but there is much to be done before the Governments of the Allies and of the United States agree to a common political programme and place its execution under joint control.

Nevertheless, progress has been made in this direction also. Since January, 1917, when the Allies made their first official attempt to define their peace programme in answer to President Wilson's appeal of December 19th, 1916, the discussion of 'War Aims' has not ceased. The motives which prompted that appeal have not yet been authentically established. It is certain only that after his second election President Wilson felt that unless the war were speedily ended the United States would not be able long to remain neutral. Before facing the choice between continued neutrality and a declaration of war, he held himself bound publicly to ascertain the motives of the two belligerent groups.

It has sometimes been suggested that even before launching the appeal his mind was made up, and that the appeal itself was a deft manœuvre to put the Central Powers in the wrong and the Allies in the right before the public opinion of America. The suggestion is based upon a misconstruction of the President's own attitude and of his reading of the situation. President Wilson is human and has his shortcomings, but trickiness is certainly not among them. His mind moves slowly, but it is essentially honest. He has been described as a 'Scotch Presbyterian,' and there is in him much that is

more readily comprehensible if the Scottish Covenanter strain in his character be taken into account. Unless I am entirely misinformed, he was not as convinced, towards the end of 1916, of the final triumph of the Allied cause as were the peoples and the statesmen of Allied countries. He knew that Germany contemplated unrestricted submarine warfare. He believed that such warfare would probably involve a breach with the United States, but he was fearful lest the German submarines should strike a fatal blow at British sea-power and ruin the Allied cause before the United States could intervene effectively in the contest. Therefore he called upon 'all the nations now at war' to make 'such an avowal 'of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war 'might be concluded . . . as would make it possible frankly 'to compare them.' He added, 'It may be that peace is 'nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents 'on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary 'to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared.'

Had the Germans answered this appeal politely and with even ostensible sincerity, President Wilson would certainly have given the fullest consideration to their plea. They preferred to treat his well-meant request with ill-disguised contempt. The Allies, on the other hand, replied on January 10th, 1917, with courtesy and firmness. Their war aims they declared to be:

'Necessarily and first of all the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro with the compensations due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Rumania, with just reparations; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable *régime* and based at once on respect for nationality and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanes and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization. The intentions of H.M. the Emperor of Russia in regard to Poland have been clearly indicated by the manifesto he has just addressed to his Army.'

The inner history of the document thus placed before President Wilson as an outline of the Allied peace programme is unlikely fully to be known until, years hence, historians gain access to diplomatic archives. It is understood, however, that after a preliminary exchange of views the Allied Governments, in order to save time, accepted a somewhat wordy French text as the fundamental draft, and revised it progressively until a common basis of agreement was evolved. The gist of a much better draft by Mr. Balfour was subsequently embodied in the British dispatch to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, covering an English translation of the joint Allied Note.

This dispatch, as the work of a single author, is in many respects a more satisfactory document than the joint Note, but it is by the joint Note that the Allied case must be judged. Mr. Balfour's dispatch, moreover, claims that none of the three conditions which he laid down as indispensable to a durable peace 'can be satisfied, even imperfectly, unless 'peace be secured on the general lines indicated (so far as 'Europe is concerned) in the joint Note.' His three conditions were :

'(1) That the existing causes of international unrest should be as far as possible removed or weakened ;

'(2) That the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples ;

'(3) That behind international law, and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor.'

If the joint Note be carefully examined, some curious reticences and inconsistencies become apparent. The passage in regard to Poland is evidently a makeshift designed to spare Russian susceptibilities. The Russian Government, and, in particular, M. Sazonoff, had steadfastly declined to admit the international character of the Polish question. They had insisted that the future of Poland was mainly, if not entirely, an internal Russian concern, to be dealt with in accordance with the Tsar's various undertakings to the Poles. The Western Allies, for their part, had shown no eagerness to create for themselves a title to speak in regard to Poland by assuring Russia of their determination to continue the war until the three parts of Poland should be united.

An assurance of this kind would have implied readiness to detach Galicia, at least, from Austria—and despite the Anglo-Franco-Russian Convention with Italy of April, 1915, and the Allied Treaty with Rumania, the Austrophil obsession was still strong enough in London, Paris, and Rome to preclude the frank declaration of a resolve to liberate all the subject Hapsburg races. Nevertheless, the joint Note spoke of the 'liberation of the Italians as also of the Slavs, Rumanes, 'and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination.' The anti-Austrian implication was clear, but Austria was not specifically mentioned.

No Allied statesman seems to have noticed the redundancy of referring to 'Slavs . . . and Czecho-Slovaks' in the same sentence, as though the Czecho-Slovaks were not Slavs. The truth seems to be that the reference to the Czecho-Slovaks was inserted at the last moment in deference to Czecho-Slovak representations in Paris; while the word 'Southern,' which had originally preceded the word 'Slavs,' is believed to have been suppressed lest a proposal to liberate the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary from foreign domination should appear incompatible with the integral execution of the Allied Convention with Italy which contemplates the transfer of Southern Slav territory from Austrian to Italian rule. Thus the word 'Slav' stood alone, despite its obvious ambiguity. Notwithstanding these blemishes, the joint Note was undoubtedly a step towards the definition of an Allied Peace Programme. In view of the ignorance of Allied statesmen in regard to many of the peoples whom they proposed to liberate, the step was, indeed, much bolder than might have been expected. It encouraged those peoples to work out their own salvation and to make clear the essential connexion between their national aspirations and the just and durable European settlement for which the Allies were henceforth pledged to strive.

The Declaration issued by the Serbian Government and the Southern Slav Committee at Corfu, on July 20th, 1917, formed a weighty pendant to the joint Note. It was conceived at once as the Charter of Serbian-Southern Slav unity, and a counterpoise to the Allied Convention with Italy. Its effect upon the situation in Austria has been so profound and its significance, both from the standpoint of the constitution

of the future Yugoslavia and from that of the reconstruction of Europe, is so great that it needs to be cited and explained at some length.

The Declaration, which was made on behalf of past and present Serbian Ministers, the President of the Skupshtina and the President of the Yugoslav Committee, affirmed that: 'Our people constitutes but one nation, and is one in blood, 'one by the spoken and written language, by the continuity 'and unity of the territory in which it lives, and, finally, 'in virtue of the common and vital interests of its national 'existence and the general development of its moral and 'material life.' It declared 'the desire of our people to free 'itself from every foreign yoke and to constitute itself a free 'national and independent State, a desire based on the prin-'ciple that every nation has the right to decide its own destiny.' It therefore proclaimed that:

'The State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who are known as the Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs, will be a free and independent kingdom, with indivisible territory and unity of allegiance. It will be a constitutional, democratic and Parliamentary Monarchy under the Karageorgevitch Dynasty, which had always shared the ideas and the feelings of the nation, placing liberty and the national will above all else.

'This State will be named "The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." . . .

'The three national designations—Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—are equal before the law throughout the territory of the Kingdom, and every one may use them freely upon all occasions of public life and in dealing with the authorities. . . .

'All recognized religions may be freely and publicly exercised. The Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Musulman faiths, which are those chiefly professed by our nation, shall rank equally and enjoy equal rights in regard to the State. . . .

'The territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will include all the territory inhabited compactly and in territorial continuity by our nation of the three names. It cannot be mutilated without detriment to the vital interests of the community.

'Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others. It demands only what is its own. It desires to free itself and to achieve its unity. Therefore it consciously and firmly refuses every partial solution of the problem of its national liberation and unification. It puts forward the proposition of its deliverance from Austro-Hungarian domination and its union with Serbia and Montenegro in a single State forming an indivisible whole.

'In accordance with the right of self-determination of peoples, no part of this territorial totality may, without the infringement of justice, be detached and incorporated with some other State without the consent of the nation itself.

'In the interests of freedom and of the equal rights of all nations, the Adriatic shall be free and open to each and all. . . .

'The nation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, thus unified, will form a State of about twelve million inhabitants. This State will be the guarantee for their independence and national development and their national and intellectual progress in general, a mighty bulwark against the German thrust, an inseparable ally of all the civilized nations and States which have proclaimed the principle of right and liberty and that of international justice. It will be a worthy member of the new Community of Nations.'

In the generally-accepted sense of the term the Southern or Yugoslavs are the Croat, Serb and Slovene inhabitants of Austria-Hungary, including Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbs of the kingdom of Serbia and the Serbs of Montenegro are also Southern Slavs, though they are usually called Serbians and Montenegrins respectively. During the decade before the war the sense of racial and linguistic unity, always latent, had been growing stronger among the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary and the Serbians and Montenegrins. The Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia and Montenegro plunged them therefore into what was practically civil strife, and increased rather than weakened their sense of solidarity. Until May, 1915, when the general effect of the Allied Convention with Italy became known, the war had been thoroughly unpopular among the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs, tens of thousands of whom had surrendered voluntarily to the Serbians, while many of their political leaders had sought safety in Allied and neutral countries. Those who could not escape were imprisoned and barbarously persecuted. In Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia-Slavonia thousands of Yugoslavs were executed without even the semblance of a trial.

This situation should have been understood by the Allied Governments and have been taken into account in the negotiations with Italy that preceded the Italian declaration of war. In their own interest and in that of Italy herself they ought to have withstood any demands of a nature to increase the difficulty of her task. While, from the point of view of the Allies in general, the main defect of the

Convention with Italy was that it substituted for the principle of nationality the strategic principle dear to German militarism, it also damaged Italy herself by ranging against her all the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary. The war, which had been for them a civil war, became a war of national defence. Austria, who ascertained the main terms of the Convention within a few days of its conclusion, used it effectively to stimulate Southern Slav resentment against the 'predatory designs' of the Allies. Thus Italy began hostilities against Austria with the serious disadvantage of having inflamed against her the inhabitants of the very territories over which she expected her armies to advance, instead of securing their sympathy and support as she might have done had her policy been based from the outset on the liberation of the oppressed Austro-Hungarian peoples. But for this mistake, the armies of Italy might to-day be fighting on the Drave instead of on the line of the Piave.

The loss of this opportunity was, however, not the only harm done by the Convention to the Allied cause. When its main terms became known in Serbia towards the end of May, 1915, deep discouragement spread throughout the Serbian army and people. For a moment it seemed as though the Serbian resistance might collapse. At the same time, Allied negotiations with and in regard to Bulgaria entered a critical phase. It is now beside the point to discuss whether or not Bulgaria might then have been won over to the Allied side, or, at least, have been induced to remain neutral. All hope of securing the one or the other of these results disappeared on the day when the terms of the Convention with Italy became known. The Allies, who had just signed away considerable portions of Southern Slav territory in Dalmatia and Istria without consulting Serbia, could not risk a further weakening of her *moral* by demanding from her the territorial concessions in Macedonia that would have been necessary to keep Bulgaria neutral. They made, indeed, tentative suggestions to her, but dared not insist upon them. Worse still, they promised Serbia 'compensation' in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the Adriatic coast without perceiving that the 'principle of compensation,' like the strategic 'principle,' is totally foreign to the Allied cause. In their ignorance—or cynicism—they proposed to use a section of the Southern

Slavs of Austria-Hungary to liquidate the debit balance of their policy towards Serbia. They had no notion that while the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs are eager for union with their Serbian and Montenegrin kindred on a basis of political and religious equality, they vigorously resent both the idea of being split up to suit the convenience of any Great Power or of being merely 'annexed' by Serbia as conquered territory. Some reactionary elements in Serbia would indeed be prepared to annex the Southern Slavs and to handle them as the Macedonians were handled in the annexed regions after the Balkan wars of 1912-13; but Southern Slav unity does not lie that way. It lies in the direction of voluntary union, with equal political and religious rights for Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, Catholic Orthodox and Musulman, from the Drave to Macedonia. The merit of the Declaration of Corfu is that it places the Southern Slav question solidly on this foundation, and that it leaves open a door for agreement with Italy by declaring that the future Yugoslavia must include all territories compactly inhabited by Southern Slavs. In border regions, where the Southern Slav population is not compact, there is, therefore, room for the amicable adjustment of contending claims. It is precisely these regions that are affected by the just and vital interests of Italy.

The effect of the Declaration of Corfu upon the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary was instantaneous and far-reaching. As clearly and as promptly as circumstances allowed they manifested their assent to it. The cohesion of the Austro-Hungarian Army began to be affected, and there is strong reason to believe that, had Italy received the Declaration in a friendly spirit as a basis for negotiation and agreement with the Southern Slavs, the disaster of Caporetto might have been avoided. Indeed, it may be assumed that among the motives which induced the German General Staff to take control of the Austro-Hungarian Army last autumn, and to organize the offensive which nearly involved Italy and the Allied cause in disaster, the desire to check the disintegrating process set up among the Southern Slav troops by the Corfu Declaration was by no means the least potent.

But in Italy at that moment the vital significance of the Southern Slav question was not generally realized. A number

of clear-sighted and high-minded Italian writers and public men, notably the Socialist Minister, Signor Bissolati, and the group of contributors to the weekly review, *L'Unità*, had, it is true, come to perceive the need for an Italo-Yugoslav understanding long before Caporetto, and had sought to spread their views among their fellow-countrymen. They made little headway against the current of nationalist feeling and the persistent efforts of pro-Austrian propagandists until military mishap lent point to their arguments. After Caporetto their doctrine gained wider acceptance and found powerful expression in leading Italian journals. The services which the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, under the enlightened direction of Senator Luigi Albertini, rendered to Italy in this respect will remain memorable in the annals of Italian journalism. The *Secolo* of Milan, and other liberal organs like the *Messaggero* of Rome, supported the efforts of the *Corriere*, and created an atmosphere in which Southern Slavs and Italians could, for the first time, meet to discuss their joint aims and interests. In the meantime, at the instance of British supporters of an Italo-Yugoslav agreement, conferences between representative Italians and Southern Slavs took place in London. They led to a large measure of agreement. Towards the end of January the Italian Prime Minister, Signor Orlando, received the President of the Southern Slav Committee during a visit to London, and after a cordial exchange of views invited him to Rome. Simultaneously an influential parliamentary committee representing both Houses of the Italian Parliament was formed in Italy. It delegated a prominent Italian Deputy, Dr. Andrea Torre, to meet Dr. Trumbitch in London, where, on March 7th, they concluded, with the help of British friends, the agreement since known as the 'Pact of Rome.' The importance of this agreement lies not only in the fact of its having been made after an exhaustive examination of the position in all its aspects, but that it formed an integral part of an understanding contemporaneously brought about in Paris between the representatives of the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Southern Slav and Rumanian Committees, under the auspices of MM. Franklin-Bouillon and Etienne Fournol. The whole understanding formed the basis for the first Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary,

which was held at the Capitol in Rome on April 10th-18th, 1918. Proclaimed publicly as a resolution of the Congress, the understanding received next day the formal adhesion and sanction of the Italian Prime Minister, Signor Orlando. Its terms are:

'The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in part to the rule of Austria-Hungary—the Italians, Poles, Rumanes, Czechs and Southern Slavs—join in affirming their principles of common action as follows:

'(1) Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own nationality and State unity, or to complete it, and to attain full political and economic independence.

'(2) Each of these peoples recognizes in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realization of its aspirations and rights.

'(3) The assembly recognizes the necessity of a common struggle against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit.

'The representatives of the Italian people and of the Yugoslav people in particular agree as follows:

'(1) In the relations between the Italian nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—known also under the name of the Yugoslav nation—the representatives of the two peoples recognize that the unity and independence of the Yugoslav nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity is a vital interest of the Yugoslav nation. And therefore the representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every effort in order that during the war and at the moment of peace these ends of the two nations may be completely attained.

'(2) They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its defence against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of the two peoples.

'(3) They pledge themselves also, in the interest of good and sincere relations between the two peoples in the future, to solve amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of the two nations, as they shall be defined at the moment of peace.

'(4) To such racial groups (*nuclei*) of one people as it may be found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other, there shall be recognized and guaranteed the right of their language, culture, and moral and economic interests.'

The unanimous adoption of this resolution at a Congress organized by representatives of the majority of both Houses of the Italian Parliament, and the adhesion to it of the Italian

Prime Minister, marked a definite and important stage in the evolution of Italian public opinion towards a peace programme in harmony with the declared war aims of the Allies. The event was warmly welcomed in France and in England, while the United States lost no time in expressing its approval.

On May 29th Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, declared officially that the proceedings of the Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities 'have been followed with great 'interest by the Government of the United States, and that 'the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-'slavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this Govern-'ment.' How great an advance this declaration represented in the policy of the United States towards Austria-Hungary is shown by a glance at President Wilson's 'War Aims' speech of January 8th, 1918. He then said: 'The peoples 'of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we 'wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the 'first opportunity of autonomous development.' The expression, 'autonomous development,' coming after Mr. Lloyd George's Austrophil War Aims speech to British Labour representatives on January 5th, had spread dismay among the oppressed Austro-Hungarian races, who knew by bitter experience that 'autonomy' or 'self-government' under Hapsburg rule are but synonyms for tyranny. Mr. Lansing's statement was therefore hailed by them as a pledge of ultimate freedom. Together with accounts of the Rome Congress which Italian and Allied propaganda had distributed broadcast among the Austro-Hungarian Armies, it helped to create a situation that greatly facilitated the Piave victory at the end of June.

Into that victory there entered several factors which have not yet been publicly analysed. Apart from the great improvement which General Diaz and his able Chief-of-Staff, General Badoglio, had effected in the organization of the Italian Armies; apart also from the presence of British and French forces in the battle line, and the feeling among the Italian troops that the German offensive in France had been checked, the soldiers of Italy were encouraged by the knowledge that Allied propaganda on the basis of the Rome Congress had seriously affected the spirit of many Austro-Hungarian divisions. In response to this Allied propaganda, numbers

of Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslav soldiers had, in the latter part of April and May, sought refuge in the Allied lines, and had brought with them information of great value. Two days before the battle, many more refugees came over with the deliberate object of informing the Italian and Allied commanders of the exact dispositions of the enemy and of the precise hour of the intended attack. Thus it became possible to subject the Austrian forces to an intense bombardment two hours before they were to go 'over the top'; and when they actually launched the offensive, it was with the feeling that the Italian and Allied troops were more than ready to receive them. The Austrian-Germans and the Magyars, who form the most reliable elements in the Hapsburg Armies, fought bravely and were not defeated without a severe struggle. But once the initial onrush had been stayed the issue was not in doubt. The Austro-Hungarian Army was heavily, though not decisively, defeated. A decisive defeat, entailing disastrous consequences for Austria, might have been possible had Italian policy followed more closely the advance of Italian and Allied public opinion. Indeed, the only hope of securing complete victory for the Allies lay in undermining the cohesion of the Austro-Hungarian forces by convincing the Slav elements among them that Italy and the Allies were in reality fighting for Slav freedom.

So clearly was this consideration appreciated by the British and French Governments that categorical declarations in regard to the future of the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugoslavs had been submitted by them to the Allied Conference at Versailles at the beginning of June. Revelations since made in the Italian press and elsewhere prove, however, that the proposal to issue these declarations was—as regards the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugoslavs—frustrated by Italy. The official announcement made on July 6th consequently ran:

'At a meeting held at Versailles on June 3, the Prime Ministers of the three Allied countries, Great Britain, France and Italy, agreed to the following declarations:

'(1) The creation of a united and independent Polish State with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.

'(2) The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration made by the Secretary of State of the United States

Government, and desire to associate themselves in an expression of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom of the Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslav peoples.'

Though issued in the name of the Italian Prime Minister it is now known that the Italian Minister actually responsible for the half-hearted character of the second clause was Baron Sonnino, the Foreign Secretary. Indeed, the Prime Minister, Signor Orlando, could scarcely have been the parent of such a formula in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugoslavs after his speech of frank adhesion to the resolution of the Rome Congress in April; though, for reasons of ministerial solidarity, he may have hesitated to dissociate himself from his colleague. According to unchallenged statements since made in the *Corriere della Sera*, the British and French Foreign Ministers at the Versailles Conference were taken aback by Baron Sonnino's apparently Austrophil attitude, and reserved for themselves the right to make supplementary declarations on their own account. In any case, the Versailles declarations were tantamount to the abandonment by Italy of the leadership of the movement for the liberation of the subject Austro-Hungarian peoples which the Rome Congress had placed in her hands. By withdrawing her previously advanced position to the level of Mr. Lansing's statement of 'earnest 'sympathy,' Italy, moreover, deliberately threw away her only chance of making a more serious impression upon the *moral* of the Southern Slav troops in the Austro-Hungarian Army before the expected Piave offensive. This withdrawal was immediately exploited by Austro-Hungarian propaganda to the grave detriment of the Allies. Mr. Lansing, however, sought to improve matters on June 28th by the following explicit statement, which was, unfortunately, too late to affect the battle:

'Since the issuance by this Government on May 29 of the statement regarding the nationalistic aspirations for freedom of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugoslavs, German and Austrian officials and sympathizers have sought to misinterpret and distort its manifest interpretation. In order that there may be no misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the statement, the Secretary of State has to-day further announced the position of the United States Government to be that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule.'

This declaration left Italy far in the rear. Mr. Balfour and M. Pichon followed it up early in July by an exchange of telegrams on the occasion of the presentation of colours to the Czecho-Slovak Army in France, when M. Pichon also referred publicly to the creation of a Yugoslav State. From these manifestations Italy held aloof. The subsequent recognition by Great Britain of the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the trustee of the future Czecho-Slovak Government and of the Czecho-Slovak people as an Allied and belligerent nation, marked a further advance in British policy towards Austria-Hungary. Though the Italian Prime Minister and the French Government had previously concluded special military conventions with the Czecho-Slovaks, the British recognition was the first definite bestowal of an Allied *status* upon a Hapsburg race. It was speedily endorsed by the Governments of the United States and Japan.

The attitude of the British Government towards the Yugoslavs may be judged from Mr. Balfour's presence at the Mansion House on July 25th, and by his expression of 'profound sympathy' with the statement of Serbian-Yugoslav war aims read officially by the Serbian Minister. It is, indeed, abundantly clear that the British and French Governments, like that of the United States, are heartily in sympathy with the Yugoslav ideal and that they would welcome the official adoption by Italy of the policy of complete liberation of the subject Hapsburg races. It was upon this point that the vigorous controversy of last August and September in the Italian press really turned. Once again the *Corriere della Sera* spoke with the true voice of Italy and forced the Italian Foreign Office to hear. The upshot of that controversy proved that Italian public opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of a policy inspired by the spirit of Mazzini, and free from the narrow preconceptions that inspired the Convention of April, 1915. On September 7th and 8th the Italian Government made up its mind. In deciding to promote an Allied declaration in favour of the unity and independence of Yugoslavia, as a requirement of a just and lasting peace, it did much to remove the effects of former errors and hesitations.

Nevertheless, the Italo-Yugoslav question will continue to require careful and constant attention. It is the pivot

of the whole peace settlement in South-eastern, if not in Central, Europe. On the basis of the Allied Convention with Italy it would be impossible either to render the position of Italy secure in the Adriatic or to build up a non-German Confederation of free States stretching from the Baltic to the Ægean. Yet some such Confederation is an indispensable condition of any satisfactory resettlement of Europe. The idea underlying the Rome Congress was therefore constructive in the best sense of the term. It was not merely the idea of a destructive 'dismemberment of Austria,' but of the constructive liberation of the subject Hapsburg peoples on the basis of a preliminary understanding between them. At the same time the Italo-Yugoslav Agreement, embodied in the resolution of the Congress, opened for Italy a way of escape from the embarrassing position in which the Convention of 1915 had placed her and the Allies. The Agreement alluded neither to the Convention nor to the Declaration of Corfu. It placed the whole controversy upon a higher level and offered to Italy the leadership in promoting the Central and South-eastern European Confederation with all the advantages, moral and political, present and future, which such leadership would entail. After a period of vacillation her Government shows signs of resuming that leadership. It should now be able to consolidate, outside Austria-Hungary, a counterpart of the alliance which has been formed between Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, and Southern Slavs inside the Hapsburg dominions.

Another and mightier factor than the influence of any single European government is gradually coming into play—the disinterested and intelligent influence of the United States. No recent developments have been more significant than the series of statements and speeches on the essential requirements of peace made by President Wilson, Senator Lodge, and ex-President Roosevelt; and no Allied Government is better informed upon the true bearing of apparently minor but really paramount features of a European settlement than are President Wilson and his advisers. When the moment comes definitely to make known the conditions of peace which the enemy will be required to accept, European diplomatists may well be astonished at the fund of precise information already acquired and digested for President Wilson by Colonel

House and his associates; and European statesmen will do well to conform betimes to the principles which the United States entered the war to uphold. The United States has already made it clear that there are to be 'no more Alsace-Lorraines in Europe.' Though no outline of the necessary peace conditions can yet be regarded as final or exhaustive, the following suggestions may be of use as aids to the crystallization of ideas in quarters where they are still fluid.

(1) That no secret negotiations or exchanges of views take place with Germany or Austria before the 'decisive victory of arms' which, in the words of President Wilson, the United States 'solemnly purpose' to achieve.

(2) That victory by arms having been won, the enemy be required to accept unaltered the Allied conditions of a just peace.

(3) That justice demands the punishment of enemy persons responsible for the war and for ordering or committing acts contrary to the spirit of civilized warfare, and reparation for the victims of those acts, and for the damage done to unoffending communities.

(4) That to Belgium full reparation must be made by Germany, including payment for damage done, and the restoration of complete independence; Belgium to be free to decide the nature of her international status.

(5) That Alsace-Lorraine be restored to France, not as a territorial acquisition but in order to right the wrong done to her in 1871, and that France be fully indemnified for the havoc wrought in her North-eastern Departments.

(6) That the three parts of Poland be unified, with access to the sea and full political and economic independence, the frontiers of the restored Polish State to include all districts preponderatingly Polish in racial character; and that the ravaged parts of Poland be restored by the enemy.

(7) That the people of Schleswig be free to determine their future allegiance.

(8) That Bohemia, Moravia, the Czech districts of Austrian Silesia, and the Slovak counties of north-western Hungary be constituted as an independent Czecho-Slovak State, the German-Bohemians being granted local self-government.

(9) That Serbia-Yugoslavia be united in the form of an independent State embracing, on a footing of complete

religious and political equality, the regions compactly inhabited by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the people of Montenegro being free to determine their own allegiance and future status; and that Serbia be indemnified by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria for havoc wantonly wrought.

(10) That the independence of Rumania be fully restored, the frontiers of the restored kingdom to include all regions ethnographically Rumanian; provision being made for the protection of the Saxon and Magyar (Szekler) groups comprised within them.

(11) That Italian unity be completed by the inclusion within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Italy of the Trentino and all Italian districts in the Carnic Alps, on the Triestine littoral and in Istria, the delimitation of those districts to comprise the cities of Trieste and Pola, and to ensure the possibility of Italian communication by land between Pola, Trieste and the present territory of Italy; the question of the Istrian and Dalmatian islands to be settled by amicable arrangement between Yugoslavia and Italy, or, in default of such arrangement, by the good offices of the Allies, provision being made, on the one hand, for the protection of the linguistic and moral rights of Italian centres that may be included within the borders of Yugoslavia, and, on the other hand, for similar protection to be given to Southern Slav centres that may fall within the frontiers of Italy; Trieste and Fiume to be respectively Italian and Yugoslav free ports.

(12) That the German inhabitants of Austria outside the geographical boundaries of Bohemia be free to determine their own allegiance.

(13) That a just solution of the Balkan question having been prepared by the constitution of approximately ethnographical Serbo-Yugoslav, Rumanian and Greek States, districts unquestionably Bulgarian be assigned to Bulgaria, whose eastern frontier might extend to the line Midia-Rodosto; Constantinople to be a free port, and navigation in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to be free.

(14) That Armenia be united and given at least autonomous government under international supervision; Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine to be held in trust for the League of Associated Nations, provision being made for a national home for the Jewish race in Palestine, and Arabia to be autonomous under an Arab Khalifate.

(15) That after the evacuation by the enemy of the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Poland, the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia be free to determine their own form of government and allegiance.

(16) That the former German colonies in Africa be retained by the Allies and held in trust and administered for the welfare of the inhabitants by specified States under the authority of the League of Associated Nations.

(17) That there be freedom of fluvial navigation on all the great international waterways of Europe, dues being levied by international commissions; and that the tariffs of all railways serving free ports be internationally established and regulated.

(18) That during the period of reconstruction after the war the control of food supplies, raw materials and merchant shipping be vested in the Inter-Allied organizations which have been constituted for that purpose during the war, the allotment of raw materials and foodstuffs to enemy countries being regulated in accordance with their just requirements after they have subscribed to the conditions of peace and given pledges of their effective fulfilment.

(19) That the States now associated in the struggle against German militarism as a fighting League of Associated Nations shall as the custodians of ordered democratic civilization permanently guarantee the world's peace and shall admit to the privileges of their association peoples now enemy or neutral when such peoples shall have qualified for admission

A peace framed on some such lines as these would contain the essential elements of stability and of international justice. Any peace that should fail to embody these or similar requirements would fall short of what is needed to safeguard the ordered development of the world.

HENRY WICKHAM STEED.

NAPOLEON I. AND CAPORETTO

1. **Correspondance de Napoléon 1er.** Thirty-eight Vols. Paris: Imprimerie Impériale. 1858-1869.
2. **Mémoires et Correspondance de Prince Eugène.** Par A. Du Casse. Ten Vols. Paris: Michel Lévy. 1858-1860.
3. **Erzherzog Johann im Feldzuge, 1809.** Hans von Zwiedeneck-Sudenhorst. Graz. 1892.

THOUGH the Austro-Italian campaign of 1809 was merely an episode in the larger Napoleonic campaign which ended in the capture of Vienna and the battle of Wagram, it possesses a certain interest at the present time, for the field of operations covered by the troops of the Archduke Johann and of Eugène Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, has recently been, and still is, the battle-ground of the Austro-Italian section in the united allied front.

The conditions of warfare have undoubtedly undergone profound changes between 1809 and 1915. The development of long-range artillery, the destructive power of high-explosives, and, above all, the invention of air-craft, have modified the whole course of a campaign, and attenuated the value of any comparison between the tactical features of the earlier and the later operations. But the geographical aspects of the region remain unchanged, and give rise to identical problems of strategy; while Napoleon, in his comments on those problems, and in his orders issued in regard to them, reviews the relative importance of the Isonzo, Tagliamento, Livenza, Piave, Adige, and Mincio lines, brings out the bearings of those mountain-knots, the Grappa, the Asiago Plateau, and Montebaldo, lying between and dominating the river valleys which give access to the Venetian plain, illustrates the fatal significance of the Trentino wedge, planted like a dagger between the shoulder-blades of Italy, and considers the steps necessary for the defence of Venice, threatened, then as now, from the east and the north.

A glance at the map of Northern Italy will quickly reveal the two essential features of that unjust and untenable frontier

which was imposed upon the Italians in 1866. That frontier was, roughly speaking, the same in 1809. To the east lies the deep gorge of the Isonzo, running from the Predil pass, by Plezzo, Caporetto, Canale, and the ravine of Salcano under Monte Gabriele, to Gorizia. Both sides and crests of this great gully were in Austrian hands in 1809 as in 1915; the Italian frontier lay to the west of it, and could not command it; it therefore formed a perfect assembly-trench in which vast numbers of men, guns, and munitions could be concentrated *via* Villach, Tarvis, and the Predil pass from the north, and from the south and west *via* Laibach, Präwald, and Gorizia, menacing the whole eastern frontier of Friuli and the Venetian plain. One point of highest importance in this assembly-trench of the Isonzo ravine lies at Caporetto, about half-way between Predil and Gorizia, because from Caporetto there is a line of exit to the south-west over a pass which leads to the head-waters of the Natizone and down the Natizone valley to the plain at Cividale, whence Udine and all Friuli can be threatened. Caporetto proved of supreme importance in the campaigns of 1809 and 1915. Napoleon had already grasped the strategic value of Caporetto in his campaign of 1796, and, when calling Eugène's attention to it in 1809, he remarks, 'You should 'carefully survey the position at Caporetto where I built 'a small fort which gave me important advantages against 'the enemy in the course of my earlier campaign.' The disaster to Italian arms at Caporetto in October last confirms this view.

The other essential feature of the Italian Alpine frontier, then as now, is the Trentino salient, thrust through the very centre of the Italian Alpine defences, and therefore menacing Italy due south by the valley of the Adige, which debouches at Verona; west, by the valleys of the Chiese and the Oglio, which point towards Brescia and Milan; east, from Rovereto, by the Val Arsa and the Val dei Signori, threatening Schio and Vicenza, or from Trent itself by the Val Sugana, the valley of the Brenta, which would lead to Bassano and Venice. Between these two eastern approaches lie the mountain groups of the Pasubio, Monte Majo, and Cimone, and, further east, the plateau of Asiago, the keys to one and the other. By this standing menace in the rear all operations

on the eastern frontier are necessarily hampered and controlled, as Cadorna found in the spring of 1916, when the Austrians captured the table-land of Asiago, thrust at Schio and Vicenza, and compelled him, for the time, to break off his operations towards Trieste, and to transfer large forces to the western front. Of these three outlets from the Trentino into the plain, the southern, the western and the eastern, the most difficult for hostile troops is the central or southernmost exit at the apex of the triangle. The road which descends the valleys of the Adige from Ala to Verona is barred at Rivoli by a narrow gorge, easily rendered impassable by forces holding the heights of La Corona, which again are dominated by Montebaldo. Both the other exits, the western and the eastern, are more dangerous for the defence of the Lombardo-Venetian plains. Which line the enemy might choose would naturally depend upon his objective, whether Milan or Venice. It is generally believed that, in the present campaign, the Austrian commander-in-chief, Conrad von Hötzendorf, favoured a western attack; but the initial operations had already been launched by the Italians along the Isonzo front, implying a threat to the Carso and Trieste; and although a menace to Milan might have offered superior political results, any movement westward would have been in a direction away from the main theatre of war. Moreover, such a move must inevitably leave the right, or western, wing of the attack detached from the left wing by that highly important district, the broken, hilly region south of Lake Garda, a complex system of hillocks and valleys, the debris of the frontal moraine thrust forward by that great glacier which no doubt, at one time, delved out the fiord-like bed of Benaeus and debouched upon the plain between Desenzano and Peschiera. The strategical importance of this hilly country is clearly indicated by the number of battle-names with which it is studded—Solferino, Lonato, S. Martino, Custozza, Monzambano, Goito, Curtatone, Valeggio. It is a continuation of that natural barrier, the Lake of Garda, which divides the northern plain of Italy into two sections, and the powerful defence positions it affords compel an enemy either to force them or to attempt to turn them by descending into the marshlands and risking entanglements between the Mincio, the Oglio, the Adda, and the

Po. And this brings us to the last of the three points of debouchement from the Trentino—the double eastern exit, either along the Val Sugana, emerging at Bassano, or by the Val Arsa, threatening Vicenza. In 1809, as in 1915, the temptation of Friuli and Cadore, the position of Venice as a naval base commanding the upper Adriatic, and the greater proximity to Austrian sources of supply, determined the concentration of war in the eastern section of the Italian plain, and accentuated the importance of the eastern exits from the Trentino. It was from this quarter that the chief danger arose.

As in 1809 so in 1915, the enemy aimed at the conquest of Friuli, Cadore, the Venetian plain, and Venice itself. For the defence of Venice and the plain against an attack from the Isonzo, or eastern front, there are the river-lines of the Tagliamento, the Livenza, the Piave, the Brenta, the Adige, and the Mincio, all running, generally speaking, from north to south with a decided easterly trend after they reach the plain; all of them issuing in rapid streams from their 'high 'mountain cradles' in the Alps, and gradually losing speed and force in their passage to the sea.

There is a considerable difference, however, in the character of these rivers. The Tagliamento, though presenting by far the widest bed, is in reality a torrent rather than a river; in flood its broad *ghiarra* is quite impassable; but its floods subside as quickly as they rise and the river is easily fordable at many places. Napoleon expressed his views on this line of defence in a dispatch addressed to Beauharnais on May 31, 1808, in preparation for the coming campaign in Italy. 'The Tagliamento,' he says, 'is not such a good line as the 'Piave. Though the Piave is fordable at several points 'it is, nevertheless, a large river, compared with the Tagliamento, which constantly runs dry. Besides, the line of 'the Tagliamento is too far from Venice and would expose 'you to the danger of being cut off from that city by the 'threat from the Trentino *via* the Val Sugana; finally, the 'line of the Tagliamento from Osopo to the sea is too 'long.'

The Livenza, called Liquentia by the Latins from its lovely, impid, tourmaline-green waters, is a stream of a very different nature. It is a river, not a torrent, and rises, a full-grown

flood, at the foot of the limestone crags at Polcenigo, near Sacile. But though deep it is not broad, and could never serve as more than a retarding line. Napoleon so indicates it when blaming Beauharnais for his retreat beyond the Piave. 'The Piave was a line,' he declares, 'quite sufficiently 'good to justify you in attempting to hold it. The Austrians 'are so little used to this kind of warfare that they are sur- 'prised you did not attempt to stand on the Livenza, which 'was a good rallying line for you, and they are simply amazed 'that you abandoned the Piave.'

But at best the Livenza was only a retarding line in case of retreat. For the defence of Venice the Piave is the true line. Napoleon recognized it as such and General Diaz has adopted it in the present war. As early as May, 1808, that is a year before the Napoleonic campaign began, the Emperor had called for a detailed survey of the whole line from Feltre to the sea, to be executed under the personal supervision of Beauharnais himself. 'We must,' says the dispatch, 'select a line which we intend to hold; and that 'line must cover Treviso; for if we are obliged to retire 'beyond Treviso we uncover Venice and weaken our army 'by detaching the 20,000 men required to garrison it. 'What, then, is the line we should choose? I desire you 'to study the line of the Piave, and to make plans of the 'whole of it, from the mountains to the sea. It ends, I believe, 'in marshes, where an army could not manœuvre, and 'it begins among inaccessible heights. The part we should 'have to defend is not long nor difficult. Three or four bridge- 'heads with redoubts should be sufficient.' Napoleon shows his marvellous memory and his grasp on essential features by observing: 'I think I recollect that when I crossed the 'river in 1796, near Asolo, I noticed that the right bank 'commands the left.' He points out that the Bosco di Montello, recently held by the British in the present campaign, dominates the Piave from the Ponte Vidor, near Valdobbiadene, down to the Ponte della Priula, the bridge on the main road to Conegliano. He notes the sinuosities of the river, among which the bend at Zenzon played so important a part in the recent Austrian attack, and he sums up the situation in words which have proved strictly applicable to the present operations:

'In order that the Piave may serve as a barrier you must create three small positions, one where the river issues from the mountains (Ponte Vidor), another on the main road to Conegliano (Ponte della Priula), and a third further down, leaving only the marshes between it and the sea (Ponte del Piave, on the road to Oderzo).' 'I believe' (he continues) 'that the river has no fords below Asolo, or if there are any they can easily be destroyed. The line of the Piave has this advantage, that the country between the Isonzo and it is of little value; if the enemy does occupy it that will not matter, while to stand on the Piave is to protect Treviso and Venice. But the question requires study before we decide. If it were not for the sake of Venice we should not choose the line of the Piave, "qui me parait si ingrate," for the defence of the whole of the northern plain; it is too far from Mantua and Peschiera, "ou se trouve le centre de la défense d'Italie," but one must have lost a battle before one could bring oneself to abandon the great arsenal and city of Venice. If we are forced to surrender the line of the Piave, we must fall back on the Adige, which, in itself, is a better line than the Piave, were it not that retreat to it implies the probable loss of Venice. The line of the Adige is already fully organized; it only requires some works at Ronco or Arcole. If the Adige has to be given up we must retire on the Mincio line, with strong positions at Valeggio and before Goito, its left resting on Peschiera and its right in the swamps. It has the advantage of being very short, and it covers Mantua.'

Neither Eugène in 1809 nor General Diaz in the present campaign was called upon to defend either the Adige or the Mincio, and a further consideration of these lines need not detain us now.

The defence of the city of Venice itself, in the event of the Piave line being forced, occupied the mind of Napoleon, as it does of the Italian high-command to-day. Long-range artillery and air-craft have completely altered the problem, and have, to a large extent, nullified the value of the natural defences—the lagoons and the marshlands at the mouth of the Piave—which have for centuries rendered Venice safe from assault, leaving reduction by siege the sole method of capture. Venice, until the great Italian victory on the Piave, was within easy range of siege-artillery planted on the eastern bank of the river, though the breach of the dykes and the flooding of the lower reaches no doubt render gun-emplacement a troublesome business, while recent experience has shown that the city was exposed to attacks from the air by machines which could renew their supply

of bombs every twenty minutes or half-hour; so that if the Piave line were forced the surrender of Venice must almost inevitably follow. But in Napoleon's day it would have been possible—and, indeed, he contemplated it—to retire on the Adige or the Mincio, leaving a garrison in Venice which would always be a menace to the enemy's flank in case he were compelled to retire again from either of those lines. For the protection of the city itself Napoleon proposed to restore and arm the great fort at Malghera, near Mestre, just where the railway bridge now begins to cross the lagoon. Malghera served as the bulwark of Venice during the Austrian siege of 1848-49, and we shall presently see that it saved the city in the campaign of 1809. The north-eastern, or Torcello, end of the lagoon is so swampy and the channels so intricate that in 1809 a few isolated batteries were sufficient to protect Venice from attack in that quarter; while to the south-west, the Chioggia side, the fort of Brondolo, on the mainland near the mouth of the Brenta artificial canal, would serve, as it did in the days of the Genoese attack in 1380, to guard the lagoon. Napoleon ordered the construction of batteries on the many lagoon mudbanks and islands that command the channels leading to the city; he instructed Beauharnais to assemble a fleet of armed barges and rafts for the further protection of the approaches; and he contemplated, partly as a defence for the south-western border of the lagoon, partly as an element in the line of the lower Adige, the flooding of all the land between Monselice, on the southern spur of the Euganean hills, and the sea, in order to keep a back-door open to Venice by way of Chioggia, Brondolo, and Rovigo, thus rendering nugatory the blockade unless the enemy forced the Adige and closed the entry. But the execution of these designs was slow, and Napoleon impatient. 'Tout 'dort,' he writes, 'en Italie.' 'Here I never go to bed without 'calling for a report on the progress of my works, and they 'are huge.' 'Though France is splendidly organized still 'nothing will go on by itself; so what can you expect in 'Italy? What the devil are you doing? Never go to bed 'without seeing for yourself what has been done? I shall 'come to Italy in October or November, and I shall find every-'thing just where I left it.' As a matter of fact, time was too short for the execution of all Napoleon's elaborate plans.

In the spring of 1809 Beauharnais frequently informed the Emperor that the enemy was massing about Tarvis and Villach, and in the Isonzo valley, indicating a double threat, one down the gorge of the Fella and the valley of the Tagliamento by way of Pontebba, Venzone, and Osopo, menacing Friuli and its capital Udine, and also an eastern threat on the same point from the assembly-trench of the Isonzo. The Viceroy's spies were sending in alarming reports, but the Emperor could not bring himself to believe that Austria meant to attack after the lesson of Austerlitz. He found a literary phrase which pleased him, and he used it again and again when writing to the various Courts of Europe to express his doubts as to the reality of Austria's menace. 'Is Austria mad?' he asks, 'or are the waters of 'the Danube the waters of Lethe?' He wrote to Beauharnais from Valladolid, in January, 1809, questioning the seriousness of the reported concentration. 'They seem 'to have assumed a fallacious confidence. They think I 'am fully engaged in distant lands; but they'll find the 'hole they are in when they hear I am in Paris, and that my 'armies are clearing out of Spain.' Napoleon always represented, and perhaps believed, that the English were defeated in Spain, and the outbreak of war with Austria, which he wished to avoid, compelling him, as it did, to turn his attention east, was one of the main factors in the ultimate success of British arms in the Peninsula. Napoleon's instructions to Beauharnais were to keep a watchful eye on Austrian movements, but to avoid any action which might precipitate war. He was to furnish the strong places of Osopo and Palmanova, but not to concentrate his forces in Friuli, merely to hold them echelonned between the Adige and the Tagliamento. These orders were largely responsible for the initial successes of the Austrian attack when war was declared on April 10th.

'The army of inner Austria,' which was now about to attack Italy under the command of the Archduke Johann, numbered some 100,000 men in all, and 148 guns. The Archduke himself, with General Zach as head of his staff, personally led the 8th and 9th Corps of about 45,000 men, and an advance guard of 18,000 men under Gavasini. Chasteler with 20,000 men was sent into Tyrol to raise the population

and menace the French rear from the Trentino. The objects of the army were to attack Eugène, drive him out of Friuli, capture Venice, and force the Viceroy to retire behind the Adige, where he would be exposed to assault from the north if Chasteler were successful in Tyrol. To meet this attack the army of Italy, commanded by Beauharnais, with General Charpentier as chief-of-staff, could oppose forces numbering about 70,000 men; while Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, in command of 20,000 men, threatened the Austrian flank from Dalmatia. On the whole, the forces were fairly equal; but Napoleon's dispositions and retarding orders rendered the strategical position unfortunate for Eugène.

When the storm seemed on the point of bursting, Napoleon instructed Beauharnais to move his head-quarters to Strà, the great Villa of the Pisani family on the banks of the Brenta, between Padua and Venice, whence he could direct the concentration of his troops in Friuli and superintend the defence works at Malghera and Brondolo. But events moved too rapidly, and Beauharnais found himself compelled to start at once on a general tour of inspection, first into Tyrol to reconnoitre the positions at Lavis on the Adige, and then into Friuli, *via* Mestre, to fix his head-quarters at Udine and prepare to stem the flood. In one of his charming letters to his wife he writes from Mestre at midnight on April 8th: 'I have been working up to this very moment. Tous ces 'Messieurs ronflent sur des chaises dans la salle voisine. Je 'serais demain soir à Udine.' At Udine, Beauharnais found instructions from Napoleon ordering him to send Broussier's Division forward to Pontebba with Grenier in support at Venzone, while Lamarque and Barbou were to be held in reserve at Osopo and Udine; thanks, however, to Napoleon's own dispositions, Grenier, Barbou, and Lamarque were miles away from Friuli. The Emperor clearly expected the attack to be delivered from Tarvis down the gorge of the Fella and the Tagliamento valley. But on the morning of the 10th April the enemy opened operations by a feint in force from Tarvis. The French outposts were forced to fall back upon Broussier's division, and Broussier, in his turn, was driven back, fighting brilliantly, at Ospedaletto near Venzone. The main attack, however, was delivered on the following day,

the 11th, by the forces under the Archduke, operating from the Isonzo valley, not down the Fella. In the teeth of a violent snow-storm they broke through at Caporetto, at the very place where the Austrians forced the Italian lines in October last, and with the same disastrous results, for by the evening of the 11th Johann, descending the valley of the Natisone, reached Cividale and menaced Eugène's line of retreat from Udine.

Meantime the Archduke had detached two columns to advance on Gorizia, one by the Isonzo from Caporetto to Salcano, the other by the longer route, from Laibach via Präwald behind Trieste. Eugène, who had expected an attack down the Tagliamento Valley from the direction of Venzone, was surprised by this incursion on his flank from Caporetto and Cividale, and found himself in an impossible position. The French reserves were far in the rear beyond the Tagliamento, and Broussier, falling back on Udine, was threatened by the Austrians from Cividale. Beauharnais was obliged to evacuate Udine and to retire behind the Tagliamento, instructing Broussier to deflect his retreat, to cross the Tagliamento at Dignano, where the river, if deeper, is narrower, and to join him at Pordenone. By the 13th the columns from Gorizia and Präwald had effected a junction with the Archduke in Udine, and on the 15th Johann, pressing forward, crossed the Tagliamento, and in a rearguard action at Pordenone, attacked and drove in Eugène, who was retiring between the Tagliamento and the Piave. The Viceroy had been obliged to abandon the line of the Tagliamento almost without a struggle, partly because his reserves were still a long way in the rear, partly because, as he explains to Napoleon, 'it was not 'safe to stand at Valvasone and dispute the passage, as I 'had the Cellina torrent behind me and it might come down 'at any moment,' for it had been pouring on the plain and snowing on the mountains all those days. 'My position,' he says, 'was a bad one. I was three marches from Grenier's 'division, and my other divisions three marches from each 'other; and I had to manœuvre for concentration.' Eugène was compelled to retire behind the Livenza, though his chances of holding that line were small. The Archduke, with his whole army, was in close pursuit, and on the 16th, at Fontana-

fredda, just outside Sacile, Beauharnais was forced to stand and give battle, having now been joined by Broussier from Dignano, and by Barbou and Severolli, who had hurried up from the west, though Lamarque and Pully with the cavalry were still wanting. The battle raged all day round the position of Porcia; most of the fighting, then as now, took place in the foot-hills, not on the plain. By five o'clock in the evening the issue was decided in favour of the Austrians. Eugène was obliged to order a retreat behind the Piave. He lost 5,000 men in killed and wounded, 6,000 prisoners, 15 guns, and 3 eagles. But the battle had been fiercely contested; the Austrians were too tired to pursue, and, moreover, the whole plain was a morass owing to the flooding of innumerable small streams and watercourses; it was impossible to bring up the guns. The Archduke resolved to rest for three days in Conegliano. He took the occasion to issue proclamations to the Italian people. 'Reason must tell you that you are merely the slaves 'of France. Le royaume d'Italie n'est qu'un songe, un 'vain nom.'

Eugène was allowed to cross the Piave at Lovadina and Nervesa undisturbed, and having secured the passage of his shattered troops, the bridges were destroyed. He seems to have made up his mind at once to retire on the Adige without attempting to hold the line of the Piave. His troops were still disordered by the fight, his reserves, especially the cavalry, had not yet joined him; Macdonald was hastening to his aid, and he desired the advice of the more experienced commander before he again challenged the issue of an encounter; above all, news of Chasteler's menace from Tyrol and the Trentino, then as now and always so decisive a factor in the strategy of any campaign in North Italy, determined him reluctantly to continue his retreat, after throwing a garrison of 8,000 men into Venice, and providing for the fort at Malghera.

'From the banks of the Piave' Eugène dates his report to Napoleon on April 17th, the day after his defeat. He tells the Emperor he was forced to engage because the Archduke was pressing him closely; because he was unwilling to surrender without a stroke two fair provinces, Friuli and Cadore, the scene of Napoleon's glorious exploits in 1796;

and, thirdly, because Chasteler was threatening his rear from the Trentino. On the 13th April the Austrian forces were reported at Brixen moving down the valleys of the Eisach and the Adige. 'I gave battle yesterday,' he says, 'and I regret to say I lost it. The action began at 9 a.m. 'and continued till 3 p.m. In the end, superiority in cavalry 'and guns turned the day. To-morrow I retire on the Adige.' To his wife he repeats the governing reason for his abandonment of the Piave line: 'Chasteler's menace from the 'Trentino compels me to retire on the Adige.' Eugène's couriers were slow to reach Napoleon, perhaps because he himself was rapidly moving from Paris by Strasburg and Stuttgart to put himself at the head of the grand army attacking Austria. On the 25th April the Emperor writes from Ratisbon, 'I must have missed many of your letters. 'I see you have retired from the Piave. It is a pity you gave 'battle without your cavalry. I wait details. You are wrong 'to be alarmed at enemy forces in Tyrol; and if you weakened 'yourself to cover Verona it was a mistake. I cannot instruct 'you, being still in ignorance of the exact situation, but you 'must hold the Adige. I trust my operations here will 'soon call off the Austrians to protect Vienna.' Next day Duroc, by the Emperor's orders, writes to say that His Majesty's knowledge of Italy is so intimate that he could advise if only he knew the position of affairs; and on the same date Napoleon himself addresses Eugène thus:

'You tell me nothing; how the battle went; number of men and guns I have lost; how it all came about. This conduct is strange. Instead of sending me officer on officer, you merely send me the miserable couriers who know nothing, and can tell me nothing. You fix your attention on Tyrol; you have absolutely nothing to fear from that quarter. The battle must have been terrible indeed if it forced you to abandon the line of the Piave. I cannot pass a sure judgment as I do not know the precise situation of my army; but to allow the enemy to blockade Venice without very strong reasons and merely out of ridiculous fear of Tyrol, is a mad proceeding. The very first thing to be done is to send me minute and accurate details, and then to send me an officer every day to keep me posted. If you fear an attack from the Trentino occupy the positions I held during my Italian campaign; any drummer-boy in your army can tell you which they were. I held Montebaldo, La Corona, Rivoli, and the Adige. The enemy was master of Innsbruck, of Bavaria, of Tyrol, and

it was precisely by preventing a junction between his troops in Tyrol and his troops in Friuli that I defeated him. I see you have not mastered the history of that campaign, for you say that if the enemy attacks from Tyrol it will be necessary to give up the plain of Verona. He cannot debouch from Tyrol if you hold the heights of Rivoli, he cannot force the position at Rivoli if you hold La Corona, he cannot storm La Corona if you hold Montebaldo. I am at a loss to understand how my troops came to be beaten by these *canaille* of Austrians; there are three hundred thousand of them before me now, and I always thrash them, though they are seven to one; and my Italian army is superior to this one in quality. If you are master of Bassano the enemy would never dare to push south of Trent down the Adige, for you could always cut him off by the valley of the Brenta. If I knew the exact state of the case I could take action; but I think it monstrous that the battle should have been fought on the 16th, and here I am on the 26th without a notion of what has really occurred. This upsets all my plans of campaign here. For God's sake instruct me as to the course of events, and let me know the state of my affairs in Italy.'

On the 30th the Emperor writes again from Bürghausen:

'I have your letter of the 22nd by post. I am grieved to see that you have abandoned the Piave. You are surprised that the enemy did not press forward to that line; I should have been surprised if he had, instead of contenting himself with the conquest, in a single day, of all the country between the Isonzo and the Piave. If, instead of destroying the bridge over the river, you had organized the bridge-head and shown an intention to dispute the passage, the enemy would never have forced the line, Venice would not have been blockaded, and all the territory between the Piave and the Adige given over to pillage. But supposing that, contrary to all expectation, the enemy had attempted to force the river and you found yourself unable to oppose him, what hindered you from retiring slowly? You had twenty-four hours at your disposal. I am grieved to see that you have neither the aptitude nor the genius for war. In war one sees one's own difficulties but not the enemy's. One must have confidence. War is a serious game in which it is easy to compromise one's own reputation and one's country's safety at the same time. A wise man will ask himself whether he is suited for this business or not. I made a mistake in giving you the command of the army. I should have sent you Masséna and given you the cavalry under him. If things become serious you must send for the King of Naples (Murat) to join you, leaving the government to the Queen. You will hand over the command to him and put yourself under his orders.'

Then the Emperor softens a little.

'It is only natural that you should have less experience of war than a man who has conducted it for sixteen years. I am not angry with you for the faults you have committed, but only because you have not written to me and given me the chance of advising you, and at the same time enabling me to arrange my plans here.'

Beauharnais continued his retreat on the Adige, virtually undisturbed, between April 18th and 26th. Johann followed, after his pause at Conegliano. He crossed the Piave on the 22nd, took Treviso, Castelfranco, and Cittadella on the 23rd and 24th, and detached Hungarian troops to reduce Malghera and capture Venice. The works at Malghera were far from complete, and the Hungarians attacked in force on the 23rd, but were repulsed by Barbou with heavy losses—600 dead; the natural defences of Venice, the lagoons, the mud-banks, the intricate canals, once more proved the salvation of the city, till the blockade was raised on May 15th, when Eugène swept eastward again, driving the Austrians before him.

After crossing the Brenta and passing Vicenza and Montebello, which commands the gap between the Monti Berici and the Alpine foothills, near the ancient castles of the Montagues and Capulets, the Archduke was able to catch up the division of Sèras, which was acting as rearguard to Beauharnais. On the 27th, however, the Viceroy was reinforced by Macdonald with 45,000 foot and 9,000 horse. He determined to stand at Caldiero and give battle for Verona and the passage of the Adige between Zevio and Arcole. On the 29th a lively but indecisive action was fought again in the foothills, round the positions of Bastia and Illasi. Writing to his wife the Viceroy describes the engagement as 'not 'a battle but a brilliant affair of advanced-posts,' and adds that the Italians chosen for the attack took, at the point of the bayonet, all they were ordered to take—'ils se sont 'réellement couverts de gloire.'

But Napoleon's expectation that the course of his own operations in Austria would soon call off the enemy for the defence of Vienna was about to be fulfilled. The Emperor had taken Ratisbon and won the victory of Eckmühl. He was in full march on the Austrian capital. Lefebvre, Duke of

Danzig, was engaging Chasteler in Tyrol and relieving the menace to the Italian army from the Trentino. Chasteler was finally crushed at Kufstein on the 13th of May. In these circumstances the Archduke had no alternative but to break off the Italian campaign and retire to Austria. If he chose any other course Napoleon would probably isolate him in Italy, while Marmont threatened his rear from Dalmatia. Venice could, now, be reduced only by siege; he would still have to fight for Verona and the left bank of the Adige against Eugène, reinforced by Macdonald. With Chasteler fully engaged in Tyrol, Baraguay d'Hilliers, commanding the French forces detailed for the protection of Verona from the north, might attack his right rear from the Trentino, issuing at Bassano from the Val Sugana. Once again the Trentino menace proved decisive in the strategy of the campaign, and the Archduke began his retreat on May 1st.

Eugène lost not a moment in following. On May 2nd he reports a successful rear-guard action at the Montebello gap, and tells the Vicereine that he hopes to overtake the enemy on the Piave. 'The Emperor is not too angry with 'me,' he adds by way of postcript. The blockade of Venice was raised by May 5th, and the garrison, joining the relieving forces, seriously threatened the retiring enemy on his left flank, while the troops from the Trentino menaced his right from Primolano above Bassano. Johann received no respite and was thrown across the Piave at Vidor and Nervesa on the night of the 6th. He destroyed the bridges, and, as the river was in flood and rising rapidly, Eugène had little time at his disposal if he wished to catch up the enemy and force him to engage. The cavalry of Sahuc and Pully were hurried across the Piave at Lovadina and Cima d'Olmo, followed by the artillery and as many of the infantry as could be carried over, but owing to the rising flood the passage had to cease in the afternoon, and the battle of the Piave, which was a complete victory for Eugène, was won with half his army still on the right, or western, bank of the river. The enemy lost 10,000 men, 15 guns, and 30 caissons. Eugène pressed his success. The enemy was pursued across the Tagliamento, swept off the heights of S. Daniele, and the main body, under Johann, was shepherded up the Tagliamento valley past Osopo and Venzone towards the gorge of the Fella and

Pontebba. Another detachment pursued by Macdonald retired by Gorizia to cover Trieste; while still another took the line of Cividale and the Natisone valley to Caporetto, whence they had started. Their instructions were to push up to the head of the Isonzo gorge and hold the pass of Predil, protecting Tarvis and the road to Villach, and covering Johann's main retreat from Pontebba. Sèras was sent in pursuit of these.

In the wild gorge of the Fella, where the track is carried along the side of the torrent on ledges artificially cut in the rock, and crosses it many times, the Austrians so effectually destroyed road and bridges that Eugène was obliged to delay his pursuit, to recall his guns to Udine and send them by Cividale, the Natisone, and Caporetto to join Sèras in forcing the Predil pass, and attacking the retreating Austrians at Malborghetto and Tarvis. The Predil pass, strongly fortified and very bravely held, withstood Sèras for several days. With a view to turning the position detachments were sent up the Roccolana and Dogna side valleys from the main Tagliamento-Fella Valley. The operations proved difficult. The by-paths in those high regions were still blocked with snow; but at length concentration on Predil was effected. After twice rejecting honourable terms of capitulation the garrison in the fort was attacked. They resisted with admirable courage till their wooden block-houses and stockades took fire, their magazines blew up, and the heroic defenders perished to a man.

The fall of the Predil pass and the capture of Malborghetto made Eugène master of the road to Villach, and opened the way to his junction with the Emperor. From Ebersdorf Napoleon issued the following Proclamation to the army of Italy:

'Soldiers of the army of Italy, you have gloriously achieved the task I set you. You have effected, on the Semmering, your junction with the grand army. I am content with you. You had to retire on the Adige, but when, on the memorable field of Arcole, the order came to advance, you swore by the spirit of your heroes to triumph. You kept your word in the battle of the Piave, in the actions at S. Daniele, Tarvis, and Gorizia. You took by assault the forts of Malborghetto and Predil. . . . The Austrian army of Italy, that for a moment dared to defile my provinces by its presence, which pretended to break my Iron Crown, has

only served to prove the truth of my device, " Dio la mi diede ; guai a chi la tocca " (God gave it me, and woe to him who touches it).'

In the thirteenth bulletin to the army of Germany the Emperor paid a handsome tribute to his adopted son: ' Le ' Viceroy a montré dans toute cette campagne un sang-froid ' et un coup-d'oeil qui présagent un grand capitaine.' He had forgiven the battle of Sacile ; and in his latter days at S. Helena he declared, ' Eugène ne m'a jamais causé aucun ' chagrin.'

Italy was once more free of the Austrians. The Italo-Austrian episode was closed. Eugène and the Archduke pass away to become absorbed in the wider operations which ended at Wagram. The extreme rapidity with which the whole Italian campaign, the Austrian attack, and the Franco-Italian counter developed between the 10th of April and the 18th of May, the extent of ground covered in this short space of time, from the Drave to the Adige, the loss and recovery of three large provinces—Friuli, Cadore, and the Veneto—the menace to Venice itself, render this brief episode of the Napoleonic wars of considerable interest—an interest which is heightened for us now by the fact that it covered the same ground as the present defence of Italy. Twice has Austria invaded Italy from Caporetto, once has she been expelled ; a second exit by the same door may not, perhaps, be long deferred.

Horatio F. Brown.

SPANISH TRADE WITH THE INDIES

1. **Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs.** By CLARENCE HENRY HARING. Harvard University Press. 1918.
2. **The Spanish Dependencies in South America.** By BERNARD MOSES. Smith, Elder. 1914.
3. **The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and in the New.** By ROGER BIGELOW MERRIMAN. New York: Macmillan Company. 1918.
4. **The Alcalde Entregador of the Mesta.** By JULIUS KLEIN. *Bulletin Hispanique*, Vol. XVII. 1915.

IT is a rare pleasure to meet with a piece of historical work which is at once so well worth doing and so well done as Mr. Haring's 'Trade and Navigation between Spain 'and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs.' Before coming to the author's treatment of his subject we must pause for a moment to present our thanks to the American University which has made it possible for him to bring his work to fruition. Such a book as his dealing with the inception, the development, and the disastrous end of a commercial policy pursued through centuries, would but too probably have been rejected as manifestly unprofitable if it had been offered in the beaten way of a publisher's adventure. We have Mr. Haring's exhaustive study because it has been included in Vol. XIX. in the series of 'Harvard 'Economic Studies.' When, at no distant date we hope, Mr. Klein's doctoral dissertation on the history of the great Spanish corporation of cattle owners named the 'Mesta' is also published with aid from Harvard or from some American rival of Harvard, they will together form a most valuable body of fact and doctrine. The fragment already printed by the *Bulletin Hispanique* for 1915 (Vol. XVII.), though it deals only with the office of the 'Alcalde Entregador of 'the Mesta,' is by no means to be neglected. A certain harmony of spirit runs through the whole story of Spain's long struggle to regulate industry and trade. Nor is the matter merely part of the puzzling 'Cosas de España.'

To-day when, as we are assured fluently, *laissez faire* and *laissez passer* are old-fashioned follies which have not even the dignity of antiquity, there is real instruction to be found in the study of Spain's pertinacious 'regulation.' There we can see the virtuous opposite of *laissez faire* in all its beauty.

The poisonous thing was not unknown before Mr. Haring made it the subject of this careful study. Our ancestors had good cause for making themselves acquainted with the trade of the Spanish West Indies. In Queen Anne's time Captain Stevens, the most indefatigable of translators, was employed to make his abridgment of the standard authority, 'La Norte de la Contratación' of Don Josef Veitia Linage. He called it the 'Spanish Law of Trade to the West Indies,' which must be understood to mean all the possessions of Spain in America. And there were many others who told the world the indispensable facts. The Spanish dominion in America was always an object of curiosity as well as of desire to other nations. But writers of books have been mainly concerned with the conquests, the wars, the government of Spanish America. The trade has been a subordinate part of the whole for them. It is Mr. Haring's subject and he keeps it to the front, touching on the rest only when some notice of things political or administrative has been indispensable. He begins at the beginning:

'As the first voyage of Columbus was mostly at the expense of the Castilian Queen, all potential profits were expressly reserved to the Crown, save one-tenth of the net proceeds, which went to the discoverer. Columbus, however, was allowed in addition to contribute one-eighth of the cost of the cargo, and receive one-eighth of the returns of the venture. A similar provision was made for the second voyage in 1493. In the instructions issued by Ferdinand and Isabella to the admiral in May of that year, private individuals of any degree or condition were expressly prohibited from carrying merchandise on that or any other fleet for purposes of trade. All persons and goods accompanying the expedition had to be registered before an agent of the royal exchequer; and on arrival at the Indies be presented a second time for comparison with the original register. Anything found over and above what was declared in Castile was confiscated to the Crown. It was also provided that a custom-house (casa de aduana) be immediately created for the receipt of royal merchandise, and that every commercial transaction take place before the treasurer, comptroller, and a representative of the admiral, or deputies, to be entered in a book set apart for such business.

'Thus, in the very first regulations laid down for the guidance of Columbus and his companions, we find the germs of the most characteristic features of the Spanish commercial system as it evolved in the succeeding century. There is the control exercised by a treasurer, comptroller, and royal factor, and there is the minute provision for the registration of every sailor, officer, and passenger, every piece of ordnance, every package of munition, merchandise, or provisions carried to and from the New World.'

For eight years a reasonable freedom was indeed allowed to the merchant adventurer. When private enterprise had begun to establish a thriving trade the paternal care of the sovereign was roused to activity. Lest private persons going for their personal profit should straggle beyond control, the model of all trade regulating bodies—the Casa de la Contratación—was set on foot in 1503. The Catholic Sovereigns went logically to work.

'As all trade with the New World was to pass through the Casa, the control of this commerce was from the outset restricted to a single port (*i.e.* Seville) for the whole of Spain. And for two centuries, in spite of the claims of other cities, in spite of protests from the colonies, and the well-intentioned efforts of Ferdinand's grandson the Emperor (Charles V.), Seville retained her high distinction. The vested interests of the merchants whose prosperity depended upon the preservation of this monopoly were sufficient to bear down all opposition; and for the Crown it was much easier to maintain in a single port that rigid supervision of every detail of trade and navigation which was the Spaniards' ideal.'

Regulation, thenas ever, begat monopoly. And Mr. Haring has written his book to let the world see by a leading example in exhaustive experiment what monopoly was in its turn to beget. The Spaniards did indeed make an ideal of 'regulation' in every part of their agricultural, pastoral, industrial, and commercial existence. A paternal government protected the baker, tinker, tailor, from the greed of the seller of raw material. Nor was it less zealous to defend the consumer from the 'profiteering' of the producer of manufactured articles. And the people would have it so. Therefore the regulation of trade with the Indies flourished in a congenial soil. There are some among us who admire this 'ideal.' No harm can be done them when they are reminded that the end for Spain was that it could be fairly described by Adam Smith as one of the most beggarly nations in Europe by the middle of the eighteenth century.

The building of the whole towering structure of regulation and 'Laws of Trade' advanced in swift but orderly sequence. Being at Alcalá de Henares in the year 1503, the Catholic Sovereigns issued the first ordinances for the Casa de Contratación on January 20th. They named their officers on February 14th. Dr. Sancho de Matienzo, Canon of the Cathedral of Seville, was appointed treasurer; Jimeno de Briviesca, comptroller (contador) and secretary; and the Genoese Francisco Pinelo was their factor. The three were to form a Board of Trade or Board of Control. The title factor would be best rendered by 'Cape (*i.e.* Head) Merchant,' if that term, once very familiar to us, had not become obsolete. At first the factor was the direct representative of the personal interest of the sovereigns in the trade. When the Kings of Spain ceased, as they did after the death of Ferdinand, to be themselves speculators and traders, the factor became the commercial member of the Board. Except for this brief period the Kings of Spain did not try to follow the example of their cousins, the Kings of Portugal, who insisted on being the sole 'merchants' in the East India trade. The rapid growth of the Spanish dominions in America forced them to be rulers and to limit themselves to fleecing at all times, and from time to time to robbing, their subjects who were authorized to carry on the trade.

The universal experience of mankind has demonstrated the amazing fecundity of a government office. The modest establishment of 1503 was the teeming parent of a huge progeny. If the trade had to be regulated, the machinery of regulation must be set up on both sides of the Atlantic. So the first consequence of the formation of the Casa was the nomination of corresponding officials in the Indies. They, however, were but custom-house officers, who collected dues and had no voice in the control of the trade. There was the Casa de Contratación at Seville explicitly appointed to see that no business should be done with the Indies save after inspection, with licence and subject to rules. In the natural course of things, the scope of the word 'Indies' was stretched so as to widen the jurisdiction of the Casa. Trade with Africa came under its crook. When a rich silver mine was discovered at Guadalcanal, in Estremadura, that also was made a ward of the Casa, and so remained till it was worked

out. When a Mexican miner hit upon the quicksilver method of amalgamating silver ore, the Spanish sovereigns were prompt to see a chance for establishing another profitable monopoly. Quicksilver was put under the care of the Casa whether it was drawn from the great Spanish mine at Almaden or imported from Hungary.

If the animating sentiment of the body had been liberal it would still have been a dead-weight on all enterprise. But the Casa was just an average governing office, quite sincerely convinced that it could do nothing more virtuous than magnify itself. Since it existed to regulate, common sense and convenience combined to show that the objects of its inspection should be kept under its eyes. So the trade was to start from Seville, some forty miles up the Guadalquivir, where the Casa was lodged in the old admiralty buildings of the 'Alcázar.' Now Seville was the residence of the capitalists who were interested in the trade of the Indies. In the Middle Ages, when all trade on water was conducted in craft not very unlike Thames barges, it had been a considerable trading port. Moreover, it had possessed the first naval dockyard established in Spain—for the construction and care of galleys. But it would be difficult to find another place (which could be reached by water at all) less fit to be the port of departure for ocean commerce. It can now be reached by vessels of not more than three hundred feet in length when they have a draught of not more than twenty feet. But that is because something has been done to clear the bed of the Guadalquivir. In the sixteenth century the river was already silted, and was getting worse. The entry to the river from the sea is obstructed by a bar which cannot be crossed by vessels of any size except at the spring tides. No one who was not blinded by official or trade selfishness could fail to see that the natural 'staple' of a trade with the Indies was Cadiz. The bay is no doubt open to the westerly gales, which are the worst on the coast, but it is a good anchorage, easy to enter and to leave. It was also incomparably safer than the bar and the shallows of the Guadalquivir. On every ground of public convenience and common sense Cadiz ought to have been preferred to Seville. But if it had been, what would have become of the private convenience of the Casa and of the capitalists?

For generations these allies fought against the nature of

things. It moved them not at all that vessels were constantly being wrecked in the river or on the bar, that convoys returning from the Indies were endangered in south-westerly gales because they could not cross the bar; that outward bound convoys were delayed for the same reason; that in times of war they were driven to go to other ports; that in normal times the largest vessels simply could not be brought to Seville. Officialdom and monopoly would not hear of allowing trade to conform to geographical necessity. Even as the mule spreads its feet, hunches its back, glares hideously, and shows its teeth when it has made up its mind not to move, so the Casa and the monopolists would insist that Seville was the true 'staple.' When under the driving of irresistible necessity the cargoes of homeward convoys were unloaded at other ports, the Casa had power to enforce the transport of the whole to their own city on mule back, even from ports so distant as Lisbon. When the Casa had helped most materially to reduce Spanish trade with the Indies to naught, it was at last dragged to Cadiz late in the eighteenth century.

The Casa was the foundation and the essential part of the whole structure of Spanish colonial government. It began by having jurisdiction over its own servants, and, after many conflicts with the regular judicatures, over commercial cases arising out of the Indian trade. In 1524 the Emperor Charles V. established the Council of the Indies. This second body was superimposed on the first and heard appeals against its decisions. The whole brought all the political and judicial control of the 'Indian' affairs under the direct power of the king. That is at least what it was meant to do, and in theory actually did. In practice, as we shall see, the Crown was controlled by its own creation in a way it had not foreseen. The organization was completed by degrees. There was no president of the whole body till Philip II. appointed Dr. Suarez de Carvajal in 1557. He died at the end of a year, and the office remained vacant till 1579; but from that date onwards there always was a President of the Council of the Indies till changes were made by the Bourbon Kings. By then its work had been so effectually done, and the world had been so much altered, that the Council of the Indies and the Casa had become fossils.

What was their work while they were effective realities

and had any material to work on? There is but one answer to the question, and it is this: the Council of the Indies and the Casa choked whatever chance Spain had of growing into a vigorous commercial and industrial country. It would be unjust to allege either that the whole destructive apparatus was imposed on an unwilling people, or that the men who worked that apparatus were always neglectful or corrupt. The contrary is the truth. In the close of the fifteenth century and henceforward till the old Spanish monarchy died of senile decay in the nineteenth, Spain looked to its sovereigns to do everything for it. The anarchy of the century and a half which preceded the reign of Isabella and Ferdinand had generated a positive hunger and thirst for more 'governance.' Those very municipal institutions of which modern Spaniards speak with a tender regret, not always according to knowledge, had become anarchical. They were fought over by local Montagues and Capulets, who filled them with 'murders and other inconveniences.' The history of Cáceres, in Estremadura, is the type of them all. It had been torn between its Montagues and its Capulets. The mass of the townsmen were profoundly relieved when Isabella swooped down on it and took the government into her own hands. No lady, royal or not royal, was ever more ready to mount her horse, put herself at the head of a detachment of crossbowmen, and bring disorderly persons to heel. And her subjects were rejoiced to see her at work and very ready to welcome the 'corregidor' whom she put in to keep law and order. Her grandson, Charles V., and her great-grandson, Philip II., met with no opposition and little criticism when they over-governed the trade with the Indies. The Cortes did indeed utter a pathetic murmur when one king or the other levied a 'tax on capital' by impounding the bullion imported by private traders from Mexico and Peru. The 'Procuradores' of the national representation pointed out that men would not risk their property in American trade if it was to be carried off in this high-handed way. But they never went beyond expostulation, nor failed to accept the 'juros,' *i.e.* bonds redeemable or irredeemable at 3 per cent. or 6 per cent., which His Majesty offered in place of the capital he took to meet his pressing necessities. There was no protest in principle against the character or the ways of his administration.

The men employed by the crown were honest until those evil days at the end of the Hapsburg dynasty, when, in dire need for money, the king took to selling offices in the Council of the Indies and the Casa, and the purchasers—whose salaries would not have represented a fair interest on their investment even if they had been regularly paid—began to recoup themselves in ways which are so well known all the world over that they need not be described. The administration was mischievous by its very nature, even when honest, because of the kind of work it was called on to perform. We may fairly ask whether the best of the officials were not precisely those who did the most harm, since they were the most exact in enforcing injurious rules.

One can imagine a Casa de Contratación which might have done unmixed good. A Board of Trade which was kept to its legitimate functions might have been a blessing. It might have taken care that merchants and shipowners should employ only seaworthy ships and should not overload them, that the masters and mates should be competently instructed in navigation, properly provided with astrolabe and back-staff, compass and chart. One can quite easily fancy that had Spain been provided with a king who was wise enough to disregard that provision of the will of Queen Isabella which directed that the trade to the Indies should be strictly confined to the subjects of the Crown of Castile, he would have thrown the way open to all the inhabitants of Spain, including the Catalan townsmen of Barcelona. Such a king would have looked to find his reward in the general prosperity of his subjects. But such a king could not have been a Hapsburg, who thought that interest and honour alike called on him to advance the fortunes of his 'August House.' We must take the history of Spain as it was, and thank the Hapsburg kings for showing us by so conscientious an experiment how trade can with the best intentions in the world be regulated out of existence.

It is by no manner of means true that a king of Spain would have aroused a formidable degree of discontent if he had disregarded the will of Isabella la Católica. Charles V. did disregard it all through his reign. The story which Mr. Haring summarizes at sufficient length and Herr Häbler tells in hi 'Geschichte der Fuggerschen Handlung in Spanien,' and hi

'Uberseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser und ihrer 'Gesellschafter,' throws too much light on our subject to be passed over unnoticed. Charles V. owed his election to the Empire in 1520 much less to the small resources he could then draw from Spain (Mexico was just being conquered and Peru was not conquered till some years later), or yet to the tardily aroused patriotism of the German princes, than to the financial support he received from the great banking houses of the German imperial cities. The Fuggers, the Welsers, the Ehingers, the capitalists of Frankfurt, Augsburg, and Constance, found the funds with which he satiated the greed of the Elector of Brandenburg and other Highnesses and Transparencies. He rewarded them by throwing open his possessions in the Indies to the enterprise of all his subjects of the Empire and the hereditary Austrian lands in Germany. During his reign they were to be found from what is now the Republic of Venezuela down to what is now the Argentine Republic, trading, exploiting, engaging in the search for El Dorado, and, in the case of some of them, rivalling the worst excesses of the Spanish Conquistadores. He had promised the Castilians that he would not appoint any of his Flemish servants to government posts in the Indies. That promise he barely kept to the ear. He had not promised to shut the new world to Flemish or German traders, and he threw it open. After his abdication his son excluded all foreigners, in part perhaps from his anger with the Imperial Electors, who positively refused to hear of him as King of the Romans or Emperor. We are too much inclined to exaggerate the hostility of Spaniards in the first half of the sixteenth century to foreigners. The most trusted servants of Charles V. were Flemings, Germans, Italians, or Franche-Comtois. The Cardinal Grandvella, who was for long the minister of Philip II., came from La Franche Comté. Spaniards accepted readily enough as regent during the first absence of their king, his foreign tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, who became Pope in 1522 as Adrian VI.

Charles V. opened the Indies to German enterprise because he owed the Fuggers, Welsers, and Ehingers more money than he could repay. When we grasp that fact we have in our hand the key which opens the innermost mystery of royal mismanagement of the trade with the New World. Philip II.

excluded the financiers of the German imperial cities, but he freed himself from them only by putting his neck, and the necks of his successors, down to the last of the Hapsburg dynasty—the wretched Charles II. 'the Bewitched,' who died in 1700—into the grip of another 'combine' of financiers. These were the merchants of the Indian trade in Seville and their associates in Genoa—the Bank of Saint George. In vain did he fleece them now and again, or seek dishonourable refuge in bankruptcy. The King of Spain had always to come to them when he stood in peremptory need of money, and they dictated their terms. Of course they insisted, to begin with, that nobody should have a chance of competing with them in the Indies. And equally of course they found the ways of evading and befooling the vast heap of rules and regulations, restrictions, injunctions, and laws which had been made to keep commerce on the straight path.

There was one part of the portentous whole which was not carried out, simply because it could not possibly be observed. Spaniards were every whit as sure as the rest of the world that bullion and coined money were the only genuine wealth. Their laws prohibited the export of both. But as Spain had but little else to give in exchange for the many things it needed, the gold and silver of Mexican and Peruvian mines was the one commodity with which it could trade. Therefore the laws which forbade the re-export of the precious metals were from first to last continuously broken. The king set the example, for he had to pay troops in Flanders or Italy, and had no other way of meeting the obligation. Nor was the evasion of a stupid commercial policy in itself an evil. Since the Spaniards would think (as other people then thought) that a commodity which no human being can eat or drink or use for its working clothes was alone wealth, it was a benefit that they should be forced to part with it for articles of real value. In so far as the bullion was wasted on bad politics and unnecessary wars the export was an evil because the king's fifth or tenth of the American mines did enable him to persist in follies which he would have been compelled to drop very early if he had had to depend on the resources of Spain. But there was neither excuse nor palliation for the constant disregard shown for rules or laws which were made to compel shipowners to provide and mer-

chants to hire only seaworthy ships, and to take care that they were not overloaded and were properly manned. There was no lack of good laws in the Indian trade. The evil was that, to use the delightful old Spanish formula, they were '*obedecidas y no cumplidas*'—obeyed and not applied. Obedience was confined to receiving them with every demonstration of the respect due to the will of 'The Prince,' His Sacred Cæsarean Majesty. Then they were laid on the shelf. When that happened to the humane laws of the Indies in Peru, the explanation was that the 'Kingdom of New Castile,' which was its official title, was too far off to be kept in better order. When it happened at Seville, under the very nose of His Sacred Cæsarean Majesty, the explanation was that he could not venture to quarrel with financiers to whom he owed more money than he could repay, and to whom he knew that he would have to go a-begging when next he needed an advance. He had no choice. He had confined the trade to Seville, and had thereby prevented the formation of other bodies of moneyed men at Barcelona or Valencia, Bilbao or Corunna. So there was nobody else to whom he could appeal. The king had meant to put the trade at his mercy by subjecting it to a small handful of persons whom it would be easy to bully. And that small handful had become his masters, for they alone had money to lend, and money he must have. If he bullied to the extent of really terrifying them, they would shut up shop and there would be no goose to lay the golden egg. They evaded the law and set the example of smuggling. Mr. Haring puts the outcome of the whole unwise business in a nutshell:

'Clandestine trade always increases in proportion to the number and vigour of the prohibitions against it. And in Seville this could not fail to be so when there were so many formalities to be observed, so many conditions to be met relating to the nature and origin of goods and antecedents of their owners. On the other hand, this secret traffic could have assumed such enormous proportions only with the connivance of the officials appointed to prevent it. If the Casa, and the Council of the Indies behind the Casa, had insisted upon a rigid execution of the law, detection in most cases would have been inevitable. The India House probably compared favourably with analogous institutions in other countries. Accidental irregularities were difficult to avoid in an organization of such varied functions. But they cannot be made to account for the widespread disorders in the export

and import trade with America. Abuses so widely prevalent, moreover, could certainly not have passed unperceived by the crown. The likeliest explanation is that the king being always in debt to the great merchant bankers for large sums of money, and dependent on them for future favours, was in no position to act with the rigour which the situation demanded.'

The reader who has never had occasion to consider the nature of monopoly may be tempted to wonder why these merchant bankers who had the whip hand of the king did not use their power to insist on more freedom and more common sense. They did not because they had a monopoly. They could evade the laws in the last resort, and could also make use of them to crush competition. They fixed prices on the other side and could put them at a figure which left them a good profit if one rotten, ill-appointed ship went down for every vessel which reached America and came back. The crew and passengers were drowned, but the merchant-banker could stand the loss and be richer when the year ended than when it began. The Casa might go on adding department to department, each with its full complement of clerks. As one goes over the pages on which Veitia Linage, a model official, proudly and sedately enumerates the long lists of the officialdom of his office, or reads Mr. Haring's quotations, one begins to wonder how room was found for the porters who carried bales of goods amid the swarm of 'Escribanos de Armadas' (scriveners of squadrons), 'Capitanes y superintendentes de las maestranzas' (captains and superintendents of technical corps, *i.e.*, boatswains, carpenters, mates, etc., etc.), 'tenedores de bastimentos' (keepers of buildings), captains of artillery, 'veedores' (surveyors), 'pagadores' (paymasters), 'contadores' (controllers), 'mayordomos' (storekeepers), 'receptores de Averias' (receivers of convoy fees), more 'contadores,' deputy-'contadores,' a whole tribunal of 'contadores.' And they had their equivalents waiting for the outward bound ships on the other side. Every one of them was another loss to useful industry, another sop to Spanish 'empleomania'—the rage for holding a place under government which has been a curse to the country. The Casa and the Council of the Indies, the whole lumbering apparatus of regulation of trade at home and in the Colonies, did more than any other institution to make the diseaes

endemic in Spain and among Spanish-speaking peoples. The merchant-bankers let it all go on because they could evade its power and could defraud their debtor the king. And if they had not been Spaniards but Englishmen or Frenchmen, they would have done just the same. It would be rash to affirm that either Englishmen or Frenchmen in the same position would have been less pertinacious in resisting the pitiful appeals of the colonists of Buenos Aires to be allowed to import goods they needed and export the abundant produce they could have given in return. The Seville monopolists used their influence with their royal debtor to secure the rejection of the petitions of the colonists. The settlers in Buenos Aires who, in the meantime, were going about dressed in skins, should have what the monopolists chose to send them. And when they sent a vessel they put more in her than they paid dues on.

The vast smuggling trade of Spanish America was not begun by foreign interlopers. It was started by the privileged merchant-bankers of Seville. They were the first who defrauded the king's customs by making 'arribadas maliciosas,' malicious landfalls. Their vessels went to unauthorized ports under pretence of needing provisions or of stress of weather, and smuggled goods ashore and shipped bullion or colonial produce instead—which they then smuggled at home. Our own Hawkins learnt the whole secret of contraband trade in the Canary Islands from Spaniards. The Canary Islanders were allowed to trade for provisions with the West Indian Islands. It was to have been a harmless little trade in such things as were not produced in Spain for export, nor needed there. But the Canaries became the centre of wholesale smuggling, in which French, English, and Dutch came to play the chief part. When the horrible combination of minute regulation and monopoly (the sin and death which destroy honest commerce) had produced their natural offspring, when the West Indies and the Spanish main were infested with armed smugglers, English, French, and Dutch, who were every whit as much pirates as interlopers in trade, the monopolists of Seville fought tooth and nail to prevent the inhabitants of the coast towns in the 'Indies' from arming ships for their own defence. They feared, and with good reason, that the vessels would be used to curtail their profits.

The Seville monopolists did not behave in this odious way because they were Spaniards. Individually they were a good sort of gentlemen. Spanish traders of all classes enjoyed a reputation for probity. The Seville merchants were a pest because they had a monopoly and one of the most unpardonable ever known. When English sovereigns, and the States-General of the United Netherlands, gave exclusive rights to their East India Companies, they had a good excuse. Neither the English monarchy nor the Dutch Republic held possessions in the east, nor had they the means of maintaining squadrons in distant seas. The choice for them was not between freedom of trade for all their subjects and monopoly. It was between leaving their traders and skippers uncontrolled and unprotected, or trusting the governing bodies of chartered companies to do the work of government for the State. The Spanish rulers were not so limited. They had effective command all over the 'Tierra Firme y 'Islas del Mar Océano'—the mainland and islands of the Ocean Sea. They put the trade into the hands of a ring because they thought they were providing themselves with an inexhaustible milch cow. They strove with blind obstinacy to correct the consequences of what they had done by increasing doses of restriction, regulations, and officialdom.

The colonists complained that they could not obtain the goods they needed because there were not ships enough to bring them. How should there be when Barcelona and all the other ports of Catalonia and Valencia, the most industrial parts of Spain, were shut out from 'la carrera de Indias,' the way to the Indies? Such ships as were provided were commonly bad. Privileged traders with no competition to dread were not driven by fear of rivals to provide better ships. Wrecks were common and so was capture by privateers or pirates. As there was not enough tonnage for the trade, vessels were outrageously overloaded so that they could neither contend with a gale, nor beat off, nor escape from, the most trumpery armed assailant. But the monopolists, who could dictate prices in the Indian market and were well insured, could afford to lose one ship out of three, or even two, and still make a profit. As the bullion, precious stones, dyes, and chocolate, or even sugar, brought back from the Indies were less bulky than the manufactured goods

exported, it paid the merchants to send out rotten tubs and sell them on the other side for what the material would bring. They had even a particular reason for taking this course. Pirates, privateers, and the squadrons of England or Holland did not molest the outward-bound ships. They had nothing to gain by capturing manufactured goods such as were produced in their own countries, and were indeed often of foreign origin, for the Spaniards were not an industrial people, and in spite of all their wish to keep the trade of the Indies to themselves, were forced to buy goods abroad for export. The booty aimed at by the plunderers was first of all the bullion, and next to that the tropical produce. So the short-sighted Seville merchants were well pleased that the returning fleets should be smaller than those which went out. They offered less mark and their crews could be reinforced by the officers and men of the ships left behind.

The Casa and the Council stormed, regulated, and inspected. The shippers and merchants met every official device by a corresponding fraud. Men were levied, spare spars and guns were shipped to pass muster. When the inspection was over they were landed again. Deck cargo was brought aboard on the sly. Then the galleon sailed, overloaded, undermanned, and unarmed. There was make-believe and fraud on all sides.

After the middle of the sixteenth century the king's need for more and ever more money drove him to impose export duties, and prices went up. The colonists were positively driven to seek for the supplies they must have from English and Dutch smugglers. The monopolists lost the power to fix prices in the Indies because the Creoles who could supply themselves 'better cheap' from the smugglers would no longer buy the dear goods sent from Spain. Officialdom, paid by percentages and fees, preyed on the vitals of the trade. The export duties and royal demands remained. The means of meeting them withered and the trade of the Indies died of inanition.

This ignominious end was not inevitable. It may well be that the Spaniards would never have become a great industrial people. They would probably have been surpassed by England, France, Holland, however wisely they had managed their affairs. But they need not have sunk into

the torpor, beggary, and starvation of the later seventeenth century. We are unjust when we say that the Spaniards cared for naught but the mines of precious metals. They covered all America from New Mexico to Chili with immense herds of horses and cattle, with swine and poultry, in a wonderfully short time. They brought wheat with them and the orange tree, and the vine. They were the first to plant the sugar-cane in the Antilles. It may be that they would never have developed a large body of excellent seamen. But there are good seamen on the Spanish coast, and with fair opportunity they would have grown better. The Spaniard is not generally industrial, but there were centres of industry in Spain which might have been largely developed. Allow that they would have been surpassed in opulence by other nations in Western Europe, yet they might have remained prosperous and vigorous. The good grain was there but the weeds of State interference, over-regulation, and monopoly sprang up and choked it. There is something pathetic in the fate of the unhappy country. We cannot but feel as we read of these things that the Spaniard deserved a better destiny. He tried hard for the right things occasionally. Take, for instance, the 'Community of the Seafarers of 'Seville'—*Universidad de los Marcantes de Sevilla.* It was meant to supply theoretic knowledge to the officers of the trading ships, and also to be what the Chest at Chatham and Greenwich Hospital were for British seamen. No lasting good came of it, in part because the bankrupt State seized the funds and applied them to political or military uses, but far more because the merchant shipping of Spain was so handled that it could no longer afford regular employment, and men turned from the sea in despair. It was better to become the porter of the sub-inspector of the inspector, who was subordinate to the sub-controller, who came next to the controller, who belonged to the Tribunal of Control. Late in the eighteenth century the one Spanish ruler who did really work in the true interests of his subjects, King Charles III., threw open the trade to the islands and the main. At last merchants and seafaring men were left to work and compete in freedom. Within ten years the merchant tonnage of the country was trebled. But it was too late. Spain had fallen too far behind, and could not regain the place she might

once have made securely her own. There is a melancholy Spanish proverb which has it that '*Tarde llega el desengaño*' — we see the truth, or we repent, or we are convicted of sin (for *el desengaño* is a word of wide scope) too late. And there is another which runs: '*Da Dios habas a quien no tiene quijadas*'—God sends the beans when the grinders are gone. They have been led to these rather cynical reflections by the contemplation of their own history.

We must not lay all upon the king nor on the monopolists of Seville. The over-regulation, the pedantry, the corruptions of Indian trade were typical of much else. Let it be repeated that the Spaniards approved of the unwisdom which was their ruin. The Casa de Contratación and the Council of the Indies had their counterpart in the President and Council of the Mesta. The Crown 'protected' the migratory flocks of sheep at the expense of agriculture because they were a handy kind of taxable property. So agriculture was ruined because fields could not be enclosed lest the flocks on their way from winter pastures on the plains to summer pastures on the hills should lack food. Farmers were compelled to sell fodder at a fixed rate, good year or bad. They deserted the land in many parts of Spain, and agriculture was so ruined that it has never recovered. When at last the privileges of the Mesta were swept away the release came too late. A country which could well feed itself and leave a margin for export, if it cultivated all its available soil intelligently, had to import foodstuffs. And of course the Mesta had its swarm of officials and did its part in infusing empleomania into the very marrow of the bones of the Spaniards. The easiest, the safest position for a man was to be employed in inspecting other people's work. Some Spaniard invented a formula for the nuisance:

> 'Que es la Mesta?
> Sacar de esa bolsa y meter en esta.'
>
> 'What is the Mesta?
> Take from that purse and put into this.'

It is so very easy to levy fees and pocket bribes. And one could make a long list of similar manifestations of folly. If the Spaniards did in the end win deliverance it was chiefly

because the evils from which they suffered had worked themselves out and had bankrupted the land in the process. For generations they could only complain, evade, revenge themselves by jests of the kind just quoted, or run away. At the close of the eighteenth century Spain was indeed one of the most beggarly countries in the world. And there was worse. During generations of conflict of wits carried on against State regulation and privileged corporations which were creatures of the government, the Spaniards, who were hampered at every turn when they worked at their trade, came to assume that the man who defrauded the State was merely acting in legitimate self-defence: he had to save himself from greedy bullies who stood over him with their 'take from that purse of yours and put into this purse of 'mine.'

Spain was, we must allow, not the only country where the evil and its consequences were to be found. We had our privileged companies, and it was not without cause that the interloper or smuggler was known as 'free-trader.' Colbertism went to great lengths in France. In that land also the traders' petition to be let alone moved the profound indignation of the peddling and meddling government official. The distinction of Spain is that it carried regulation, and what never fails to go with regulation—monopoly—to the furthest point it could reach, and that is the point where it ruins commerce, industry, and agriculture, and where it infects a whole race with dishonesty. The Laws of Trade with the Indies, the Mesta, and so forth, are perhaps ancient history, but their consequences remain, and the warning they have to give us is not superfluous.

David Hannay.

THE FOUR GREAT WARS

IT has often been pointed out that this is the fourth time in the four hundred years of modern history that England has played the leading part in resistance to the world domination of a single State. Philip II., Louis XIV., Napoleon, and Kaiser Wilhelm are the four great ones to whom England said 'No,' each of whom, but for England, would have 'bestrode the narrow world like a Colossus.'

In each case the attempt was made to revive over Europe a control like that of ancient Rome, a European domination that must under modern conditions have led to an empire over the whole globe. In each case the country assailing the world's liberties relied on a newly developed system of military and administrative efficiency of its own, and on the chaotic internal condition of that continental State which should in each case have been the principal makeweight in the balance of power. In the year of the Armada, France was, owing to her wars of religion, in a condition of anarchy as hopeless as that of Russia to-day, and the Catholic League showed itself as abject towards Spain as either Lenin or the Finnish Whites towards Prussia. And if Germany in the times of Louis XIV. and Napoleon be regarded as a single country, then she, too, was as much divided against herself as France prior to Henri IV., or Russia at this moment; Bavaria, in both the eras of French conquest, threw in her lot with the national enemy.

One question was asked of every country, of every court, of every party in the known world, on the first occasion: 'Are you for or against Spain?' Then, twice over, 'Are 'you for or against France?' And now, 'Are you pro-'German or anti-German?' For, in every State that made up the known comity of nations, Philip, Louis, Napoleon, and Kaiser Wilhelm had their bribers, propagandists, and terrorists—their Mendozas and their Gerards; their Jesuits and their Jacobites; their Barillons and their Portacarreros; their Bülows and their Bernstorffs: a whole hierarchy of spies and ambassadors, hirelings and dupes, fanatics and led

captains, all studying by a thousand different methods of the day and hour to plant in distant countries the domination of the new Rome. On each occasion these methods succeeded in some countries, but roused others to fury. By these methods Philip reduced Italy, Portugal, and France of the Guises, but made all England his foe. By these methods Louis first won and then lost the Spanish inheritance. By these methods Germany has for the time conquered the Balkans and Russia, but has brought in Italy and America on our side. And on each successive crisis there has been a hero country on the continent to bear the brunt of battle—Holland against Philip and Louis; Spain against Napoleon; France against Kaiser Wilhelm; and in each case the English fleet and the English-speaking race have come to the rescue in the end.

So far there is a close parallel between those bygone times of danger—best known by their good old schoolboy names of Armada, Blenheim, Waterloo—with this affair of ours to-day; provided always that we shall end by winning the war. But there is one point on which the parallel breaks down in the Napoleonic case, though it holds good in the others. All four were struggles for the liberty of States and peoples in their internal relations against one imperial domination. But our struggle against revolutionary and Napoleonic France was not also—like our struggles against Philip, Louis, and Kaiser Wilhelm—a war for liberty and popular government against reactionary principles in the internal affairs of the States themselves.

The struggle began in 1792-3 as an attempt, doubtless largely provoked, to suffocate the French Revolution in France herself. Burke's anti-democratic crusade and Brunswick's manifesto were the starting points of the twenty years' war. Owing to the prolonged success of French arms on land, the attempt to restore the complete *ancien régime* in France herself failed. But in almost every other country on the continent Waterloo meant the establishment of clerical, social, and despotic reaction in their worst forms. Poland and Italy were handed back to their torturers. As regards Austria and Germany, we are fighting the results of Waterloo to-day. Waterloo was necessary—Napoleon's ambition made it so—but it was in many respects a necessary

evil; it sits heavily on Europe to-day in the form of the Prussian and Austrian State systems.

Waterloo did good to France, restoring to her a modicum of political life extinguished by Napoleon, and ending her fevered dreams of world-dominion; it did great good to England, giving her peace and prosperity for a hundred years. But it did as much harm as good to most other countries, and now it is bringing back against France and England the slave hordes of Central and Eastern Europe, organized under the despotisms which secured their position by the victory of Wellington and Blücher.

Unlike the struggle against the French Revolution and Napoleon, the struggles against Philip II. and Louis XIV. were fought against the principle of despotic authority. The victories of Drake and Marlborough preserved and fostered such popular liberty as then existed, confined mainly to England and Holland. When we fought Philip and Louis we were fighting against the Jesuits and the Catholic persecution in Europe; when we fought Napoleon we were fighting for the Jesuits and the Catholic persecution in Europe, and the Protestant persecution in Ireland. The Jesuits went down at Blenheim; they rose again at Waterloo. William the Silent, Elizabeth, and Henri IV. fought the Inquisition; William III. and Marlborough fought the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. And the Inquisition and the Revocation were the handmaids of Philip's and Louis' principle of absolutism in State Government. '*L'état c'est 'moi*,' said Louis; but his enemy William III. made no claim to be the State, either in Holland or in England.

Philip II. was the State; Spain had no will save that one man's. But Elizabeth was not the State. She watched her people's drift of thought as carefully and shrewdly as Lincoln or President Wilson. With her ear to the ground that imperial woman survived a generation of appalling danger. Unlike Philip she had no army; unlike Philip she had a parliament instead. Her monopoly of the appearances of power was a shrewd feminine and Tudor trick. She lived on parliaments and fostered their growth; they had no place under Philip II. or Louis XIV. Elizabeth would have boxed the ears of anyone who had said she was bringing

democracy into England, but her democratic victim, Stubbs, was truly inspired when, after his hand had been cut off, he cried from the scaffold, 'God save the Queen.' That cry, in the English tongue, echoes down the centuries.

Philip's other great antagonist, William the Silent, went further than Elizabeth on the path of modern liberty. Prince though he was, he first acknowledged democracy; and Calvinist though he was, he first practised toleration. '*Je serai toujours populaire*,' he said. 'I shall always be 'of the people's party.' After surviving the struggle with Spain, Holland, in the seventeenth century, became even more than England the hearth whence liberal and progressive ideas radiated over Europe.

If William the Silent and Elizabeth had fallen before Philip, the tender plant of democracy would never have taken root in Europe or America. And, again, if England and Holland had gone down before Louis and his henchman, James II., democracy would have lost its only footing in Europe. But, instead of that, the victories of Marlborough clouded the glory of the Sun King, and turned to naught his despotic power, till then regarded as the secret of efficiency. Despotism in Church and State appeared a thing of weakness in contrast with the England of Locke, the Revolution, and the Toleration Act. From the result of the battle of Blenheim the liberal philosophy of the French eighteenth century took its origin. If Louis had won the war of the Spanish Succession, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau would have written differently, or in vain. Louis would have proved the case for despotism and the Revocation. William and Marlborough disproved it. The philosophers did but expound the lesson of Blenheim and Ramillies to a world half convinced beforehand by the obvious decadence of despotic France.*

In the case of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon the issues of good and evil were more confused, and the outcome less satisfactory. When England joined

* In a most significant letter of Marlborough's, I know not why unpublished by Coxe, he proposes that one of the terms of a victorious peace should be the summons of the States General after a hundred years' interval. The proposal was only premature; they actually met in 1789.

the coalition against the French Republic in 1793, Fox and Wordsworth both regarded it as a tragedy. They were right, just as they were right when a dozen years later they both urged on the war against the hegemony of Napoleon—Fox as Prime Minister, and Wordsworth as national sonneteer.

It must always be a disputed point whether or not in 1793 England could have avoided war with the Jacobins. They were difficult folk to live at peace with. As regards other countries they never took to heart the warning of the radical Burns :

> ' The kettle o' the Kirk and State
> Perhaps a clout may fail in't ;
> But deil a foreign tinkler loon
> Shall ever ca' a nail in't.'

But, whether avoidable or not, the participation of our country in the despots' coalition against France was the source of innumerable evils of which we were only able in 1914 to gauge the full magnitude.

Fox thought that if our governing class had sympathized with the French Revolution, and supported it against Prussia and Austria, France would never, in mad desperation, have called up the devil of Jacobinism to defend her against foes within and without. Perhaps the view was too generous—it certainly was too generous to commend itself to the British propertied classes of the day—but it was at worst a generous error which no enemy of Prussianism and no friend of the third French Republic can condemn as unworthy of a British statesman. There is a ludicrous inconsistency in those who condemn Fox as unpatriotic and at the same time keep Bastille Day and praise the heroic deeds of the Republican soldiery, who, dressed in rags, and singing the ' Marseillaise,' saved France and freedom from the despotic invaders. These people seem to forget that Fox's alleged crime was his protest against our joining the despotic invasion.

It is impossible to go on for ever having it both ways. Either the French Revolution was an entire mistake, as Burke thought, or else Fox was largely in the right. In the former case we are on the wrong side to-day, battling away for democracy, ' the rights of man,' and ' the swinish multitude ' ; but in the latter case we are in the right now, and can be proud

that England produced Fox to blurt out the truth when it was less palatable than it is to-day. It is just as much due to our French alliance that we should revise our historical views of the war of 1793 as it is due to the American alliance that we should celebrate July the Fourth. We were, most of us think, more in the wrong in 1776 than in 1793, but to assume that we were 'saving Europe' when we endeavoured to crush France in 1793-4 is to state a complicated problem in terms far too simple. It would be at least as true to say that, if the Duke of York had got to Paris, England would have been Liberty's executioner, and that the liberal movement of the nineteenth century would have been strangled by us at birth.

Some people attempt to separate Fox from Wordsworth in this matter. But the thought of the two men started from the same point in 1793 and arrived at the same conclusion at the time of Fox's death in 1806.* On England's entry into the war in 1793 Wordsworth exclaims:

> 'What, then, were my emotions, when in arms
> Britain put forth her freeborn strength in league,
> Oh, pity and shame! with those confederate Powers.
> Not in my single self alone I found,
> But in the minds of all ingenuous youth
> Change and subversion from that hour. No shock
> Given to my moral nature had I known
> Down to that very moment.'

When he wrote those lines for Book X. of the Prelude in 1804, he was strong for the war against Napoleon, but his sober and more conservative judgment still regarded our original participation against France nine years before not only as a blunder but as a crime. The whole long passage in the Prelude devoted to the subject should be carefully studied by any admirer of Wordsworth's political poetry who blames Fox and Grey for taking precisely the same view. If it is the test of patriotism to approve the war of 1793, then Wordsworth was no patriot.

The terrible reaction of forty years which the war caused

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* Wordsworth's feeling for Fox at the moment of his death is enshrined in the noble lines written at Grasmere, 'Loud is the Vale.'

in our domestic politics and society, just at the moment when reform was overdue and the problems of the Industrial Revolution required more instead of less political liberty, led for awhile to a moral and physical deterioration of the masses, and has left marks even now plainly discernible in the social, educational, and political evils of our land.

That untimely domestic reaction was the inevitable result of a war in which we set out to fight democracy abroad in alliance with Prussia and Austria. To-day exactly the opposite is happening. We notice an increasingly democratic tendency in our polity and our political philosophy as the war proceeds. Liberty has to await the return of peace, but democracy grows apace even under the Defence of the Realm Act. Contrast these two facts: then Grey was denounced as a traitor because he proposed to abolish rotten boroughs in war time; now Conservative statesmen enfranchise women and pass what is practically manhood suffrage as a war measure. So, too, during the Napoleonic war small grants for popular education were rejected on the ground that education would make the lower orders discontented with their lot; in this war popular education has been endowed as no government in the fat years before the war would be at the trouble or expense to endow it.

The reason of this profound contrast which appears in everything—the treatment of the private soldier, the handling of 'combinations of workmen'— is not merely that a hundred years have passed since the days of Pitt; it is also that then we were fighting against democracy and now we are fighting for it. Then our allies were Prussia, Austria, and the reactionary and clerical parties in every State. Now these same parties are our enemies in every country, from Spain to Russia. Our friends are the democrats and liberals everywhere, and our allies are France, America, Italy, the children of three revolutions. It follows from this fortunate regrouping of our alliances that, with a single exception, every important conservative paper in Britain to-day does homage to the principle of democracy, and scouts the whole theory of Burkian politics in the spirit of which we waged the great struggle against France.

A great war necessarily has a profound effect on the policy and philosophy of the nation engaged in it. The war with

Spain made us Protestants. The war with Louis made us Whigs and Tolerationists. The war with revolutionary France made us Tories. The war with Germany makes us Democrats—not Socialists, Liberals, or Conservatives, but just all Democrats. Since the disappearance of the Czar ally, and the full entry of America, this tendency is even more marked than at the beginning of the war.

It is remarkable that we began to change our party in Europe almost immediately after Napoleon was shut up in St. Helena. We did not even wait for a Liberal reaction at home. Castlereagh and Wellington themselves grew suspicious of their own handiwork. When Wellington walked out of the Congress of Verona, and withdrew England from the counsels of the Holy Alliance, the victor of Waterloo must have dimly perceived that his former allies were a precious set of scoundrels. He began, negatively, a change of policy which Canning, no longer an 'anti-Jacobin,' soon made more active than the old Duke liked. Palmerston, Russell, Gladstone, developed Canning's Liberal lead in foreign policy, helping Italy to become free. Disraeli made a temporary reaction, saving the Turkish Empire and bringing Austria into the Balkans. He thereby prepared our Balkan catastrophe of 1915, and the present dangers to our position in the East. Then Gladstone and Salisbury, in the last unhappy decades of the century, resumed our Liberal policy abroad, but with little efficiency or success. Little indeed could be done so long as the great weight of military predominance lay with the despotisms of Eastern Europe, according to the settlement of 1815.

In 1848 Europe had striven to throw off these masters, and failed. That great crisis ended in a disaster to liberty on the continent from the effects of which Italy and France alone recovered in the following generation. Central and Eastern Europe had the chains of 1815 riveted on them more strongly than ever in 1849, and that is why we have at last been obliged to fight this war.

England, in 1848, remained neutral, much to Mazzini's sorrow. Our conservative statesmen, far less democratic than their successors to-day, were frightened by the spectacle of popular revolutions abroad. And the Liberal party was

divided between the ignorant jingoism of Palmerston, as hostile to France and the United States as it was to Prussia and Austria, and the pacifism of Cobden and Bright. Those two rendered England immense service. They first, while Gladstone was still deceived, unmasked the Turk as a ' liberal ' ally ; they prevented us from going to war with France about nothing, and with the United States on behalf of the poor oppressed slaveowners. But Manchester's service in foreign affairs, indispensable as it was in these respects, was purely negative. It had no crusading ambitions, wisely perhaps as things then stood. The Manchester doctrine was that England could be a world by herself away from the general politics of Europe.

And so it came to pass that the only achievement of our well-meaning Victorian foreign policy was the aid we gave to the liberation and union of Italy. Italy was the only country—not excepting the United States—of which our politicians had personal knowledge. If Russell and Gladstone, and many of their followers, had not had intimate friends among the Italian exiles, we should have made a sad mess of the Italian as we made of the Turkish and American problems. In 1914, fortunately for the world, we knew our America as well as our grandfathers knew Italy. It was the counsellors of Kaiser Wilhelm who had succeeded to Palmerston's and Gladstone's ignorance of things American.

After 1870 the dominance of military despotism in the counsels of Europe was more marked than ever before. In place of the effete *ancien régime* of Metternich, always apologetic and on the defence against a Liberalism that was recognized as ' the spirit of the age,' despotism under Bismarck became itself ' the spirit of the age '—efficient, boastful, aggressive, contemptuous in the name of modern science and culture of the ' retrograde formulas of Liberalism.' Even in England it was the fashion twenty years ago to speak of Bismarck as the one great figure of the century ; Cavour was forgotten, Gladstone despised, Lincoln ignored. Although this German reading of history had lost ground in England before 1914 it was still the prevalent note in the world's thought when the war broke out. In obedience to this doctrine, the new, efficient, scientific despotism of Prussia challenged the ' effete ' democracies of the world to prove their Darwinian fitness

to survive. Much against his will and ours, Sir Edward Grey was forced in our name to assume the part that Mazzini had wished us to assume in 1848—the part of liberty's crusaders. Well, 'being in it,' let us finish the affair and make it the last crusade.

At the present stage of the war (September, 1918) Western Europe could be saved—for a time—by a compromise. But only at the price of leaving the Slav races subject to the Germans and Magyars. And if the German military despots can point to newly subjected Slav provinces as the spoils of war, they will be able to retain their own immemorial supremacy over the German masses. They can also proceed to organize the Slav millions of Austria-Hungary, Posen, and Russia for the next world war. We have no more right to interfere in forms of German government by Germans than the French Jacobins had to interfere in forms of British government by Britons. But if we free the Slavs the Germans will free themselves. If not, not.

Futhermore, we have incurred a debt of honour. We have used the gallant Czecho-Slovaks for our own purposes in Italy, France, and Russia. If we liberate them at the peace, this policy will have been wise and righteous. But if we leave Bohemia and the Slav races of Hungary to the vengeance of their old masters after the war, the name of England and America, of France and Italy, will have become a hissing and a reproach, and no one will ever trust us again. Our Czecho-Slovak policy of the last six months involves a moral obligation to win the war.

When Wellington raised his cocked hat over his head for 'everything to go in,' in the immortal sunset hour upon the ridge, he gave the signal for the best hundred years of English history to begin. He saved us and he gave us peace. But for others—for the Poles, for the Italians, for the inhabitants of Austria—that field had other meanings than freedom, progress, peace. For it was won by the ominous aid of sinister forces. 'C'est les Prussiens qui arrivent!' And behind old Blücher and his student dupes the slave hosts of Austria and the Czar were moving on.

But now, in this more protracted and terrible Waterloo—

now while we are not yet sure of victory—we are already sure of this, that if victory comes it will not this time be half defeat. For this time we can trust our allies. 'C'est les 'Américains qui arrivent!'

The world to-day is like the United States in Lincoln's time. It cannot any longer continue half slave and half free. Ever since Waterloo we have been living in a house divided against itself, and it has not stood. We are all buried under its ruins. Popular government and military despotism can no longer co-exist in a world drawn narrowly together by modern means of locomotion. The war must go on to its issue—the issue of 'all free.' If, instead, we leave the various branches of the Slav race, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean in the hands of German and Magyar, there will be a fifth great war. If we liberate them now, whatever the cost, the world is sufficiently 'weary of the past' to find other means in future of settling its disputes. The road to the League of Nations lies through victory.

G. M. Trevelyan.

THE AGONY OF THE VICTORIAN AGE

1. Some Eminent Victorians. By LYTTON STRACHEY. Chatto & Windus. 1918.
2. Some Aspects of the Victorian Age. By the RIGHT HON. H. H. ASQUITH, M.P. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1918.

FOR a considerable time past everybody must have noticed, especially in private conversation, a growing tendency to disparagement and even ridicule of all men and things, and aspects of things, which can be defined as 'Victorian.' Faded habits of mind are lightly dismissed as typical of the Victorian Age, and old favourite poets, painters, and musicians are treated with the same scorn as the glued chairs and glass bowls of wax flowers of sixty years go. The new generation are hardly willing to distinguish what was good from what was bad in the time of their grandmothers. With increasing audacity they repudiate the Victorian Age as a *sæclum insipiens et infacetum*, and we meet everywhere with the exact opposite of Montaigne's 'Je 'les approuve tous l'un après l'autre, quoi qu'ils disent.' Our younger contemporaries are slipping into the habit of approving of nothing from the moment that they are told it is Victorian.

This may almost be described as an intellectual and moral revolution. Every such revolution means some liberation of the intellect from bondage, and shows itself first of all in a temper of irreverence; the formulas of the old faith are no longer treated with respect and presently they are even ridiculed. It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that a spirit of this kind is at work amongst us, undermining the dignity and authority of objects and opinions and men that seemed half a century ago to be more perennial than bronze. Successive orators and writers have put the public in possession of arguments, and especially have sparkled in pleasantries, which have sapped the very foundations of the faith of 1850. The infection has attacked us all, and there is probably no one who is not surprised, if he seriously

reflects, to realize that he once implicitly took his ideas of art from Ruskin and of philosophy from Herbert Spencer. These great men are no longer regarded by anybody with the old credulity; their theories and their dogmas are mined, as were those of the early eighteenth century in France by the Encyclopædists, by a select class of destructive critics, in whose wake the whole public irregularly follows. The ordinary unthinking man accepts the change with exhilaration, since in this country the majority have always enjoyed seeing noses knocked off statues. But if we are to rejoice in liberation from the bondage of the Victorian Age we ought to know what those bonds were.

The phenomena of the decadence of an age are never similar to those of its rise. This is a fact which is commonly overlooked by the opponents of a particular section of social and intellectual history. In the initial stages of a 'period' we look for audacity, fire, freshness, passion. We look for men of strong character who will hew a channel along which the torrent of new ideals and subversive sentiments can rush. But this violence cannot be expected to last, and it would lead to anarchy if it did. Slowly the impetus of the stream diminishes, the river widens, and its waters reach a point where there seems to be no further movement in their expanse. No age contains in itself the elements of endless progress; it starts in fury, and little by little the force of it declines. Its decline is patent—but not until long afterwards—in a deadening of effort, in a hardening of style. Dryden leads on to Pope, Pope points down to Erasmus Darwin, after whom the world can but reject the whole classical system. The hungry sheep of a new generation look up and are not fed, and this is the vision which seems to face us in the last adventures of the schools of yesterday.

But what is, or was, the Victorian Age? The world speaks glibly of it as though it were a province of history no less exactly defined than the career of a human being from birth to death; but in practice no one seems in a hurry to mark out its frontiers. Indeed, to do so is an intrepid act. If the attempt is to be made at all, then 1840, the year of Queen Victoria's marriage with Prince Albert, may be suggested as the starting-point, and 1890 (between the death-dates of Browning, Newman, and Tennyson) as the year in which

the Victorian Age is seen sinking into the sands. Nothing could be vaguer, or more open to contention in detail, than this delineation, but at all events it gives our deliberations a frame. It excludes 'Pickwick,' which is the typical picture of English life under William IV., and 'Sartor Resartus,' which was the tossing of the bound giant in his sleep; but it includes the two-volume Tennyson, 'chiefly lyrical,' the stir of the Corn Law agitation, the Tractarian Crisis of 1841, and the 'History of the French Revolution' and 'Past and Present,' when the giant opened his eyes and fought with his chains. Darwin was slowly putting together the notes he had made on the 'Beagle,' and Hugh Miller was disturbing convention by his explorations of the Old Red Sandstone. Most of all, the discussion of permanent and transient elements in Christianity was taking a foremost place in all strata of society, not merely in the form of the contest around 'Tract '90,' but in the divergent directions of Colenso, the Simeon Evangelicals, and Maurice.

The Victorian Age began in rancour and turmoil. This is an element which we must not overlook, although it was in a measure superficial. A series of storms, rattling and recurrent tempests of thunder and lightning, swept over public opinion, which had been so calm under George IV. and so dull under William IV. Nothing could exceed the discord of vituperation, the Hebraism of Carlyle denouncing the Vaticanism of Wiseman, 'Free Kirk and other rubbish' pitted against 'Comtism, ghastliest of algebraic spectralities.' This theological tension marks the first twenty years and then slowly dies down, after the passion expended over 'Essays 'and Reviews.' It was in 1840 that we find Macaulay, anxious to start a scheme of Whig reform and to cut a respectable figure as Secretary of State for War, unable to get to business because of the stumbling-block of religious controversy. Everything in heaven and earth was turned into 'a theological treatise,' and all that people cared about was 'the nature of the sacraments, the operation of holy orders, 'the visibility of the Church and baptismal regeneration.' The sitting member goes down to Edinburgh to talk to his constituents about Corn Laws and Sugar Duties and the Eastern Question; he is met by 'a din' of such objections as 'Yes, Mr. Macaulay, that is all very well for a statesman,

'but what becomes of the headship of our Lord Jesus 'Christ?'

If the Victorian Age opened in a tempest of theology, it was only natural that it should cultivate a withering disdain for those who had attempted to reform society on a non-theological basis. In sharp contradistinction to the indulgence of the Georgian period for philosophic speculation, England's interest in which not even her long continental wars had been able to quench, we find with the accession of Victoria the credit of the French thinkers almost abruptly falling. Voltaire, never very popular in England, becomes 'as mischievous a monkey as any of them'; the enthusiasm for Rousseau, which had reached extravagant proportions, completely disappears, and he is merely the slanderous sceptic, who, after always soaking people's waistcoats with his tears, sent his own babies to the Foundling Hospital. The influence of the French eighteenth-century literature on the mind of England was first combated and then baldly denied. The premier journalist of the age declared, with the satisfaction of a turkey-cock strutting round his yard, that no trace of the lowest level of what could be called popularity remained in England to the writers of France, and he felt himself 'entitled to treat as an imbecile conceit the pretence' that a French school of thought survived in Great Britain. Such was the Podsnappery of the hour in its vigilance against moral and religious taint.

Notwithstanding, or perhaps we ought to say inevitably conducted by these elements of passion and disdain, the infant Victorian Age passed rapidly into the great political whirlpool of 1846, with its violent concentration of enthusiasm on the social questions which affected the welfare of the masses, with, in short, its tremendous upheaval of a practical radicalism. From that time forth its development baffles analysis. Whatever its present enemies may allege to its discredit, they cannot pretend that it was languid or monotonous. No Age hitherto lived out upon the world's surface has been so multiform or so busy; none defies the art of the historian to such a bewildering degree. Its latest critic does not exaggerate when he says that our fathers and our grandfathers have poured forth and accumulated so vast a quantity of information concerning it 'that the industry

'of a Ranke would be submerged by it and the perspicacity 'of a Gibbon would quail before it.' This is manifestly true, and it is evident that an encyclopædia would be required to discuss all the divisions of so tremendous a subject. If we look over too wide a horizon we lose our bearings altogether. We get a hopelessly confused notion of the course of progress; we see experiments, criticisms, failures, but who is to assure us what was the tendency of evolution?

Mr. Lytton Strachey's 'Eminent Victorians' has arrived at the very moment when all readers are prepared to discuss the age he deals with, and when public opinion is aware of the impatience which has been 'rising in the bosom of a man 'like smoke' under the pressure of the insistent praise of famous men. The book has attracted a very remarkable degree of notice; it has been talked about wherever people have met together; and has received the compliment of being seriously displayed before the University of Oxford by one of the most eminent of the Victorian statesmen whom Oxford has produced. If we look into the causes of this success, enjoyed by the earliest extended book of a writer almost unknown, a book, too, which pretends to no novelty of matter or mystery of investigation, we find them partly in the preparedness of the public mind for something in the way of this exposure, but partly also in the skill of the writer. Whatever else may be said of Mr. Lytton Strachey, no one can deny that he is very adroit, or that he possesses the art of arresting attention.

It is part of this adroitness that he contrives to modify, and for a long time even to conceal the fact that his purpose is to damage and discredit the Victorian Age. He is so ceremonious in his approach, so careful to avoid all brusqueness and coarseness, that his real aim may be for awhile unobserved. He even professes to speak 'dispassionately, 'impartially, and without ulterior intentions.' We may admit the want of passion and perhaps the want of partiality, but we cannot avoid seeing the ulterior intention, which is to undermine and belittle the reputation of the great figures of the Victorian Age. When the prodigious Signor Marinetti proposes to hurl the 'leprous palaces' of Venice into her 'fetid canals,' and to build in their place warehouses and railway stations, he does not differ in essential attitude from

Mr. Lytton Strachey, delicately 'laying bare the facts of 'some cases.' The only real difference consists in the finer tact, the greater knowledge of history—in short, the superior equipment of the English iconoclast. Each of them—and all the troop of opponents who grumble and mutter between their extremes—each of them is roused by an intense desire to throw off the shackles of a dying age, in which they have taught themselves chiefly to see affectation, pomposity, a virtuosity more technical than emotional, and an exasperating monotony of effect.

Mr. Strachey has conducted his attack from the point of view of biography. He realizes the hopelessness of writing a history of the Victorian Age; it can only be dealt with in detail; it must be nibbled into here and there; discredited piecemeal; subjected to the ravages of the white ant. He has seen that the lives of the great Victorians lend themselves to this insidious kind of examination, because what was worst in the pretentiousness of their age is to be found enshrined in the Standard Biographies (in two volumes, post octavo) under which most of them are buried. Mr Strachey has some criticism of these monsters which could hardly be bettered:

'Those two fat volumes, with which it is our custom to commemorate the dead—who does not know them, with their ill-digested masses of material, their slipshod style, their tone of tedious panegyric, their lamentable lack of selection, of detachment, of design? They are as familiar as the cortège of the undertaker, and bear the same air of slow, funereal barbarism.'

It is impossible not to agree with this pungent criticism. Every candid reader could point to a dozen Victorian biographies which deserve Mr Strachey's condemnation. For instance, instead of taking up any of the specimens which he has chosen for illustration, we need only refer the reader's memory to the appendix of 'Impressions,' by a series of elderly friends, which closes the official Life of Tennyson, published in 1897. He will find there an expression of the purest Victorian optimism. The great object being to foist on the public a false and superhuman picture of the deceased a set of illustrious contemporaries,—who themselves expected to be, when they died, transfigured in like manner,—form a

bodyguard around the corpse of the poet and emit their 'tedious panegyric.' In this case, more even than in any of the instances which Mr. Strachey has taken, the contrast between the real man and the funereal image is positively grotesque. Without question this contrast is not a little responsible for the discredit into which the name of Tennyson has fallen. Lord Selborne found nothing in Tennyson 'inconsistent with the finest courtesy and the gentlest heart.' Dr. Jowett had preserved through forty years 'an ever-'increasing wonder at the depth of his thought,' and emphatically stated that he 'was above such feelings as a 'desire of praise, or fear of blame.' (Tennyson, who was thirsty for ceaseless laudation, and to whom a hint of censure was like the bite of a mosquito!) Frederick Myers ejaculated, 'How august, how limitless a thing was Tennyson's own 'spirit's upward flight!' The Duke of Argyll, again, during the space of forty years, had found him 'always reverent, 'hating all levity or flippancy,' and was struck by his possessing 'the noblest humility I have ever known.' Lord Macaulay, who 'had stood absolutely aloof,' once having been permitted to glance at the proof-sheets of 'Guenevere,' was 'absolutely 'subdued' to 'unfeigned and reverent admiration.' The duke was the glad emissary who was 'the medium of intro-'duction,' and he recognized in Macaulay's subjugation 'a premonition' of Tennyson's complete 'conquest over 'the living world and over the generations that are to come.'

Thus the priesthood circled round their idol, waving their censers and shouting their hymns of praise, while their ample draperies effectively hid from the public eye the object which was really in the centre of their throng, namely, a gaunt, black, touzled man, rough in speech, brooding like an old gipsy over his inch of clay pipe stuffed with shag, and sucking in port wine with gusto—'so long as it is black and sweet 'and strong, I care not!' Their fault lay, not in their praise, which was much of it deserved, but in their deliberate attempt in the interests of what was Nice and Proper—gods of the Victorian Age—to conceal what any conventional person might think not quite becoming. There were to be no shadows in the picture, no stains or rugosities on the smooth bust of rosy wax.

On the pretext, therefore, of supplying a brief and above

all a complimentary set of portraits, Mr. Strachey takes the biography of an ecclesiastic, an educational authority, a woman of action, and a man of adventure, and tells them over again in his own way. The four figures he chooses are all contemporary, and yet, so implacably does time hurry us along, all would be very old if they still survived. Three of them could hardly survive, for Cardinal Manning and Dr. Arnold would be far over a hundred, and Florence Nightingale in her ninety-ninth year; the fourth, General Gordon, would be eighty-five. The motto of Mr. Strachey is 'Put not your trust in the intellectual 'princes of the Victorian Age,' or, at least, in what their biographers have reported of them; they were not demi-gods in any sense, but eccentric and forceful figures working dimly towards aims which they only understood in measure, and which very often were not worth the energy which they expended on them. This attitude alone would be enough to distinguish Mr. Strachey from the purveyors of indiscriminate praise, and in adopting it he emphasizes his deliberate break with the age of which they were the envy and the ornament. Given his 1918 frame of mind, no blame can attach to him for adopting this gesture. At moments when the tradition of a people has been violently challenged there have always ensued these abrupt acts of what to the old school seems injustice. If Mr. Lytton Strachey is reproached with lack of respect, he might reply: In the midst of a revolution, who is called on to be respectful to the fallen monarch? Extreme admiration for this or that particular leader, the principle of Victorian hero-worship, is the very heresy, he might say, which I have set out to refute.

When S. John the Divine addressed his Apocalypse to the Angels of the Seven Churches, he invented a system of criticism which is worthy of all acceptation. He dwelt first upon the merits of each individual church; not till he had exhausted them did he present the reverse of the coin. In the same spirit, critics who, in the apostle's phrase, have 'something against' Mr. Lytton Strachey, will do well to begin by acknowledging what is in his favour. In the first place, he writes sensibly, rapidly, and lucidly, without false ornament of any kind. Some of his pages might, with advantage, be pinned up opposite the writing-tables of our

current authors of detestable pseudo-Meredithian and decayed Paterese. His narrative style is concise and brisk. His book may undoubtedly best be compared among English classics with 'Whiggism in its relations to Literature,' although it is less discursive and does not possess the personal element of that vivacious piece of polemic. In this recurrence of Mr. Strachey to a pellucid stream of prose we see an argument against his own theory of revolt. The procedure of the arts, the mechanical tricks of the trade, do they really improve or decline from age to age? Are they not, in fact, much more the result of individual taste than of fashion? There seems to be no radical change in the methods of style. The extravagant romanticism of rebellion against the leaders of the Victorian Age finds at length an exponent, and behold he writes as soberly as Lord Morley, or as Newman himself!

The longest of these biographies is that of Cardinal Manning, and it is the one with which Mr. Lytton Strachey has taken most pains. Briefer than the briefest of the 'English 'Men of Letters' series of biographies, it is yet conducted with so artful an economy as to give the impression, to an uninstructed reader, that nothing essential about the career of Manning has been omitted. To produce this impression gifts of a very unusual order were required, since the writer, pressed on all sides by a plethora of information, instead of being incommoded by it, had to seem to be moving smoothly in an atmosphere of his own choosing, and to be completely unembarrassed by his material. He must have the air of saying, in Froude's famous impertinence, 'This is all we know, 'and more than all, yet nothing to what the angels know.' In the face of a whole literature of controversy and correspondence, after a storm of Purcell and Hutton, Ward and Mozley and Liddon tearing at one another's throats, Mr. Lytton Strachey steps delicately on to the stage and says, in a low voice, 'Come here and I will tell you all about a 'funny ecclesiastic who had a Hat, and whose name was 'Henry Edward Manning. It will not take us long, and 'ever afterwards, if you hear that name mentioned, you 'will know everything about him which you need to remember.' It is audacious, and to many people will seem shocking, but it is very cleverly done.

The study of Florence Nightingale is an even better example

of Mr. Strachey's method, since she is the one of his four subjects for whom he betrays some partiality. 'The Miss 'Nightingale of fact was not as facile fancy painted her,' and it has greatly entertained Mr. Strachey to strip the Victorian varnish off and reveal the iron will beneath. His first chapter puts it in one of his effective endings:

'Her mother was still not quite resigned; surely Florence might at least spend the summer in the country. At this, indeed, among her intimates, Mrs Nightingale almost wept. "We are ducks," she said with tears in her eyes, "who have hatched a wild swan." But the poor lady was wrong; it was not a swan that they had hatched, it was an eagle.'

It is therefore as an eagle, black, rapacious, with hooked bill and crooked talons, that he paints Miss Nightingale, and the Swan of Scutari, the delicate Lady with the Lamp, fades into a fable. Mr. Strachey glorifies the demon that possessed this pitiless, rushing spirit of philanthropy. He gloats over its ravages, its irresistible violence of purpose. It is an evident pleasure to him to be able to detach so wild a figure from the tameness of the circumambient scene, and all his enmity to the period comes out in the closing pages, in which he describes how the fierce philanthropist lived so long that the Victorian Age had its revenge upon her, and reduced her, a smiling, fat old woman, to 'compliance and com-'placency.' It is a picture which will give much offence, but it is certainly extremely striking, and Mr. Strachey can hardly be accused of having done more than deepen the shadows which previous biographers had almost entirely omitted.

In this study, if the author is unusually indulgent to his subject, he is relatively severer than usual to the surrounding figures. To some of them, notably to Arthur Hugh Clough, he seems to be intolerably unjust. Yet to most of those public men who resisted the work of Florence Nightingale it is difficult to show mercy. Mr. Strachey is so contemptuous, almost so vindictive, in his attitude to Lord Panmure, that the reader is tempted to take up the cudgels in defence of an official so rudely flouted. But, on reflection, what is there that can be said in palliation of Lord Panmure? He was the son of a man of whom his biographer has admitted

that 'he preserved late into the [nineteenth] century the 'habits and passions—scandalous and unconcealed—which 'had, except in his case, passed away. He was devoted to 'his friends so long as they remained complaisant, and violent 'and implacable to all who thwarted him. His uncontrollable 'temper alienated him from nearly all his family in his latter 'years. In private life he was an immovable despot.'

This was the father of Fox Maule, second Baron Panmure, of whom Mr. Strachey has so much to say. Evidently he was a Regency type, as the son was a Victorian. Determined not to resemble his father, Fox Maule early became a settled and industrious M.P., and in 1846 Lord John Russell made him Secretary of War. He held the same post under Lord Palmerston from 1855 to 1858. Nothing could dislodge him from office; not even the famous despatch 'Take care of 'Dawb' could stir him. In 1860 he became eleventh Earl of Dalhousie. He died two years later, having enjoyed every distinction, even that of President of the Royal Military Asylum. He was 'unco guid,' as pious as his father had been profane, but he had no social or political or intellectual merit of any kind which can at this distance of time be discerned. Florence Nightingale called him the Bison, and his life's energy seems to have been expended in trying, often with success, to frustrate every single practical reform which she suggested. To the objection that Mr. Strachey has depicted the heroine as 'an illtempered, importunate spinster, 'who drove a statesman to his death,' he might conceivably reply that if history, grown calm with the passage of years, does so reveal her, it is rather absurd to go on idealizing her. Why not study the real Eagle in place of the fabulous Swan? It is difficult to condemn Mr. Strachey along this line of argument.

The early Victorians liked what was definable and tangible; they were 'ponderous mechanists of style.' Even in their suggestions of change they preserved an impenetrable decorum of demeanour, a studied progress, a deep consciousness of the guiding restraint of tradition upon character. Their preoccupation with moral ideas tinged the whole of their surroundings, their literature, their art, their outlook upon life. That the works of Mr. Charles Dickens, so excruciatingly funny should have been produced and appreciated in the

midst of this intense epoch of exhortation seems a paradox, till we recollect how careful Dickens is, when his laughter is loudest, never to tamper with 'the deep sense of moral 'evil.' This apprehension of the rising immorality of the world, against which the only rampart was the education of 'a thorough English gentleman, Christian, manly and 'enlightened,' was dominant in no spirit more than in that of Dr. Thomas Arnold, of whom Mr. Strachey gives a somewhat deterrent portrait. It is deterrent, because we have passed, in three-quarters of a century, completely out of the atmosphere in which Dr. Arnold moved and breathed. We are not sure that Mr. Strachey acted very wisely in selecting Dr. Arnold for one of his four subjects, since the great schoolmaster was hardly a Victorian at all. When he entered the Church George III. was on the throne; his accomplishment at Rugby was started under George IV.; he died when the Victorian Age was just beginning. He was a forerunner, but hardly a contemporary.

Although in his attitude to the great Rugby schoolmaster Mr. Strachey shows more approbation than usual, this portrait has not given universal satisfaction. It has rather surprisingly called forth an indignant protest from Dr. Arnold's granddaughter. Yet such is the perversity of the human mind that the mode in which Mrs. Humphry Ward 'perstringes' the biographer brings us round to that biographer's side. For Mrs. Ward has positively the indiscretion, astounding in a writer of her learning and experience, to demand the exclusion of irony from the legitimate weapons of the literary combatant. This is to stoop to sharing one of the meanest prejudices of the English commonplace mind, which has always resented the use of that delicate and pointed weapon. Moreover, Mrs. Ward does not merely adopt the plebeian attitude, but she delivers herself bound hand and foot to the enemy by declaring the use of irony to be 'unintelligent.' In support of this amazing statement she quotes some wandering phrase of Sainte-Beuve. By the light of recent revelations, whether Sainte-Beuve was ironical or not, he was certainly perfidious. But, to waive that matter, does Mrs. Humphry Ward consider that Swift and Lucian and Machiavelli were, as she puts it, 'doomed 'to failure' because they used irony as a weapon? Was

Heine and is Anatole France conspicuous for want of intelligence? And, after all, ought not Mrs. Ward to remember that if she had a very serious grandfather, she had a still more celebrated uncle, who wrote 'Friendship's Garland'?

While no one will seriously blame Mr. Strachey for employing irony in his investigation of character, the subject leads on to what may be regarded as a definite fault in his method. A biographer should be sympathetic; not blind, not indulgent, but *sympathetic*. He should be able to enter into the feelings of his subjects, and be anxious to do so. It is in sympathy, in imaginative insight, that Mr. Strachey fails. His personages are like puppets observed from a great height by an amiable but entirely superior intelligence. The peculiar aim of Mr. Strachey, his desire to lower our general conception of the Victorian Age, tempts him to exaggerate this tendency, and he succumbs to the temptation. His description of Lord Acton at Rome in 1870—'he despised Lord Acton 'almost as much as he disliked him'—is not ironic, it is contemptuous. Arthur Hugh Clough presents no aspect to Mr. Strachey but that of a timid and blundering packer-up of parcels; one might conceive that the biographer had never contemplated the poet in any other capacity than, with sealing-wax in his hand and string between his lips, shuddering under the eye of Miss Nightingale. The occasional references to Lord Wolseley suggest an unaccountable hurrying figure of pygmy size, which Mr. Strachey can only just discern. This attitude of hovering superiority is annoying.

But it reaches a more dangerous importance when it affects spiritual matters. The author interests himself, from his great height, in the movements of his Victorian dwarfs, and notices that they are particularly active, and prone to unusual oddity of movement, when they are inspired by religious and moral passion. Their motions attract his attention, and he describes them with gusto and often with wit. His sketch of Rome before the Œcumenical Council is an admirably studied page. Miss Nightingale's ferocity when the War Office phalanx closed its ranks is depicted in the highest of spirits; it is impossible not to be riveted by the scene round Cardinal Manning's death-bed; but what did those manifestations mean? To Mr. Strachey it is evident that the fun of the whole thing is that they meant

nothing at all; they were only part of the Victorian absurdity. It is obvious that religious enthusiasm, as a personal matter, means nothing to him. He investigates the feelings of Newman or Keble as a naturalist might the contortions of an insect. The ceremonies and rites of the Church are objects of subdued hilarity to him, and in their presence, if he suppresses his laughter, it is solely to prevent his missing any detail precious to his curiosity. When the subject of Baptismal Regeneration agitates the whole pious world of England Mr. Strachey says, looking down with exhilaration on the anthill beneath him, 'The questions at issue are being taken 'very seriously by a large number of persons. How Early 'Victorian of them!' Mr. Strachey has yet to learn that questions of this kind *are* 'taken seriously' by serious people, and that their emotion is both genuine and deep. He sees nothing but alcoholic eccentricity in the mysticism of Gordon. His cynicism sometimes carries him beyond the confines of good taste, as in the passage where he refers to the large and dirty ears of the Roman cardinals. Still worse is the query as to what became of the soul of Pope Pius IX. after his death.

These are errors in discretion. A fault in art is the want of care which the author takes in delineating his minor or subordinate figures. He gives remarkable pains, for example, to his study of General Gordon, but he is indifferent to accuracy in his sketches of the persons who came into contact, and often into collision, with Gordon. In this he resembles those French painters, such as Bastien Lepage, who focus their eye on one portion of their canvas, and work that up to a high perfection, while leaving the rest of the picture misty and vague. Even in that case the subordinate figures, if subdued in fogginess, should not be falsely drawn, but Mr. Strachey, intent upon the violent portrait of Gordon, is willing to leave his Baring and Hartington and Wolseley inexact as well as shadowy. The essay on General Gordon, indeed, is the least successful of the four monographs. Dexterous as he is, Mr. Strachey has not had the material to work upon which now exists to elucidate his other and earlier subjects. But it is difficult to account for his apparently not having read Mr. Bernard Holland's life of the Duke of Devonshire, which throws much light, evidently

unknown to Mr. Strachey, on the Gordon relief expedition. Sir Evelyn Baring is here seen to have urged the expedition, while Chamberlain was one of its opponents. Mr. Strachey does not seem to have noticed how much the issue was confused by conflicting opinions as to whether the route to be taken should be by Suakin or up the Nile.

No part of his book is more vigorous or picturesque than the chapter dealing with the proclamation of Papal Infallibility. But here again one is annoyed by the glibness with which Mr. Strachey smoothly asserts what are only his conjectures.

In his account of Manning's reception in Rome—and this is of central importance in his picture of Manning's whole career—he exaggerates the personal policy of Pio Nono, whom he represents as more independent of the staff of the Curia than was possible. Rome has never acknowledged the right of the individual, even though that individual be the Pope, to an independent authority. Mr. Odo Russell was resident secretary in Rome from 1858 to 1870, and his period of office was drawing to a close when Manning arrived; he was shortly afterwards removed to become Assistant Under Secretary of State at our Foreign Office. The author of 'Eminent Victorians' is pleased to describe 'poor Mr. Russell' as little better than a fly buzzing in Manning's 'spider's web of delicate and clinging diplomacy.' It is not in the memory of those who were behind the scenes that Odo Russell was such a cipher. Though suave in address, he was by no means deficient in decision or force of character, as was evidenced when, some months later, he explained to Mr. Gladstone his reasons for stating to Bismarck, without instructions from the government, that the Black Sea question was one on which Great Britain might be compelled to go to war with or without allies. Lord Morley's 'Life of Gladstone' (vol. ii., p. 354) is explicit on this interesting point. The information which, by special permission of the Pope, Cardinal Manning was able to give to him on all that was going on in the Council was, of course, of great value to Odo Russell, but his views on other aspects of the question were derived from quite different sources.

In this respect he had the advantage of the Cardinal, both on account of his diplomatic position and of his long and

intimate knowledge both of Vatican policy and of the forces which the Curia has at its command. On the strength of those forces, and on the small amount of effective support which British opposition to the Decree of Infallibility was likely to receive from the Catholic Powers, he no doubt held strong opinions. Some years later he did not conceal his conviction that Prince Bismarck would be worsted in his conflict with Rome on the Education Laws, and the event proved his forecast to be perfectly correct. This is an example of the dangers which beset a too glib and superficial treatment of political events which were conducted in secret, and with every circumstance of mystery.

Several of the characteristics which diversify Mr. Strachey's remarkable volume are exemplified in the following quotation. It deals with the funeral of Cardinal Manning:

> 'The route of the procession was lined by vast crowds of working people, whose imaginations, in some instinctive manner, had been touched. Many who had hardly seen him declared that in Cardinal Manning they had lost their best friend. Was it the magnetic vigour of the dead man's spirit that moved them? Or was it his valiant disregard of common custom and those conventional reserves and poor punctilios which are wont to hem about the great? Or was it something untameable in his glances and in his gestures? Or was it, perhaps, the mysterious glamour lingering about him of the antique organization of Rome? For whatever cause, the mind of the people had been impressed; and yet, after all, the impression was more acute than lasting. The Cardinal's memory is a dim thing to-day. And he who descends into the crypt of that Cathedral which Manning never lived to see, will observe, in the quiet niche with the sepulchral monument, that the dust lies thick on the strange, the incongruous, the almost impossible object which, with its elaborations of dependent tassels, hangs down from the dim vault like some forlorn and forgotten trophy, the Hat.'

Longinus tells us that 'a just judgment of style is the final 'fruit of long experience.' In the measured utterances of Mr. Asquith we recognize the speech of a man to whom all that is old and good is familiar, and in whom the art of finished expression has become a habit. No more elegantly balanced, no more delicately perceptive mind than his has appeared of recent times in our midst, and there is something in the equipoise of his own genius which points Mr. Asquith out as a judge peculiarly well fitted to sit in judgment upon rival

ages. In his Romanes lecture there is but one thing to be regretted: the restricted space which it offered for the full expansion of the theme. Mr. Asquith excels in swift and rapid flights, but even for him the Victorian Age is too broad a province to be explored within one hour. He has endeavoured to lighten his task by excluding theology and politics, and indeed but for such self-denial he could scarcely have moved at all in so dense an air. He is able, however, having thrown out so much formidable ballast, to rise above his subject, and gazing at the Victorian Age, as it recedes, he declares it to have been very good. The young men who despise and attack that Age receive no support in any particular from Mr. Asquith.

He dwells on the fecundity of the literature of the Victorian Age in its middle period, and especially on the publications which adorned the decade from 1850 to 1859. He calls those years, very justly, 'marvellous and almost unexampled' in their rich profusion. We may suggest that the only rival to them in our history is the period from 1590 to 1600, which saw the early plays of Shakespeare, the 'Faerie Queene,' the 'Arcadia,' the 'Ecclesiastical 'Polity,' 'Tamburlaine,' 'The Discovery of Guiana,' and Bacon's 'Essays.' If the works catalogued by Mr. Asquith do not equal these in intensity, they excel them by the breadth of the ground they cover, extending from Browning to Darwin and from Thackeray to Ruskin. Moreover, the Oxford list might have included 'Lavengro,' and Newman's 'Lectures,' and Herbert Spencer's 'Social 'Statics.' The only third decade worthy to be named with those of 1590 and 1850 is that which opens in 1705, and is illuminated by the names of Pope, Shaftesbury, Swift, Arbuthnot, Defoe, Steele, Addison, and Berkeley. It is pleasant to compare these three magnificently flowering epochs, but not profitable if we attempt to weigh one against the other. They are comparable only in the splendour of their accomplishment.

It is more difficult to fit science into our scheme of the Victorian Age than to find places there for Art and Literature. Perhaps the reason of this is that the latter were national in their character, whereas scientific inquiry, throughout the nineteenth century, was carried on upon international

lines, or, at least, in a spirit unprecedentedly non-provincial. The vast achievements of science, practical and theoretical, were produced for the world, not for a race. Mr. Asquith speaks with justice and eloquence of the appearance of Darwin's 'Origin of Species,' which he distinguishes as being 'if not 'actually the most important, certainly the most interesting 'event of the Age,' and his remarks on the fortune of that book are excellent. No one can overestimate the value of what we owe to Darwin. But perhaps a Frenchman might speak in almost the same terms of Claude Bernard, whose life and work ran parallel with Darwin's. If the 'Origin 'of Species' made an epoch in 1859, the 'Introduction à 'la médicine expérimentale' made another in 1865. Both these books, as channels by which the experimental labours of each investigator reached the prepared and instructed public, exercised at once, and have continued ever since to exercise, an enormous effect on thought as well as on knowledge. They transformed the methods by which man approaches scientific investigation, and while they instructed they stimulated a new ardour for instruction. In each case the value of the discovery lay in the value of the idea which led to the discovery, and, as some one has said in the case of Claude Bernard, they combined for the first time the operations of science and philosophy. The parallel between these two contemporaries extends, in a measure, to their disciples and successors, and seems to suggest that Mr. Asquith in his generous and difficult estimate may have exaggerated the purely Victorian element in the science of the age of Darwin. This only accentuates the difficulty, and he may perhaps retort that there is an extreme danger in suggesting what does and what does not form a part of so huge a system.

Justifiably Mr. Asquith takes it for granted that the performance of the central years of the Victorian Age was splendid. With those who deny merit to the writers and artists of the last half century it is difficult to reach a common ground for argument. What is to be the criterion of taste if all the multiform exhibitions of it which passed muster from 1840 to 1890 are now to be swept away with contumely? Perhaps indeed it is only among those extravagant romanticists who are trying to raise entirely new ideals, unrelated

to any existing forms of art and literature, that we find a denial of all merit to the Victorian masters. Against this caricature of criticism, this Bolshevism, it would be hopeless to contend. But there is a large and growing class of more moderate thinkers who hold, in the first place, that the merit of the leading Victorian writers has been persistently overestimated, and that since its culmination the Victorian spirit has not ceased to decay, arriving at length at the state of timidity and repetition which encourages what is ugly, narrow, and vulgar, and demands nothing better than a swift dismissal to the dust-bin.

Every stratum of society, particularly if it is at all sophisticated, contains a body of barbarians who are usually silent from lack of occasion to express themselves, but who are always ready to seize an opportunity to suppress a movement of idealism. We accustom ourselves to the idea that certain broad principles of taste are universally accepted, and our respectable newspapers foster this benevolent delusion by talking habitually ' over the heads', as we say, of the majority of their readers. They make ' great music for a little clan,' and nothing can be more praiseworthy than their effort, but, as a matter of fact, with or without the aid of the newspapers, the people who really care for literature or art, or for strenuous mental exercise of any kind, are relatively few. If we could procure a completely confidential statement of the number of persons to whom the names of Charles Lamb and Gainsborough have a distinct meaning, and still more of those who can summon up an impression of the essays of the one and of the pictures of the other, we should in all probability be painfully startled. Yet since these names enjoy what we call a universal celebrity, what must be the popular relation to figures much less prominent ?

The result of this tyranny of fame, for so it must appear to all those who are inconvenienced by the expression of it, is to rouse a sullen tendency to attack the figures of art and literature whenever there arrives a chance of doing that successfully. Popular audiences can always be depended upon to cheer the statement of ' a plain man ' that he is not ' clever ' enough to understand Browning or Meredith. An assurance that life is too short to be troubled with Henry James wakes the lower middle class to ecstasy. An oppor-

tunity for such protests is provided by our English lack of critical tradition, by our accepted habit of saying, 'I do 'hate' or 'I must say I rather like' this or that without reference to any species of authority. This seems to have grown with dangerous rapidity of late years. It was not tolerated among the Victorians, who carried admiration to the highest pitch. They marshalled it, they defined it, they turned it from a virtue into a religion, and called it Hero Worship. Even their abuse was a kind of admiration turned inside out, as in Swinburne's diatribes against Carlyle, who himself fought against the theory of Darwin, not philosophically, but as though it were a personal insult to himself. Such violence of taste is now gone out of fashion; every scribbler and dauber likes to believe himself on a level with the best, and the positive criterion of value which sincere admiration gave is lost to us. Hence the success of Mr. Lytton Strachey.

But the decline of ardour does not explain the whole position, which we have to face with firmness. Epochs come to an end, and before they have their place finally awarded to them in history they are bound to endure much vicissitude of fortune. No amount of sarcasm or of indignant protest will avail to conceal the fact that we stand to-day at the porch, that much more probably we have already penetrated far into the vestibule, of a new age. What its character will be, or what its principal products, it is absolutely impossible for us as yet to conjecture. Meanwhile the Victorian Age recedes, and it loses size and lustre as we get further and further away from it. When what was called 'Symbolism' began to act in urgent and direct reaction to the aims of those still in authority, the old order received its notice to quit, but that was at least five and twenty years ago, and the change is not complete. Ages so multiform and redundant and full of blood as the Victorian take a long time to die; they have their surprising recoveries and their uncovenanted convalescences. But even they give up the ghost at length, and are buried hastily with scant reverence. The time has doubtless come when aged mourners must prepare themselves to attend the obsequies of the Victorian Age with as much decency as they can muster.

EDMUND GOSSE.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PESSIMISM

THE preposterous person who declares that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds probably does not know that he is quoting Leibnitz at a distance, or that a formal system of philosophy underlies his complacent creed. Yet it was the considered opinion of Leibnitz, by no means a contemptible person, that the universe is the perfect work of an infinitely benevolent God, Who from all conceivable possibilities has chosen the best; and this hypothesis in some form or other must be the essence of every optimistic theory of life.

Unfortunately the full hypothesis becomes difficult to defend as soon as it is tested by the superficial facts of existence. A slight acquaintance with medicine or history intrudes uncomfortable doubts of its universality. A London slum and a filthy Balkan village infested by hunger-typhus are hard to reconcile with any actual good, let alone any theoretical best, yet thousands of people live in London slums and die in Balkan villages. And the contrast between what might be and what is, which lies at the very root of all observation of life, has created the opposite school of pessimism, which holds that life on the whole is evil, that the bad predominates over the good, and that the vast majority of the human race is predestined to suffer misery in this world, and perhaps damnation in the next. Schopenhauer is the typical modern pessimist, but his ancestry is a long one; it reaches back through Calvin to Augustine, who was himself the principal and possibly the deciding factor in the vast conflict of moral opinion in the previous three centuries; it includes Buddha and other Indian thinkers; it is very largely represented in the religious philosophy of Babylon and Persia, and it can claim the unknown author of Ecclesiastes and lesser post-exilic writers among the Jews. The mighty names of Plato and St. Paul cannot, it is true, be urged by the pessimists, but neither will the optimist always be altogether happy in their company; for complete satisfaction he must fall back on the obscure

and long discredited Origen, who cherished hopes even of the conversion of Satan that seem unhappily destined not to be fulfilled.

For what it may be worth then the weight of authority, if not definitely with the pessimists, is certainly not on the side of the complete optimists; and if the mass of men have generally accepted the latter view, and obstinately incline to the belief that life is usually worth living, they have emphatically endorsed at least one of the main conclusions of the pessimists. The belief in the immortality of the soul owes much of its force to the profoundly pessimistic conviction that life as it stands is not worth the living, but is an experience to be borne as patiently as may be in the hope that something better may yet reward our present suffering. The very article of faith which has perhaps done more than anything else to convince men of a moral purpose in life springs largely from the conclusion that without that faith there is no evident moral purpose in the universe at all. Pessimism has in this case provided its own antidote, and called a new world into being to redress the balance of the old.

But there have been times when large masses of men have acquiesced in pessimism as the only rational outlook on life, when disastrous experience has seemed to show that the bulk of the human race was bound to suffer, and the sight of their evil fate led to a belief in the innate depravity of our species which left its mark for generations in the discipline of nurseries and prisons, and is still reflected in the demand for a servant's 'references,' for fidelity guarantees, and documented history. When floods, pestilence, or famine have overwhelmed a country, the whole community has sought the cause, not in its own ignorance of irrigation or hygiene or agriculture, but in the existence of malignant powers, supernatural because invisible; or has even credited nature itself with malignant properties that could only be controlled by the propitiation of those still higher powers which created the universe and for some mysterious purpose permitted these evils to exist. Man has terrified himself with his own fancies, and he does so still. Our ancestors ascribed their physical evils to maleficent spirits; some of our scientific contemporaries, baffled in their psychical researches,

hastily attribute their failure to imps and demons of the same essential character.

In most cases, however, the effects of such calamitites are transient. The worst disaster England ever suffered was the Black Death, which swept away a third of the population in a year or two; but the next generation produced the gay insouciance of the 'Canterbury Tales.' The natural resilience of human beings and our God-given faculty of forgetfulness soon restore the normal way of life; only in the case of Russia perhaps have the misery, hunger, and oppression which have been the common lot from one generation to another produced a profound and permanent pessimism reflected throughout her literature, her music, and her art.

But such disasters, which were not infrequent when life was so continuously menaced that its very foundations were insecure, nevertheless left one deep impression in the mind of man—a persistent conviction of his insignificance and impotence. The belief in fate, the will of Allah, the mysterious chastenings of a divine providence, all testify to this feeling; and to comfort or reassure themselves against these buffetings men have created the pleasant myth of a Golden Age, a theory which does at least link our past with the immortal gods, in compensation for our present too evident exclusion from those august circles. From Hesiod to Pascal the weight of surrounding evil has been explained—if it has been explained—by the doctrine that man has fallen from primitive bliss and is expiating his ancestral crime, from which some day perhaps, purged and purified, he may hope to return to his original high estate, the deformed transformed, the remittance man become the heir of the demesne. But this ultimate restoration is seemingly a subsequent and not very convincing afterthought, a concession to that very human desire for a happy ending which the critics tell us spoils all the best stories. The theory of the Golden Age is indeed essentially a creation of the pessimists, since it implies the deterioration of the race; only the optimist rejects the belief that we are degenerate and holds fast to the creed of progressive development. In that sense modern evolutionary science is emphatically optimist; and, in fact, as we conquer the

world we talk less about our impotence, and the Golden Age is transferred from the past to the future. It is never in the present; on that one point both pessimist and optimist are perforce agreed.

Religion is inevitably deeply concerned in this matter, but only one of the great religions of the world has definitely adopted the pessimistic theory that life is an evil from which man continually seeks deliverance by absorption into Nirvana. Islam, as a militarist and crusading creed, is essentially and emphatically optimist. The record of Christianity is more chequered, as was to be expected in a belief which has not only inspired but has itself been influenced by the philosophies of so many different races. The Christianity of the Gospels, it is true, knows nothing of pessimism. The stern and jealous tribal God of the Old Testament, Who created man only to place temptation in his path from which it was foreseen that he would fall, Who created His children so that the great majority were doomed to live and die without the law, has vanished utterly or is at least transformed unrecognizably into a God of Love, without whose knowledge not a single sparrow can fall to the ground; a deity whose forgiveness is illimitable, Who delights in little children, yet Who sacrifices and degrades His own Son to redeem a world which, had it not been for the inexplicable riddle, would not have needed redemption. But on that central riddle of life the Gospels are silent. They accept the existence of evil, to which even God incarnate is subject; they do not explain it.

The standpoint of the Epistles, though slightly modified, is fundamentally the same. In the Epistles, as in the Gospel of St. John, the love of God is still the dominant fact in the new world; to St. Paul, who places the love of man above either faith or hope, the love of God was one of those essential things from which nothing should separate the believer. But already it is not to St. Paul, as it is to St. John, an entirely self-evident proposition. That contradictory intellect, which can ascend in a flash from a trivial discussion on the ritual of circumcision to the highest flight of argument, grasps the existence of evil and the sorrow which encompasses

the world as a grave stumbling-block. The eternal riddle, which must have puzzled the mythical Adam in Mesopotamia and may still elude the last of his descendants as the tired earth falls downwards to the welcoming breast of its mother the sun, has begun consciously to assert itself again in the Epistle to the Romans. The problem of the existence of evil is stated, but certainly not solved, by St. Paul; the question of its origin he avoids altogether, or rather he adopts the old pentateuchal theory as it stood. The whole matter had been far more boldly, although not very convincingly, argued by the later Hebrew sages of the post-exilic period; but these chapters in Romans are perhaps logically the least satisfactory part of the writings of a man who was inferior as a logician to our own Bishop Butler, although he had a gift of unforgettable and inspiring phrase which the admirable bishop never possessed. One cannot help wondering how this Epistle would have read if it had been written by a Christianized Aristotle; it would certainly have lacked the colour and passionate conviction which the Apostle gave; but it might conceivably have gained a cohesion and depth that would have been serviceable in the difficult philosophical struggles which early Christianity had to face.

The silence of the New Testament on these matters could have been repaired by subsequent divines; its positive teaching was more difficult to explain. It is rather curious that in three different aspects that teaching was implicitly pessimistic, and that each of those aspects played some part in the development of Christianity. St. Paul incorporated predestination into Christian doctrine; St. John foreshadowed antichrist; and both St. Paul and St. John anticipated the speedy end of the world. To none of these doctrines could an avowed optimist give a ready or unconditional assent.

The fact that early Christianity looked forward to the speedy end of the world with evident desire seems a very curious phenomenon, and perhaps not least from the circumstance that in all these predictions the end was catastrophic. The slow cooling of an exhausted planet, the gradual shrinkage of an enfeebled civilization, did

not present itself as an alternative; the imagined end was always sudden and violent. It was the dramatic faculty, proverbially strong among the Jews and Greeks, asserting itself; but it would not have been currently received had not the Christian congregations taken over from the Jews—whose later eschatology was saturated with this imagery—a pessimistic conviction of the hopelessness of improving the existing conditions of mankind.

There are signs of a struggle between common sense and ideals, in this as in other matters. It soon became evident that prophecies of disaster had their disadvantages. Those ecclesiastical statesmen who were pressing for a definite system of government must have been considerably hampered in their aims by the widespread expectation of an early end of the world; the administration of property cannot, to say the least, have been expedited by this belief, and the proverbial opposition of priest and prophet was no doubt accentuated by this mundane consideration. But as the predictions delayed their fulfilment, the constitutional party naturally gained in strength, and the exponents of prophecy seem to have sought a different and less easily disproved hypothesis. The vague and mystical figure of antichrist was identified with several of the emperors with apparent justification; but when the weapon of persecution fell from the hands of the pagans into the more formidable armoury of the triumphant Christians, the symbol of antichrist was found too convenient to be abolished. Successive generations of Christians hurled it at one another, but since Mahomet, the Guelphs and Ghibellines, and, finally, the very Pope himself became the target, its effectiveness as a controversial weapon seems to have diminished. It is one of the ironies of ecclesiastical history that Cardinal Newman once preached a sermon identifying the Pope with antichrist. Needless to say, it was in his Anglican days.

But the young religion had more formidable opponents than the Roman Emperors; it had to combat an acute spiritual infection. Against the subtle theories of the Gnostics it waged a long campaign which ended in the utter destruction of those powerful sects—destruction so complete that even their sacred literature has perished

and many of their principles are now a matter of conjecture. The dualistic system on which the Gnostics based themselves sprang directly from a study of the origin of evil, but by some strange perversion of thought they held that God Himself had fallen from good, and by His fall had animated matter, the essential evil.* In previous systems man alone had fallen, and the innate depravity of his descendants was harmonized with the idea of justice by the necessity for punishment This remained true, whether the fall of man was traced to his own act, as in the early Jewish historians, or to the cohabitation of the daughters of man with the angels—a theory slightly mentioned in Genesis, but considerably developed by the post-exilic writers. But the terrible creed of the Gnostics involved God Himself in the general ruin, and made the Creator responsible for, and precedent to, the catastrophe of the creature. The Gnostics envisaged a world without hope, or as nearly without hope as human beings can tolerate, for they allowed an alleviating doctrine of spiritual escape. From their theory it followed that the physical body of man, being animate matter, was the essential evil which imprisoned the spirit. And they carried the hypothesis to its logical conclusion. The continued propagation of mankind being one of the main causes of the persistence of evil, the Gnostics advised unbridled prostitution in order that propagation might cease and the race die out. It was probably that logical conclusion which brought a revulsion from their teaching. No more hideous nightmare has ever afflicted the human imagination, and it is curious that it should have fermented at a time which Gibbon maintains to have been one of the few periods of absolute contentment that the world has known. If those doctrines had

* It was in a disgusting, pestilent village of Eastern Europe some years ago that the idea struck me that the persistent belief in the evilness of matter may originally have sprung from the sight of unswept streets, decaying refuse, etc., inducing a dawning consciousness of the evil of dirt, and disease which spring from dirt. Unfortunately men turned to metaphysics to explain, and not to sanitation to abolish it. If Plato had been a sanitary engineer, how different might the world have been!

triumphed, humanity would have committed suicide—indeed it would have been the only thing to do, since otherwise humanity would have gone mad. This fundamental misanthropy of the Gnostics was the cause or the consequence—it is impossible to say which—of a pessimism beside which the calm stoicism of Ecclesiastes is a lyrical joy; it can be compared for horror only to some of those repulsive practices of the old Mexican rituals, the mere reading of which seems to freeze the brain.

Against this system Christianity did instant and courageous battle, and it performed perhaps the greatest of its many services to the world by conquering and by extirpating it. Probably Christianity, as a practical working system of holiness, routed Gnosticism as a practical working system of evil; and the bulk of humanity, being decent people in the mass, preferred a creed which maintained the noble hypothesis that the body is the temple of the Holy Ghost to one which maintained the ignoble hypothesis that the flesh is evil and the source of all evil.

But the battle was not won when Gnosticism was defeated, for the Manichean theory which succeeded it was the pale shadow of a decadent Gnosticism. It too was pessimistic; for it held that while the creation of the world was due to good spirits, man himself was created by evil spirits. It was not God but Satan who had made man in his image, and although the good spirits had from the first taken man under their protection, the evil ancestry was still instinct and ineradicable. Again Christianity triumphed, but this time it emerged scarred and wounded from the fight. From the Manicheans it obtained by conversion its first and one of its greatest philosophers; but sincere as the conversion undoubtedly was, it was not complete. From the tainted Manichean atmosphere of Africa came Augustine with exaggerated doctrines of original sin and predestination;* from Britain

* A curious passage of the 'Confessions' shows that unnatural vice and sexual perversions were rife at Carthage in Augustine's youth. It is very possible that disgust at the prevalent excesses was the origin, or perhaps the proof, of the Manichean theory.

came his contemporary Pelagius with the masculine heresy of freewill and the liberty of man to work out his own salvation. It was precisely the doctrine that one would expect from this freedom-loving, optimistic island; but, unfortunately, Pelagius was the lesser man, and he and his theory paid the penalty of condemnation. That forgotten heretic has had his revenge. Under the influence of Geneva, he was dutifully repudiated as a 'vain talker' by the Anglican Church a thousand years later, but every Englishman to-day is an obstinate Pelagian at heart. Our stiff-necked race would rather go to hell of its own free will than to heaven by predestination.

Various by-products of these disputes had important social consequences. The Gnostic and Manichean theories naturally led to a low opinion of woman; for, if man was evil from his very conception, how much more must the mother of man be evil? Some trace of this idea certainly transferred itself to Christianity as the ascetic movement gained in strength; but it was counteracted by the growing cult of the Virgin Mary, which added enormously to the dignity of woman as it gained full weight and consistency. If Eve had been the mother of man in the Jewish creed, Mary was the mother of God in the Catholic faith; the mother, too, without the interposition of man. (The Christian doctrine, it may be noted, was the exact opposite of the Greek legend; the goddess of wisdom was the daughter of a male without a mother.) The cult of the Virgin, apart from the mystic element with which it surrounded woman, gave her a spiritual exaltation against which all the strange excesses of the ascetic, whether male or female, in the long run beat in vain.

The feminist question is not new; nothing is. (It is the pessimist Ecclesiastes who laments the monotony of history.) The most superficial study of early Christianity shows that the problem of sex was as formidable, possibly even as attractive, to the austere fathers of the Church as to the lady novelist of yesterday; a great silent battle was fought over women's rights in those early times, in which on the whole women won. Their place in the Christian system has never been successfully challenged:

it is the great heathens of the modern world, like Schopenhauer, who regard woman as essentially evil, but in this matter centuries of Christians have accepted the sturdy common sense of St. Paul that woman is good but inferior to man, and it has yet to be demonstrated that Mrs. Pankhurst will depose the Apostle. He wrote without a trace of mystical feeling in his message, as one who was not greatly interested in the relations of the sexes; but the by no means enthusiastic manner in which he spoke of matrimony certainly gave some countenance to the monastic movement. The ascetic tendency undoubtedly had a pessimistic aspect, inasmuch as every devotee who withdrew himself from the world of action tacitly admitted the impossibility of bettering that world. Unhappily, there must have been many periods when this standpoint was merely a recognition of the obvious. It must be admitted, however, that the monastic attitude, which sprang from the arid cult of virginity, developed a strong spiritual aspect not without its compensations for the evils that incidentally arose from its impossible standard —evils remarked by Dante and every mediæval writer. The beautiful legends of Percival and Galahad were fathered in the cloisters, and the Sangreal is the one epic of virginity.

Christianity as a whole, however, was neither pessimistic nor optimistic. It accepted things as they were, good and evil as substantial realities; it loved its saints and hated its devils with a very human passion; it became a practical system of living which few indeed could aspire to fulfil, but which all could imitate or attempt to imitate. From this attitude of tacit or reverential acquiescence towards life and the unseen powers, developed another with more sinister consequences—the doctrine that it is not for man to inquire too closely into the mysteries which surround him and which must ever be impenetrable to his inferior senses. The theory that there are set limits to human knowledge which cannot be surmounted—probably the original form of conservative thought on this planet—emerged very early; it can at least claim respectable antiquity on its behalf, and its supporters have been able to invoke the most august authority for their views.

The tree of knowledge was forbidden to Adam. The builders of Babel were scattered, not because they adopted a primitive form of life assurance, as the popular theory holds, but because they attempted to pass the limits of human achievement: 'This is what they have begun to 'do, and *now nothing will be withholden from them which 'they purpose to do,*' are the precise words which the author of the Pentateuch puts into the mouth of God Himself. The Greeks admitted the same idea: Prometheus was bound as the dispenser of those forbidden gifts to man, which would have given a purpose to

> 'The blind and aimless strivings,
> The barren blank endeavours,
> The pithless deeds of the fleeting, dreamlike race.'

It cannot be said that this pessimistic theory finds much support in the New Testament. There are, indeed, passages indicative of contempt for human learning in comparison with omnipotent wisdom. These expressions have frequently been used by zealous bigots to justify their persecutions; but the main fault is with the bigot, not the text, and the advocate of freedom of inquiry could have found at least as good support for his view. Unfortunately the letter of a text has too often prevailed over the spirit of a whole Epistle, and there have been long periods when official Christianity has steadily opposed any advancement of learning.

This prejudice was probably due in the earliest times to the fact that the young religion found most of the intellectual men of the day outside its ranks, and mildly contemptuous if not actually hostile; it opposed the learning of the pagan world, but that was practically all the learning there was at that time. A backwater left by this current, which regarded all pagan literature and art as the creation of Satan, remained obstinately stagnant, and its pestilent vapours are still occasionally visible; but it has seldom stirred the main stream of life, and the classics have had an ample revenge. Dante indeed placed Virgil in hell as a concession to theology, but he followed his master thither in proof of his devotion —surely the most flattering literary criticism on record;

and Aristotle became the intellectual apostle of mediæval Christianity. It is the rare tribute of the victor to the vanquished.

Against new inquiries a more persistent warfare has been waged, as the names of Roger Bacon, Bruno, Galileo, and a hundred smaller men attest. Perhaps the enmity is instinctive, and its working is as visible in the records of Puritanism as of Catholicism. Every creed relies on authority, and must therefore distrust any system independent of that authority; if the two conflict it will naturally rely on its authority to 'chastise error.' But that is by no means a full statement of the case. It is the fact that in most of these conflicts the orthodox side is the popular side, and the authority which burnt the heretics probably knew that it was backed by the democratic public opinion of the day.

The tendency to persecute knowledge, or at least inquiry, is in itself a form of pessimism, for it assumes that man has reached his limits; even men of science have not always been exempt from the idea that the unknown may prove the unknowable. That there are limits to man's actual and present knowledge is of course a platitude, but that there are limits to his potential capacity is an entirely different assumption, and those who hold this view are not likely to add much to the stock of knowledge or human achievement. Fortunately, the insatiable curiosity of our race fights a slowly winning battle against an assumption which has been invoked in opposition to the experiments in medical and mechanical science that have given us chloroform, railways, and human flight. In this matter ignorance and superstition fight a constant rearguard action against knowledge. Their defeats have been many and cumulative; their rare victories have been disastrous, since each has checked or destroyed a civilization.

In our times these disputes on the origin of evil and the range of human knowledge have assumed other forms without finding a solution. Our science is speculative within the limits it has set itself, but beyond those limits it has not often strayed. Huxley, who was a philosopher as well as a man of science, could not get further than the statement that 'infinite benevolence need not have

'invented pain and sorrow at all—infinite malevolence 'would very easily have deprived us of the large measure 'of content and happiness that fall to our lot. The 'wealth of superfluous loveliness in the world condemns 'pessimism. It is a hopeless riddle.' In one respect, however, science echoes the tacit pessimism of early Christianity, and contemplates the eventual destruction of the world, not indeed by some catastrophic agency or external interposition, but by the slow and imperceptible, but nevertheless cumulative and in the end decisive, loss of cosmic energy in the planet itself. If it be true, as Kelvin stated, that 'within a finite period 'of time past, and within a finite period of time future, 'the earth has been, and will again be, uninhabitable 'for man as at present constituted'—then all our efforts must at length be in vain, and man is doomed to destruction as surely as the mammoth which he has survived, or the fly whose evanescence he has turned into a proverb, but which may in the end survive him.

Fortunately most of us stop short of these ultimate considerations, and for the mass the choice between optimism and pessimism is determined by present conditions of life. The decision is partly a matter of experience and partly of temperament, and whole nations sway towards one view or the other: it is not by accident that we find our pessimistic philosophers in Germany, our pessimistic novelists in Russia, our pessimistic dramatists in Scandinavia. These countries have no comedy; it is among the nations which have clung to the sunny side of the street, the Greeks, the Italians, and the French, that comedy and optimism keep company together. No pessimist can really enjoy the roaring fun of Aristophanes or Rabelais; his only solace in all Latin literature would be Don Quixote, which has the unique quality of being extraordinarily comic or the very reverse, according to one's humour. The optimist laughs consumedly over the perpetual blunders of the last of the knight-errants; but the pessimist sighs at the failure of the ideal in an eternally commonplace world.

Pessimism is emphatically not an English characteristic, because it is the outcome of the passive, contemplative

mind, and our English nature is essentially active; we shall produce a dozen Darwins before a single Buddha. The active mind may often be melancholy, and its ineffectual revolt against the harsh bonds of time and circumstance, which we call fate, furnishes the very staff of tragedy; but pessimism scarcely ever. Englishmen enjoy life, but they enjoy it because they have so much to do, hardly because they have so much to think about. We can reverence a saint, but the great contemplative orders of the Catholic Church have had few followers in England, and the typical figure in our religious life is not the ecstatic but the missionary who carries his creed to the ends of the earth.

The missionary is the adventurer type in religion, as the explorer and settler are the adventurer types which play so great a part in our secular history. These can never be pessimists. They may be restless and discontented, but it is only with the narrow world of home; the man who seeks the promised land over the next mountain range, or sets out to find an earthly paradise across the next sea, can hardly be a pessimist. It may be said that these are exceptions, and we must look for our pessimists among those who stay at home and fail. So be it. The youth who starts out to make a name and ends by being glad if he can make a living—it is the common tragedy of mediocre middle-age—may lose his ideals, his soul may decay, he may increasingly substitute the pass-book for the book of life—but it is to material comfort he becomes wedded, not to pessimism. It is true that that may be the greater damnation.

Our politics are saturated with optimism. Every general election is a competition in optimism; each party promises a short cut to the millennium, and every government falls because it too evidently fails to get there. The socialist looks for a better world if his theories of human society are accepted. A belief in progress is the very foundation of liberalism, and only an optimist believes in progress. The conservative is less inclined to optimism about the future, because he is bound to hold that things are very well as they are; but this profession, although it may be qualified by regret for the disappear-

ance of the 'good old days,' that last shrunken relic of the theory of a Golden Age, is a whole continent removed from pessimism. And since no Englishman will ever believe that a political evil is irremediable, no Englishman can ever be a political pessimist, for it is only the pessimist who acquiesces in evil.

The great forces which mould society are often beyond the power, or at least the ability, of statesmen to control, but every individual, in our English view, has a reasonable chance of controlling his own destiny. The Utopia which More created for the nation, he rightly placed in nowhere, since there only could it exist; but the Utopia which any individual creates for himself he has a fair chance of realizing. The firm belief of Englishmen that a man's career lies in his own hands to make or mar has done not a little to make careers and not to mar them. It is indeed the very essence of optimism. Faith in ourselves makes us masters of our fate. The axiom that things are what they are, and that they will be what they will be, may pass in the schools, but in practical life the victory is to the man who holds that things will be what he wills them to be.

Since our literature covers a wider field than our politics, it is less consistently optimist. But there is little actual pessimism in English writers, although most of what little there is was concentrated by a curious perversity in that most cheerful and complacent of centuries, the eighteenth. Young's 'Night Thoughts,' Blair's 'Grave,' and Gray's 'Elegy' are all sombre, melancholy, resigned; genius has saved the last from neglect, but the first has been willingly, the second even hastily, allowed to die. One of the wisest books, not only in English but in all literature, is the 'Vanity of Human Wishes'; it and its companion 'Rasselas,' are among the few authentic utterances of true pessimism in our language. It is probably for that reason that they are little read, and not because of their style, as was suggested by Macaulay, the typical cocksure optimist of the typical cocksure age of optimism.

Milton, despite his misfortunes, was no pessimist—'All 'is best, though oft we doubt, What the unsearchable 'dispose, Of highest wisdom brings about'—and there is

only one line of real pessimism in Dryden, the magnificent

'Who would live past lives again?'

but elsewhere his masculine spirit has the sturdy English ring. The shallow philosophizing of his chronological successor Pope never touched so deep a note in all his thousand couplets of sham metaphysics; but Pope's contemporary Swift was a true pessimist, and nothing shows more completely the thorough-going cheerfulness of the English character than the fact that it has persistently regarded the mighty dean as a comic writer for children, or that Macaulay, who actually ranked him lower than the trivial Addison, seems never to have suspected that one of the most terrific satires in all literature was anything more than the clownish pose of a discontented priest. That Macaulay should have been wrong is not very astonishing, but it is rather curious that none of his contemporaries should have seen he was wrong. Perhaps the Victorians believed he was right; they were so far removed from pessimism that they could not recognize it when they saw it.

What they would have said to Thomas Hardy one can only conjecture. There is tragedy, or at least melancholy, even in his comedy: in his tragedy the darkness is unrelieved. He is our one real pessimist, and for that reason probably he is read far less than his inferiors; but even his steadfast admirers are sometimes disconcerted, not so much by the stark brutality of the 'Satires of 'Circumstance' as by the occasional sudden withdrawal of the veil that shrouds the author's philosophy. One instance will suffice. In that marvellous book, 'Jude 'the Obscure,' occurs the unforgettable phrase, 'the coming 'universal wish not to live.' Does one Englishman in a million find this true? I doubt it.*

* Two minor pessimists may be added to the list—Crabbe and Piers the Plowman. The latter's view of life was probably coloured by the Black Death and the social unrest caused by its economic consequences. Crabbe, like Hardy and the melancholy Piers, lived close to the soil—a coincidence from which the literary critic might have drawn considerable deductions had not Johnson, our other pessimist, lived in Fleet Street, most optimistic of thoroughfares.

On the contrary, our representative men have enjoyed their life intensely, and faced death, that supreme test of all our philosophy, like men—if not always with the exultant courage of Grenville or the wit of More or Raleigh, at least with the stoicism of a Cromwell, who 'would 'have stayed a little to be useful, but God's will be 'done.' Only Clive, of all the company of great Englishmen, grew tired of life and committed suicide; and precisely as to die for an ideal may be the highest form of optimism, so the suicide confesses himself on the very extreme of pessimism.

Perhaps our national attitude to life is best illustrated in the anecdote of Cecil Rhodes, one of the most typical Englishmen of any age. Almost his last words were, 'So little done, so much to do'; but in the very heyday of his career some years before, while confessing himself uncertain of a future life, he said, 'If I were to 'go before the Almighty to-morrow, and He were to 'tell me He thought I had acted very badly at times . . . 'well, I should be prepared to have it out with Him.' The Englishman, in fact, is so certain of his own purpose in life that it is incredible to him that God should not also have a purpose—and scarcely less incredible that His purpose should not be ours. And this is the ultimate triumph of optimism, for at bottom the controversy between optimist and pessimist is whether there is a purpose in the world or not.

A. Wyatt Tilby.

RELIGION AND PATRIOTISM

1. **Historical Memoirs respecting the English, Irish, and Scottish Catholics, from the Reformation to the Present Time.** By CHARLES BUTLER, of Lincoln's Inn. John Murray. 1819.
2. **Supplementary Memoirs of English Catholics, addressed to Charles Butler, Esq.** By the Rev. J. M., D.D. (John Milner). London. 1820.
3. **The History of Catholic Emancipation.** By W. J. AMHERST, S.J. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1886.
4. **Vaticanism. An Answer.** By the Right Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE.
5. **The Life of Sir Thomas More.** By the Rev. T. E. BRIDGETT. Burns & Oates. 1871.
6. **Le Bienheureux Thomas More.** By HENRI BRÉMOND. Victor Lecoffre. 1904.

RECENT events have roused an old cry, an old accusation, an old suspicion: the cry of No-Popery; the accusation of Ultramontanism; the suspicion that Roman Catholics lie under the burden of an obligation which conflicts with their duty as citizens.

By the cry of No-Popery I mean the words in their literal sense, as a protest against all action of the Head of the Catholic Church in matters that regard our national welfare: matters in which he has no true concern. By the accusation of Ultramontanism I mean the charge of admitting a foreign element into our lives as citizens. When I speak of an old suspicion I mean the prejudice against a spiritual power that might be exercised for temporal ends; the fear that religious authority may take advantage of its immunity from civil control to advance its own political aims, and that those subject to it may deem themselves under the obligation to obey a religious superior in matters that regard their character as citizens of a State.

This war has brought us within the range of things with which we thought our acquaintance had long been closed; indeed, hardly closed, for they seemed to belong to a chapter that was ended before we were born. And now it has brought to the Catholics of England the memory of a charge they never

thought to hear again : the charge of being a danger to the State ; the argument that our religious professions are not consistent with perfect loyalty to our country, that if we are perfectly correct Catholics we cannot be perfectly reliable citizens.

There is an answer to this charge which many Catholics are making with perfect ease. They are declaring their repudiation of the line of conduct followed by the Irish clergy ; they are confessing their disappointment at the absence of any sign of disapproval, on the part of the Holy See, of German violence and pride and ambition. But this answer is not adequate or sufficient. It is an answer dependent on their policy and conviction in regard to the practical questions at issue ; it is not an answer to the objection by which they are confronted. Were they inclined to doubt the wisdom or the justice of the Conscription Bill for Ireland, they would not meet the charge in the way that they have done.

As I have said, it is an old accusation with which we are dealing ; one that has been rebutted in various ways, denied by Catholics, despised and condemned by Protestants, but it has never been satisfactorily quashed ; nor will the spectre be finally laid to rest until both accusers and accused realize how fundamental are the principles involved.

English dread of Roman Catholicism—that dread which beset and delayed the process of Emancipation—is grounded on the belief that the absolutist monarchical form of the Roman Catholic Church is a menace to State authority. Even the spiritual power of the Pope might complicate our political life, but the danger is tenfold greater from the fact that the Pope claims temporal as well as spiritual authority, and a kind of super-temporal authority into the bargain. He is, as all Catholics admit, their supreme spiritual ruler ; he is also a temporal sovereign in claim and desire, if not in fact ; he is, lastly, and this is the point of greatest moment, a ruler who maintains the right to prescribe political conduct in so far as it may subserve spiritual ends ; to claim Catholics as subjects to the Papacy in addition to their character as citizens of the State to which they belong.

Now England is the first country in the world to recognize the rights of conscience ; and perhaps, for this very reason, is the country in which the misgivings which thus

arise would become most acute. For what is the position, if Catholics were to grant the full creed of Ultramontanism as the English mind here conceives it? The position is that, as all persons of religious mind will admit, a spiritual duty is higher than a political one. Hence, given that our religious duty as Catholics is found to conflict with our national duty as Englishmen; given that the lord of our souls asks of us something contrary to the demands of our civil rulers; our conscience will teach us to obey the former rather than the latter. Hence, says the Englishman, we are not always to be trusted, for, if we do as we think we ought to do, we are morally bound to be politically untrustworthy.

It follows that Catholics can give no final and satisfactory answer to the charge that periodically confronts them without a more serious examination of their real belief in these matters. The question of Ultramontanism, in its extreme form, has to be faced, and, with it, the whole question of religious and ecclesiastical authority. We can be content with vague ideas on the subject until we are brought in contact with a live and concrete difficulty; until the question of authority, and its limits, affects our own lives and interests, and not merely the ideas and convictions of others, or fields of knowledge and life in which we have no part or interest.

We shall find, when we examine the subject more deeply, that it is not only in religious matters that the problem exists; that a certain Ultramontanism has a part in political as well as religious life; that there, too, the problem has been neglected, to the injury of our political welfare. We shall find, in fact, that ideas are more influential than the English mind perceives, and that they will make their way to the surface in the shape of physical forces when their spiritual import is not recognized.

Let us now glance through the history of Roman Catholicism in a non-Catholic England, and see how this charge of disloyalty has worked itself out; often forgotten, frequently repudiated, but never finally dissolved.

Setting aside the more brutal personal motives of Henry VIII., the severance from Rome was begun and completed in resentment at foreign interference, and from the ambition to make our kingdom a perfectly self-contained State. Ultramontane influences have been so persistently exercised over the

Catholic mind in England, since 1870, that few English Catholics now realize how much less plain and defined was the position of the Holy See in relation to the Church in England when Sir Thomas More died rather than deny the Papal Supremacy, than it has now become.

One of the noblest and most pathetic features of his attitude was its undogmatic character. He would not condemn the opinion contrary to his own; he endeavoured to win no one to his side; but he refused to say anything but what he deemed right and true.

By an irony of fate it was the king who first confirmed his belief in a doctrine which the king afterwards required him to repudiate:

'I was myself sometime not of the mind that the primacy of that See should be begun by the institution of God, until that I read in that matter those things that the King's Highness had written in his most famous book against the heresies of Martin Luther. At the first reading whereof I moved the King's Highness either to leave out that point, or else to touch it more slenderly, for doubt of such things as after might hap to fall in question between His Highness and some Pope, as between princes and popes divers times have done. . . .

'But surely after that I had read his Grace's book therein, and so many other things as I have seen in that point . . . I have not read in any approved doctor of the Church that a temporal lord could or ought to be head of the spirituality. . . .

'I say further that your statute is ill made, because you have sworn never to do anything against the Church, which, through all Christendom, is one and undivided, and you have no authority, without the common consent of all Christians, to make a law or Act of Parliament or Council against the union of Christendom.'

The two great principles which More here sets forth are, first, the distinction between spiritual and temporal authority, and the importance of that distinction; secondly, that of the union and solidarity of Christendom, a union that would be sacrificed by any branch of the Church that set up a supreme and final authority of its own and repudiated the common head and ruler.

The characteristic English dread of Roman Catholicism is grounded on the suspicion of any admixture of spiritual authority in temporal affairs; the danger that presented itself to the mind of Sir Thomas More was that of the lessening of the spiritual character of religion by the influence of temporal

authority. The specifically English dislike of the intrusion of any foreign element into national affairs inspired the ambition to form a State that should be as independent in ecclesiastical as in political matters; the belief that the universal character of Christianity could not be reconciled with the national character of a separate Church inspired Sir Thomas More's distrust of such a scheme. Never was there an Englishman of more truly English temper, never was there a Catholic more stalwart in his Catholicism, yet this Englishman died for his opposition to the first making of an English Church, and this Catholic died the loyal subject of his king, the lover of his native land. Yet he died under a charge of treason, and from then, onwards, this was the charge that Protestant Englishmen brought against their Roman Catholic countrymen, until their final emancipation, and even afterwards. They might declare their loyalty as often as they chose, but they were told that they had another master in the Pope, and that even though this master were spiritual, and not temporal, yet he was but a man, and was, at the same time, the lord of their conscience, and therefore the lord of their conduct. Hence it became the ever-recurring task of English Catholics to prove that the authority of the Pope had nothing to do with their life as citizens, and that their religious obedience to the Head of their Church could not conflict with their political duty to their sovereign.

The question was, as I have said, more open to discussion in those days than it now seems to the ordinary Catholic mind. The position of the Holy See was less defined, the claims of the English Church were more ambiguous. Furthermore, as has always been the case in religious warfare, there were other than purely religious questions at stake. In the first instance, the marriage of Henry VIII. with Anne Boleyn had raised the question of lawful succession, and later on a like complication arose in regard to the Stuarts. There was thus, in the mind of Protestant rulers, a valid excuse for uneasiness and suspicion. Religious discontent could find a pretext for rebellion which would not exist where the dynastic succession was entirely without flaw.

Yet, apart from these incidental aggravations, the distrust of English Catholics was politically grounded on the above stated charge of double and conflicting allegiance; the case

of Sir Thomas More was the case of subsequent Catholicism in England. In 1870, when dynastic disputes had long been laid to rest, the old accusation recurred in all its force, and was once more set forth by the pen of a Liberal statesman.

Glancing through the history of Roman Catholicism in England, from the time of Sir Thomas More, it is worth while to note a few salient examples of this theme, and to see how the charge was met by English Catholics.* First let us note the Bull issued by Pope Paul III., who, having inflicted the sentence of spiritual excommunication on King Henry VIII., proceeded to carry his action into the temporal domain by declaring him deposed from his throne, and absolving his subjects from their allegiance. Sir Thomas More was not alive to express an opinion on this event, but his double profession of spiritual independence and political loyalty leave us in no doubt as to what that opinion would have been.

Next we may note the oath prescribed in the reign of Elizabeth to every civil servant of the queen, who had to declare that :

'the queen's highness is the only supreme governor of this realm . . . as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things, or causes, as temporal ; and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate, hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm ; and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that, from henceforth, I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the queen's highness,' etc., etc.†

Of this oath Charles Butler writes :

'It has been sometimes contended that the pre-eminence, spiritual authority and spiritual jurisdiction, mentioned in the acts which conferred the supremacy upon Elizabeth, ought to be understood to denote only that pre-eminence, supremacy and jurisdiction which the clergy or their courts receive from the state ; and that the clauses in the acts, which deny the supremacy of the pope, were intended only to deny his right to that temporal power which the state, in consequence of its alliance with the Church, had conferred upon him.

'Those who contend for this construction of the oath cite

* These historical notes are drawn from the Memoirs of Charles Butler.

† 'Historical Memoirs.' Vol. I. p. 156.

what is termed the "admonition of Queen Elizabeth." In the very year in which the act enjoining the oath of supremacy was passed, Elizabeth published a body of "Regulations of the discipline and order of the Church." In one of those she professes to notice the misconstructions of her claims to the spiritual supremacy.'*

Our next landmark is the Bull of Pius V., in which the Pope,

'out of the fulness of his Apostolic power, declares Elizabeth, being an heretic, and a favourer of heretics, and her adherents in the matter aforesaid, to have incurred the sentence of anathema, and to be cut off from the unity of the body of Christ . . . and to be deprived of her pretended title to the kingdom aforesaid, and of all dominion, dignity and privilege whatsoever; and also the nobility, subjects and people of the said kingdoms, and all others which have in any sort sworn unto her to be for ever absolved from any such oath, and all manner of duty, of dominion, allegiance and obedience; and we also do, by the authority of these presents, absolve them and do deprive the same Elizabeth of her pretended right to the kingdom, and all other things aforesaid; and we do command and interdict all and every the noblemen, subjects, people and others aforesaid, that they presume not to obey her, or her monitions, mandates and laws, and those which shall do to the contrary we do innodate with the like sentence of anathema.'†

Here was indeed a good case against every Catholic in the realm: a case that has never been repudiated at the source from which it emanated.

In 1602 thirteen priests signed a protestation of allegiance, directed against such radical distrust of their loyalty as the claims set forth in the Bull of Pius V. seem to justify. In this act the signatories declare that though

'the pope should also excommunicate every one born within her majesty's dominions that would not forsake the foresaid defence of her majesty and her realms, and take part with such conspirators or invaders; in these and all other such like cases, we do think ourselves, and all the lay-catholics born within her majesty's dominions, bound in conscience not to obey this or any such like censure.'

They end with a profession of loyalty and obedience to the Holy See, and two of the signatories suffered death for their faith.‡ The oath of allegiance framed by James I. declares

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* 'Historical Memoirs.' Vol. I. pp. 158, 159.
† Ibid., pp. 194, 195.
‡ Ibid., pp. 262-267.

'that the pope, neither of himself, nor by any authority of the Church or see of Rome, or by any other means, with any other, hath any power or authority to depose the king, or to dispose of any of his majesty's kingdoms or dominions; or to authorize any foreign prince to invade or annoy him or his countries; or to discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance and obedience to his majesty; or to give license or leave to any of them to bear arms, raise tumults or to offer any violence or hurt to his majesty's royal person, state or government.'*

Now the object of this oath was, in the words of the king,

'to make a separation not only between all my good subjects in general and unfaithful traitors . . . but especially to make a separation between so many of my subjects who, though they were otherwise popishly affected, yet retained, in their hearts, the print of their natural duty to their sovereign.'†

This oath was condemned by Pope Paul V., and Catholics were forbidden to take it. This is not the place to enter on a discussion of the ensuing controversy, but it is plain that a chief question in point was that of the deposing power of the Holy See; and, once more, it was a charge of doubtful loyalty under which English Catholics continued to lie. As Charles Butler remarks:

'It is greatly to be lamented that, when on this and other similar occasions, the popes condemned the formularies of religious or civil opinion, which were tendered to the English Catholics, or framed by them, they did not specify the particular propositions to which they objected, and confine their condemnation of the formulary to these. . . . .

'In the dreadful state of persecution in which the English Catholics were then placed, and in which an absolute and unequivocal disclaimer of the pope's deposing power might have served them so essentially . . . was it quite just or quite humane for any pope to pronounce a formal condemnation of it?'‡

We now pass on to the time when English Catholics, and particularly Catholic laymen, began to take more independent action in the matter of their own political liberation: times of which the writer of the Memoirs, from which the above quotations are taken, had personal and direct knowledge.

In 1778 the Roman Catholic peers and commoners of Great Britain addressed a petition to His Majesty King George III.

* 'Historical Memoirs.' Vol. I., p. 311. † Ibid., p. 305.
‡ Ibid., Vol. II., pp. 19, 20.

In this petition they plead, first of all, for the right to approach the king in order to declare their allegiance and affection. They state that their dissent from the legal establishment in matters of religion is 'purely conscientious' and not political. They express their 'utter detestation of the designs and views 'of any foreign power against the dignity of his majesty's 'crown.'

The Relief Act of 1778, of which this petition was the prelude, was coupled with an oath of which Charles Butler gives the text; of which, significantly, his adversary, John Milner, in his attack on the Memoirs,* makes no mention whatever; and which the Rev. W. J. Amherst, S.J., also overlooks in his account of the Relief Act of 1778. Of this oath Charles Butler writes as follows:

'As soon as the terms of it were arranged, to the satisfaction of his majesty's ministers, it was communicated to the four Vicars Apostolic,† and admitted by them all. Lord Petre, and some other gentlemen, waited upon the late Bishop Challoner, and put it into his hands. He perused it, with great deliberation, and explicitly sanctioned it. He observed, however, that it contained some expressions contrary to the Roman style; that these might create difficulties at Rome, if Rome were consulted upon it before-hand; but that Rome would not object to the oath after the bill was passed. He therefore recommended to the gentlemen, who waited upon him, to avoid all unnecessary delay in procuring the act. This fact is known to every person who has lived in habits of intimacy with Lord Petre . . . the writer himself has frequently heard Lord Petre mention it.' ‡

Any person taking this oath did thereby 'renounce, 'reject and abjure the opinion that princes excommunicated 'by the pope and council, or by any authority whatsoever,

* See 'Supplementary Memoirs' by the Rev. J. M., D.D.

† These Vicars Apostolic were bishops *in partibus*, and carried out the episcopal duties of the Church of England until the re-establishment of the hierarchy.

‡ 'Historical Memoirs.' Vol. II., pp. 82, 83. Of this same Lord Petre, Charles Butler relates the following anecdote: In 1798, when there was fear of invasion, he raised, equipped, and trained, at his own expense, with leave of the government, a corps of 250 men for His Majesty's service, and asked that his son might be appointed to their command. His religion, however, was objected; so Lord Petre placed his corps at the disposal of the government, and his son served in it as a private.

'may be deposed or murdered by their subjects or any person 'whatsoever.'

Charles Butler remarks: 'A more complete and unre-'served disclaimer of the deposing doctrine, than is found in 'this oath, language cannot express.'*

On May 3rd, 1787, at a general meeting of English Catholics, it was decided to form a committee 'to watch over and promote 'the public interest of the English Roman Catholics.' This Committee was constituted, in the first instance, of laymen, viz., Lord Petre, Lord Stourton, Mr. Throckmorton, Sir Henry Charles Englefield, Mr. Fermor, Lord Clifford, Sir John Lawson, Sir William Jerningham, Mr. Thomas Hornyold, and Mr. John Towneley. These were the names of men who had borne with persecution and suffered under disabilities. They felt that the time had come to take their part once more in the life of their country. Mr. Charles Butler, writer of the Memoirs, was their secretary, and two bishops and a Benedictine monk were soon added to their numbers. Through this Committee a Memorial was presented to Mr. Pitt in 1788, on behalf of the Roman Catholic body in England. The Memorial makes reference to the oath above cited, and afterwards, in pursuance of Mr. Pitt's suggestion, three questions were submitted to certain Catholic Universities abroad, to which the following answers were obtained:

'1. That the pope, or cardinals, or any body of men, or any individual of the Church of Rome, has not, nor have, any civil authority, power, jurisdiction, or pre-eminence whatsoever, within the realm of England.

'2. That the pope, or cardinals, or any body of men, or any individual of the Church of Rome, cannot absolve or dispense his majesty's subjects from their oath of allegiance upon any pretext whatsoever.'

The third answer regards the keeping of faith with heretics.†

These events were followed by the signing of a Protestation, which became afterwards the subject of much dispute. The fact, however, remains that it was signed by the Catholic Committee, and also by the Vicars Apostolic. In this Protestation the Catholics of England once more repudiate the doctrine that the Pope has the right to absolve subjects from their

* 'Historical Memoirs.' Vol. II., pp. 84, 85. † Ibid., II., p. 108.

allegiance to their sovereign, or to oblige them to take up arms against the government of their land. They declare:

'Whereas we positively deny that we hold any such obedience to the pope, and general council, or to either of them. . . . We acknowledge no infallibility in the Pope; and we neither apprehend nor believe that our disobedience to any such orders or decrees (should any such be given or made) could subject us to any punishment whatsoever. And we hold and insist that the Catholic Church has no power that can, directly or indirectly, prejudice the rights of Protestants, inasmuch as it is strictly confined to the refusing to them a participation in her sacraments and other religious privileges of her communion, which no church (as we conceive) can be expected to give to those out of her pale and which no person out of her pale will, we suppose, ever require.'*

This Protestation was followed by the framing of a new oath, which was condemned by the Vicars Apostolic, though it is difficult to differentiate it from the Protestation which it embodied. It was at this stage of the proceedings that the lay and clerical elements of the Catholic party began to display their natural characteristics, and a figure arose, in the person of John Milner, to represent the traditional principles of the official Church.

For a further account of the controversy readers may be referred to the works quoted at the head of this article; they will probably find none more honest and reliable than the Memoirs of Charles Butler. The point of interest in our present discussion is the constantly recurring one of the rival claims of the spiritual and the civil power. The Catholic Committee, and the Cisalpine Club which succeeded it, represent the efforts of a faithful Catholic laity to distinguish their political from their ecclesiastical duties. Had they worked their way unchecked, they might have sacrificed the spiritual principle for which Sir Thomas More laid down his life. Had they implicitly accepted the dicta of their ecclesiastical superiors, they might have remained political nonentities. The characteristic of the struggle was its English sense of rightful independence, sometimes excessive, sometimes tainted by worldly considerations, but, on the whole, religiously sound and wholesome.

We may pass over further developments of the same theme,

* Ibid., II., pp. 115, 116.

and note the last great landmark—the upheaval caused by the definition of Papal Infallibility in 1870. For a lucid statement of the anti-Popery position we cannot turn to a better advocate than Mr. Gladstone, in his pamphlet 'Vaticanism.' He maintains that

'the name of Popery, which was formerly imposed *ad invidiam* by heated antagonists, and justly resented by Roman Catholics, appears now to be perhaps the only name which describes, at once with point and with accuracy, the religion promulgated from the Vatican in 1870.'

He holds that the admission of this doctrine by Catholics implies a denial of

'the pledges which were given by the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church to the Crown and State of the United Kingdom, and by means of which principally they obtained the remission of the penal laws, and admission to full civil equality.'

He maintains that

'the Vatican decrees do, in the strictest sense, establish for the Pope a supreme command over loyalty and civil duty.'

He adds:

'The question is not what the Pope will do, but what he *can* do, what he has power to do. . . . In all times, the lay Roman Catholics of England, as a body, have been unreservedly loyal. But they have been as eminently noted for their thorough estrangement from Ultramontane opinions; and their clergy, down to the period of the Emancipation Act, felt with them; though a school addicted to curialism and Jesuitism, thrust among them by Popes at the commencement of the period, first brought upon them grievous sufferings, then succeeded in attaching a stigma to their name, and now threatens gradually to accomplish a transformation of their opinions, with an eventual change in their spirit of which it is difficult to foresee the bounds.'

Mr. Gladstone sums up the question with which we are dealing in the following words:

'There exists no law wherever a living ruler, an executive head, claims and exercises and is allowed to possess a power of annulling or a power of dispensing with the law. . . . This exemption of the individual, be he who he may, from the restraints of the law is the very thing that in England we term absolutism. By absolutism we mean the superiority of a personal will to law, for the purpose of putting aside or changing law.'

During the years that have elapsed since Gladstone uttered his protest, his prophecy has been justified in one sense, but not in another.

'There is no escaping it, and no disguising it,' he wrote, 'the whole Christian religion, according to the modern Church 'of Rome, is in the breast of one man.'

As regards the faith of the ordinary Catholic of our days these words can be justified more fully than one has pleasure in admitting; but as regards the influence of this fact on Catholic patriotism, Gladstone's misgivings have proved fallacious.

In point of fact, if we look back on the history of the world, and even on the record of its religious wars, can it be said that religion has often got the better of patriotism? Has not religion subserved a national or political cause much oftener than it has overruled it? Dynastic disputes have called religion to their aid; political revolutions have been inflamed by religious differences; racial struggles have been embittered by religious variance; but religion alone has not alienated men in large numbers from their country or their rulers.

M. Loisy, in his recent work, 'La Religion,' points out that the creed in which Frenchmen have proved themselves best united is that of patriotism. Yet France was profoundly divided on religious questions before the war; and, what is more, those religious divisions coincided with political ones.

If, at the present moment, the Catholic Church in Ireland shows itself hostile to British interests, is this on religious or on racial grounds? Is religion the means or the end? Are its interests supreme? Is the church bell sounded for a spiritual end? or is religion simply subserving the political cause?

And yet, for all this, there is justice in Gladstone's charge; the question, he said, 'is not what the Pope will do, it is what 'he can do, what he has power to do.' In like manner we might say that it is not a question of what Catholics actually do, but of what, consistently with their creed, they can or ought to do. Is not Ultramontanism in itself, with its extreme presentment of papal claims, inconsistent with sound patriotism? Are not modern Catholics largely Ultramontane in belief and practice? And is it not from a happy inconsistency that their religion does not affect their loyalty?

Had not English Catholics themselves an instinctive sense of this danger when they set forth their 'protestations'; when they formed their 'Cisalpine' clubs and meetings; when they even attempted the excessive measure of adopting a new religious appellation?

Gladstone was right in theory; and, indeed, right in fact as regarded the purely religious evolution of the Catholic mind. To quote his words again:

'Every father of a family, and every teacher in the Latin communion, shall, as he dies, be replaced by some one more deeply imbued with the new colour, until at the last, in that moiety of the whole Christian family, nothing shall remain except an Asian monarchy; nothing but one giddy height of despotism and one dead level of religious subserviency.'

But, as regards the political results, Gladstone was mistaken. And why? Because although, in men of religious temperament, religion is the deepest instinct of life, and the one that inspires all the rest, that deepest instinct lies deeper than the semi-religious creeds of Ultramontanism or Cisalpinism. Because, furthermore, there is, in the sound lay mind, and particularly in the mind of the English layman, a sense of the conflicting claims of religious and civil authority that may be dim at times, but that wakes to life in periods of stress and storm. Because, lastly, we are all of us moved by ideas much deeper and more complex than our professions, and because Catholicism is a greater and more potent idea than Ultramontanism, just as patriotism is a greater and more potent idea than party.

As Gladstone said, the essence of absolutism is the setting of an individual above the law. But Ultramontanism implies more than the doctrine of absolutism. Other of its vices are its repudiation of individual responsibility; its suspicious attitude towards ideas; its dread of all progress that implies change; its worship of privilege and vested rights; its content with what is, its distrust of all that is to be.

Ultramontanism will hold to its own until suppressed ideas are transformed into force and passion; it will not be modified by thought or reason, though it may be weakened by defections, intimidated by superior force, or shattered by revolution. But Ultramontanism has its counterpart in other places than the Roman Catholic Church; there are analogous forms

of absolutism, of rigidity, of dulness and intellectual sloth, whose poison infects political as well as religious life.

To me it seems that what is now happening is evidence of the terrific, irresistible, avenging force of neglected ideas. Englishmen think that an idea can be left to itself; history proves that it cannot. The day will come when men will see, as they cannot now see, that this war was the volcanic eruption of ideal factors; that statesmen, generals, citizens, soldiers, were rather the moved than the movers; were the players (and heroically noble ones) in a great game whose conditions had been already shaped by the collective mass of human thought, and by ideas that were, probably, more than human.

If we are at war it is not only because of Hohenzollern ambition, Hohenzollern arrogance, Hohenzollern rapacity, but because we did not face and determine the issues of those conflicting ideas that are represented by Hohenzollernism, on the one side, and international co-operation, political self-determination, human brotherhood, on the other side. We should not be fighting Hohenzollernism in the flesh if we had previously conquered it in the spirit, and not contented ourselves with a life of political ambiguities. Perhaps things cannot be otherwise. Perhaps ideas can only come into their own through a process of physical convulsion. Yet there are surely cases in which the idea has presented itself plainly enough to obtain some form of recognition; in which some part of the lesson might have been apprehended before it was too late.

There is indeed a strange irony in the present upheaval against Ultramontanism, given the religious events that shortly preceded this war.

Amongst the accusations brought against Sir Thomas More was the perfidious one of provoking the king to set forth his book on the seven sacraments and of maintaining the Pope's authority, thus causing the king ' to put a sword into the ' Pope's hand to fight against himself.' His answer was:

' Wherein, when I found the Pope's authority highly advanced, and with strong arguments mightily defended, I said unto his Grace: I must put your Highness in remembrance of one thing, and that is this—the Pope, as your Grace knoweth, is a prince as you are, and in league with all other Christian princes. It may so hereafter fall out that your Grace and he may vary upon some point of Leagues.

whereupon may grow breach of amity and war between you both. I think it best, therefore, that that place be amended and his authority more slenderly touched.'*

Now, there are Catholics, both lay and ecclesiastical, who might take those words to heart. Unlike Sir Thomas More they hardly put a limit to their support of papal claims before the war. That unqualified allegiance was rudely shaken when they found the Holy See tepid in its sympathy for them in matters of life and death. Authority never went too far for them in its dealings with the thoughts and convictions of others; they saw the mischief when their own national and patriotic ideals were involved.

Even Protestants and non-Catholics were inclined to show remarkable deference to papal authority on certain questions which were at issue a few years before the war. In the Catholic Church a great conflict of ideas was taking place. To many outsiders it seemed that the Catholic Church was no fit place for such a conflict, that Catholics were booked for a course of unquestioning obedience, and that their rulers, whether right or wrong in the general and ultimate sense, were perfectly right in their practical attitude. Furthermore, there was not much general sympathy with the ideals of those Catholics who found themselves in opposition to their spiritual rulers. Those ideals appeared vague and remote; their connexion with life was not apparent to the ordinary mind; historical and philosophical difficulties are lightly borne by those who have not come in direct contact with them; in fact, there was too much of idea in the whole movement, and ideas are not expected to kick, or bite, or use high explosives if you neglect them.

On the whole, then, sympathy was with the Pope rather than with the Modernist in the great controversy, and some of those who would now cry 'No-Popery' were on the other side then.

Yet the Modernist was wrestling with those fundamental ideas that are now working themselves out in a more obvious and practical form. Modernism stood, in religion, for those principles of self-determination and liberty, of free development and progress, whose political counterparts are to be

* 'Life of Sir Thomas More.' Rev. T. E. Bridgett.

found in the professed articles of the Allied programme, in the pronouncements of the American President.

The charge then brought by non-Catholics against the Modernist was one of inconsistency, not of error. His principles were all right, but he was upholding them in the wrong place. Acknowledging an autocratic government, he was endeavouring to live on democratic lines; acknowledging an infallible authority, he was pleading for liberty of thought.

Quite true—the Modernist was inconsistent as the laws of life force us all to be inconsistent. We must live as we can while striving to live as we ought; we must not kill when we hope to cure. The ideas of Modernism were too wide for the frame of Ultramontanism; so are the ideals of democracy too wide for our social framework. We should not have had to repeat our creed so often during the course of this war if that creed had been an accepted commonplace; this war has been the outcome of conflicting and inconsistent theories.

There is nothing in Catholicism to menace the ideals of the Allied cause and programme, though there be much that is contrary to that programme in the creed of Ultramontanism. Yet Ultramontanism itself is, as we have seen in this war, a feeble thing when it comes in contact with the stronger force of patriotism. Its chief harm is to Catholicism itself, and not to civil life. In its extreme form it has lessened the spirituality of religion, it has hampered the individual soul, it has alienated noble and truthful minds from the creed it besets; but when it comes in conflict with the life of man in another sphere its weapons prove obsolete and useless. As we have seen in the history of English Catholicism, the life of the citizen asserted its rights against the undue claims of religion in a sphere that was not its own; when the layman found it was time to act, he did act, and he knew how to distinguish his duty as a Catholic from his rights as an Englishman.

In France and Belgium we have seen, too, that the light of Ultramontanism was as the flicker of a candle before the flame of patriotism; there, also, men have felt, when the emergency arose, that Catholicism was a greater, a deeper thing than Ultramontanism.

It is as the enemy of ideas that the latter is mostly to be feared; and the damage it does is, I will reiterate, chiefly to religion itself. It stands for the narrow and unprogressive

form of Catholicism, not for Catholicism itself. So, too, there is a sectarian nationalism which stands for the narrow and unprogressive form of patriotism, not for patriotism itself. Such nationalism has its votaries in England, and far too many votaries in Ireland. No country will be great till it faces its part in the wide world as well as its own, strictly national, duties.

True Catholicism, with its sense of universality and solidarity, should be the noblest expression, in the religious order, of a creed of international union and human brotherhood. It was for the supremacy of the Papal See as a bond of union throughout Christendom, and a pledge of its human character, that Sir Thomas More laid down his life; a strictly national Church was too narrow for his Catholic ideal. He would have died as readily for any infringement of the rights of his country by ecclesiastical authority.

Religious Ultramontanism has crumbled away before patriotism; so too must political sectarianism crumble before the summons of world-wide ideals. Ecclesiastical and political autocracy are kindred forces. So, too, is a free and human conception of political life the counterpart of a spontaneous and spiritual conception of religion.

M. D. Petre.

THE NEED FOR LAW REFORM

NOTWITHSTANDING the steady work of the Revision Committee the present state of our statute law is disgraceful. Constant new enactments, partial repeals, references from one statute to others, bits of sections cut out of one Act and replaced by words only found by reference to others, make a chaos. Of recent years, moreover, its bulk has grown enormously in spite of numerous Consolidation Acts which have been passed from time to time. The work of consolidation ought to be speeded and extended. As regards this matter, it is improvement of *form*—the expression and arrangement of the law—that should be aimed at. No question of policy arises. The machinery for doing the work might easily be provided, and the cost saved would be far greater than the cost incurred. Certain branches of the law, such as the criminal law, ought to be codified, but whether general codification is a good thing or not is very doubtful. Case law or common law is often a clearer guide and is more adaptable to new circumstances and altered conditions.

It is interesting to find that some continental jurists, living in countries where the law has been codified, have come to the opinion that common or case law has great advantages, being more capable of development and adaptation to new conditions and also really more scientific. Even where partial codification has been attempted, as in the Partnership Act, in spite of the draftsman's skill certain clauses have introduced new riddles of which the solution is extraordinarily difficult. Recent experience has shown how certain attempts to express detailed rules of international law on capture, blockade, and contraband have led to most unfortunate consequences, and how cases decided by applying the old principles established by the courts to new facts as they arise from time to time have been a better guide and led to much more satisfactory results.

Far more important however than the complete revision

of existing statute law is the need for certain specific changes in the substance of the law where it is in conflict with justice and creates evil instead of redressing wrongs. In such cases there is no excuse for postponing year after year the amendment of the law. There would be little difficulty in constituting small commissions of lawyers to put the required changes into proper form for submission to Parliament.

A few of the subjects most urgently demanding amendment may be stated as examples. The 'abolition of primo-'geniture and entail' has long been a favourite phrase with certain reformers. The phrase is inaccurate, but it may be taken to cover two alterations in the law for which the time is ripe. The Fines and Recoveries Act of 1833 made the transfer of land easier by providing a method for dealing with estates tail. It might now be made easier still and the law simplified by abolishing estates tail altogether. This could be done by an Act of one section. A Bill for the purpose was introduced in the House of Commons by a private member in 1896 and backed by distinguished lawyers on both sides of the House, but owing to a steady block from one quarter it never got beyond a first reading. A private member's Bill seldom has the chance of becoming an Act however clear the case for it may be. A change advocated both by a lawyer like Blackstone, whose opinions are said 'to have commended him to 'the Tory government of the time,' and by an economist like Mill, might surely be made by a reformed parliament.

Shortly before the outbreak of the war Lord Haldane, in consultation with Sir Philip Gregory and other eminent authorities on real property, introduced two very long and comprehensive Bills dealing with a large number of questions affecting the law relating to land and its transfer. These Bills, afterwards consolidated into one Bill, were withdrawn for the time with the intention of being again presented; but that intention has not yet been fulfilled. We may go further and ask whether there is now any adequate reason for maintaining the distinction between the devolution of real and of personal estate in case of intestacy. When military or other service was an incident of land tenure there might be good ground for the rule that land should go to the eldest son only, and that daughters should be excluded

entirely in favour of male issue. The present law of inheritance is a real injustice to women, and perhaps the newly enfranchised women will help to insist on the alteration of a law by which the daughters of a rich landowner may be left penniless, if he dies intestate, leaving a son and no personal estate. In practice, however, it is in the case of small estates that the greater inconvenience is found. It is absurd that a house held on a lease for one thousand years at a nominal rent should pass in a different way from a house granted in fee subject to the kind of chief rent common in Lancashire.

There are other changes called for which affect the question of personal status as well as the devolution of property, where the character of the change required is perfectly clear. One of these, viz., the legitimation of children by their parents' subsequent marriage, has been the subject of discussion for centuries, and the settlement of the question ought not to be further delayed.

Every one who has had much experience in what is called for convenience Chancery practice must from time to time have come across cases showing the flagrant injustice, the absurd consequences, and, incidentally, the injury to morality caused by the present state of the law. Families have been brought up together, educated in the same way with like expectations, the parents married and living happily together, and then if the father dies intestate it is discovered that perhaps only the youngest child is regarded in law as his. It alone inherits the whole property; the others are left penniless. A man leaves his property to his son for life with remainder to the son's children. The son is then living happily with his wife and several children. After the grandfather's death the son dies, and it is discovered that his elder children, though brought up and educated by him and acknowledged as his, were born before his marriage, and that the youngest alone can take anything under the bequest. In the interests of morality it is a good thing that a man and a woman, who have been living together, and who have children, should be induced to marry. Six centuries ago the barons of England, suspecting with some reason the source from which a proposal to change the law on this point had come, rejected it with the celebrated formula 'nolumus

'leges Angliæ mutari.' A 'democratic' parliament will surely not claim for English laws the virtues or vices of those of the Medes and Persians. Probably one real reason underlying the present objection to allow legitimation by subsequent marriage is a desire to punish the parties—especially the woman—for 'immorality.' As the woman cannot now be stoned, the modern Pharisee punishes her by injuring her innocent children.

Some of the arguments in favour of 'legitimation by subsequent marriage' may be summarized:

(1) It would encourage and assist a man to perform the paramount duty of doing all he can for the welfare of those for whose existence he is responsible.

(2) It would be some inducement to him to discharge a duty to the woman, who has given herself to him and become the mother of his children, by turning a union which is not lawful, but which cannot be terminated without cruelty to the woman if attached to him, into one which is recognized and lawful and may result in happy family life.

(3) It would tend to relieve the innocent progeny of an irregular union from a stigma they have done nothing to deserve, and to open opportunities in life to them from which they are at present often debarred. If the parent has not made provision by will, the law would do what the parent ought to have done, instead of setting an evil example by holding that such children have no claim on their father's property.

(4) It would bring English law into harmony with the law of Scotland and of many of the colonies and continental countries. At present the question of a person's legitimacy and his right to inherit his father's property may be the subject of sharp controversy between Scottish and English courts. The decision will depend on the question of the father's domicile, and the result of such a litigation is hard to predict.

(5) To those who hold the opinion that the law of the Church ought to have any influence on the law of the State affecting questions of this kind, the fact that 'legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium' has been regularly recognized by the civil and canon law ought to carry some weight. The Emperor Constantine, acting in accordance with the spirit

of the religion he had adopted, decreed that children born to persons living in concubinage should become legitimate on the subsequent marriage of their parents, but this was afterwards decided to be confined to the case of children already living when the law was passed. The object was no doubt to give an inducement to marry instead of continuing an irregular relationship. Justinian went further and established the general principle of legitimation by subsequent marriage. Even where a master had had children by a slave he could—if he had no legitimate children—enfranchise and then marry her, and by these acts alone the children became free and legitimate.

To judge of the value of the arguments against the proposed change one cannot do better than refer to our old friend Blackstone, who may be taken as an able advocate when he has any case. He states four reasons for which 'we may suppose the peers to have acted at the Parliament 'of Merton, where they refused to enact that children born 'before marriage should be esteemed legitimate.' One specimen must suffice :

> 'The rule of the Roman Law admits of no limitations as to the time or number of bastards so to be legitimatized, but a dozen of them may twenty years after their birth, by the subsequent marriage of their parents, be admitted to all the privileges of legitimate children. This is plainly a great discouragement to the matrimonial state, to which one main inducement is usually not only the desire of having children, but also the desire of procreating lawful *heirs*.'

What morals! A man lives with a woman; they are faithful to each other many years; they have a 'dozen or 'more' children; they are bound to one another and to their children by every natural tie; yet Blackstone argues that the law ought to encourage the man to desert the woman with whom he has lived, and the children whom he has begotten. They are to be cast on the world as *filii nullius* and he is to be encouraged to marry another woman in order to 'procreate lawful heirs.' The dozen may starve, though their father is a millionaire, and the other woman's child will be legally entitled to take all. It may be said perhaps that this is an over-statement, for if any of the first family are under sixteen years of age the mother may get an order

from the magistrates for a contribution of five shillings a week for the support of each. By all means let us not overlook this munificent provision of English law. It means that if a millionaire has, say, four illegitimate children by four different women the law will compel him to pay fifty-two pounds a year for the lot. When the child has turned sixteen the father's liabilities either to mother or child cease. It is true that if he has seduced any of the women under promise of marriage he may have to pay damages for breach of contract; but even this remedy is now objected to, and some professed law reformers advocate the abolition of this protection for a woman who has been deceived. A civilized community ought to get rid, root and branch, of the doctrine that a child born out of wedlock is a *filius nullius*, and ought to recognize that a father has a paramount moral duty to do what he can to educate and to maintain throughout childhood all those whom his act has brought into the world.

A still more important subject is the reform of the law of divorce. Conditions arising partly out of the war have rendered it more urgent than ever. It has already been made the subject of careful and prolonged enquiry and a mass of evidence has been collected. The labours of Lord Gorell's Commission ought not to be thrown away, though the death of its chairman has deprived the country of one whose sound judgment, kind heart, and wide experience would have been of inestimable value when the reform of the marriage law comes before parliament. Plain speech and fearless recognition of facts will indeed be needed when this subject is brought forward. In all legislation, all political action, it has to be remembered that in the family—in the life of the true home—is to be found the basis of what is best in national life, the guarantee for security, the hope for real progress and diffused happiness. But recognition of the sanctity of family life must not be used as an excuse to justify the continuation of a state of the law which is responsible for much human misery and moral wrong. To many minds—though the sincerity of those who take a contrary view is not denied—it appears unspeakably shocking that divine sanction should be claimed for the indissolubility of the marriage tie under circumstances which make its continuance revolting to the best instincts of humanity.

Another matter to which increased importance has been given by the war is the failure of the English law to recognize the adoption of children. There are many war orphans, and the number grows daily. Simultaneously from many homes the joy of young life has passed away, and the hope for the future has gone. Further, the inequality in the numbers of women and of men has increased. There are very many women in whom the maternal instinct is strong, but who will never be able to have children of their own. The reason given by the Roman legislator for allowing adoption by women—*ad solatium liberorum amissorum adoptare possunt*—applies now in England with painful force as never before. Although private arrangements are now often made by which a relative or a stranger takes the custody of a child, provides for and directs its maintenance and education, and acts generally *in loco parentis* towards it, adoption in the sense of the transfer of parental rights and duties in respect of a child to another person and their assumption by that person is not recognized by the law of England. The law as to the position of those who place themselves *in loco parentis* is vague and unsatisfactory.

The time has come for the law of England to provide, as the laws of many other countries do, regular methods of adoption establishing definite parental and filial rights and duties as between the adopting parent and adopted child. Roman law, Hindu law, and other systems have elaborate provisions on the subject. No doubt the basic ideas underlying these were generally due to religions which required the performance of certain rites and the continued maintenance of family worship, but some valuable hints may be derived both from ancient and existing laws in other countries on the subject. The aim is to secure that children who have not the advantage of proper parental or maternal care, and for whom no financial provision would otherwise be made, should be able to acquire a legally recognized position with regard to those persons who wish to undertake the duty of bringing them up and of providing for them. As in Rome, the act of adoption should be sanctioned by some public authority, such as a judge or magistrate, who should be satisfied of the good faith and competence of the adoptive parents, of the probable benefit to the adopted child, and of

the consent of the natural parents, if any, unless by criminal conduct or very gross neglect the latter had forfeited their rights. The child itself should also be examined unless too young to have any feeling on the subject. Care would be required in defining exactly what rights of succession to property should be given to the adopted child. For example, it would not be right to treat them as 'heirs of the body' where estates are settled in tail with remainders to collaterals. On the other hand, adopted children—at least if there are no others—should have rights of succession as regards property to which their adoptive parent was absolutely entitled. It might perhaps be desirable to have different forms of adoption recognized as giving rights of greater or less extent, and the act of adoption should be recorded and registered by some official person.

We pass to a different branch of law which needs reform, namely, the law as to murder and manslaughter. At present a number of different classes of acts are all treated alike as murder, and death is the sentence decreed by the law, whatever the judge's view may be, although the moral character of, and the social damage caused by, such acts differ as widely as the poles. In some cases of murder where, according to the law, the accused must be hanged, the sympathy of even good and thoughtful people is largely with the criminal. An offence—a crime—has been committed, but the carrying out of the prescribed sentence would be a greater crime, an outrage on the moral sense and best instincts of humanity. In spite of the great reforms in the law relating to the punishment of crime since the time of Sir Samuel Romilly and Sir James Mackintosh, we still need to be reminded that 'it is one of the greatest evils which can befall a country 'when the criminal law and the virtuous feelings of the 'community are in hostility to each other.'

The acts now treated as murder should be differentiated and classified. Murder in the first degree should be limited to the cases where the act is done deliberately, where there is really malice aforethought, where the death of the victim is really intended, is in fact the aim of the accused, and where there has been no serious provocation. The death penalty should be limited to such cases. This rule would exclude a number of acts—of very varying degree of

criminality for which different penalties should be imposed, but which are now regarded alike as murder in law.

First may be mentioned those cases where a person's death ensues in consequence of a felonious act. A, shooting at B's hens, intending to steal them, happens to hit B and kill him. According to many authorities A is guilty of murder. In recent years there has been a reluctance to apply this principle logically; but at best it must be admitted that the law is uncertain and that it needs amendment. A serious and perhaps the most common example of this class is where death is caused by procuring abortion. The offence of procuring abortion, especially for gain, is a very serious one; but whether death ensues or not is a matter beyond the control of the culprit. He does not desire, aim at, or intend the death of the woman. His desire and aim may be to save her from shame and trouble; he may yield to her entreaties out of kindliness of heart and with no hope of gain. Even in the worst cases where the main motive of the crime is pecuniary gain there is no murderous intent. The death of the woman is not desired; if the accused had thought that death would occur, it is in most cases certain that he would not have undertaken to commit the crime. The crime he commits is the crime of procuring abortion, and it is for that, and that alone, that he ought to be punished. Yet persons have been sentenced to death before now for even advising a woman in trouble to consult a person who afterwards performed an illegal operation resulting in death.

An analogous injustice occurs when a number of persons are jointly engaged in a criminal act, such as the forcible release of a prisoner, and one of them, perhaps the only one armed, shoots a constable in charge. He may have been the only one who intended to kill or even injure anybody, yet all the party are equally liable. To hang a score of men on such a ground would excite sympathy with the criminals even among law-abiding citizens, with the result that the serious nature of their lesser offence and the necessity for punishing it severely may be overlooked.

In the second category are cases of serious provocation. Public attention has been specially directed recently to this class, and more such cases are likely to arise in the immediate

future. It is better to refrain from comment on any particular case, but there is a risk that where the act of vengeance is felt to have some justification, a jury will strain the facts in order to avoid a verdict which may lead to capital punishment. If a husband catches his wife *in flagrante delicto* with an adulterer and kills either, the crime is manslaughter not murder. But there is authority for saying that in all other cases, though the provocation may be at least as great, the crime is murder, and if the accused is found guilty he must be sentenced to be hanged. To avoid this excessive penalty for a partially excusable act of private vengeance the jury acquits the criminal and he escapes all punishment, though some punishment is due. The nature of the crime of killing may indeed vary to any extent, and the punishment properly to be awarded should be adjusted according to the circumstances of each case, except in the case of murder in the first degree as above defined. The death penalty should not be at the discretion of the judge.

Thirdly, we have cases where the person who has killed another is labouring under fear, distress, or anxiety, causing mental disturbance which though not amounting to insanity may greatly affect the judgment. In these cases there is some excuse—not justification. They vary widely in their character and degree of criminality, but differ all of them from those which ought to be treated as murder of the first degree and worthy of death.

Infanticide by mothers shortly after childbirth is the commonest form of case falling within this class. It is true that the death penalty in this case is rarely if ever inflicted; but what is at best a solemn and cruel farce—the passing of the death sentence—should be abolished. The court, with all the facts before it, should decide at the time what sentence other than death is proper to meet the case, and not leave it almost to chance or to those who have not heard the evidence or seen the parties to determine at some future time what should be done. The cold-blooded severity which would demand the death deliberately inflicted by hanging of a girl in the position of Hetty Sorrel is utterly repugnant to human feeling. Cases of this class arise from time to time in real life—they are not simply the theme of imaginative fiction. No one would accuse the late Mr. Justice Hawkins

of sentimentality or excess of sympathy with the feelings of those whose cases he had to deal with, but there is one act recorded of him which ought to be remembered when the Penge case and other unhappy instances of his procedure are forgotten. His own account of the case should be read:

'A woman with a baby a week old, unable to sustain the load of shame which oppressed her, ran one night into a river, holding the baby in her arms. She had got into the water deep enough to drown the baby, while her own life was saved by a boatman. I asked the jury whether, without being insane in the ordinary sense, the woman might not have been at the time of committing the deed in so excited a state as not to know what she was doing.'

The verdict was 'Guilty,' and in finding it the jury were doing their duty, and the judge had no discretion but to pronounce sentence of death. He refused to put on the black cap, and said to the sheriff, 'I do not intend the poor 'creature to be hanged, and I am not going to frighten her 'to death.' Addressing the prisoner by name he said:

'"Don't pay any attention to what I am going to read. No harm will be done to you. I am sure you did not know in your great trouble and sorrow what you were doing, and I will take care to represent your case so that nothing will harm you in the way of punishment." I then mumbled over the words of the sentence of death, taking care that the poor creature did not hear them.'

It is surely better to alter the law than thus to bring it into deserved contempt.

Beccaria, than whom no one has ever given more careful or more detached thought to the study of crime and its punishment, writing more than a century ago, says:

'The murder of bastard children is in like manner the effect of a cruel dilemma in which a woman finds herself who has been seduced through weakness or overcome by force. The alternative is either her own infamy or the death of a being who is incapable of feeling the loss of life. How can she avoid preferring the last to the inevitable misery of herself and her unhappy infant? The best method of preventing this crime would be effectually to protect the weak woman from that tryanny which exaggerates all vices that cannot be concealed under the cloak of virtue.'

There is a foolish maxim 'hard cases make bad law.' The proper form of the maxim would be 'bad law makes hard

'cases, but good law prevents them.' It is true that if we have a law it ought to be obeyed, even if the case is hard, but the law of the land ought not to be so framed as to make its execution an infamy. If it is so framed, in practice it will not be executed. A hundred years ago Sir William Grant declared that as a consequence of the death penalty being legally imposed in a great number of cases where its infliction was revolting to the moral sense, there was 'a general 'confederacy of prosecution, witnesses, counsel, juries, 'judges, and advisers of the Crown, to prevent the execution 'of the criminal law.' As a deterrent to crime the certainty of a proper and suitable punishment is far more effective than unduly severe penalties which are not carried out or are uncertain.

The fact is that the whole criminal law, at least as to indictable offences, ought now to be codified. Drafts of a criminal code have been prepared at different times and consolidation acts dealing with certain subjects have been passed. More than a quarter of a century ago Sir John Holker directed his attention to the subject, but was prevented from completing his work. One reason, no doubt, why the criminal law has not been completely codified is that the existing law as to murder and manslaughter is in such an unsatisfactory state that it will not bear clear statement, and in some respects is so vague that precise and accurate statement is very difficult. Apparently there is no one to-day whose duty it is to consider and propose in definite form the amendments which ought to be made, still less to undertake the general codification of our criminal law. Yet it is significant that the *Code Napoléon*, the greatest piece of codification ever carried out, was undertaken and completed at a time when France was engaged in a great European struggle.

ALFRED HOPKINSON.

WIND POWER

1. **Final Report of the Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy after the War.** 1917.
2. **Report of Reconstruction Sub-Committee on Electric Power Supply.** Cd. 8880.
3. **Report of the Dominions Royal Commission.** Cd. 8462. 1917.
4. **Report of the Royal Commission on Canals.** Cd. 4979. 1909.
5. **Report of Special Board of Scientific Societies on Water Power.** 1918.
6. **Report of Committee of Board of Trade on Shipping and Shipbuilding.** 1918.

THERE used to be windmills: why have they gone? Those who watched their gradual disappearance probably looked upon it as a sign that the age of steam had superseded the age of wind. But the explanation is inadequate. There were a great many factors involved in the decay of the old windmills. They were, in the first place, costly to build, involving the erection of a lofty tower standing on a considerable area of land; then they were difficult to manage, the process of reefing in bad weather being attended with many accidents and not seldom with loss of life; again, they were uneconomical in working, utilizing but a small fraction of the available wind energy; they were seldom erected in the most favourable positions, and were most numerous in those parts of the country in which our wind power is least exhibited. But the most potent cause of the decay was a growing preference on the part of the public for a white loaf made of blended flour; this it was which finally gave an overwhelming advantage to the steam mills situate near the ports of entry for foreign grain.

Still, the windmill never quite ceased to exist; it continued to do pumping work in the Cornish mines and in the Lincolnshire fens; and its great utility as a pumping agent led to its revival in an altered form for this particular purpose. Small mills on steel frames, of what is known as the American type, began to appear in our nursery gardens, in private

estates, in farmsteads, and even in public undertakings, until, at the present day, there are more windmills working in England than there were sixty years ago. No doubt their use for public waterworks would have been more extensive but for the regulation of the Local Government Board which practically forbade district councils to use them unless accompanied by auxiliary steam power. The regulation seems a little difficult to justify, except on the principle that it is better to have no water at all rather than to have it for six days out of seven. Those councils who have complied with the stipulation of the Board have usually found that the auxiliary plant has not been required.

Two instances will suffice to show the very substantial nature of the work accomplished by these pumping engines. One windmill, forty feet in diameter, erected by a private firm on an estate in Yorkshire, raises during a steady breeze three million gallons of water through a height of ten feet in twenty-four hours. Another mill of similar dimensions installed by a district council to supplement a steam pumping plant has saved the council two hundred tons of coal per annum and has cost nothing in upkeep. It may seem strange that a power showing such substantial results should not have been applied to other purposes. But it may be remembered that for many years after Watt's inventions the steam engine still continued to be used for no other purpose than pumping. And in the case of the windmill there are certain specific drawbacks which have militated against its general adoption as a prime mover.

The first defect is that the power hitherto obtained has been but a small fraction of the available wind energy. The old corn mill probably did not extract more than five per cent. of the energy theoretically obtainable from wind pressure on its sail area. The modern or American type does better, perhaps to the extent of ten or twelve per cent. of the available energy, but not more. The figures quoted above, thirty million foot-gallons a day, sound large, but they do not represent more than seven horse-power, as against forty horse-power which might be obtained from a thoroughly efficient wind engine of equivalent area.

In the second place, the speed of the sails at their circumference is greater than the speed of the wind, and it increases

without limit, so that in violent storms the disruption point is reached. In the old type that was avoided only by reefing; in the American type it is avoided by adjusting the inclination of the vanes; but in neither case is safety assured. The chance of being wrecked by storms has led to a preference for small mills.

In the third place, the variability of the power, while it does not matter for pumping, is a stumbling block in the way of direct machine driving. So long as the mill is pumping only, it does not matter whether it is pumping faster or slower; but if it were driving a circular saw or a loom some provision would have to be made for adjusting the speed to tolerable uniformity.

Three things are therefore desirable in a really efficient engine: first, the devising of a motor which would utilize more of the wind energy; secondly, the invention of means of regulating speed; and thirdly, the devising of some means of storing power. All these requirements have now been met.

In 1881 Lord Kelvin (then Sir W. Thomson) referred to the subject of wind-power utilization at the meeting of the British Association. He pointed out that since the invention of storage batteries there was no longer any need to neglect such an important natural source of energy since the surplus power of a period of high winds could be accumulated and utilized in a period of calms. Acting upon this hint, one of Lord Kelvin's pupils, James Blyth (afterwards Professor at Glasgow Andersonian College) made a series of experiments which led to the construction of a very efficient and economical wind motor. Bernoulli and Maclaurin had shown that in theory the most efficient form for a windmill would be a cup or box, consisting of half a sphere or half a cylinder revolving in the line of the wind. Robertson adopted this type for his anemometer, the four cups of which are familiar objects at our observing stations. These four cups constitute a body revolving in a resisting medium, and cannot exceed a certain limiting speed. In the usual form of anemometer that speed is one-third that of the wind.

Upon this sound theoretical foundation Prof. Blyth saw the possibility of designing a wind motor which would develop more power than the old sails, while it would be more

economical in construction and free from their defects in working. For the cups of the anemometer he substituted boxes, semicircular in section, which he mounted on arms extending at right angles from the shaft. Using boxes ten feet by six feet, he found that his motor developed eight horse-power in a very moderate breeze, and, moreover, it justified his expectations in other respects, and could be left free to run by itself in the strongest gales without suffering injury. After using his mill for some years for the purpose of electric lighting, Prof. Blyth was sanguine enough to prophesy that before long electric light and power would be supplied over a large part of Great Britain by the use of wind engines on his model.

Possibly the inventor's early death led to the oblivion which his invention has suffered. More probably the neglect is due to our preoccupation with the ideas of coal and steam, which lead us to contemplate any alternative source of power with a smile of derision. We have grown accustomed to regard the hewing and carrying and burning of coal as the first essential of industry and even of life, and have regarded the multiplication of railway sidings with their miles of laden or empty trucks as signs of material prosperity. But the war has opened our eyes on this subject as on others, and in some measure we are prepared for the conclusion that the internal transport of coal is a wasteful and disagreeable necessity which in a well-ordered community would be reduced to a minimum. And when, in addition, we are confronted with a rise in price to at least double its pre-war quotation, the question of an alternative source of power which does not need railway transport and storage, and does not require the assistance of highly paid middlemen and brokers, becomes a question of truly practical politics. There ought, therefore, to be a chance for the element which has so often befriended us.

The first consideration is whether we have a sufficiency of wind-power presented to us by Nature in these islands. It is the firm conviction of the land dweller that nothing is more uncertain or inconstant than the wind; and even the yachtsman would agree with him that there are times of provoking calm and seasons of needless activity. But neither the pedestrian nor the yachtsman is an adequate

authority. Calm as it may seem on land or on the surface of the water, there is almost always a movement of the upper air. The records of the too short-lived observatory on Ben Nevis disclosed many occasions on which the observers had to struggle, roped together, against an eighty-knot breeze at a time when scarcely a ripple disturbed the surface of Loch Linnhe below. The records of American observatories confirm the conclusion that wind speed uniformly increases with the elevation at which it is recorded.

Even near the ground a condition of absolute calm is rarer than would be anticipated. The longest continuous records that we have are those of Greenwich Observatory, and they show an average of fifteen days calm in a year. But the Greenwich anemometer is not favourably placed, being unduly sheltered from the south and south-west, and it is quite certain that if it were fifty feet higher its record of calm would be diminished. It seems probable that at a height of a hundred feet from the ground the existence of absolute calm is an event of extreme rarity, and that if we could place a wind motor at a height of a thousand feet above the surrounding land we could rely on its working for nineteen-twentieths of the time.

The records of the Meteorological Office furnish us with actual experience of the wind movement at different observing stations for several years past. Some of these stations are, it is true, badly placed, and their instruments are not so favourably situated as a windmill would be; but they are for that reason a safe guide to the minimum of expectation. The following facts emerge clearly from the records. Our prevalent winds are south-westerly, or a few points on each side; these occur on 188 days in each year. It is therefore obvious that the area in which the best wind-power is developed lies on or near our western coasts. On the other hand, the easterly breezes which are felt most strongly on the eastern coasts do not lose quite so much of their force in passing over the midlands as do the south-westerly winds, which are partially intercepted by the higher ground of our western counties. There are, therefore, three zones of decreasing wind strength, the western coasts being the highest, next, the eastern coasts, and last, the midlands. Taking the average of seven observatories near the western and southern

coasts, it appears that a wind velocity of four miles an hour and upwards is experienced during 7,450 hours out of the 8,760 hours in a year, and the wind velocity most frequently recorded is from fifteen to seventeen miles an hour. Again taking the average of nine observatories on the eastern coasts and inland, a wind velocity of four miles an hour and upwards is experienced for 7,106 hours in twelve months, and the most usual velocity experienced at these stations lies between eleven and thirteen miles an hour. In both areas there are certain stations at which these figures are much exceeded, some places recording a working breeze for more than 8,000 hours, and one or two stations giving a most usual wind speed of nineteen miles an hour. For the reason already given the average both in duration and intensity may safely be taken as an underestimate.

It is clear that a power which is presented to us in such quantity is worth using for purposes other than pumping, and that wind-power stations might with great economical advantage be established in all those parts of our islands which are remote from the coalfields. The objection from an engineering point of view would doubtless be that such power would have to be developed in small units. If the only object in generating power were to use it on a large scale such an objection would be conclusive. We are never likely to construct a wind engine which would develop even a thousand horse-power at one spot; and there are of course certain specific objects for which a larger power than this is required, such, for instance, as the extraction of nitrogen from the atmosphere, or the preparation of aluminium. But if the power at the generating station is required simply for the purpose of distribution in small units over a large area, then the object might equally be attained by local generation in small quantities. It becomes purely a question of economy, in which the determining factors are the original cost of construction, the expense of maintenance, and the loss of power through leakage in transmission.

It is these factors which distinguish the case of electric generation in industrial districts. Here there is power required which must be got from coal; it is required, moreover, in different quantities, for different purposes, and in different parts of a certain well-defined area. It would be wasteful in

the extreme—or, rather, we should say, it is wasteful in the extreme—to have a number of generating stations working on different systems, serving adjoining portions of the area. The committee which has been investigating this subject has presented a report in which there is no trace of doubt, reservation, or hesitation whatever. It shows that our existing system of electrical generation involves an absolute waste of fifty million tons of coal a year. There are six hundred electrical undertakings in Great Britain, and their average size is one-thirtieth of the size of a really economical power station unit. In only one part of England has an ideal electrical station been established, and that is on the north-east coast, with Newcastle as its head-quarters. Electrical power is available all over this area for less than a halfpenny a unit. Compare this with Lancashire, a larger and more densely populated area—in fact, the greatest industrial area in the world. In Lancashire there are twenty-three borough generating stations, and the charges per unit vary from three times to six times the charge in the Newcastle area. There can be no doubt that if the Lancashire district were supplied from one centre the cost of electric power in the county would instantly sink to even less than the price in Newcastle.

The attention of our engineers has very naturally been directed to the generation of power from coal or falling water. Nor can anything be more completely satisfactory than a water-power station in a situation where nature has provided the necessary head. But in our islands such opportunities exist only in small and isolated units, and the fluctuating character of our waterfalls is sufficient to convince us that the construction of a large installation is at the best a doubtful experiment. The amount of our rainfall is easily exaggerated. Figures of one hundred and thirty inches taken from one locality in Cumberland, and one hundred inches from one locality in Inverness, seem to show that the quantity is sufficient to justify a large experiment. But as a fact the areas over which such a fall occurs are exceedingly circumscribed. There are only five small patches of ground in which an average fall of more than eighty inches is recorded—one in the lake district, one in the Snowdon range, one in Ross, and one in Inverness ; there may be a sixth not yet identified. But even including those isolated patches there are only

nine stations in Great Britain in which an average fall exceeding sixty inches has been recorded. It is therefore evident that in order to secure a steady head of water for a large installation, an extensive area has to be enclosed and converted into a water-tight reservoir. The recent project of the Aluminium Company involved the enclosure of two hundred and fifty square miles of country, and the expenditure of two and a half millions sterling. And, after all, it would have given employment to but a handful of people; whereas the expenditure of the same capital on two thousand separate wind-power stations might conceivably double the productive capacity of a considerable section of the population.

There is, however, a possibility of providing water-power on a large scale on the coasts of these islands, provided only that we use sea-water and employ windmills to pump it. There are on the western coasts certain inlets with narrow entrance and considerable internal capacity. If the entrance were closed, up to the summit of the cliffs, a windmill or two on the top of the sea wall would suffice to maintain a head of one hundred and fifty feet of water. The cost of construction would be trifling when compared with the cost of an inland power station, while the cost of upkeep would be very small. There is one such fjord which, so treated, would furnish a power station comparable with any in Europe, but for the sake of our dwindling scenes of peaceful beauty we may hope that it will escape the notice of the large-power enthusiasts; for all England is not yet an industrial area, and we need something which, without involving the extension of the industrial areas, will render our handiwork more productive in the village and the countryside which yet remains unspoilt.

Let us imagine one form which a wind-power station might take. A steel shaft with four semi-cylindrical boxes at right angles, the shaft revolving in a cup which is itself secured by four chains extending to the ground, would constitute the motor, and it would be entirely unconnected with the main building except by the belting from the fly-wheel below to the shafting in the machinery annexe. The mill-house would consist of the central hall through which the shaft rises and in which the fly-wheel revolves. The four annexes would diverge from this central hall: one would contain dynamo

and gear, accumulator cells, and other electrical equipment; a second would contain circular saw, planing machine, and other wood-working appliances; a third would be devoted to chaff-cutters, grindstone, root-pulpers, and other agricultural machinery; and the fourth would be reserved for looms, heavy sewing machines, or any other machinery likely to be in special demand in the district. When there was a working wind, power could be communicated direct to the shafting in one or other of the machine rooms; and when the machines were not in actual use it could be communicated through the dynamo to the accumulator cells, or else could be utilized to pump water into an elevated reservoir. If both reservoir and batteries were fully charged the belting could be withdrawn and the shaft left to revolve by itself.

The ground space occupied by such an installation need not exceed two acres; the building would require little strength or solidity, and might be constructed of the partition blocks with which necessity has recently made us familiar; the whole installation, of dimensions capable of giving forty horse-power with a fifteen mile breeze, could be erected for a few hundred pounds. If such a power-house were built in a suitable locality it would not take many months to outlive the first period of ridicule and neglect, and within two years many parish and district councils would desire to become possessed of their own stations, from which they could supply electric light and power in their own neighbourhood, and in which they could let the use of specific machinery at so much per unit or per hour.

There is even a possibility of the employment of wind-power on a larger scale. In Denmark where small wind installations have been at work for some years, and where they have lately increased rapidly in number, a station intended to develop two hundred horse-power is now in contemplation for the use of a bacon factory. The project may be too ambitious, but that it should be in contemplation is proof that the plan has been a commercial success in a country in which the average wind-power is decidedly less than in Great Britain. And it may be added that certain devices recently invented by Professor La Cour of Copenhagen have completely solved the mechanical difficulties in the way of adjusting the variable power of the motor to the working

of a dynamo without injury to the accumulators from any sudden drop in wind energy.

Meanwhile the winds have another call upon us—a call from the sea, no less insistent than that on land. They are constantly reminding us that we are an island people with vast dominions across the seas, and that our home is not only these islands but also these possessions and the ocean which lies between. In the crown colonies there are territories which have been in our possession for a hundred and fifty years—territories teeming with produce awaiting our handling, and yet in whose ports a British ship is rarely seen. Trade has not followed the flag, and one reason is that the sailing vessel has been neglected to the point of disappearance.

Here, again, as in the case of the windmill, it is advisable to consider the specific causes of disuse. Let us carry our minds back to the year 1830. A committee of the House of Commons was then sitting to consider the possibility of sending the Dublin and Holyhead mail by steamer. This, be it remembered, was nearly a generation after Fulton and Symington, and at a time when steamers had been plying on the Mississippi for twenty years. It was the time, moreover, when the experts, headed by Dr. Lardner, had demonstrated to their own satisfaction that useful as a steamer might be on a river it could not possibly undertake a long ocean voyage. Up to that time the winds had not merely ground our corn but had borne all our ocean traffic, maintained our colonial connexions, conducted our commerce, won our naval victories, and established our position in the world. 'Sea-power,' to use Mahan's phrase, then resolved itself into capacity for utilizing wind-power. It is largely the truth that our Empire was created, preserved, and sustained by our skilful use of the wind. But that era was already drawing to a close. With the improvement of marine engines, and especially with the great economy in fuel following the introduction of compound engines, Dr. Lardner's prediction that the steamer could not provide cargo space was falsified, although it was a perfectly reasonable objection at the time it was uttered.

There followed a period in which the sailing ship was so far developed and improved that it frequently distanced the steamer bound on the same voyage. But the screw and

the compound engine together decided the issue of the duel. Then came the question whether the new power could not be used in combination with sails. Many experiments, now forgotten, were tried with this object. The navy was very unwilling to part with the power which had so long been its prime mover. Even merchant shipowners were reluctant to part with the clippers which had built up their commerce. But in the course of experiments to combine sail and steam it became apparent that the space demanded by engine and boilers and bunker coal, together with the quarters of an engineering staff in addition to the large number of hands required by a full-rigged ship, were too great a tax on the cubic capacity of the hull and left little space available for cargo.

Now, if we consider the conditions of the problem we shall see that they have much altered since the days when it was dismissed as impracticable. The invention of the internal combustion engine with oil as fuel has reduced the space taken up by the engines by nine-tenths. It is now possible to fit a sailing ship with auxiliary screw and oil engines without interfering materially with her carrying capacity, and experimental voyages undertaken by the firm of Preuthout le Bland, of Havre, have demonstrated the commercial economy of the sailing ship so equipped. Moreover, for certain voyages—routes in which the trade winds play an important part—it has been demonstrated both by German and French shipowners, before the war, that it is actually cheaper to tow a sailing vessel to the trades than to employ steam for the whole voyage. *A fortiori* with coal at double the price the advantage will be greater.

It has now become a matter of importance to us that our coal reserves should not be wasted in work which can be done equally well by power which is supplied to us gratuitously. Of the twenty million tons of coal which we annually export to our coaling stations abroad, a considerable portion might be carried by the wind, just as well as by steam. Part also of our annual imports might without disadvantage be carried by the same agency. But an even more important consideration is the opening up of trade routes to certain of our crown colonies which are neglected by the steam-ship because they do not afford sufficient

opening for regular periodical voyages. In these smaller trades to out-of-the-way places there is undoubted scope for sailing-ships fitted with auxiliary petrol engines. Here is a considerable field of enterprise which is open to the sailing-ship without challenging by direct competition the lines of traffic already occupied by steam-ship companies. And it is moreover a field in which the ancient spirit of the merchant adventurer may be revived.

Ever since the complete triumph of steam the tendency of merchant shipping has been towards consolidation, combination, amalgamation of rival companies, and the like forms of monopoly. Competition and commercial rivalry are becoming extinct, and the ocean, like the land, is parcelled out into spheres of influence and zones of exclusive dealing. The sailing vessel alone furnishes the chance for the small capitalist. It can be built at a more moderate outlay, its upkeep costs far less, it deteriorates less rapidly and may still keep the water long years after the steamer has been broken up for scrap iron. A sailing vessel gives a chance to co-operative enterprise, for there is no reason why the profit sharing which was the basis of the old whaling voyages should not be applied to every trading voyage. Just as the ship may be owned by sixty-four individuals, so the profits of the voyage may be shared by the adventurers, the master, and the hands, every one having his personal profit in the success of the voyage. Under such a system the merchant service would receive a great impetus. It would attract a higher type of recruits and it would call forth and educate their best qualities. After all, Great Britain is and will be what her seamen make of her and what she makes of her seamen. So long as her young men desire to go to sea, and so long as she treats them well when they have entered on her service, be it naval or mercantile, so long is Great Britain's position among nations secure, even against the enhanced rivalry with which we are threatened after the war.

James Carlill.

CASTE AND DEMOCRACY

1. Cochin Tribes and Castes. By L. Anantha Krishna Iyer. Madras: Higginbothams.
2. The History of Caste in India. By S. V. Ketkhar. New York. 1909.
3. Castes and Tribes of Southern India. By Edgar Thurston, assisted by K. Ranga Chariar. Madras: Government Press. 1909.
4. Omens and Superstitions of Southern India. By Edgar Thurston. Fisher Unwin. 1912.
5. The People of India. By Sir Herbert Risley. Second Edition. Thacker & Co. 1915.
6. The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India. By R. V. Russell and Rai Bahadur Hira Lal. Macmillan. 1916.

DEMOCRACY as a catchword has already reached India and is widely used. But the spirit of democracy still pauses west of Suez, and will find it hard to secure a footing in a country where caste is strongly entrenched. Democracy and caste are antagonistic and mutually destructive forces, and that was the reason why the Aryan invaders of India invented caste and established it firmly to provide against possible future inroads by democratic ideas.

When the Aryan invaders came to India from the Hindukush, or the Arctic regions, or wherever else they hailed from, they brought the Vedas and the Vedic religion with them. But according to savants who have dived deep into the Vedic lore there is no mention of caste in the Vedic Hymns. Professor Max Müller says:

'There is no authority whatever in the hymns of the Veda for the complicated system of castes. There is no law to prohibit the different classes of the people from living together, from eating and drinking together; no law to prohibit the marriage of people belonging to different castes; no law to brand the offspring of such marriages with an indelible stigma. There is no law to sanction the blasphemous pretensions of a priesthood to divine

honours or the degradation of any human being to a state below the animal.'

But when the Aryan invaders had conquered practically the whole of India, they began to evolve plans for settling down comfortably. They had not come to India with any ideas of the rights of the conquered, nor were they looking forward to a time when they would have to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of an *intelligentsia* of their own creation. They had a radical method for preventing such complications. 'Don't create the *intelligentsia* outside your own 'limited circle and there will be no legitimate aspirations to 'satisfy.' So the code of Manu was compiled, which created castes and assigned duties and privileges to each caste, or rather assigned duties to the lower castes, and conferred privileges on the higher ones.

This Brahminical code lays down that to slay a Brahmin is mortal sin. Whoever even threatens a Brahmin with physical violence will wander for a hundred years in hell. The man who seizes a Brahmin's property will feed in another world on the leavings of vultures. Even the cardinal duty of veracity is dispensed with in the interest of the Brahmin. The Brahmin is not to be put to death, even for the worst crimes. Land given to a Brahmin secures a safe passage to Heaven. A suitable gift to a Brahmin on a death-bed secures salvation to a malefactor. Whatever exists in the world is the rightful property of the Brahmin : for a Brahmin, whether ignorant or learned, is a divinity.

On the other hand, the Sudra, or the servant class, had definite duties imposed on it and enforced by severe penalties, with no privileges except that of serving the Brahmins.

A Sudra, whether purchased or not, must always perform servile work for the Brahmin. A Brahmin may seize the property of a Sudra, for a slave can have no personal property. A Sudra is forbidden to amass wealth, 'for a Sudra, who 'has acquired wealth, gives pain to Brahmins.' The Sudra must live on the refuse of the Brahmin's food and wear the cast-off clothes of a Brahmin. A Sudra who insults a Brahmin shall have his tongue cut out ; if he mentions even the name and caste of the Brahmins, 'an iron nail, ten fingers 'long, shall be thrust red-hot into his mouth.' 'With what-'ever limb a Sudra or low-caste man does hurt to a high-caste

'man, even that limb shall be cut off.' If a Sudra dares to sit on the same seat as a high-caste man he shall be branded on the hip and be banished. The code of Manu says:

'The dwellings of Chandalas and Svapakas (certain tribes of Sudras) shall be outside the village, and their wealth shall be dogs and donkeys. Their dress shall be the garments of the dead, they shall eat their food from broken dishes, and they must always wander from place to place.'

A Sudra may not hear the Vedas and may not receive religious instruction; and if a Brahmin or other high-caste man murders a Sudra or low-caste man, he shall pay the same penalty as if he had killed a cat, frog, dog, owl, or crow.

The code of Manu revolutionized the Hindu religion. Hinduism as it is known in India at the present day is not the Hinduism of the Vedas, but the Hinduism as camouflaged by Manu, with rigid caste distinctions as its cornerstone. The arrangements worked well till foreign invasions came. Under the code of Manu each caste performed its allotted duties without any suggestion of 'strikes' or the necessity for 'lock-outs.' The threat of a 'lock-out' from Heaven coupled with the possibility of having to undergo various surgical operations, such as excision of the tongue, enucleation of the eyeballs, and so forth, was quite sufficient to keep the workers at their task. The Brahmins toiled not, neither did they spin. The sweated slaves supplied them with everything, and they in their turn cultivated 'spirituality.' But their spirituality received a rude shock when brought into forcible contact with the materialistic forces of the foreign invaders. And since India passed out of Brahminical power the Brahmins have been whining.

Coming to more modern times, we have the admission in the Montagu-Chelmsford report that 'if there are Indians who 'really desire to see India leave the Empire, to get rid of 'English officers and English commerce, we believe that 'among their springs of action will be found the bitterness 'of feeling that has been nurtured out of some manifestation 'that the Englishman does not think the Indian an equal.' What, then, must be the strength of the bitterness of feeling nurtured by the non-Brahmin population of India against their Brahmin oppressors, who for generations past have

put the stamp of inequality and the brand of degradation on the helpless non-Brahmins, not by occasional and casual manifestations of inequality but by a whole code of laws! The Brahmin had no compunction, no mercy, no sense of justice, no pangs of conscience in subjecting those who had the misfortune to come under his theocratic power to social and intellectual degradation and abject slavery, but when some one else stronger than himself treats him not exactly as his equal he howls in protest and invokes the principles of humanity and international law.

That is always the way of the tyrants. The barbarous Huns are inclined by nature to fire on hospitals, or sink hospital ships, or squirt out burning liquid on wounded British soldiers, but when they find British bayonets in the inconvenient vicinity of their carcases they are only too ready to throw up their hands and shout 'Kamarad.' The Montagu-Chelmsford report is good enough to say that 'the Indian temperament is sensitive.' Do the authors of that report think that this sensitive temperament is the special monopoly of the priestly classes in India? If not, what allowance have they made for the operation of the code of Manu on the sensitive temperament of the many millions of India for nearly three thousand years? The caste distinctions established by the code of Manu are not things of the past. The code of Macaulay has mitigated the severity of the code of Manu to a certain extent; but what Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford call the 'social grievance' still exists.

I will not take up unnecessarily any space in this REVIEW to describe the treatment meted out to the lower castes in India, even at the present time, by the higher castes. I do not want to lay the charge of oppressing the lower castes at the door of any particular caste. All the higher classes take a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all the non-Brahmin classes. The high-caste non-Brahmin, very often with aspirations to be considered a Brahmin, oppresses all the non-Brahmin castes below him. Thus the caste that is lowest in the scale under the pressure of this accumulated oppression becomes depressed. But it is not the condition of the depressed classes that I want to cite here in proof of the statement that caste distinctions still exist

even among the educated classes in a sufficient degree to demonstrate inequality. I will take my own case. I do not belong to the depressed or backward classes. I believe the Census Commissioner will class me among the *literati*, both in the vernacular and in English.

In the summer of 1915 I was staying at the Hill Station called Ootacamund, which is the summer capital of the Madras Government. Intimation was received at Ootacamund at that time of Sir Sankaran Nair's appointment to the Viceroy's Executive Council. A well-known Rajah gave a breakfast party at the Lawley Institute to meet Sir Sankaran Nair, who was at Ootacamund at the time. Invitations were issued to Indian residents of Ootacamund without distinction of caste. There were Brahmins, non-Brahmin Hindus, Indian Christians, and Jews among the invited. The company present was the very cream of the *intelligentsia* of Southern India. Members of the Legislative Council, leaders of the Bar, and high Government officials all assembled in the drawing-room of the Lawley Institute. In the middle of the general conversation I noticed most of the Brahmins slipping out of the room one by one. About ten or fifteen minutes after that the non-Brahmins began to slip out of the room also, one by one. Some one at this stage came and took Sir Sankaran Nair out of the room. About eight or ten of us were left in the room, most of us anglicized, England-returned Indians, with an Indian Christian and a Jewish lawyer.

'What do you think has happened to our fellow-guests 'who have gone out?' I asked.

'Nothing,' replied my Jewish friend. 'They are having 'their breakfasts and we have to wait for ours.'

At last we had our turn, in a different room. By the time we started our breakfast the Brahmin breakfasters had finished theirs and came in to see us eat. A little later on the non-Brahmins, including my friend and fellow-caste man, the guest of the day, also finished their breakfast, and, like their Brahmin colleagues came to see us eat. We felt like the inmates of the Zoological Gardens at feeding time, with an admiring audience outside their cages. In our case the audience was inside the dining-room and not outside. The gentleman who made a speech after the guests reassembled

in the drawing-room said something about a regrettable incident. He went in with the second class. I wonder what he would have said if he had had, like myself, to go in with the last class!

Now that is an example of the operation of the code of Manu among highly educated Indians in the year of grace 1915, and it is by no means a solitary instance of caste distinction publicly made in Indian dining-rooms. If, because Englishmen manifest in some way or other that they do not regard Indians as their equals, it becomes excusable for Indians to nourish bitterness of feeling to the extent of desiring to see India leave the Empire, and of desiring to get rid of English officers and English commerce (I am using the language of the Montagu-Chelmsford report), are we—the breakfasters of the second and third class—not justified in cherishing an equally bitter feeling? In sober fact, the Brahminical display of inequality is worse than the European because it is permanent. An Englishman who thinks an Indian his inferior to-day in matters social may accept him as his equal some time hence. But a Brahmin who treats a non-Brahmin as his social inferior can never accept a change in their relative social positions.

I have been told by some of my Brahmin friends that the question of inter-dining is a very small one, and that the want of it need not stand in the way of the hearty union of all the different classes of Hindus. That can be said of all 'social grievances.' The European generally shows that he does not consider the Indian his equal in railway carriages. The Brahmin claims his superiority over the non-Brahmin in the dining-room. The change of venue does not make the assertion of superiority any more agreeable to the non-Brahmin. Many Europeans in India have been arrogant and at times needlessly offensive to Indians. All classes in India are united in resenting such conduct. But the Brahmin has been on occasion equally offensive, and, what is more, shows no tendency to give up his superior pretensions. And yet he is ready to ask the non-Brahmins to join him in political agitation and to demand political privileges for Indians.

But what guarantee is there that when political privileges are secured the Brahmins will not become more objectionable

from a social point of view? When any class which has been nursing pretensions to social superiority comes into possession of political power, the temptation to assert that long-nourished feeling becomes irresistible. The motives that actuated that enactment in the code of Manu rules condemning Sudras to slavery and servitude were precisely the same as those which prompted the white colonists in South Africa in preventing Indians from acquiring real property or travelling first-class in railway trains, and in requiring them to live in definite locations. The assertion of social superiority by a class which is politically powerless is less irritating because more easily opposed than similar action by the governing class. That is perhaps the reason why the average Indian resents the objectionable conduct of Europeans more than he does that of the Brahmins; but if political power passes to the Brahmins the resentment will turn against them, and with aggravated bitterness. For, if the Brahmins while still cherishing their sense of caste superiority obtain the power which the Montagu-Chelmsford report would place in their hands, the chances are that the code of Manu, revised and brought up to date, will come into full operation once again.

I may be told that I take too pessimistic a view of things, and that already Brahmins, even in Southern India, have begun to dine with members of the other castes. From time to time reports are published in the newspapers in Madras of dinner parties where members of the different castes of Hindus have dined together. But at such dinner parties care is taken that the food is cooked and served by Brahmins. Such examples of interdining and others where high Brahmin officials come to picnic at Government House dinner-parties with a hamper containing food cooked in their own houses, to be eaten at the Government House dinner-table, do not convince me that the Brahmins have really made a move in the direction of acknowledging the equality of other castes with them. And where there is no admission of equality there cannot be any foundation for the establishment of mutual confidence and respect between caste and caste.

From interdining let me pass to intermarriage. In India there is no provision for civil marriages between members of two separate castes, if they profess any of the known religions of India. Religious marriage between members of two

different castes is not permitted. And so members of different castes cannot intermarry at all.

From what I have explained above about the origin of caste it is only reasonable to expect some such restriction. The superior Aryan conquerors did not want to permit the inferior conquered inhabitants of India to marry into their families. I understand that in the Transvaal the marriage of a negro with a European woman is contrary to law. One can very well understand the object of such restrictions. But in a country like India a restriction which was originally intended to preserve the purity of the Aryan race operated injuriously in two respects—it prevented the development of a homogeneous population, and it helped to degenerate the race by encouraging to an unusual degree in-and-in breeding. Obstruction to the development of a homogeneous population laid the axe at the very root of democracy. But the Hindus have never had any aspiration for democracy or democratic forms of government.

The Mohammedan conquerors of India, who had a religion which was highly democratic, perceived the obstacle which stood in the way of the formation of a consolidated Indian Empire, and many of them encouraged intermarriage between Hindus and Mohammedans. Those experiments only met with a limited success. After the fall of the Mohammedan power practically all traces of intermarriage disappeared, and now not only is there no intermarriage between Mohammedan and Hindu but there is none even between the different castes of Hindus. Intermarriages between individuals of different communities will only take place freely if there is a feeling of equality between the two communities. When there was an agitation in the early seventies of the last century for a Civil Marriage Act most of the religious communities in India opposed the movement. The result was the Act of 1872, according to which a man and woman may be married in India before a registrar, provided the parties make a declaration that they are not Hindus, Mohammedans, Christians, Parsees, Buddhists, or Jains.

In 1912 Mr. Bhupendranath Basu made an attempt to amend this Act by omitting the declaration of not professing any of the religions mentioned in the Act. Mr. Basu's Bill met with such violent opposition from the orthodox Hindu

community that it was lost. Critics ignorant of the conditions in India blame the Government of India for not having helped to pass Mr. Basu's Bill into law, and for having taken up the position that government cannot support a measure for altering the social usages of the people of India unless they are convinced that there is an overwhelming demand for the change. That has always been the attitude of the Government of India, and that is the only attitude possible till there is representative government in India in its truest and most complete form.

With the exception of one or two emancipated Brahmins, like the late Mr. Gokhale, all the orthodox Brahmins in the Imperial Legislative Council opposed the Bill. When Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford wrote that 'in such matters 'as child marriage, it is probable that through excess of 'caution proper to the *règime* under which it works, it may be 'actually perpetuating and stereotyping customs which the 'better mind of India might be brought, after the necessary 'period of struggle, to modify,' they were being entirely guided by theories and were absolutely ignoring past experience. The violent opposition to the Age of Consent Bill—during the viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne—ending in a riot in Bengal, is evidently forgotten. No one feels more strongly than myself the necessity for the abolition of child marriage. As a medical man, I have seen the evils of child marriages in all their horrible realities. I have also seen, as a Legislative Council member, the enormous amount of opposition on the part of educated Indians that was offered to a permissive 'Post Puberty Marriage Bill.' It is a vain delusion that the majority of educated Brahmins will ever consent to reforms of Hindu social customs which they believe, rightly or wrongly, to be rooted in religious sanction. The fact of the matter is there are no people in the world into whose everyday life religion—or what they consider to be their religion—has penetrated so deeply as in the case of the Hindus. And when it is remembered that that religion happens to be the very negation of the principles of democracy and all that democracy stands for, the hopelessness of converting the Hindus into a democratic nation will become apparent.

When the so-called Home Rule movement was started in India and boomed with great noise and vigour, the danger to

the less advanced among the Hindu communities became manifest. Old-established traditions, the position of the Brahmins as the highest and the most sacred of the Hindu castes, the nature of their ancient calling and their consequent freedom from manual toil—all these helped them to adapt themselves easily to the new conditions under British rule, as under previous epochs, in larger numbers and far more successfully than the other castes and communities. The skill to pass examinations, especially after Sir Henry Hardinge's educational order of 1844, gave the Brahmins a decided advantage in securing a disproportionately large number of appointments in the public services in India, and they have not been slow in utilizing for the interests of their own community the political power necessarily attending this preponderance.

With the commencement of political movements in India the educated Indians, among whom Brahmins preponderate, helped by the inability of the other classes in India to play a prominent part, have assumed the position of leaders. It will be evident from what I have said above that such assumption of leadership under these conditions will not constitute them the democratic leaders of a united Indian community. The non-Brahmin movement which gave expression to the non-Brahmin feelings, long smouldering, is a protest against this Brahmin leadership. Most non-Brahmins feel that their interests cannot be safely entrusted to the hands of their hereditary oppressors. Under existing conditions Home Rule for India would mean Brahmin rule. Till the spirit of social exclusiveness and the rigidity of class and caste have disappeared, in the best interests of India the government of that country ought to be conducted on true British principles of justice and equality of opportunity to all.

The attainment of responsible government for India is an ideal towards which India ought to be helped to travel by gradual stages and steady steps. The practical politician has for the present to concern himself with what lies immediately in front of him in the first stage of his journey. Disregard of the obstacles immediately in front of a pedestrian in his earnestness to concentrate his gaze on a distant objective will inevitably lead to a nasty fall. The task of building 'a 'nation' out of the heterogeneous elements that constitute the

Indian population is a laborious one. In that slow process of evolution each element that is finally to unite to form the homogeneous nation has to be trained to take its place in co-operation with the other component parts, not as a dependent and helpless unit, but as a self-respecting and highly-developed social organization, offering its willing co-operation for the promotion of common objects on terms of perfect equality.

Such a desirable end cannot be achieved by placing the heterogeneous elements in India into one ballot box and shaking it vigorously in the hope of taking out of it an Indian nation. I will not blame any Englishman for his supreme faith in the efficacy of the ballot box, for it has done much for England. But the experience of Austria-Hungary and other countries stretching eastwards has been different. A time may come when we of the East may also be able to bless the common ballot box as the most valuable instrument for expressing the will of a united nation. That time is not yet. 'East is East and West is West.' I will not go so far as to say that East and West shall never meet, but if Western institutions are to be grafted on to an Eastern people the process can only be successfully accomplished after preparing the Eastern people by Eastern methods. A recognition of this elementary fact will make all the difference between success and failure for such proposals for political reconstruction as the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme embodies.

To study the Indian method of self-government one must go back to the village Panchayats of the Hindus. A Panchayat is a council of five, and, according to the ancient Hindu system, every village had its council of five to settle disputes between the villagers and generally to look after purely village affairs. This was an admirable beginning for local self-government, and the ancient Hindus, unlike the modern British government in India, began the development of self-government at the bottom and not at the top. But unfortunately they did not proceed far. The Hindu system of self-government began and ended with the Panchayats. These rudimentary local bodies, which in a way may be said to correspond to the English vestries, remained isolated units, probably on account of the want of proper means of communication between villages in those days.

But the most interesting point about the village Panchayats, at all events so far as southern India is concerned, is that, whatever the basis may have been upon which they were originally created, they very soon assumed a character dependent upon the distinctions of caste. This was inevitable, for institutions established for each village to look after purely village concerns would necessarily reflect the nature of the composition of the village population. In southern India the Brahmin villages, called Agraharams, were sharply demarcated from those occupied by other Hindus, and the low-caste villages generally known as Paracherries were at a distance from the villages of high-caste Hindus. Thus village Panchayats in their composition naturally exhibited a distinctly caste basis. Indeed, the only Panchayats that have survived the turmoil of foreign conquests are the caste Panchayats. In southern India eighty-six per cent. of the population live in rural districts, scattered about in something like sixty thousand villages. The condition of these villagers has been aptly described in the Montagu-Chelmsford report thus :

> ' On the other hand is an enormous country population, for the most part poor, ignorant, non-politically minded, and unused to any system of elections—immersed indeed in the struggle for existence. The rural classes have the greatest stake in the country because they contribute most to its revenues ; but they are poorly equipped for politics and do not at present wish to take part in them.'

And again, speaking of the Indian ryot, the Montagu-Chelmsford report says :

> ' He has sat on caste Panchayats ; he has signed joint petitions to official authority. But he has never exercised a vote on public questions. His mind has been made up for him by his landlord, or banker, or his priest, or his relatives, or the nearest official. These facts make it an imperative duty to assist and to protect him while he is learning to shoulder political responsibilities.'

That many an elector in southern India has yet to learn to shoulder political responsibility, and that he cannot do so without assistance and protection, has been amply demonstrated by the result of more than one election in that part

of the country. The nature of the assistance and protection that the average Indian elector requires can be summed up in the words 'communal representation'—to use the phrase now universally employed in India to denote a system of representation which takes account of distinctions of caste. The majority of electors in India, no matter on what basis the electorate is constituted, will be deficient in education, with imperfectly developed political ideas. It is essential that they should receive some training in the methods of using the franchise that is to be given to them. In the development of a non-political people communal representation is an inevitable stage. The Montagu-Chelmsford report says that:

'Some persons hold that for a people, such as they deem those of India to be, so divided by race, religion, and caste as to be unable to consider the interests of any but their own section, a system of communal and class representation is not merely inevitable but is actually the best. They maintain that it evokes and applies the principle of democracy over the widest range over which it is actually alive at all, by appealing to the instincts which are strongest; and that we must hope to develop the finer, which are also at present the weaker, instincts by using forces that really count.'

Among those who held this view are to be counted the late Lord Dufferin, Lord Lansdowne, and the late Lord Minto. In 1892 Lord Lansdowne's government wrote that 'the 'representation of such a community upon such a scale as 'the Act permits can only be secured by providing that 'each important class shall have the opportunity of making 'its views known in Council by the mouth of some member 'specially acquainted with them.'

Elections, in the real sense of the term, for the Indian Legislative Councils were first introduced under the Minto-Morley reforms. Under Lord Cross's Act we had a system which empowered constituencies to 'recommend candidates 'for nomination.' But elections as such were the gift of the Minto-Morley reforms. With elections came the communal electorates. Communal representation, as understood and practised in India, is the election, by such of the members of a 'community' as possess the prescribed electoral qualification, of one of their own number to represent them in the

Legislative Council. By a 'community' is meant a group of persons possessing a common religious allegiance. The peculiar characteristic of the Minto-Morley reforms is that the candidate for election must be an elector in the constituency which he aspires to represent in the Legislative Council. This excellent rule eliminates the carpet-bagger. Political theorists may protest against the interference with the unfettered discretion of the voters to choose whom they like to represent them in the Legislative Council. It may be safe and reasonable to permit educated and experienced electors who at the same time are inheritors of great electoral traditions to choose anyone except a peer, pauper, or lunatic to represent them in parliament, but if unfettered discretion in the choice of a representative is given to people who have their minds made up for them by the nearest official or their lawyer or priest, the legislature will represent more the interests of its members than of their constituents. The opponents of communal representation in India have attempted to modify it in two ways. One is by permitting the communal electorates to elect anyone outside their community to represent them. The danger of this change and the consequent encouragement of the carpet-bagger I have already pointed out. The other modification of the communal electorate which has been suggested in the Montagu-Chelmsford report is that of 'reserving to a particular community a certain number of 'seats in plural constituencies, but with a general electoral 'roll.' This will open the door for the entrance of that not very desirable system of voting by ticket. If the non-Brahmins, for example, have a certain number of seats reserved for them in plural constituencies with a general electoral roll, the Brahmins will have a ticket consisting of a number of Brahmin candidates and a number of what we call in Madras the Brahmin-non-Brahmin, on whose behalf the whole of the Brahmin organization would canvass the constituency. The result would be that the non-Brahmins who are returned for such constituencies would be barely distinguishable from the Brahmins. These modifications of the communal electorates will defeat the very object of creating such electorates. There is only one way of working communal electorates: it ought to be decided by careful investigation as to which communities in India require com-

munal representation. And then those communities should have electorates of their own, composed of their members who satisfy the prescribed conditions, and such electorates ought to be given the power to elect one or more of their number as their representatives.

But the Montagu-Chelmsford report says that 'when we 'consider what responsible government implies, and how 'it was developed in the world, we cannot take this view.' Yet elsewhere Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford say that there is 'no parallel in the world' for the conditions that prevail in India. If so how can the development of responsible government in the world under entirely different conditions guide us in deciding the method of developing responsible government in India under peculiarly Indian conditions? The Indian problem is, no doubt, very complicated and highly perplexing. Finding themselves puzzled the authors of the report are proceeding on the principle of the American doctor who, when called in to see a child suffering from a nervous complaint, said: 'I don't understand 'this case, but that does not matter; give him these pills and 'they will bring on fits, and I am an authority on fits!'

The treatment suggested for the present condition of India is sure to bring on new complications which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford may possibly understand better than they apparently understand the present situation; but it does not follow that the health of the patient will be improved by the experiment.

What is true of communal interests is also true of interests other than communal. Under the Minto-Morley reforms the landed and commercial interests were also given special representation. These require extension. It is only by special and separate representation of all the important interests in the country, religious or otherwise, that a system of safe and equitable representative government can be instituted in the peculiar and almost unique circumstances of India. So far as southern India is concerned, I would propose separate representation to the following communities: (1) Brahmins, (2) Non-Brahmin Hindus, (3) Panchamas and other depressed classes, (4) Mohammedans, (5) Indian Christians, (6) Anglo-Indians (*i.e.* Eurasians) and non-official Europeans. I would also have European commerce and trade, Indian

commerce and trade, the planting and mining interests, the Zemindari, Ryotwari landholder, and the agricultural ryot interests specially safeguarded by separate representation. Against such a proposal it may be urged that it would introduce plural voting on a large scale. But we have plural voting under the Minto-Morley reforms, and I do not consider that plural voting, especially in the earlier stages of the development of an electoral system, is such an objectionable thing as would vitiate the whole system. It may also be urged that the representation of communal as well as other interests in India would result in a highly complicated electoral machinery. Would it be more complicated than the cleavages that exist in Indian society at the present time? Is it not a wiser State policy to accept the existence of sharp divisions and deep cleavages among the Indian population on account of race, religion, and caste, and shape and direct them in a manner preparatory to a future fusion, rather than to ignore them in the haste for the speedy attainment of responsible government, only to find out when too late that class and race divisions have merely been covered over and that Indian society has been made into a whited sepulchre with a fair exterior but full of dead men's bones within? The example of the racial divisions in Austria only gives a very imperfect idea of what dangerous complications India might develop under the proposed compulsory method of artificial unification of the Indian peoples. It is better to

'bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of.'

T. M. Nair.

LABOUR AND A GENERAL ELECTION

LABOUR is looming larger on the political horizon than any other single internal factor. The situation is extraordinarily paradoxical. Colloquially, the word 'Labour' is used to express the joint organization and activities of the trade unions and of certain socialist societies. 'Labour' thus defined takes no cognizance of, and is indeed regarded as hostile to, the unorganized elements among the manual workers. Until quite recently the same remark could have been applied to all other workers, *i.e.* the professional classes, the administrators, and the overwhelming majority of the clerk class. Now, however, efforts are being made to induce the 'brain-workers' to associate themselves with the Labour movement—not, as might have been anticipated, in their corporate capacity, but individually. In other words, the Labour Party has not sought to secure the affiliation of the Law Society, the British Medical Association, the Institute of Civil Engineers, and similar bodies, on the basis of a recognized salary for recognized work, but is angling for the individual members of these professions. In furtherance of this object, under the new constitution of the Labour Party, individuals, irrespective of class or calling, may become members of the party through the affiliated local groups and unions. In theory at least there is nothing to prevent the non-trade unionists, and even blacklegs, from becoming active members of a movement the foundations of which remain trade unionist in character. All this is extremely illogical and self-contradictory: whether it will result in a permanent strengthening or weakening of the movement time alone can tell. But however illogical or inconsistent its organization may be, the sheer weight of numbers renders the Labour movement a potentially formidable factor in the social, industrial, and political life of the nation.

Primarily and essentially, the Labour movement is a class movement based on craft or industry. It maintained that character right through the Victorian period from the debacle

of Chartism. From the period of Peterloo to the period of the rise of the modern socialist movement, British trade unionism was almost exclusively industrial in character. Practically the only trade unionist members who entered politics and the House of Commons were a handful sent up from mining constituencies, supported and encouraged by the Liberal Party. As industrialists they sat in the House of Commons in their quality of trade unionists, but as politicians they represented their constituencies as Liberals, being not only Liberals in name, but inheriting the principles, the economic ideas, and the limitations of Victorian Radicalism. On the whole, they were worthy representatives of their class, and no more honourable or clean-handed men ever sat in the House of Commons than the veteran Thomas Burt, or the late Sam Woods and the late Charles Fenwick. As representatives of the actual coal-getters, they were not without influence in their day and generation, but in *la haute politique* they were ciphers.

Throughout all that earlier period the Trade Union Congress continued to be the exclusive expression of the British trade unionist movement. Subsequently there emerged the General Federation of Trade Unions, formed of affiliated organizations, largely, though not entirely, identical with the trade union organizations affiliated to the Trade Union Congress. The General Federation of Trade Unions was established for specific purposes of an industrial and economic nature, other than those discharged by the Trade Union Congress.

While this slow and undramatic evolution of the organization of the manual wage-earning class was taking place in Great Britain, there had been an extraordinary revival of socialist thought and activities on the continent. In 1871 Marx and Engels had launched their famous Communist manifesto; the International had been re-formed, and a group of socialist propagandists had initiated an untiring campaign in this country. Chief among the latter were William Morris, H. M. Hyndman, H. H. Champion, Ernest Belfort Bax, and John Burns. They did not, indeed, initiate, in the true sense of the term, the socialist movement in this country, but rather inherited and modernized the evangel of which Robert Owen had been the father, and of which, also,

in their various ways, Ernest Jones, Charles Kingsley, and Frederick Denison Maurice had been the intermediate heirs. Marxist ideas and Marxist economics commenced to permeate the minds of the lesser-known leaders of British Labour. The new Unionism was born. As romanticism yielded to realism in literature, so a similar movement is traceable in politics. Hyndman's 'England for All' greatly popularized Marxist ideas amongst the more thoughtful of the younger generation of manual wage-earners. The materialistic or economic interpretation of history alike inspired and moulded the thought of those who were inheriting the mantles of the fathers of English trade unionism. Revolutionary socialism, however, was still in its infancy, and it would be true to say that up to the last decade of the nineteenth century the thoughts and aspirations of the rank and file of the British working classes failed to cross the rubicon of bourgeois Radicalism.

About this time, however, the Independent Labour Party was established, and the late Mr. Keir Hardie commenced a virile propaganda amongst the Scottish and provincial workers, which only terminated with his death. Where Mr. Hyndman and the Social Democratic Federation had failed to proselytize the masses of the British workers, Mr. Keir Hardie and the I.L.P. came much nearer to success. The S.D.F. only succeeded in a few places outside London in forming anything like a strong movement. Their creed was too logical, too revolutionary, too melodramatically crude, perhaps, in its declaration of the class-war to appeal to the provincial working-class. Mr. Keir Hardie, and, later on, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, Mr. Philip Snowden, Mr. Bruce Glasier, and others —very different types from Morris the artist, Hyndman the Cambridge graduate, Bax the scholar and metaphysician— provincials in the double sense of the term, learnt to 'temper 'the wind to the shorn lamb,' and introduced what the revolutionary followers of Hyndman contemptuously described as 'soft socialism.' There still lingers in my mind the recollection of one of Mr. Snowden's earlier essays in oratory, enthusiastically distributed by his disciples at thousands of meetings and entitled 'The Christ that is to Be.'

In a word, the I.L.P. found its recruits first by the score and then by the thousand amongst those who had been

brought up under the influence of the smaller chapel life of the provinces, and who unconsciously transferred the fervour and the idealism of the lesser dissenting schools to the work of political agitation. In those days the stranger who wandered into an I.L.P. meeting would have much more readily supposed himself to be taking part in some Nonconformist gathering than in a meeting of revolutionary socialists. Unlike the earlier meetings of the S.D.F., where Russian Nihilists, French Revolutionists, and German Social Democratic exiles mingled with the more turbulent spirits of the metropolitan proletariat, at those of the I.L.P. there were all the impedimenta and characteristics of earlier Wesleyanism—occasionally the squeaky harmonium, the illuminated texts of moral maxims on the walls, the fervent cult of hymnology, and the lengthy and quasi-religious address from one of the elders. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to say that the relative success of the I.L.P. propaganda could be traced much more to the adaptation of its methods to the social and religious customs of its converts than to its political principles or to its 'economic basis'—for, in the words of the 'clear-cut, 'class-conscious, revolutionary Social Democrat' of the Hyndman school, its 'economic basis' was notoriously unsound.

To this movement was drawn a large proportion of the keenest, the most industrious, and the most thoughtful of the working-class leaders of that decade, and these in their turn commenced to permeate the unions of which they were members. Then came the South African war, the association in the minds of the masses of patriotism and imperialism with cosmopolitan plutocracy. The defeat and debacle of Mr. Chamberlain's campaign synchronized with the Osborne judgment, which brought British trade unionism together as no other single factor had done, and these events were followed by the general election of 1906, and the emergence of the Labour Party in parliament as a political party 'inde-'pendent of all capitalist parties.' In the meantime the Fabian Society had played no small part in providing the younger school of Labour leaders with the data of a collectivist propaganda, collected by the untiring zeal and industry of the Webbs and their coadjutors. Nor, in this brief summary of the spread of socialist thought, must one fail to chronicle

the immense impetus given to it by the publication of Robert Blatchford's 'Merrie England,' subsequently re-issued in a revised form under the title of 'Britain for the British.' Probably no other book of its class has had so extraordinary a circulation with the single exception of 'Progress and 'Poverty' by the late Henry George.

From the general election of 1906 to the outbreak of war the Labour Party in parliament was relatively a declining force in the British Labour movement. Mr. Hyndman and his social democratic followers had resolutely refused to follow on the pathway of compromise traced out by Mr. Keir Hardie and his lieutenants. Nor could the veteran social democrat fail to see through the ill-concealed camouflage of an 'Inde-'pendent' Labour Party, practically every one of whose members would never have entered the House of Commons but for an agreement understood, if not written, with the Liberal caucus.

The presence in parliament of the Labour Party and of the members of the Trade Union Congress, whose adhesion to the Liberal policy had prevented them from accepting the Labour Party's whips, led to the setting up of the Joint Board which was at first representative of the parliamentary Trade Union Congress, of the Labour Party, and of the General Federation of Trade Unions, but from which the last named body was expelled two years ago. Frequent and increasing complaint is made, both inside and outside the ranks of Labour, in regard to the control exercised by the small minority of socialists over the political destinies of the Labour movement. That criticism is both short-sighted and irrelevant. A political party must be founded on principles, even though it applies these principles in the most opportunist fashion. Now, the Labour Party had no principles—or, rather, its principles were a more or less incoherent and cumbersome defence of the 'bottom dog.' The socialists inside the Labour Party had a body of doctrine. It is true that they applied that doctrine in an excessively undecided manner, but its possession gave them a cohesive force entirely lacking to the ranks of the mass of trade unionists. This, and the fact that the socialist propaganda had unquestionably attracted the overwhelming majority of the broadest minds amongst the Labour leaders of the last twenty years, is a full and adequate explanation

of the control exercised by the socialist minority over the trade unionist majority.

Of what is that trade unionist majority made up? We are told that they are all manual wage-earners and industrially they unite as trade unionists, that is, organized craftsmen, organized in defence of their craft interests. To-day there are no less than four and a half millions of them. Of these four and a half millions, however, it is obvious that hundreds and hundreds of thousands are Tories by temperament, opinion, or tendency. A still larger number are Liberals. Only a minority profess and call themselves Labour men *pur sang*, resolved to vote for the Labour candidate at parliamentary elections, whoever his opponents may be and whatever may be the political issues of the contest. How can such a vast body of men, drawn both from the skilled and unskilled, with infinite differences of idiosyncrasy and character, constitute a solid political whole?

To ask the question is to answer it, and to give at the same time no inadequate explanation of the domination of the socialist leaders. From 1906 to 1914 there was, as already hinted, a decline in the influence and power of the parliamentary Labour Party. That party had been hailed by a great flourish of trumpets. The leader-writers in the 'Times,' in the 'Daily Telegraph,' and the 'Morning Post' apparently had nightmares of a Committee of Public Safety, followed by a Triumvirate of Hardie, Macdonald, and Snowden in Whitehall, with a guillotine functioning in Trafalgar Square. In place of this melodramatic vision there emerged the respectable philistinism of Mr. Arthur Henderson, the verbose activities of Mr. J. H. Thomas, the genial simplicity of Mr. Will Crooks, the easy good-fellowship of Mr. James O'Grady, and the suave gentility of Mr. C. W. Bowerman.

The 'slump' in political Labour was so obvious that an extreme Left Wing rapidly emerged in the form of the Syndicalist movement. The ground had already been freely sown by the propaganda of the Industrial Unionists, the gospel of continental thinkers, who had begun to realize that a centralized and bureaucratic Collectivist State offered but a poor instrument to establish the social democracy at which they were aiming. They proceeded to lay the foundations of the Neo-Socialism by finding a bond of union for the anarchist, com-

munist, and the social revolutionist in an industrial and economic theory which sought to realize in the structure of the modern Labour unions the implement through which the State of to-morrow would function. The bourgeois conception of political democracy, the Marxist theory of social democracy, functioning through a centralized State, were alike flung into the limbo of exploded ideas. Industrial democracy, to be realized through the ownership and control of each industry by the organized workers concerned in that industry, was, according to the syndicalist, the only safe path for the workers to tread. As a means to this end the old craft union was to be destroyed and to be merged into an industrial unionism in which the workers would be organized not by craft but by industry. This agitation was at its height, rapidly converting tens of thousands of the more revolutionary-minded of the manual wage-earners, when, in the opening hours of August, 1914, the German legions violated the Belgian frontier and Europe was plunged into the cataclysm of war.

During the last four years international socialism has become more and more pacifist in its tendencies. The national sentiments which at the outbreak of war engulfed the international opinions of nearly all European socialists have swung back to their pre-war international phase. The most striking example of this has been the conversion of the patriotic majority of the French Socialist Party into an actual minority. In our own country we have witnessed a singular commingling of tendencies hitherto generally hostile. The cosmopolitanism of the Marxist, tireless in his proclamation of the social democratic maxim: 'Workers of the world, unite: you have 'nothing to lose but your chains: you have a world to win,' found a strange bed-fellow in the 'little Englandism' of our socialists of native growth, whose opinions and sentiments before the war were shaped far more by the tenets of primitive or Tolstoyan Christianity than by the cosmopolitanism of Marx, a German Jew. These two tendencies have more and more coalesced under the stress of war, so that to-day, Herren Lenin and Trotsky Braunstein have unquestionably struck a responsive chord in the hearts of the somewhat smug, respectable, and philistine leaders of contemporary British Labour.

An international concordat between Herren Scheidemann

and David, the Russian Soviets, and British 'Little Bethelism' incarnate in Messrs. Henderson and Macdonald, is such a spectacle as Marx, in his wildest visions, never dreamed. Nothing, indeed, is more striking—and more perilous for this country—than the intellectual inferiority of the British trade unionist leaders to their continental prototypes. Whatever we, English or Scots, may think of the German socialist leaders, or of men like Vandervelde, Troelstra, Branting, and others, it must be sorrowfully confessed that in educational attainments, in a knowledge of international affairs, and in a grip of political economy, British Labour leaders are to them as little children to competent adults. Take from Mr. Henderson and his associates the bureaucratic capacity of Mr. Sidney Webb, the tireless propagandism of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, the cosmopolitan impartiality of Mr. Morel, and the driving force of the later syndicalists, and there would be little left for even a beginning of leadership.

What is called the Labour Party moves towards the electoral field of battle, not as a united and organized army, but as a conglomeration of proletarian cohorts made up of the adherents of Craft Unionism, Industrial Unionism, Syndicalism, Revolutionary Socialism, 'Soft Socialism,' and of the merely discontented. That there are ample reasons for social discontent no one can deny: that a great cause can move through battle to triumph wholly on discontent, few will affirm. The solution of a large number of the problems of modern history lies rather in the hands of the workers in those industries than in politics. The very nature of the cause of Labour demonstrates that in Labour itself, rather than on the political plane, is to be found the solution of Labour's problems. Politics can only co-relate what Labour creates. On the other hand, there are a thousand and one questions in the political field towards a solution of which Labour can deliver no mandate nor discover any 'open sesame.'

From the maelstrom of the war there has emerged another party which seeks, wholly on the political plane, to offer some solution of the problems with which politics alone can properly deal. This new party, the National Democratic and Labour Party, was evolved from the British Workers' League, which was brought into existence in order to combat the pacifism and defeatism in the ranks of Labour, and has gone on to

promulgate a programme of national and industrial reconstruction based on what it conceives to be a reasonable compromise between the individualistic *laissez faire* economics of the bourgeois State and the revolutionary socialist principles nowadays promulgated by the Labour caucus. This new party, not forgetful of the blessings conferred by the Liberal vindication of individual rights, strives to take what is good from socialist thought, and, finding its basic principles in the great ideas initiated in America by Alexander Hamilton and in Germany by Friedrich List in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century, seeks to elaborate a polity founded on national economics in contradistinction to the cosmopolitan economics of mid-Victorian Britain. Unlike the Labour Party, it upholds the economic and political unity of the Britannic Commonwealths, but, unlike the imperialists of an earlier period, it seeks to establish such an empire unity on the basis of democratic institutions. Both politically and industrially it already numbers many thousands of supporters in its ranks throughout the kingdom, is well organized, and will challenge the opinion of at least half a hundred constituencies at the coming general election.

When, therefore, we come to enquire as to the issues that will be raised at the coming election, it is essential that we should bear in mind the history of the growth and development of Labour in this country as summarized in the foregoing pages. Labour will only enter the electoral lists nominally as a united party. From the extreme right wing represented by the rather stodgy and unimaginative trade unionist of Radical Party tendencies, to the extreme left wing, as expressed in the syndicalist-communist movement, there is a considerable number of gradations. These various factions have been more or less driven together under the pressure of the war; it is, however, in the last degree unlikely that they will remain a cohesive force when peace comes. The trade unionist who pins his faith to a craft unionist organization, including those who before the war were Tories by conviction or Liberals by conviction; the trade unionist who is labouring unceasingly to merge the craft union into the industrial union; the State socialist of the classical Fabian type; the pre-war 'soft' socialist of the I.L.P. model; the Marxian socialist of the disciplined and more or less centralized socialism

as visualized by the social democrat; the 'rebel' of the George Lansbury type—all these will have a tendency to break away from each other. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that there is a counter-influence to these disintegrating influences which tends to draw minorities towards a compromise of their principles with the solid majority. It is dimly and unconsciously recognized by all the factions that in Labour affairs the maxim that 'unity is strength' is particularly apposite. Moreover, the insistent and revolutionary minorities are not entirely unhappy in their trade union environment inasmuch as they supply—and feel that they supply—the driving force.

In addition to these considerations the woman electorate is a new factor. Prophecy is notoriously an unsafe guide, but in regard to the women's vote it is probable that, so far as the manual wage-earning class is concerned, in the large majority of cases the wife will vote on the same side as her husband. The exceptions, of course, will be numerous. The experience of the female vote for instance in our Dominions overseas goes to show that the women's vote has on the whole been cast in favour of such measures as prohibition of the liquor traffic, greater protection of mother and child, a drastic revision of the divorce laws, and draconic police measures against the spread of venereal disease applied equally to men and women. The women's vote may also be counted on as being cast in favour of greater educational opportunities in all directions, measures which come under the generic description of the endowment of motherhood, and such applications of socialist ideas as the nationalization of the milk trade.

Moreover, the whole of our political issues will be fought out on a different plane than before the war. Conservative politics, in the pre-war sense of the term, are as dead as the dodo. The battle of democracy *versus* class-government has already been fought out, and won and lost. Parties will only survive in the future in so far as they express most forcefully and most clearly the political and social ideals of democracy, that is, of industrial democracy as well as of political democracy.

The profound weakness of the Labour movement as a political force lies in the present incoherence of its political ideas. The movement seeks to co-relate the most rigid indivi-

dualism in economics and politics with the most sweepingly socialistic theories. Industrially it has given a tepid welcome to the aims and objects expressed in the Whitley Report, while simultaneously the spirit of the class-war and the ceaseless fight against the capitalist order as a class is everywhere prevalent and prominent. The recent Trade Union Congress, for example, has called for the full restoration of the civil and industrial liberties of the workers, has re-affirmed its conviction that the institution of any system of tariffs would be contrary to the national interest, and at the same time has demanded the most sweeping forms of nationalization in regard to canals, mines, railways, milk, agriculture, housing, and air-craft: has called for a great extension of State-aid for education, State control of industrial conditions, and—in the closer federation of trade unions on an industrial basis—aims at stamping out entirely individual 'freedom' of employment.

There is still another factor to be taken into consideration in estimating the influence of Labour in the coming general election. Under the new constitution the Labour Party as a political entity will function not only through the trade unions affiliated thereto, but largely, if not mainly, through the local Labour parties whose individual members need not necessarily be trade unionists or members of affiliated socialist societies. The trade unionist masses are not yet alive to the pitfalls and perils to trade unionism which the extended membership thus introduced will add to an already heterogeneous body.

The case of Mr. Charles Roden Buxton affords a piquant example of these perils. Mr. Buxton has recently been adopted as Labour candidate for so considerable an industrial constituency as Accrington, mainly, if not exclusively, through the influence of the Independent Labour Party. As prospective parliamentary candidate before the local Labour caucus he defeated so sound a trade unionist as Mr. John McGurk, chairman of the Labour Party. Now, Mr. Buxton, as is well known, is neither a trade unionist nor a socialist. He is a disgruntled Radical who has deserted the Liberal camp because the Liberal Party did not afford adequate expression to his ultra-pacifist opinions. Mr. Buxton is not only not a trade unionist nor a socialist, he is not a manual

wage-earner, but one of the abhorred intellectuals—the son of a baronet and a distinguished graduate of Cambridge. Apart from his pacifism, chasms yawn between him and his socialist and syndicalist colleagues on the most essential political and economic ideas and principles.

There is a further consideration. At the general election of 1906, which witnessed the Parliamentary birth of the Labour Party, not more than two or three Labour candidates were elected independently of Liberal votes. There was a complete understanding between the Labour Party machine and the Liberal caucus in regard to a certain number of seats at that election, and the defeat of the Unionists in a majority of those constituencies was due to the political unity of the Liberal and Labour forces. This was a highly convenient arrangement for the party, then led by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. It came about mainly through the pledge given by the former Liberal leader to the trade unionists to reverse the Osborne judgment by statute, and force was given to the campaign by the attack made on the employment of Chinese labour in the South African mines.

It has now, however, become fairly obvious that the Labour Party can only grow at the expense of the Liberal and Radical Party. Under these conditions Mr. Henderson's arrangement for running three or four hundred Labour candidates is not being regarded with any degree of enthusiasm by the distinguished officials whose head-quarters are in Abingdon Street. Liberalism had no objection to the lordly patronage of a more or less docile and infinitesimal minority of trade unionists, whether they accepted the Liberal whips, as in an earlier stage of Labour representation, or whether they were nominally 'independent.' But when it comes to the very junior partner seeking to 'jump' the claim of the old hands in practically every seat which the Radical wirepullers at the apex of their party's fortunes could hope to control, then they regard it as 'too much of a good thing.' Hence it may be inferred that—willy-nilly—Liberalism will fight Labour at the next General Election. The Old Liberalism will be between the hammer and the anvil of Lloyd-Georgism and Hendersonism, and it will certainly have to fight for its life.

Had parliament accepted the principle of the second ballot or of the alternative vote the situation would have been at

once simpler and clearer. As it is, the contest at the coming general election will tend to assume, more and more, the character of the electoral battles in France, where victory in the lists is frequently disputed by candidates styling themselves respectively Legitimists, Orleanists, Republicans, Progressives, Radicals, Radical-Socialists, Independent Socialists, Unified Socialists, and others besides.

If the industrial delegations which meet at the Trade Union Congress or at the Labour Party Conference actually represented the political and industrial sentiments and opinions of the rank and file of the organized workers, and those of their women-folk who can claim and will exercise the vote, the result of this coming general election would be a foregone conclusion. Neither the middle class, nor the unorganized wage-earning class, could stand up politically with any hope of success against organized Labour. How far, then, is the individual trade unionist elector likely to support the Labour Party candidate for parliament? This is the crux of the whole matter, and this is where, I think, the Labour Party will fail, and fail heavily.

In my earlier student days in France we used an expression current in Parisian *argot* which signified the doleful after-dinner bill—'la douloureuse.' There was a big moral behind this. One gets nothing in this life without paying for it in some form or another, and the Labour Party will have to pay for its gigantic industrial organization at the price of homogeneous political power. The manual wage-earning classes of the country could never have been organized in anything approximating the proportions in which they have been organized except on a craft basis. Wage-earners were brought together, and then federated in their craft organizations in defence of their craft interests, and for the improvement of their economic and industrial status. Had they been appealed to on any other grounds their organization could never have been realized. Hence Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Agnostics, Tories, Liberals, Radicals, Socialists, and men who had no ideas, either theological or political, were brought together—either as cotton operatives, or as miners, or as railway workers, and so on. Later on small socialist organizations were linked up in political partnership with this mass of craft workers, with the result that, with their greater driving

force and elaborate sociological theories, they succeeded cleverly, and even cunningly, in expressing the social and industrial discontent and wrongs of the manual wage-earner in all sorts of programmes of a more or less socialistic character. They did this by a deft and energetic manipulation and increasing control of the 'machine.' They have succeeded too well. They have unquestionably captured the machine, but they have failed to bring along with them the rank and file of the workers. Nor could it be otherwise. Three plumbers may collaborate in any locality to form a branch of the Plumbers' Union, and may co-operate with the utmost loyalty to improve their status and increase their wages—*as plumbers*. One of the plumbers, however, is a Roman Catholic, another is a dissenting Protestant, the third is an Agnostic. No two of these three will agree on the subject of religious education in the public elementary schools. Or, again, one comes from Belfast, the second from Cork, and the third from Manchester. It is scarcely likely that they will agree on Home Rule. Or, in the third hypothetical case, one has been a sailor and knocked about the world, and has realized with Kipling that 'there 'ain't no buses running from the Bank to Mandalay,' another has never been far beyond the reach of the parish pump, the third is a revolutionary syndicalist and dreams dreams of an International Communist Republic. They will hardly come to a common understanding on the subject of Imperial Federation. And so we may go over the whole gamut of political as distinguished from industrial questions, and realize that industrial and political organizations are not, and cannot be, co-ordinated. It is no reply to this objection that the political questions which divided parties before the war are effete or do not interest the 'downtrodden wage-earner.' Other political problems will arise, demanding a solution, utterly unrelated to industrial organization or aims.

Again, leadership is a factor which none can afford to ignore. In leadership the Labour Party is bankrupt before it opens the campaign. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald is impossible. His astuteness and industry are beyond question, but he lacks the *flair* for properly estimating great issues. He is the product of that narrow parochialism which characterizes a certain type of his countrymen, and his quaintly-mingled, unconscious hypocrisy and dogged persistency on a fatal course have earned

for him an unpopularity which on other counts he scarcely deserves. When all is said and done, he is of considerably higher intellectual stature than the average Labour leader. Mr. Arthur Henderson has suffered the fate of Humpty-Dumpty. The country for a time mistook for statesmanship the mere average competence of a very ordinary trade union official. Mr. Henderson is not only not an asset to the Labour Party, he has become a weight round its neck. The Labour ministers may be discounted in these estimates as they are either rapidly becoming 'back numbers' or their ministerial positions will deprive them of the popular power essential to an Opposition chief. Mr. J. H. Thomas is mentally agile and readily verbose, but nine-tenths of his influence springs from the fact that he is the General Secretary of one of the most considerable unions. Mr. Robert Smillie, the President of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, who ought to be the most powerful Labour leader in the country, is notorious in Labour circles as being the most impossible and unfortunate of parliamentary candidates. His pacifism is well-known, and nobody thinks of him as leading a victorious party. Not to extend the list further, let me say that whatever else the Labour movement has produced, it has not produced a single personality that could for an instant command a national following. Unity of command under a chief of genius has been found essential for the Allied armies on the western front. Unity of command under a chief of acknowledged superiority will be found no less essential for any political party in its electoral battles. As an opponent of Mr. Henderson's party, I do not contemplate, therefore, with any anxiety the approaching general election.

The parties which on the whole represent the essential administrative capacity to conduct the affairs of the nation and the empire must, in the first place, be democratic both in their opinions and in their sympathies, that is to say, they must have a real trust in the people as a whole. All the old class barriers and safeguards for preserving political power as a monopoly of a caste, or for maintaining the jobs that are worth having as the privilege of a class, will be as useless in the coming period as a feudal castle against modern artillery. The second essential factor is that we should embark loyally on a programme of sane and carefully thought-out reconstruction

in the interests of the nation, irrespective of sectional interests. Briefly, there is only one power that in the long run can meet and overthrow the sectional demands of revolutionary syndicalism, and that is democracy, which has been described as 'government of all the people for all the people by all the people.' Thirdly, there must be a *sanction* for all governance. That is too frequently forgotten. We have long lost the sanction of a quasi-divine royalty. Gone, too, is the sanction of a great governing aristocracy. Nor have we any longer the sanction of an orthodox religious faith to which all practically yield a ready obedience. Where, then, shall that sanction be found if not in the same splendid fidelity to Motherland which is the supreme inspiration of modern France? Against the creeds of internationalism, cosmopolitanism, revolutionism, can alone be successfully raised the standards of nationality and empire.

The lack of cohesion, the absence of a common principle, the striking divisions of opinion on some of the most vital matters referred to in the foregoing pages, was strikingly exemplified at the recent Trade Union Congress at Derby. Far more perilous however, from the point of view of political Labour, than these weaknesses was the extraordinary apathy of the rank and file of the delegates. By their votes, in the course of an hour they had abolished the House of Lords, nationalized the canals and internal waterways of the kingdom, socialized the mines, and declared in favour of the socialization of the milk supply of the country. Practically every one of these gigantic revolutionary measures was adopted without debate, and without any discussion as to ways and means. Resolutions were no sooner formally proposed than from all parts of the assembly resounded cries of 'Vote! Vote!' The delegates were anxious to 'get on with the business,' even though they apparently did not understand the full significance of the affairs to be discussed. It would have been tragic had it not been comic. What really aroused these Labour statesmen were the disputes between competitive and rival trade unions, or such questions as the relationship between the Congress and the General Federation of Trade Unions.

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COMMERCE AND EMPIRE

1. **Essays in Politics.** By ANDREW MACPHAIL. Longmans, Green. 1909.
2. **Nationality and Government.** By ALFRED E. ZIMMERN. Chatto & Windus. 1918.
3. **Commerce and the Empire.** By EDWARD PULSFORD. P. S. King. 1917.
4. **British Colonial Policy.** By C. H. CURREY. Oxford University Press. 1916.
5. **The Disclosures from Germany.** New York: American Association for International Conciliation. 1918.
6. **Foreign Countries (Preference to Colonies).** House of Commons Paper 296 of 1909.
7. **Report of Departmental Committee on Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries.** 1918.

THAT the present war may result in the establishment of some new international concord is the hope of most people; but those who take the lead in giving expression to this hope have hitherto confined themselves to formulating more or less elaborate projects for a League of Nations. These projects all involve the creation of international machinery for settling national disputes. That is certainly an ideal to be desired, even though the obstacles in the way of its attainment seem almost insuperable. But what is even more to be desired than the creation of machinery to settle disputes is the removal of conditions which tend to provoke disputes. Yet this aspect of the problem seems to have been almost entirely ignored by the leading advocates of the League of Nations. They are so intent upon designing a perfect machine for settling international quarrels that they rarely pause to ask whether it is not possible to diminish the range of subjects over which nations are apt to quarrel, and to press their quarrel even to the point of war in defiance of any international tribunal.

Among the ultimate causes which led up to the present war perhaps the most dominant of all was the German conception that nationality and commerce go hand in hand.

Pursuing this conception the German State assisted German citizens in their trade with the citizens of other nations in the hope of strengthening itself against the rest of the world. If the trade was profitable the riches accruing to German subjects helped to pay for more ships and guns with which to wage war when the time was ripe. Reciprocally it was calculated that a successful war, carefully planned in advance and launched at the right moment, could be used to secure increased trading facilities for German subjects, or increased control of raw materials for German industries. The evidence that this was, and is, the German attitude is overwhelming. It was indeed assumed by responsible German writers that as a matter of course commercial and national interests were parts of one whole. Thus, Herr von Jagow, in the course of the reply which he wrote to the embarrassing Lichnowsky memorandum, incidentally remarks: 'But to-day economic 'interests are no longer to be separated from political 'interests.'*

In pursuance of this policy of combining national and commercial interests the German nation-State thought itself entitled to plunder its neighbours for its own economic or commercial ends. Germany's policy of peaceful penetration in the economic sphere was but the forerunner of the war of aggression which she launched in 1914. This policy of the German Government and of the German people has met with universal condemnation in England and throughout the British Empire. It has been equally condemned in France and Italy. In both these countries before the war Germany's peaceful penetration was a far more important factor in the economic life of the country than it was in Great Britain. Especially in Italy was German financial and industrial influence becoming a matter of grave importance. Everywhere this influence was being used, not merely to secure profit for German private citizens who were adventuring their capital or using their talents in a foreign country, but also to promote the political interests of the German Empire.

That the rest of the world is entitled to protect itself against this German policy no one questions, except perhaps the

* See 'Disclosures from Germany,' p. 354.

international socialist or the professional pacifist. But the curious fact is that in our own country the very people to whom credit belongs for taking the lead in exposing German ambitions and in denouncing German methods are themselves the advocates of a policy which involves the acceptance of German principles. There are two widely differing conceptions of commerce. According to one view, which is usually stigmatized by a certain school of politicians as Cobdenism, trade whether national or extra-national is the affair of the individuals who engage in it. France does not trade with England; it is Auguste Lesage who trades with John Barclay. If the bargain is a good one both are satisfied, both are richer than before, and—in default of evidence to the contrary—the presumption is that each nation gains by the increased prosperity of its respective citizens. According to the other view, extra-national trade must be looked at primarily as an affair of the nation as a whole. Individuals must not be left to seek out the most profitable bargains they can make with the subjects of other States; they must be partly coerced and partly bribed into directing their trade into certain restricted channels which are presumed to be more advantageous for the nation as a whole.

Both views are fairly old. There were convinced free-traders in England long before the activities of Cobden, and there is no reason for suspecting that they were any less patriotic than their protectionist contemporaries. Among the more prominent free-traders of the eighteenth century was Pitt, who is not generally regarded as a traitor to his country. Nor apparently did the eighteenth-century protectionists arrogate to themselves a monopoly of patriotism. What they were most concerned about was the national stock of gold. Here is not the place to discuss the mercantilist theory which so largely dominated English economics in the eighteenth century. It led straight to the absurdity that a nation would trade most favourably if it always sold and never bought. That delusion has long been abandoned in England, even by most protectionists, but it still survives in the Antipodes.

It was crudely set forth by the late Mr. Seddon, at one time premier of New Zealand. Observing that the recorded imports into the United Kingdom exceeded in one year the

recorded exports by £160,000,000, he lectured his mother country for her folly in annually sending abroad 'a hundred 'and sixty million golden sovereigns.'

A more recent illustration of the same delusion is given in a publication issued by the Incorporated Accountants' Students' Society of Victoria, in March, 1918, where the following passage is reproduced from a leading article in the *Melbourne Age:*

'If the "Aspasia" takes £250,000 of wool and meat to London, it thereby benefits Australia to the extent of £250,000. But if she brings back a cargo worth £300,000, is it not evident that Australia is a loser to the extent of £50,000? If she return empty is not Australia clearly £550,000 to the good, less only the trifling expenses of the return voyage?' *

These bizarreries of the protectionist creed are, however, a side issue. The intelligent protectionist understands clearly enough that trade is, and always has been, and always must be, an exchange of goods or services against other goods or other services, gold only serving as a counter. What the intelligent English protectionist wants to do is to regulate this interchange of goods and services with a view to increasing the wealth and power of his country; he demands that the individual seeking private profit should be guided and curbed by the State seeking national ambitions. This also was the policy of the whole German people.

That this policy does not tend to promote peace is fairly obvious. In trade itself there is constantly involved an element of war. The rival grocers in a village street fight for the custom of squire and farmer and even of Hodge; the great steam-ship lines that trade to the ends of the earth contend fiercely to secure contracts for the shipment of produce. All kinds of devices, reputable and disreputable, are employed in this warfare which accompanies trade; but as long as the combat is confined to private traders or trading companies no national question arises. When, however, the State steps in and deliberately pushes one trade or blocks another, for some motive of national policy, what was a struggle between private merchants or manufacturers begins to loom forth as a national quarrel.

* 'Money and its Purchasing Power,' by J. R. Butchart. Published at 59, William Street, Melbourne. 1918.

If one State by devious methods assists its subjects to secure a hold upon the industry and commerce of another country, may not that other country retaliate by legislation directed towards an economic boycott of the offending foreigner? The next step may be actual war. Or, again, if one State having control of large sources of supply of raw materials that are widely wanted by mankind refuses to allow the citizens of other countries to purchase these materials except upon disadvantageous terms, will not those other countries have some justification if they decide to try to take by force of arms what is refused to fair commerce? The area of the world is limited, the strain upon its natural resources grows greater as population increases; if the peoples of the world are going to struggle for the possession of these resources, not as individuals on commercial principles, but as States on national principles, wars long and frequent will hardly be avoided. For disputes between individuals in the final resort are settled in the law court, which in every civilized community has resistless power behind it; disputes between nations imply a trial of strength, and even if a League of Nations were set up to act as arbiter the dissatisfied parties would frequently have at their command sufficient strength to challenge the judgment.

It is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the nationalistic conception of commerce is directly provocative of war. Yet the members of the present government of the United Kingdom, while proclaiming that their ideal is universal peace, casually announce that they have decided on a policy of imperial preference. In other words, they propose to identify commerce with nationality throughout the whole British Empire, to segregate that great Empire with all its varied peoples and spacious territories from the rest of the world, and to treat all other nations with varying degrees of commercial hostility.

The two reasons which are urged on behalf of this policy are, first, that it is necessary to protect ourselves against German commercial penetration and incidentally to punish the Germans for their crimes; secondly, that the Dominions have rendered such invaluable services to the Empire during the war that we must comply with their oft-repeated demand for a general system of imperial preferences. Both these

arguments rest upon a substratum of truth. It is true that German methods of commercial penetration do constitute a danger which we ought to take into account; and it is also true that in most of the Dominions some persons at one time or another have expressed a desire for a system of imperial preferences.

But these two propositions do not lead towards one policy; they lead in opposite directions. If we are to guard against German penetration it is of the utmost importance that we should form a definite league for that purpose with our present Allies. This was the object contemplated in the famous Paris resolutions of 1916, and the spirit of those resolutions still holds good, though no opportunity for giving effect to them has yet arisen. But the policy of imperial preference involves an economic breach with our Allies. By whatever phraseology this policy is covered up it means in hard fact the imposition of duties on Belgian, French, Italian, and American goods which previously entered the United Kingdom untaxed. Protectionists at any rate cannot dispute that such duties would be an injury to the nations who are now fighting side by side with us on the battle-fields of the world, for their doctrine is that the 'foreigner pays the tax.' From the free trade point of view a protective tariff is an economic injury to both sides—to the country that imposes the tariff and to the country against whose goods it is directed. If then we impose duties upon the goods of our Allies in order to please those persons in the Dominions who ask for imperial preferences, we can hardly expect Belgians, Frenchmen, Italians, and Americans to show any great desire to co-operate with us in an anti-German economic policy. They are quite likely to say: If that is the way England plays the game we had better seek our commercial ends in our own way.

Even if Belgium, France, and Italy alone took that course the whole policy of an economic boycott, or partial boycott, to prevent German expansion or to punish German crimes would fall to the ground. We cannot imprison Germany in an economic strait-jacket if her territorial neighbours are willing to trade with her. As a matter of fact before the war the most important and the most expansive portion of German export trade was with the continent of Europe. Striking figures illustrating this point and showing the simul-

taneous expansion of the trans-oceanic trade of Great Britain are given in the *Economic Journal* for June, 1916, and the writer thus sums up his conclusions:

'The broad conclusion to be drawn from these figures seems to be that, as regards the continent of Europe, Germany had a great superiority, obviously due to her central position and to her magnificent railway and water communications with the countries by which she is surrounded; while we, on the other hand, had an even greater advantage as regards the rest of the globe in our ocean communications and in the increasing magnitude and efficiency of our mercantile marine. The continent in the pre-war days was becoming more and more the *hinterland* of the German railways, while the overseas countries of the world remained in increasing measure the sphere of influence of British sea supremacy.'

Parenthetically, it may be noted that the point here brought out is important for other than commercial reasons. It shows how rail-power has become a rival of sea-power, and proves, if further proof were needed, that we should have lost the war if, while driving Germany back in the west, we allowed her to retain control over Russia with the accompanying power of railway expansion over the whole of Asia.

But for the moment the continental character of Germany's trade is only emphasized here for the purpose of showing that we are dependent upon our continental Allies for any effective economic restraint over Germany after the war. Of necessity also we shall be partly dependent upon neutrals, but if our Allies go with us we shall be justified in approaching the neutral States who adjoin the German Empire and demanding that they shall help us to prevent Germany from again using commercial means to secure her national ends. We cannot however present such a demand if we have alienated our present Allies by pursuing for our own imperial purposes a policy embodying the German principle.

To this argument the preferentialists reply that our Allies would have no right to complain, because we in establishing colonial preference should only be doing what they have long done. That reply is not conclusive. In the first place we should be making a change in our policy to their injury, and a new injury is generally more unpleasant than an old one, especially if the old one has never been noticed until it was wanted for argumentative purposes.

In the second place the colonial preferences given by other countries were on a very different footing to those proposed for the British Empire. Full particulars of foreign colonial preferences are given in a House of Commons paper issued in 1909 (No. 296). The subject is complicated and only the briefest summary of the various arrangements in operation can here be given. France is the most important country because of the wide extent of her colonial possessions and the varying treatment accorded to different colonies and to different products. The details of the various concessions made to different French colonies and groups of colonies occupy five pages of the report. The counter-concessions are somewhat simpler; in the main they indicate that practically all French manufactures are admitted free of duty into nearly all French possessions. It must be realized that the French colonies without exception are under the direct control of the metropolitan government, and that government imposes upon them whatever fiscal system it deems desirable. No one has yet suggested that this system should be extended to the British self-governing Dominions.

Germany comes next in the report, and is disposed of in four lines, which record the fact that Germany treated her colonies on precisely the same footing as foreign countries entitled to 'most-favoured nation' treatment.

Holland also had no preferential arrangement with her colonies.

Spain had a limited schedule of preferences for her African possessions; but the Canary Islands gave no preference to the mother country and only received a preference on a very limited number of articles.

The United States has proceeded on the principle that the oversea possessions of the Republic should be treated as part of the territory of the United States, so that with a few minor exceptions trade between the United States and her colonies is entirely free on both sides.

This brief summary is sufficient to show that there is no parallel between the fiscal arrangements maintained by other colonial empires and the kind of system which British preferentialists wish to establish. The systems above summarized are in every case imposed by the metropolitan country upon its dependencies, and their general purpose is to secure

approximate free trade between the metropolis and the dependency. What the British preferentialists propose is that the self-governing Dominions should enter into a contractual arrangement with the United Kingdom, as nation bargaining with nation. They further propose that each of these bargaining nations should start from a protectionist standpoint. Great Britain is to protect her domestic industries against colonial as well as against foreign competition; the Dominions are equally to protect their industries against the competition of the mother country. But over and above the tariffs required to protect the nations of the Empire against one another there are to be higher tariffs directed against the goods of foreign countries, including our present Allies. That is the scheme, and it is not surprising that our Allies should look askance at it.

Take the case of the United States. Hitherto Great Britain has maintained an open door equally for American and for Canadian produce, though both America and Canada imposed heavy protective duties on British goods. It is now proposed to give Canada a commercial reward for discharging an act of national duty. Her goods are to receive preferential treatment in our ports as compared with American goods—presumably because America came into the war later.

Take next the case of France. She was in the war before we were; we came to her help. Tens of thousands of brave English and Scottish lads have given their lives to help to liberate the soil of France from a bestial enemy; Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans have spontaneously come across the ocean to join the mother country in this crusade. The 'Times' of August 28th, 1918, reports from Vancouver the case of John Campbell, a full-blooded Red Indian, who travelled two thousand miles by train, canoe, and steamer to enlist in the Canadian Army. 'He started from the Arctic coast near Herschel Island, and 'walked along the trail to the head of the Porcupine River, 'where he worked for several months to get money to pay 'his passage to Vancouver.' That is the spirit in which citizens of the British Empire have spontaneously come to fight for that Empire, for liberty, and for France. It seems almost incredible that any Englishman should now be found willing to suggest that we should close this glorious episode

in our imperial history and in our relations with our nearest neighbour by putting an extra tax on French wines in order to give a preference to Australian vintages.

Take Italy. She came into the war after much hesitation, after much persuasion. We wanted her assistance; she wanted to be liberated from the dominance of her Teutonic neighbours and to recover for her flag territories peopled by her children. A fair bargain was made, and much energy has since been expended both in England and in Italy in considering how to promote trade between the two countries. Are we now to go back upon what has been done or planned and tell the Italians that we mean to treat the British Empire as a commercial Holy of Holies to which they are only to be admitted after payment of more or less extortionate fees to the guardians of the temple?

Lastly, take Belgium. Of all the countries engaged in the present war Belgium would be awarded the highest place by any Court of Honour. When the issue was placed before her she did not hesitate a single day. Threatened by overwhelming military force she boldly faced the calamity of war to preserve her national honour and to discharge her international duty. She has paid a terrific price. For more than four years she has lain under the heel of a ruthless enemy. Her priceless monuments of a glorious past have been wantonly destroyed; her factories have been gutted; the private homes of her people have been pillaged and defiled; hundreds of her citizens have been executed for the crime of loyalty to the Belgian flag; thousands have only been kept from starvation by doles of food from Great Britain and the United States. Even if the war ended to-day many long years must elapse before the Belgian people by persistent industry could recover their old prosperity. And it is proposed by British preferentialists that while this hard struggle is in progress Belgian commerce should be penalized in British markets.

The above considerations ought to have some weight with a nation which loves fair play, even if the economic issues involved were from the practical point of view insignificant. They are of immense practical importance. The British Empire comprises a far greater portion of the earth's surface than is included under any other single flag. Even Russia, with all her immense Asiatic territories, only possessed, according to the figures of 1912, 7,889,000 square miles as

compared with 11,375,000 under the British flag.* The figures of the same year show the area of the United States to be just one-quarter that of the British Empire, and the population to be less than one-quarter. These are pre-war figures. Since the war began Great Britain has enormously expanded her territorial possessions. Cyprus has been definitely annexed, and by the declaration of a British Protectorate over Egypt and her dependencies an extensive territory of great actual —and even greater potential—value, stretching from the Mediterranean almost to the Equator, has been effectively added to the British Empire. In addition we shall certainly annex when the war ends a considerable portion of German West Africa, the whole of German South-West, and possibly the whole of German East Africa. The last-mentioned region is alone three times the size of the United Kingdom; it contains splendid harbours and great natural wealth. In the Pacific we have already in substance annexed to the Empire Samoa and German New Guinea.

Thus after the war the British Empire will occupy an even more predominant position both as regards territory and as regards population than before the war. It will include a very large proportion of the habitable globe, comprising some of the richest lands that the world contains. Within this great area several of the materials that man requires for his wants are exclusively found; other essential materials are found within that area in greater abundance than elsewhere.† The population in round figures will not be less than 440,000,000. Is it seriously proposed to shut off this gigantic area, this immense population, from the rest of the world by erecting a barbed wire fence of commercial restriction to impede trade with other countries? Only the most urgent necessity could justify such an anti-social policy towards the rest of mankind. Where is that necessity?

It has been shown above that the policy of imperial preference, so far from being wanted as an instrument of protection against German commercial penetration directly conflicts with that requirement. Equally is the policy of preference unwanted as a means of securing England's food

* Statistical Abstract for Foreign Countries.

† See Final Report of Dominions Royal Commission (Cd 8462), pp. 67 to 69.

supplies in time of war. Not only would imperial preference fail to assist us in the essential task of safeguarding our food supplies, but it would distinctly hinder us. The development of submarine warfare has proved that we can no longer rely upon our naval supremacy to secure the safe arrival of supplies of food from the ends of the earth. Therefore to diminish the risk of being starved into surrender, two courses of action are required: first, we must try to increase the proportion of our total food supply produced in our own islands; secondly, we must aim at drawing the balance of our food supply from near countries rather than from distant countries, so as to economize our imperilled tonnage. Any attempt to stimulate the supply of food to Great Britain from distant British possessions conflicts with both these requirements. If the British farmer is to be encouraged by fiscal measures to grow more food he must be protected against the colonial as well as against the foreign producer. British farming profits can be beaten down just as easily by wheat from Canada as by wheat from the Argentine.

But whatever we do to protect British or Irish farmers from external competition we cannot hope to feed the present population of the United Kingdom out of the soil of these islands; nor can we safely risk the uncertainties of our climate. During the Napoleonic wars our population was relatively so small that it could be fed in a normal year upon food grown upon our own soil, but when the harvest failed the price of wheat leaped up to starvation point. If we were now to attempt to make ourselves entirely dependent upon home-grown food, a bad harvest would be a far worse calamity to the nation than the most vigorous submarine warfare. We must import some of our food from abroad, but it is easier to import from Belgium, France, and Italy than from any trans-oceanic country; it is easier to import from the United States or Canada than from the Argentine or South Africa; and the tonnage difficulty would affect us most of all if we relied upon importations from the Antipodes.

We have had experience of this last fact during the present war. At a critical period of the war Mr. Hughes, in his capacity of premier of the Australasian Commonwealth, put pressure upon our government to buy the Australian wheat which his government had already purchased from

the growers at high prices. He hinted that if the British government did not help him out of his speculation he would sell his wheat elsewhere. He did in fact sell some wheat to Spain, and actually used requisitioned British ships to convey this wheat to Spanish ports. For the sake of the unity of the Empire the home government assented to his terms, and 14,000,000 quarters of wheat were purchased direct from the Australian government for £26,000,000,* subject to the condition that the British government should fetch it from Australia. But we had no ships that we could spare to make the long double voyage, so the wheat was left to be stored in Australia, under a guarantee as to quality, which expired in December, 1917. The Select Committee on Expenditure report that 'the storage is not satisfactory.'

So far, then, as the security of our food supply is concerned there is no case for the policy of imperial preference. Similar considerations apply to the question of raw materials. The security of our manufacturing industries cannot be increased, it will be diminished, by trade restrictions intended to compel our manufacturers to draw their supplies from distant British possessions rather than from comparatively near foreign countries.

It may, however, be argued that we never know when these foreign countries may not be at war with us. That is surely an awkward argument to employ at a moment when most of the principal nations of the world are fighting side by side with us for the avowed purpose of crushing a disturber of the world's peace, and of establishing, if it be possible, conditions of international life which will render future wars impossible. We can hardly expect our Allies to trust us if we set out by expressing such profound distrust of them. Moreover, the policy which it is proposed to pursue as a means of guarding against the danger of future war with our present Allies in itself tends to bring that danger nearer. If we are to start forthwith economic hostilities against our present Allies lest they in some remote future should be at war with us, we necessarily destroy that feeling of friendly confidence which is the best of all securities against war.

Thus neither for the purpose of securing ourselves against

* Report of the Select Committee on National Expenditure, December, 1917.

German commercial penetration nor for the purpose of safeguarding our supplies of food and raw materials in time of war is imperial preference desirable. It would be a hindrance instead of a help.

Is there any other purpose so important as to justify us in attempting by fiscal devices to segregate the British Empire from the rest of the world? Some years ago British preferentialists would have replied that preferential tariffs were necessary to bind the Empire together. They would hardly repeat that insult now. The Anzacs who fought and died at Gallipoli did not leave their homes and abandon their business prospects for the sake of a schedule of tariff preferences. Yet for years on countless platforms in this country the spokesmen of the Tariff Reform Party have asserted that unless Great Britain abandoned her policy of free imports and established a protectionist tariff with preference for the colonies, the loyalty of the Dominions would disappear. There was never the slightest justification for that statement.

Those who wish to study in detail the genesis and development of what he rightly calls the 'Preferential Delusion' should read Senator Pulsford's book on 'Commerce and the Empire.' Senator Pulsford is not what political disputants in this country would call a 'Cobdenite Little-Englander'; he is an Australian, and, like the writer of the present article, a strong imperialist. In the book referred to he relates how the idea of inter-colonial preferences was raised at the Ottawa Conference in 1894 between representatives of Canada, of the five Australian colonies, of New Zealand, and of the Cape of Good Hope. The prime purpose of that conference was to secure improved commercial arrangements, including improved cable facilities, between the separate colonies there represented. A resolution was however carried after considerable opposition by five votes to three recording the belief of the conference 'in the advisability of a customs 'arrangement between Great Britain and her colonies by 'which trade within the Empire may be placed on a more 'favourable footing than that which is carried on in foreign 'countries.'* Simultaneously, another resolution was carried by a unanimous vote in favour of the establishment of a customs preference between the colonies themselves. It

* Pulsford, p. 122.

might fairly be assumed that as the latter resolution was carried unanimously, and as action upon it was entirely within the competence of the colonies represented, such action would have been taken without delay. Nearly a quarter of a century has since elapsed and no general agreement has been reached. Instead, the discussions which have taken place have demonstrated the impossibility of common action between colonies approaching the problem of trade from divergent protectionist views. Take for example a debate in the Commonwealth Parliament in December, 1911. Sir William Lyne, formerly Minister for Trade and Customs, there related how he had met Sir Wilfrid Laurier in London with the object of arranging a reciprocal tariff between Canada and Australia.

'He gave me a list of what he desired that we should admit free. It comprised all the machinery manufactured in Canada by the Massey-Harris Company, the International Harvester people, and other Canadian firms. These were the articles which Sir Wilfrid Laurier wanted us to allow to be dumped here, to the detriment of our own manufacturers. I submitted my list of what we could admit, but he would have nothing to do with it. The whole kernel of their request was that we should allow their machinery to be admitted free to compete with our own people. It was impossible to get any reciprocal trade arrangement under those conditions, and that is what is wrong now.'*

This failure of the two great protectionist Dominions to agree on a reciprocal tariff shows that 'Little-England 'Cobdenism' is not the only barrier in the way of a system of imperial preferences.†

The fundamental difficulty lies in this—that while the advocates of preference profess that their object is to link the Empire together by means of inter-imperial trade, their actual proposals are based on a desire for domestic protection. These two objects are essentially opposed to one another, and no trick of words can make them one. On a protectionist basis a *bona fide* imperial preference is impossible. For the

* Pulsford, p. 138.

† Incidentally Mr. Pulsford (pp. 141 to 146) shows that Mr. Richard Jebb in his book on 'The Imperial Conference' was inaccurate in asserting that 'in 1895 reciprocal trade agreements were made by New Zealand with South Australia and with Canada.' Such agreements were indeed proposed, but were rejected.

protectionist theory asserts that the people of any given area are injured by the free importation of competing products from other areas. Therefore England must shut out colonial corn and meat and butter and the colonies must shut out English manufactures. After this has been done it is a matter of indifference whether a further duty for form's sake is imposed upon corresponding goods coming from foreign countries. This was clearly seen by Mr. Chamberlain. In his address to the colonial premiers in 1902 he frankly expressed his disappointment with the results of the Canadian preferential tariff established by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1897, and said: 'So long as a preferential tariff, even a munificent 'preference, is still sufficiently protective to exclude us alto-'gether, or nearly so, from your markets it is no satisfaction 'to us that you have imposed even greater disability upon 'the same goods if they come from foreign markets.'

To that argument there is no answer. Mr. Chamberlain's ideal then was, as his speeches at the time clearly showed, the establishment of free trade, or approximate free trade, within the Empire with more or less hostile tariffs against the rest of the world. If we accept the theory that nationality and commerce go hand in hand, as Mr. Chamberlain did, his ideal was intelligible and defensible. It however necessarily provoked opposition, not only from colonial protectionists who wanted protection against Great Britain, but also from English and Scottish free traders, who held that the commercial prosperity of the United Kingdom is largely dependent upon the policy of free imports. From the political point of view the latter was the opposition with which Mr. Chamberlain had immediately to deal, and therefore he had to appeal for the electoral support of English, Scottish, and Irish voters who wanted protection for their own industries. But in making that appeal he was compelled to abandon the free trade basis which alone made his policy desirable from the imperial point of view. His successors found themselves in the same position, with the result that in the United Kingdom to-day the only advocates of imperial preference are protectionists, and on the protectionist basis, as Mr. Chamberlain so clearly pointed out in 1902, preference is valueless.

It may be added that if the nature of the principal industries

of the mother country and of the overseas Dominions and possessions be compared, it will be seen that the opportunities for agreement in detail, even if there were an agreement in principle, are very small. For Great Britain, owing to her abundant coal supply, to her insular position, and her good harbours, depends for the maintenance of her crowded population primarily upon manufacturing and shipping; the overseas portions of the Empire with their wealth of undeveloped territory depend mainly upon the extraction of raw materials and the production of food. Thus it is to the commercial interest of the mother country to buy food and raw materials as cheaply as possible, and it is to the interest of the oversea territories to sell these commodities as dearly as possible. The only effective preference that Great Britain can give to the colonies is by taxing food and raw materials imported from foreign countries; but no one in this country has yet ventured to advocate openly a tax on the raw materials of British industries, and the British Cabinet, in recently announcing its conversion to a policy of imperial preference, expressly stated that there must be no tax on food. Reciprocally the colonies could undoubtedly benefit Great Britain by export duties on food and raw materials intended for foreign countries, but this would clearly restrict the market for these colonial products and so diminish the price. The self-governing Dominions have shown not the slightest inclination to deprive themselves of the liberty of selling their most important products on favourable terms to foreign purchasers. They are equally determined not to allow their nascent manufactures to be under-cut by the free importation of manufactured goods from the mother country.

Thus neither at home nor in the Dominions are we a step nearer to the policy of imperial preference as originally laid down by its most prominent advocate in this country. It is therefore well to ask whether the primary postulate on which the whole policy rests—the assertion that Empire and Commerce are one—can be upheld.* This question is most ably dealt with by a Canadian writer, Mr. Andrew Macphail, in a book

* In his 'Essays on Politics' (p. 41) Mr. Macphail states that in a speech delivered on June 10th, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain said 'Empire is Commerce.'

of essays published in 1909. Mr. Macphail challenges the whole proposition that trade is a bond of Empire. He writes:

'The worst enemy of Canada is the man who declares that if we are permitted to trade with the United States or with Germany we shall become Americans or Germans. The worst enemy of the Empire is the "Imperialist" who declares that unless Englishmen tax themselves for our benefit we shall prepare some sudden stroke of treachery.'

He caustically adds:

'An Empire based upon preference is at the mercy of every country which chooses to offer a better rate. If a 5 per cent. preference will purchase a 5 per cent. loyalty towards England, how much loyalty will a 10 per cent. preference with the United States purchase?'

He goes on to say boldly that an Empire which can only be held together by tariff preferences is not worth dying for; it might as well fall apart. Englishmen would do well to remember that the great Empire which their fathers had built up in the eighteenth century was founded on tariff preferences and it broke asunder.* From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards the British Empire has been founded on fiscal freedom, and it is mightier and more united than any Empire that the world has ever known before.

There are people who talk loosely about a 'self-contained' Empire. They never seem to trouble to look at a map. Geography is an essential factor in trade. Is Australia, situated in the Pacific Ocean, to be debarred from trading with countries bordering that ocean if they are under a foreign flag? Is New Zealand to be compelled to abandon her export business to the United States, which in 1913 was worth fifty per cent. more than her export trade to Canada? In the same way it may be asked whether we are to compel the Canadians of the western provinces to send their produce eastwards many thousand miles to the United Kingdom when there is an excellent market for it a few hundred miles or even a few score of miles southwards, across the American frontier.

The attempt to make our far-flung Empire a self-contained

* This subject was dealt with at some length in the EDINBURGH REVIEW for April, 1917.

commercial unit is indeed a geographical absurdity. Equally absurd from a totally different point of view is the self-containment delusion when applied to a small national unit such as the United Kingdom. If England were to cut off her external trade in order to satisfy the protectionist ideal of self-containment she would cease to be an imperial power. It is quite true that a nation whether small or large must protect itself against such dangers as those represented by the German policy of commercial penetration. But it does not in the least follow that for this purpose it ought to adopt a general policy of protective duties. The experience of France and Italy and Russia before the war demonstrated the futility of protective tariffs as a safeguard against German penetration. Australia herself is an equally striking example of the failure of a protective tariff to prevent German penetration, for the Germans before the war had obtained control over some of the most important raw materials that Australia produces. The German danger is a specific problem which must be dealt with by measures specifically framed to meet it; those measures will certainly require the co-operation of other countries, and that co-operation will be unattainable if we embark on a general policy of protection against the rest of the world. Equally is it important to secure the co-operation of our Allies in taking such economic measures after the war as may be requisite in order to inflict upon Germany adequate punishment for the crimes she has committed. That these measures may involve economic loss to ourselves and our Allies by shutting out the possibility of profitable trade with our present enemies is more than probable. But this is a matter in which our duty to posterity far outweighs any question of immediate profit. It were better to remain poor for many decades rather than permit Germany to go unpunished.

But above all things let us not, while condemning Germany's crimes, imitate the policy which was the ultimate incentive to those crimes. The conception of national loyalty, whether limited to a little island or extended to a great Empire, is on a totally different moral plane to considerations of commercial profit. For trade has no feelings. Men will give their lives for their country, but in business they will rarely forgo the chance of a profitable bargain even with a private enemy

or with the hated foreigner. That is the ultimate reason why it is better—except where considerations of national security supervene—to keep nationality and commerce altogether distinct. Loyalty to one's country is a moral duty to be discharged if necessary at the cost of life itself; success in commerce is a business proposition best to be attained by business methods. On this theme the present writer may perhaps be excused for venturing to quote words written by himself at a time when they were more in the nature of a prophecy than if they had been first written to-day, when the whole Empire is fighting as one nation for one ideal. In the year 1896 I wrote for the *Daily Graphic* a series of articles in reply to a book, much talked of at the time, which professed to prove that England was tottering to her downfall, mainly for lack of a protective tariff. The articles necessarily touched on the question of imperial preference, and concluded with these words:

'As for the closer union between our Colonists and ourselves, it will hardly be promoted by asking them to sacrifice their commercial freedom to increase the profits of our manufacturers, nor by taxing our food to please their farmers. It is indeed a sign of little faith even to look for a new bond of empire in an arrangement of tariffs. The tie that binds our Colonists to us will not be found in any ledger account, nor is ink the fluid in which that greater Act of Union is writ.'

EDITOR.

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INDEX

Titles of Articles are printed in heavy type.

Acton, Lord, 288
Addis, Sir C. S.—**Problems of British Banking**, 43
Adoption of Children, law of, 337
Afghanistan and the German Threat, 59.
  Army: training of officers at Quetta advocated, 70
  Indo-Afghan trade, development urged, 71
Aga Khan, the, 163
'Alcalde Entregador' of the Mesta, 247
Allegiance, Elizabethan oath of, 318; of James I., 319
All-India Moslem League, 157
Armada, the, 265
Armenia—Allied war aims, 228
Arnold, Dr. Thomas, 287
Aryans, 355
Asquith, Mr. H. H.—and Irish mismanagement, 141; *Some Aspects of the Victorian Age*, 291
Austro-Italian Campaign (1809)—Comparison with present campaign, 230 *et seq.*

Balfour, Mr. A. J.—dispatch in reply to President Wilson's request for declaration of Allied war aims, 214
Balkan question—Allied war aims, 228
Bank Amalgamations, Report of the Treasury Committee on, 43
Banking, Problems of British, 43; German and British systems compared, 49
Bank of England—its position in relation to bank amalgamations 48.
Basu, Mr. Bhupendranath, 362
Beauharnais, Eugène, 230 *et seq.*
Beccaria, 341
Belgian Socialists—conference with Noske and Koster at Brussels, 15
Belloc, Hilaire, 123
Besant, Mrs., 159
Bibi, Hamillah, 61
Bible—**The Philosophy of Pessimism**, 299
Bills of exchange—supremacy of London as a discounting centre, 54 *et seq.*
Bismarck, 273
Bissolati, Signor—and an Italo-Yugoslav understanding, 220
Blenheim, battle of, 266 *et seq.*
Blyth, Prof., 345
Bokhara—German policy in, 62; Khan of, and Turkestan, 65
Books and Travel, 107
Borden, Sir Robert, 73 *et seq.*
Borrow, George, 123
Bourassa, Mr. Henri, 76 *et seq.*
Brahmins—Caste and Democracy, 356
Bread—subsidy, 102
British Empire—trade policy, 387 *et seq.*
Briviesca, Jimeno de, 250
Brown, Mr. Horatio F.—**Napoleon I. and Caporetto**, 230
Butler, Charles, quoted, 318, 321

Campan, Mme., 176
Canada—**The Political Situation in Canada**, 73
  Alien immigrants, 80
  French Canadians, 75, 82

Canada—
Language question, 81
Military service controversy, compulsory, 74 *et seq.*
Naval Service Bill (Laurier's), 77
Railway problem, 87
Schools controversy, 79, 80
Spoils system, 86
United States, relations with—the reciprocity proposals, 74
Capitalism—modern development in Germany and the war, 5 *et seq.*
Caporetto, Napoleon I. and, 230
Carlill, Mr. James—**Wind Power,** 343
Casa de la Contratación, 249 *et seq.*
Caste and Democracy, 355.
Catholics: *See* Roman Catholics
Central Europe, 18
Centralization and Revolution, 167
Chamberlain, Mr. Austin, 95
Chamberlain, Mr. Joseph—tariff policy, 402
Charles V. of Spain—and trade with the Indies, 253
Child's (Sir Josiah)—'New Discourse on Trade,' *quoted,* 26 *et seq.*
Chirol, Sir Valentine — **India in Travail,** 147
Christianity—and the philosophy of pessimism, 299
Clough, Mr. Arthur Hugh, 285
Coke, Roger, *quoted,* 30 *et seq.*
Colonies—effect of Navigation Acts on their trade, 26 *et seq.*
Commerce and Empire, 387
Constitutional reform—**The Government of England,** 190
Corfu, Declaration of, 215, 219
Criminal law, need for codification, 342
Crusades—the opportunity for travel, 113
Curtis, Mr. Lionel—'*Letters to the Indian People,*' 149, 161 *et seq.*
Czecho-Slav question, 214 *et seq.*, 274

Democracy, 194; **Caste and Democracy,** 355
De Tocqueville, *quoted,* 169, 170
Devlin, Mr. J., 130
Discount Market, London—probable effect of bank amalgamations, 46
Divorce, law of, 336
Drinkwater, Mr. J.—**The Poetry of Francis Ledwidge,** 180
Dunsany, Lord, 180

Ehengers, 255
Elizabeth, Queen—and the war against Spain, 267
Empire, Commerce and, 387
England, the Government of, 190
Expenditure, National, 92

Fabian Society, 374
Fayle, C. Ernest—**The Navigation Acts,** 22
Federalism, 190
Fiscal policy, 387
Fisher, Mr. Victor—**Labour and a General Election,** 371
Food supply—fiscal policy and, 378
Fournol, Etienne, 220
Fox, 269.
France—absolute monarchy under Louis XIII, 167; fiscal policy, 394
Francœur, Mr., 85
Franklin-Bouillon, M., 220
Free trade, 387
French Revolution—**Centralization and Revolution,** 167; England and, 268 *et seq.*
Freytag-Loringhoven, Lieut.-Gen. von—*Deductions from the World War,* 1
Fuggers, 255

Gaelic League, 138
General Election, Labour and, 371
General Federation of Trade Unions, 352
Germanism, War and Peace, 1
Germany—
Afghanistan, German intrigues in, 62
Banking system compared with British, 49

Germany—
Blockade of—Dr. Naumann and British policy, 4
Fiscal policy, 394
Responsibility for the war, 4 *et seq.*
Shipping—suggested British restrictive legislation, 36 *et seq.*
Social Democrats and the war, 4 *et seq.*
Taxation, direct, control over, 197
Gladstone, Mr. W. E., 273, 324
Gnostics, 301
Gokhale, the late Mr., 157, 165, 363
Gordon, General—Mr. Lytton Strachey and, 289
Gosse, Mr. Edmund—**The Agony of the Victorian Age**, 276
Gouin, Sir Lomer, 85
Government — **Centralization and Revolution**, 167
Griffith, Mr. Arthur, 138

Habidullah Khan, 59 *et seq.*
Hakluyt, *quoted*, 120
Hannay, Mr. David—**Spanish Trade with the Indies**, 247
Harcourt, Sir William, *quoted*, 193
Hardie, Mr. Keir, 373
Hardy, Mr. Thomas, 311
Haring, Mr. C. H.—*Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time of the Hapsburgs*, 247
Heine, *quoted*, 122
Henderson, Mr. Arthur, 385
Henry VIII., King—and the controversy with Rome, 315 *et seq.*
Herat—Persian aspirations, 65
Hinduism—**Caste and Democracy**, 357
Holdsworth, Dr. W. S.—*The Relation between Commercial Legislation and National Defence Historically Considered*, 22
Holland: *See* Netherlands.
Home Rule, Federal, 190 *et seq.*
Home Rule—**Irish Realities**, 127 **The Government of England**, 190
Hopkinson, Sir Alfred—**The Need for Law Reform**, 331
House of Commons—control over expenditure, 95
Hughes, Mr. W. M., 398
Huxley, Prof., 307

Ihering, *quoted*, 13
Ikbal Ali Shah—**Afghanistan and the German Threat**, 59
Imperial defence—Canada and, 77
Imperial preference, 387
Independent Labour Party, 373 *et seq.*
India—**India in Travail**, 147. **Caste and Democracy**, 355
Child marriage, 363
Councils Act (1909), 148
Extremist leaders among the politicians, 189
Intermarriage, 361
National Congress, 156
Representative government, 151, 355
Indies, Spanish Trade with the, 247
Infanticide, 340
Inheritance, law of, 332.
International law—German juridical theory of war, 11 *et seq.*
International, the new—German Socialist anticipations, 19
Ireland—**Irish Realities**, 125; **The Government of England**, 190
Isabella of Spain—and trade with the Indies, 253
Italy—Allied Convention with, 215; and the Southern Slav question, 219 *et seq.*; and Allied war aims, 228.

Jacobinism, 269
James, Mr. W. P.—**Books and Travel**, 107
Jennings, Mr. Claud H. C.—Political Situation in Canada, 73
Jesuits—and the four great wars, 267
Jouhaux, 16

Keats—on discovering Homer, 108
Kelvin, Lord, 345
Klein, Mr. Julius—*The Alcalde Entregador of the Mesta*, 247 *et seq.*
Koster, Dr., 15

Labour and a General Election, 37
Labour Party, 371 *et seq.*
Lansing, Mr.—and the Yugoslav question, 224
Lardner, Dr., 352
Lasson, Prof., *quoted*, 12
Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, 76, 401
Law Reform, the Need for, 331
Lear, Edward, 109
Ledwidge, the Poetry of Francis, 180
Legien, 16
Legitimation, 334
Lensch, Dr. Paul, 21
Liberal Party—foreign policy during 19th century, 272 *et seq.*; and the Labour movement, 379
Liberty, 193
Loisy, M., 325
Louis XIV.—details of establishment 173; aspirations for world dominion, 265
Lyne, Sir William, 401

Macdonald, Mr. J. Ramsay, 384
Macphail, Mr. Andrew, *quoted*, 403
Manichean theory, 303
Manitoba—school controversy, 79
Manning, Cardinal—Mr. Lytton Strachey and, 284
Manu, code of, 356
Marlborough, the Duke of, 268
Marriott, Mr. J. A. R.—**National Expenditure**, 92
Marx, Karl—Dr. Renner's emendation of his economic theories, 6
Mercantile marine : *See* Shipping
Merv, 67
Mesta, the, 247 *et seq.*
Milner, John, 321 *et seq.*
Mittel-Europa : *See* Central Europe.
Modernists, 328
Montagu, Mr. E. S.—Indian reforms, 147
More, Sir Thomas—and the Papal supremacy, 316, 327
Morley, Lord—on representative government in India, 148
Müller, Prof. Max, *quoted*, 355
Munitions, Ministry of—control over Expenditure, 97
Murder, law of, 338

Nair, Dr. T. M.—**Caste and Democracy**, 355
Napoleon Buonaparte—**Napoleon I. and Caporetto**, 230; aspirations for world dominion, 265 *et seq.*
Nasrullah Khan, Sirdar, 60
National defence—purpose and effect of Navigation Acts discussed, 23
National Democratic and Labour Party, 378
National Expenditure, 92
Naumann, Friedrich, *Central Europe*, 1
Navigation Acts, The, 22
Netherlands—effect of British Navigation Acts on Shipping, 26 *et seq.*
Nightingale, Florence—Mr. Lytton Strachey and, 284
Noske, 15

Ontario—schools controversy, 82
Orlando, Signor, 220, 224
Osborne judgment, the, 374

Panchayats, 367
Panmure, Lord, 285
Papal supremacy, 316
Paris resolutions (1916), 392
Parliament—control over expenditure, 95
Patriotism, Religion and, 313
Peace, Germanism, War and, 1
Peace—Revised, a Programme for, 209
Pearce, P. H., 127
Pelaquis, 304
Penjdeh, 67
Persia—aspirations towards Herat, 65
Pessimism, the Philosophy of, 297
Peto, Mr. B. E., *quoted*, 22
Petre, Lord, 321
Petre, Miss M. D.—**Religion and Patriotism**, 313
Philip II. of Spain—aspirations for world dominion, 265

Piave, Battle of the, 222
Pillans, Mr. T. Dundas—Centralization and Revolution, 167
Pinilo, Francisco, 250
Pius, V., Bull of, 319
Plantations, the—effect of Navigation Acts on their trade, 26 *et seq.*
Polish question, 214 ; Versailles declaration, 223.
Protection, 387 *et seq.*
Pulsford, Senator, *Commerce and the Empire*, 400

Quebec—French Canadians and the war, 75

Raleigh, Sir Walter—on the discovery of America, 119
Referendum, 197
Relief Act (1778), 321
Religion—and pessimism, 299 ; Religion and Patriotism, 313.
Renner, Karl—*Marxismus, Krieg und Internationale*, 1
Revolution, Centralization and, 167
Richelieu, Cardinal, 167
Roman Catholics—Religion and Patriotism, 313
Rumania—Allied war aims, 228
Russell, Lord John, 272–3
Russell, Mr. George, *quoted*, 127 *et seq.*
Russell, Mr. Obo, 290

St. Paul, 299
Sancho de Matienza, Dr., 250
Seddon, the late Mr. Richard, 389
Seistan — Afghanistan and the political situation in, 66
Serbia—declaration (of July 20th, 1917), 215
Seville—and Spanish Trade with the Indies, 251
Shadwell, Dr. A.—Germanism, War and Peace, 1
Shaw, Mr. George Bernard, 190
Shipping, British—purpose and effects of Navigation Acts discussed 22 *et seq.* ; successful resistance to foreign competition in modern times, 35
Sinha, Sir Satyendra, 151
Sinn Fein, 129, 136 *et seq.*
Slav question, 214 *et seq.*
Smillie, Mr. Robert, 385
Smith, Adam, *quoted*, 24, 43
Social Democratic Federation, 373
Socialist movement, British, 352 *et seq.*
Southern Slav Committee—declaration (of July 20th, 1917), 215
Spain—Spanish Trade with the Indies 247 ; fiscal policy, 394
Steed, Mr. H. Wickham—Programme for Peace—Revised, 209
Stock Exchange, London—probable effect of bank amalgamations, 46
Strachey, Mr. Lytton, *Some Eminent Victorians*, 276
Sudra—Caste and Democracy, 356
Syndicalist movement, 376

Tache, Sir Etienne, 85
Tariff policy, 387 *et seq.*
Tennyson—in Milan, 109 ; Mr. Lytton Strachey and, 281
Thomas, Mr. J. H., 385
Tilby, Mr. A. Wyatt—The Philosophy of Pessimism, 296
Torre, Dr. Andrea, 220
Trade, British—purpose and effects of Navigation Acts discussed, 22 *et seq.* ; banks and the finance of trade, 49, 53 *et seq.* ; Commerce and Empire, 387
Trade Union movement, 372 *et seq.*
Travel, Books and, 107
Treasury—functions in relation to expenditure, 94.
Trevelyan, Mr. G. M.—The Four Great Wars, 265
Trumbitch, Dr. 220
Turkestan, Russian—German policy in, 62

Ultramontanism, 313 *et seq.*
United States—result of multiplicity of legislatures, 198 ; and the Southern Slav question, 222, 224 ; war aims, 226 *et seq.* ; fiscal policy, 394

Vandervelde, Emile, *quoted*, 15
Victorian Age, the Agony of, 276
Vikings as travellers, 116
Ville Lardouin, 112

Wallace, Prof. D., 192, 196
Ward, Mrs. Humphry—defence of Dr. Arnold against Mr. Lytton Strachey, 287
War and Peace, Germanism, 1
War Office—control over expenditure, 100
War, the—
  Afghanistan and, 59
  Allies' war aims discussed, 209-229
  Austro-Italian campaign—compared with Napoleon's campaign in 1809, 230 *et seq.*
  Canada and, 73
  Four Great Wars, the, 265
  German aims, 18
  German conduct of, 17
  Germany's responsibility—analysis of Dr. Renner's arguments, 4 *et seq.*
  Peace: *See* Peace.
War, the—
  Piave, battle of the, 22.
  United States and, 226
Wars, the Four Great, 265
Waterloo, battle of, 266 *et seq.*
Welsers, 255
West Indies—**Spanish Trade with the Indies,** 247 *et seq.*
Whitney, Sir James, 82
Wilhelm II., Kaiser—aspirations for world dominion, 265
William the Silent, 268
Wilson, President—and the war, 212, 226
Wind Power, 343
Women—St. Paul and their position in the early Church, 304–5
Wordsworth—and the wars against France, 269

Young, Arthur—on condition of France under Louis XIV., 172
Young, Captain Brett—*Marching on Tanga*, 107
Yugoslav question, 215 *et seq.*

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